

AFTER WAR ENDS

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

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The 2011 Ambon riots

- September 11: Muslim *ojek* driver found dead in suspicious circumstances
- Next day: Riot after the funeral. Escalation and violence across the city
- By September 14: 8 dead, 200 injured, 3,000 displaced
- History of violence in Maluku
- Not just communal passions but politico-economic interests
 - ▣ Elites under pressure from corruption investigations
 - ▣ *Preman* active
 - ▣ Security force pull out just before the riots
- **Why do such incidents of post-conflict violence occur?**


Outline

- The context and the puzzles
- The approach
- The argument
- Evidence from Indonesia
 - ▣ Maluku
 - ▣ North Maluku
 - ▣ Aceh
 - ▣ Indonesia-wide
- Some implications



THE CONTEXT, PUZZLES & METHOD

Violence in Indonesia's early transition



Extended violent conflicts

Province	Period of extended violence	Deaths	Injuries	Buildings
Aceh	Jan 98-Aug 05	10,613	8,546	9,230
N. Maluku	Aug 99-Jul 00	3,257	2,635	15,004
Maluku	Jan 00-Mar 02	2,793	5,057	13,843
W. Kalimantan	Jan 97-Mar 97 Feb 99-May 99	1,103	646	3,830
C. Kalimantan	Feb 01-May 01	1,031	77	1,998
C. Sulawesi	Apr 00-Jan 02	517	579	6,004

Source: National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS)

But post-conflict violence varies

Province	Deaths	Yearly deaths/ million	Yearly injuries/ million	Yearly buildings /million	Level of post- conflict violence
Maluku	529	34	280	150	HIGH
C. Sulawesi	718	27	139	58	HIGH
C. Kalimantan	547	22	114	7	MEDIUM
Aceh	597	19	108	23	MEDIUM
W. Kalimantan	929	16	188	27	MEDIUM
N. Maluku	139	12	115	70	LOW


All incidents of post-conflict violence (until end 2012). Source: NVMS

Types of post-conflict violence also vary

	Large episodic violence			Small episodic violence	
Province	<i>Incidents per year/million people</i>	<i>Deaths per year/million people</i>	<i>Level</i>	<i>Deaths per year/million people</i>	<i>Level</i>
Maluku (H)	4.6	10.7	HIGH	23.6	HIGH
C. Sulawesi (H)	1.8	5.3	MEDIUM	22.0	HIGH
C. Kalimantan (M)	0.4	1.1	LOW	20.9	HIGH
Aceh (M)	0.9	1.4	LOW	17.9	MEDIUM
W. Kalimantan (M)	0.6	1.8	LOW	14.4	MEDIUM
N. Maluku (L)	1.5	3.0	LOW	8.8	LOW

Source: NVMS

The decline of extended violence



Deaths from violence in 15 provinces. Source: NVMS

Three puzzles

1. Why do some areas see more post-conflict violence than others?
2. Why does post-conflict violence take different forms in different areas?
 - ▣ Episodic small-scale (violent crimes, vigilante attacks)
 - ▣ Episodic large-scale (riots, large group clashes)
3. Why has there been no return to extended violent conflict anywhere in Indonesia?

My approach

- Large-n violence dataset (NVMS)
 - ▣ Incidents of violence from 1998-2012; local newspapers main source (158,000+ incidents)
- Sub-national comparative case analysis
 - ▣ Matched provinces/districts: similar conditions of extended violence but varying patterns of post-conflict violence
 - ▣ 300+ field interviews



THE ARGUMENT


Support for violence by different actors

- Violence not primarily a result of societal hatreds of a weak state
- Variance in post-conflict violence driven by levels of support for violence by 3 groups
 - ▣ Local elites
 - ▣ Local violence specialists
 - ▣ National state elites
- Different forms of violence driven by different actors

Violence specialists

Local elites

Central state



The political economy of violence

- The instrumental uses of violence
 - ▣ Expected gains of using violence
 - ▣ Risk of negative outcomes of using violence
 - ▣ Availability of peaceful means
- Rents and positions in patronage democracies
- Signaling
 - ▣ Where violence is shown to ‘pay’ groups will increasingly use it

Temporal variation

- Violence will increase when:
 - ▣ Level of resources to capture about to increase
 - ▣ Level of resources about to decrease
 - ▣ Expected changes in the rules of the game
- Will only occur where institutions/norms developed that legitimize violence



EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

Maluku

high levels of large and small episodic violence

- What the theory predicts
 - ▣ Support for violence from local elites and local violence specialists
 - ▣ Both groups use violence because it is beneficial
 - ▣ Few other opportunities for peaceful accumulation
 - ▣ Violence will rise when changes in resources or to rules of the game

Maluku

why local elites support violence I

- It is **beneficial** and **non-costly**
 1. Malino agreement led to > Rp 2.2 trillion (US\$ 220m) extra post-conflict funds (civil emergency and Inpres 6/2003)
 2. Funds and jobs provided to co-opt elites who did not support peace (e.g. Attamimi)
 3. Little risk of using violence (security agencies allow it)
 4. Violence becomes currency of local politics
 1. Corruption investigations (Letwaru, SMSes)
 2. Used to prevent withdrawal of BKO troops (RMS riots)

