Can Japan contribute to AUKUS?

Following public advocacy by former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso, Japan's
potential involvement in the two key pillars of the AUKUS partnership –– acquiring
nuclear submarines and the sharing of 'advanced capabilities' –– has come under
scrutiny. The logistics of Japan's potential acquisition of US nuclear-powered
submarines would at the very least significantly delay Japan's formal participation
in the AUKUS agreement by way of Pillar 1, while the political context in which
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are
currently operating would complicate matters even more. However, the drawbacks
of nuclear submarines notwithstanding, Japan's domestic R&D advancements and
technology-sharing development in fields considered ‘non-traditional security', as
well as reform of its security clearance system and unique position in a
deteriorating security climate –– underscore the case for close collaboration
between Japan and the AUKUS triad on Pillar 2 advanced capabilities. As both
AUKUS partners and the Japanese government continue to explore avenues for
deeper cooperation, this paper assesses Japan's technological advancements and
strategic priorities against the criteria for participation in AUKUS as the country sits
poised to make further significant contributions to defence capability-building and
innovation in the Indo-Pacific.