Japan narrows path to citizenship amid labour shortages

Japan increasingly needs foreign workers, but the government is becoming more restrictive about who can become a citizen. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, the Nationality Act has not been formally amended — Article 5 still states that applicants for naturalisation must have ‘continuously maintained a domicile in Japan for five years or more’. But in practice, the threshold for acquiring Japanese citizenship has become noticeably harder to reach.

The shift lies not in statutory change but in administrative practice. The Ministry of Justice has reportedly tightened scrutiny of tax payments, pension contributions, health insurance compliance, employment stability and legal records over longer periods of residence. Formally, the five-year requirement remains intact. But in practice, applicants increasingly face expectations of stable residence and social integration in Japan for closer to a decade before naturalisation is realistically attainable.

This tightening reflects the broader political logic of the Takaichi government. The administration has consistently drawn a distinction between accepting foreigners as workers and accepting them as members of the national community. Foreign labour may be economically necessary. But Japan is not yet prepared to redefine itself as an immigration country.

The distinction has become increasingly important as labour shortages deepen. The working-age population continues to shrink rapidly, rural depopulation is hollowing out local economies and labour shortages are undermining essential sectors. Industries such as aged care, construction, agriculture, hospitality and logistics already struggle to secure workers.

The expansion of the Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) program shows how dependent Japan has become on foreign labour. By the end of 2025, SSW visa holders reached record numbers, with strong growth in sectors facing chronic labour shortages. The expansion of the Type 2 SSW category in 2023 — allowing long-term residence and family accompaniment in most sectors — appeared to signal a gradual shift towards a more settlement-oriented migration model.

Yet the simultaneous tightening of naturalisation practices points in the opposite direction. While labour market access has expanded, access to citizenship and permanent membership in the national community has become more restrictive. The state is separating economic incorporation from political incorporation.

This tension reflects a long-standing feature of Japan’s migration policy. Successive governments have officially maintained that Japan does not pursue an immigration policy. But they have gradually expanded the intake of foreign workers through side-door arrangements. Policymakers have tried to resolve the contradiction between economic necessity and political caution by treating foreign labour as temporary and economically instrumental.

Under Takaichi, this balancing act has become more ideologically explicit. Conservative policymakers increasingly frame nationality not simply as a legal status but as membership in a historically and culturally bounded community. In this view, citizenship requires more than residence. It demands evidence of social conformity, economic self-sufficiency, administrative compliance and long-term commitment to Japanese society.

The tighter scrutiny of naturalisation must also be understood in the context of Japan’s changing security environment. Rising tensions with China, concerns over economic security and conservative anxieties about social cohesion have reinforced demands for tighter state control over national membership. Conservative narratives emphasise the risks of rapid social change, welfare dependency and insufficient integration.

Within this political atmosphere, extending the practical barriers to citizenship serves a symbolic function. It reassures conservative voters that, despite growing reliance on foreign labour, the state retains sovereign control over who belongs to the Japanese nation.

This marks a shift in the logic of Japan’s post-war nationality system. The original five-year naturalisation rule was a compromise between maintaining a blood-based nationality system and a pathway for foreigners through residence and assimilation. Five years was broadly in line with practice in many developed democracies.

Permanent residency, in contrast, traditionally required 10 years. This is because it was intended for foreigners seeking indefinite residence while retaining foreign nationality. Japan therefore historically maintained a dual structure — naturalisation after five years for those willing to become Japanese nationals and permanent residency after 10 years for those wishing to remain foreign citizens.

But the practical distance between the two statuses is now narrowing. The state increasingly expects applicants for both permanent residency and naturalisation to demonstrate lengthy records of stability, tax compliance and behavioural conformity. Administrative discretion has become a mechanism for tightening access without formally changing the law.

The irony is that these restrictions are emerging when Japan’s economic future depends on foreign residents staying permanently. The SSW system was designed as a labour mobility framework rather than an immigration pathway. But demographic realities are transforming temporary labour migration into de facto settlement migration. Employers need experienced foreign workers to remain in Japan for the long term, particularly in sectors such as nursing and manufacturing in regional areas where labour turnover is disruptive.

This creates a growing contradiction at the centre of Japanese policymaking. Economically, Japan requires a more stable and permanent foreign workforce. Politically, conservative leaders remain reluctant to embrace multicultural nation-building or large-scale immigration openly. The economy becomes more internationally dependent while political membership remains restricted.

Japan is opening its labour market while narrowing the symbolic boundaries of belonging. The effective extension of residency expectations carries a political message — Japan may need foreign workers, but it still does not want to think of itself as an immigration nation.

Yasuo Takao is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow in the School of Media, Creative Arts and Social Inquiry at Curtin University.