

INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY: TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION

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TRANSITION: 1998-2004

FOUR LINZ AND STEPAN REQUIREMENTS:

- AGREEMENT ABOUT PROCEDURES (1999)
- GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY ELECTED IN POPULAR VOTE (1999)
- THAT GOVERNMNENT HAS AUTHORITY TO FORMULATE POLICIES (1999)
- NO POWER-SHARING OUTSIDE EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL BRANCHES (2004)

EXPLAINING THE TRANSITION I

CONSTRAINING AND ENABLING FACTORS

- THE ZEITGEIST—END OF COLD WAR, ASIAN NEIGHBORS DEMOCRATIZE
- CIVILIAN ELITE ACTORS PREFERRED DEMOCRACY
- ARMED FORCES, UNDER WIRANTO, SUPPORTIVE
- AVAILABILITY/FAMILIARITY OF SUHARTO-ERA ELECTORAL LAWS

EXPLAINING THE TRANSITION II

B. J. HABIBIE THE KEY DECISION MAKER

- WANTED DEMOCRACY
- CHOSE JUNE 1999 DATE
- DECENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT
- ALLOWED REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR

TRY SUTRISNO AS COUNTERFACTUAL

- FAVORED "PANCASILA DEMOCRACY"
- FAVORED STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
- FAVORED EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

BEHAVIORAL CONSOLIDATION

NO SIGNIFICANT GROUPS ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW REGIME BY "TURNING TO VIOLENCE OR FOREIGN INTERVENTION TO SECEDE FROM THE STATE."

- Islamists mostly within the system
- National identity strong, Papuan separatism weak
- Decentralization positive
- Not like 1950s democracy, which was threatened by Islamists and communists

ATTITUDINAL CONSOLIDATION I

"A STRONG MAJORITY OF PUBLIC OPINION" BELIEVES THAT FURTHER CHANGE SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE "PARAMETERS OF DEMOCRATIC FORMULAS."

- Voters know they were not free under Suharto, are free today
- Support for democracy high, growing (68% in 1999, 79% in 2008)
- But only 44% define democracy as freedom to elect and criticize government; 31% as affordability of basic commodities

ATTITUDINAL CONSOLIDATION II

 IF FORCED TO CHOOSE DEMOCRACY OR DEVELOPMENT:

DEVELOPMENT—76% (!!!)
DEMOCRACY—10%

- SBY REELECTED IN 2009 VOTERS EQUATED HIS PRESIDENCY WITH ECONOMIC SUCCESS
- SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS OR LONGTERM STAGNATION COULD HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON CONSOLIDATION

Figure 1. Parallels Between Political Economy Components: Choice of President, Partai Demokrat, Evaluations of Presidential Performance and National Economic Condition (%)




Figure 2. Correlation of Political Economy Components and Democracy 2007-2008 (N = 10)

186 - 1894) 18	Choose SBY	Choose Demokrat	SBY's Perform.	National Economy	Inflation (BPS)	Satisfied with Dem Perform.	Democracy Best System
Choose SBY	1	.95	.99	.97	98	NS	NS
Choose Demokrat		1	.93	.87	91	NS	NS
SBY's Perform.			1	.98	99	NS	NS
National economy		T.		1	-98	.95	NS
Inflation (BPS)		15			1	76	NS
Satisfied with Dem. Perform.		N2				1	.86
Democracy Best System		21	8				1

All correlations significant at P-value 0.01 or better. NS = Statistically not significant. BPS: Central Statistical Bureau.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSOLIDATION

"GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL FORCES" AGREE – POLITICAL CONFLICT MUST BE RESOLVED "WITHIN THE SPECIFIC LAWS, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS" OF DEMOCRATIC REGIME.

