The Changed Global Economy of the 1990s

Although there have always been surplus and deficit nations in the world, the 2008 global financial crisis underscores the magnitude of the so-called global imbalances which provided the macroeconomic backdrop to the worst financial crisis in nearly a century. The key players are the United States and China, which have been the two major engines of growth in the world economy since the 1980s. But, the changed global economic structure involves many more nations, specifically the rise of emerging economies in the early 1990s. The global economy fundamentally changed then with the take-off of the “open door” policy in China in 1992, the switch to export-oriented from import-substitution policies in India after its 1991 balance of payments crisis, and the re-emergence of Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism in the former Soviet bloc at the start of the 1990s. These nations together doubled the global labour force to three billion people, which effectively halved the capital-to-labour ratio in the world. It led to falling wages and therefore lower prices, including the cost of imports into rich economies. The deflationary effect, particularly of China with its 700 million labourers, meant that inflation was low throughout the past decade whilst growth was strong with low interest rates in place in the West, particularly the United States. Capital was cheap both in terms of price and also in returns given the additional labour in the global economy. Rapid growth and plentiful liquidity led to increased consumption via borrowing in the U.S., while export-oriented economies accumulated ever-increasing amounts of foreign exchange reserves. The consequence of which was a flattening of the U.S. bond yield curve since there was a growing demand for dollar-denominated assets by emerging economies in developing Asia and amongst Middle Eastern oil exporters to maintain stable exchange rates while their current account surpluses grew. The other side of the deflationary effect of China and other surplus economy was to produce upward pressure on commodities, generating a supply side boom that peaked in the summer of 2008. The rise in energy prices furthered fuelled the accumulation of reserves in the Middle East throughout the 2000s. Until the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, this period had been called the ‘nice decade’ or the ‘Great Moderation’ since it marked an era of strong growth, low inflation, and therefore low interest rates.

Independent Central Banks & Financial De-regulation

The changes in the global economy coincided with the early 1990s movement to create independent central banks (starting in New Zealand in 1991 and was undertaken by the UK and European Central Bank or ECB in the late 1990s) which has been credited with increasing transparency about monetary policy. However, targeting asset bubbles was not part of such mandates, and this became an evident problem during the ‘Great Recession’ which followed the near-collapse of the
banking system in the West. It wasn’t only monetary policy which changed. Financial
de-regulation since the 1980s enabled financial innovation that had led to the
abandonment of the previous targeting of monetary aggregates (e.g., M2) in favour
of inflation through interest rates. Because of the growth of financial intermediation
and globalised nature of liberalised financial markets, the monetary transmission
mechanism did not operate in a straightforward manner to transform the central
bank’s monetary target into the money supply of the economy. In other words,
complicated high powered money made it difficult to target money supply once
banks moved away being simple intermediaries in the credit system. Thus, central
banks moved from controlling the supply of money to dictating its price in order to
manage inflation and the business cycle. De-regulating banking and capital markets
also meant that financial instruments and global linkages became much more
diverse, leading to securitisation of assets which were sold and bought around the
world. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed the Glass-Steagall of 1933 that
had previously separated retail from investment banking. This notably transmitted
the risks being undertaken by investment banks in a liberalized and globalized
financial sector to retail (deposit-holding) banks which led to the possibility of
systemic banking system failure in the 2008 financial crisis that is reminiscent of the
1930s banking crisis that had led to the passage of Glass-Steagall in the first instance.
Around that time, European banks were also able to access U.S. wholesale money
markets to a greater extent so their lending became less reliant on deposits and also
meant that they could access the same cheap money as the Americans even though
the European position is not a significant contributor to the global imbalances. The
balance of payments and savings rate of Europe have not changed dramatically in
the past decade, but the losses at European banks due to non-performing assets
exposed in the global financial crisis have been worse than in American ones.

**Genesis of a Crisis**

In 2001, after the bursting of the U.S. dot.com bubble, loose monetary policy in the
United States fuelled a further asset bubble in sub-prime mortgages. Although this is
the usual utilisation of monetary policy (cutting interest rates) to forestall recession,
the question is why did interest rates stay low for so long? With the focus on
inflation and maintaining price stability, the Federal Reserve did not act to raise
interest rates because inflation was low. This is in spite of growth being strong and
excess liquidity (growth of money over GDP growth) in the economy which led to the
under-pricing of risk that was at the heart of the financial crisis. Because the cost of
borrowing was so low, lenders sought borrowers even if they were sub-prime ones.
When interest rates started to rise in 2004, the downward pressure on the yield
curve kept both long- and short-term interest rates low which fuelled the housing
bubble until it burst in the summer of 2007 despite the efforts of the Federal
Reserve to raise the base rate. Another view of the global imbalances picture is to
consider the falling U.S. saving rate. Savings as a share of disposable income fell
steadily over the past decade to less than 1% on the eve of the crisis. With a low
supply of saving, the cost of borrowing should have risen, but did not because the
United States could access global savings due to its position as the *de facto* global
reserve currency. Demand for dollar-denominated debt was driven not just by the
U.S. current and capital accounts or balance of payments, but also by commodity trades priced in dollars, international investments and also as a hedging instrument since the dollar is considered to be a “safe haven.” The increased purchases of central banks amassing foreign exchange reserves totalling several trillion in the 2000s, largely in dollars, depressed long-term interest rates as well as the short-term ones targeted by the Fed. Low interest rates further deterred savings and led instead to a search for yields as housing offered greater returns than the negative real interest rates for cash.