Maluku

why local elites support violence II

- Few **other peaceful options** to achieve and sustain power and access to resources
 - Politics divided along religious lines
 - Collaboration short-lived (joint tickets)
 - Continued focus on 'religious balancing' leads to zero sum game

Maluku


why violence specialists use violence

- It is **beneficial** and **non-costly**
 - Use of funds to co-opt spoilers led to continuity of militia and *preman* groups
 - Elites find such groups useful to support their agenda
 - Continuing community support for violence legitimates violence specialists (e.g. segregation, a result of elite interests)
- **Few other peaceful options** for accumulation

Maluku

changes in violence over time

Large incidents of post-conflict violence in Ambon and Central Maluku



North Maluku

low levels of large and small episodic violence

- What the theory predicts
 - ▣ No support for violence from local elites and local violence specialists
 - ▣ Presence of other opportunities for peaceful accumulation
 - ▣ Violence will not rise when changes in resources or to rules of the game because norms developed that mean it is not seen as legitimate

North Maluku

why local elites don't support violence I

- It is **not beneficial** and is **costly**
 - Funds were not used to co-opt elites
 - Elites had already achieved their goals
 - No formal peace accord or large-scale formal distribution of spoils
 - Led to focus on reconciliation rather than pay-offs
 - Similar levels of post-conflict money but came later (after reconciliation)
 - Security responses to early acts of provocation
 - Those who preached hatred lost
 - Violence not a currency of local politics

North Maluku

why local elites don't support violence II

- **Other peaceful options available** to achieve and sustain power and access to resources
 - More pragmatic politics (need to build coalitions between ethnic groups)
 - Costs of losing elections lower
 - *Pemekeran* provides new opportunities

North Maluku

why violence specialists don't use violence

- **Relative absence of violence specialists**
 - Militia groups were less focused on accumulation than protecting their community group
 - Militia groups disbanded after end to extended violence
 - No strong links between current *preman* groups and old militia
- **Less tolerance of violence** by security agencies
 - Violence not needed to justify police and military presence (the mines)

Aceh

low levels of large and high levels of small episodic violence




- What the theory predicts
 - ▣ No support for large episodic violence by local elites
 - ▣ Support for small episodic violence by violence specialists
 - ▣ Support (or lack of) function of expected benefits of using violence and availability of other peaceful channels for accumulation

Aceh

why local elites don't support large episodic violence

- **Other channels available** for accumulation that don't require (large-scale) violence
 - ▣ High levels of resources (special autonomy funds)
 - ▣ Political opportunities (local elections including local parties)
- Buy in to peace from both GAM and others
 - ▣ GAM contracting and control of power
 - ▣ Other elites also have opportunities to benefit
- **High costs** of using violence
 - ▣ Atu Lintang

Figure 7.1. Provincial and District Governments Revenues in Aceh, 1999-2012 (US\$, 2012 prices)



Sources: 2012 Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis (World Bank 2006b), Ministry of Finance, World Bank database.

Note: 2012 is based on budget plans; other years use budget realisation.

Aceh

why violence specialists use violence

- **Few other peaceful options** for accumulation
 - Disappointments with reintegration aid
 - Low level ex-combs unable to access resources
 - Rising inequalities within GAM
- It is **beneficial** and **non-costly**
 - Violence used to capture resources (crime) and send signal upwards
 - GAM leaders and security officials accept small-scale violence

Extended violent conflict disappeared in Indonesia



- What the theory predicts
 - ▣ Initial extended violent conflicts not only a result of local motivations but also national elite factors
 - ▣ Incentives for national elites to support violence have changed over time

Violence specialists

Local elites

Central state

Yes

Yes

Yes

Extended violence

No

Small episodic

No

Large episodic

No

Infrequent violence


National elite incentives in early post-Suharto period ('98-'04)

- Unclear rules of the game
- Challenges to military power (Habibie and Gus Dur)
 - Dwifungsi, MPR seats, Timor, Aceh, etc
- Violence **beneficial** and **non-costly**
 - Means to ensure continuing military power in face of reform pressures
 - No sanctions on those who use it

National elite incentives in later post-Suharto period ('04-)

Factor	1998-2003	2004 -
<u>Benefits.</u> Resources distributed to elites based on violence	Yes	No
<u>Costs.</u> Supporting escalation shown to be costly	No	Yes
<u>Opportunities.</u> Other peaceful channels for accumulation by elites	No	Yes
Level of extended violence	High	None

Improved security responses





SOME IMPLICATIONS

- (Post-conflict) violence not a function of societal hatreds or weak state but of **interests**
- Addressing different types of violence means focusing on different actors at different levels
- Need to make violence less beneficial and more costly
 - ▣ Don't reward bad behavior in distributing resources
- Need to provide more peaceful opportunities
 - ▣ Development, employment, political channels



Thanks