- Tadjoeddin U.N. report on massive social conflict peaked in 1999-2000, over by 2001 (like previous national crises)
- Caveat—ongoing U.N. research in this area

THREATS TO CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY IN FIVE ARENAS

CIVIL SOCIETY (FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COMMUNICATION)

- ISLAMIST SOCIAL MOVEMENT (WITH ALLIES IN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING MUI)
 - POLITICAL SUCCESSES: ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY LAW, BANNING OF AHMADIYAH, RESTRICT PERSONAL FREEDOMS, ESPECIALLY OF WOMEN
- CSOs RESOURCE-STARVED DUE TO LOW LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
 - EXAMPLES: LABOR, LEGAL AID, ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS





POLITICAL SOCIETY (FREE AND INCLUSIVE ELECTORAL CONTESTATION)

- NO CONSENSUS ON ELECTORAL PROCEDURES AFTER THREE NATIONAL ELECTIONS
- LEGISLATORS AND POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS NOT WELL LINKED DOWN TO CIVIL SOCIETY OR UP TO GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
 - Legislative resources too small
 - Legislators not responsive to constituents
 - Weak executive support in parliament due to many small parties

RULE OF LAW

(CONSTITUTIONALISM)

- INSTITUTIONS WEAK. GREATEST LONG TERM OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
- WORLD BANK RULE OF LAW INDEX—INDONESIA AMONG LOWEST IN WORLD
- NO PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM SUKARNO TO SUKARNOPUTRI!!!
- KPK REPRESENTS PROGRESS, BUT OUTSIDE MAIN INSTITUTIONS
- GREATEST HOPE: POPULAR AND MEDIA PRESSURE





STATE APPARATUS (RATIONAL-LEGAL BUREAUCRATIC NORMS)

- STILL LIMITED "CAPACITY TO COMMAND, REGULATE, AND EXTRACT"
- DISADVANTAGES:
 - NATIONAL BUDGET OF USD 70 BILLION FOR 230 MILLION PEOPLE (COMPARED TO BUDGET OF USD 65 BILLION FOR US STATE OF ILLINOIS WITH 13 MILLION)
 - WIDESPREAD INCOMPETENCE, INEFFIENCY, CORRUPTION
- ADVANTAGES:
 - IMPROVED STATE INFRASTRUCTURE BY NEW ORDER
 - "EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY" OF ECONOMISTS
 - NAÏVE OR TOLERANT CITIZENRY (E.G., HEALTH, EDUCATION POLICY)

ECONOMIC SOCIETY (INSTITUTIONALIZED MARKET)

- ECONOMIC FREEDOM NETWORK—INDONESIA 101^{ST/}141 IN LEVEL OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2006)
- PRIVATE SECTOR DOMINATED BY SINO-INDONESIANS VULNERABLE TO EXTORTION BUT ALSO CAPABLE OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
- STATE SECTOR—MORE THAN 150 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOEs), FEW PROFITABLE BUT MANY MILCH COWS
- PERNICIOUS POLITICIAN—SOE OFFICIAL— BUSINESS NEXUS
- AN "OLIGARCHY?"

CONCLUSIONS I

DEMOCRACY CONSOLIDATED

- BEHAVIORALLY: NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP SUPPORTS RETURN TO AUTHORITARIANISM OR SEPARATION
- ATTITUDINALLY: IN SURVEYS, VOTERS SUPPORT DEMOCRACY, UNDERSTAND DIFFERENCE WITH NEW ORDER
- CONSTITUTIONALLY: AMENDED 1945 CONSTITUTION WIDELY ACCEPTED

CONCLUSIONS II

REASONS TO BE WATCHFUL/PRIHATIN:

- BEHAVIORALLY—ISLAMIST THREAT TO FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY; LONG-TERM SEPARATISM IN PAPUA
- ATTITUDINALLY—DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT HOSTAGE TO ECONOMIC SUCCESS
- FIVE INTERACTING ARENAS: LOW GDP/SLOW GROWTH; WEAK RULE OF LAW; CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER IN STATE AND BUSINESS ELITE

Terima Kasih