Global Imbalances

Global imbalances, therefore, provided the macroeconomic context to the current crisis. Although long-standing, the shift to independent central banks and the trend of financial de-regulation since the late 1980s coincided with a changed global economy. The paper upon which this briefing note is based seeks to understand the interactions of the U.S. and China throughout this period within the larger context of the global economic crisis. Using a gravity model, the respective weights exerted by the U.S. and China will be investigated to shed light on the pull and push factors of the global macroeconomic identities of current account surpluses/deficits, global net savings, and the drivers of foreign exchange accumulation. By understanding better the drivers of the global imbalances, recommendations can be put forward to assist in the process of re-balancing and recovery from this historical financial and economic crisis.

The preliminary findings are:

- The U.S. has run a current account deficit for some time, but it clearly worsened to reach 6% of GDP or 1.7% of global GDP on the eve of the global financial crisis. Its mirror is in the surpluses of emerging Asia and Middle East oil exporters which have also increased significantly during the past decade, even though they have been surplus economies for some time. For instance, China had only a modest balance of payments surplus until around 2005 (Figure 1).

- The imbalances are mirrored in the savings picture, where U.S. savings have fallen in the past decade whilst Chinese and Asian savings rose (Figure 2). The European countries in both figures have not changed their external or domestic positions much during this period.

- The increase in foreign exchange reserves in Asia and amongst Middle East oil exporters is evident since the early 2000s (Figure 3).

- Using a gravity model of global trade covering some 99 countries between 1980 and 2007, the effect of the U.S. on worldwide exports was some three-and-a-half times the magnitude of China. In another view, the U.S. effect on China’s exports is considerable but smaller than the magnitude of impact of Germany, Japan and South Korea, suggesting that processing trade plays an
important role in determining the exports from China and not just final demand stemming from consumers in the U.S. Similarly, the China effect on U.S. imports, once other trade determinants such as GDP, population, distance, tariffs, etc. have been taken into account, is larger than the U.S. effect on Chinese exports. However, in magnitude, China exerts a smaller influence on U.S. imports than Europe, Japan, Canada and even other Asian countries such as South Korea. Therefore, the effects of China are significant in the global imbalances and perhaps increasingly so, but the U.S. remains the most important factor. Although there is no causality per se inferred in these macroeconomic imbalances since the balance of payments have to equal globally, the magnitude of influence is much larger from the U.S. side.

Conclusions

The macroeconomic context to this global financial crisis points to the importance of global imbalances and re-balancing as a part of recovery. Since the 1990s, there has been a transformative increase in the global labour supply, leading to falls in prices of traded goods and services. This in turn generates low interest rates in Western economies as inflation stays low due to cheaper imports. Also, there has been a fall in the global capital to labour ratio, which increases returns to capital while makes it all the more attractive to seek yields whilst the cost of capital is cheap. Global imbalances are part of this picture of excess liquidity which has fuelled cheap credit and leverage or borrowing in the West. In emerging economies like China, capital controls and trapped savings due to limited capital account outflows contribute to its balance of payments surplus which in turn leads to accumulation of reserves which increases purchases of dollar-denominated assets and fuels more lending in America. Ironically, the crisis has led to a credit crunch in the West, but China may well experience the “hot money” inflows which will lead to asset bubbles in its real estate and stock markets. Finally, the fixed exchange rate regimes of emerging economies also depressed bond yields such that U.S. monetary policy was too accommodative for too long which contributed to the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and the ensuing financial crisis as globalized financial markets spread the securitized assets based on U.S. sub-prime mortgages around the world.

Recommendations for Global Re-balancing

There is already re-balancing in the global economy due to the de-leveraging of the balances sheets of U.S. firms and households. For instance, the U.S. current account deficit is at its lowest point in a decade (under 3% of GDP) and the U.S. savings rate increased some four-fold a year since the crisis. For China, the collapse of exports has been offset by a dramatic decline in imports, so that it may well still run a current account surplus despite massive closures of export industries. As a result, China is experiencing significant inflows of capital which, along with its own loose monetary policy to combat the recession, is contributing to potential asset bubbles in its real estate and stock markets. By implementing its “going out” policy, China should experience more capital outflows that will
reduce its balance of payments surplus and foreign exchange holdings, which will have the further effect of easing liquidity in its economy. It is also a more effective way of re-allocating saving from East to West through foreign direct investment and equity investment rather than via government bonds. In that way, Asian savings can be utilised in the West, which will help with re-balancing and also alleviate the bankruptcies and foreclosures as a result of the credit crunch which could in turn stymie the recovery, particularly as tight financial conditions will compound the woes for households experiencing unemployment that will ultimately affect firms in turn through weak demand.

Capital account liberalisation and greater exchange rate flexibility in China will also ease the global imbalances. Similar to de-leveraging and increased savings in the United States which will accomplish the same on the other side of the equation. As a developing country, China is likely to continue as a net exporter while the U.S., as a rich economy, will continue to be a net importer. Although neither economy is likely to shift to completely re-balance the global economy, the reining back of the excesses of the past decade to take into account the fundamentally altered nature of the macroeconomic context of the 2000s will pave the way for a more stable period of global economic growth. This is particularly if global financial regulation and monetary policy formation also take this change in circumstance into account.
Figure 1 Current account balances, % of world GDP

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Figure 2 Gross domestic savings, % of GDP

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Figure 3 Foreign exchange reserves, % of GDP

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.