Takaichi’s Japan enters an era of fragile coalitions

Sanae Takaichi’s rise as Japan’s Prime Minister is historic, but the symbolism of her appointment hides a more immediate challenge. She leads a government navigating one of the most uncertain parliamentary situations in postwar Japan. The political arithmetic is unforgiving — her bloc remains short of a stable majority in both chambers. That reality will define what her government can do.

For the first time in more than two decades, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is governing without Komeito, the centrist partner that has anchored Japanese cabinets since 1999. The alliance provided stability by moderating policy, managing legislation and, until the July 2025 upper house election, delivering majorities in both chambers. Komeito framed the split around issues of political funding rules and trust. Whatever the mix of motives, the effect is the same. The LDP has lost its most reliable stabiliser, and the collapse of the alliance has unsettled Japan’s political balance.

In Komeito’s place, Takaichi reached a deal with the Japan Innovation Party, also known as Ishin. Commentators often describe the arrangement as a coalition, yet it does not involve sharing cabinet positions as was the case during the LDP–Komeito era. Ishin backed Takaichi’s appointment as Prime Minister and pledged support on budgets, votes of confidence and certain key bills, while keeping its own identity and policy freedom. In practice, the arrangement is one of confidence and supply. Ishin remains outside the cabinet, rather than a member of a government coalition.

Japan now has a single-party minority government that must negotiate constantly to stay in power. Even if every LDP member and every Ishin member follows party discipline in Diet votes, the numbers are insufficient to carry the most visible tests of strength. In a budget or a confidence vote, the two parties together still need a few more votes or abstentions from elsewhere. That means the leadership must recruit support from other parties on a case-by-case basis. It also means that attendance at votes is critically important. Illness or a scandal that sidelines a single lawmaker could bring down the government.

Minority governments without a support party providing majority support from the outside can endure, yet they usually govern defensively. Comparative research shows that they do not perform as well in parliament because they have less control over the policy agenda and are less stable, forcing them to rely more on administrative orders and to devote more time to maintaining support in the legislature rather than advancing reform. Japan’s consensus-oriented institutions will amplify these tendencies. The LDP will need to assemble coalitions issue by issue.

Each Diet session will become a test of bargaining skills. The LDP must spend as much time counting heads and arranging abstentions as they do drafting bills. It may court the Democratic Party for the People or sympathetic independents on tax, energy and social spending, then repeat the process with a new combination of supporters on the next policy issue. A whip who can find two or three extra votes on short notice will be as valuable as any policy specialist.

The direction of policy is also shifting. For a generation, Komeito moderated defence initiatives and defended welfare programs. Ishin’s reformist but nationalist stance points in a different direction, one that is more pro-market, more hawkish and less enthusiastic about redistribution. There is talk of faster defence build-up, looser rules on arms exports and renewed debate around nuclear sharing — concepts once considered fringe. These ideas may be well-received in Washington, but at home they will be filtered through constant bargaining in a divided Diet.

Personnel choices offer a window into both the priorities and limits of the Takaichi cabinet. The new government has highlighted economic security, immigration management and industrial competitiveness as key objectives. These priorities stem, in part, from a recognition of public dissatisfaction over inflation and wages. It has also promised continuity on macroeconomic policy while exploring new instruments for productivity growth.

Yet the cabinet’s composition, particularly the small number of women, suggests that political management, rather than sweeping reform, is the near-term priority. The LDP’s agreement with Ishin also constrains the party’s ability to implement major reforms addressing these concerns. These impediments to meaningful action on key priorities is consistent with the demands of minority rule.

The immediate test is whether the LDP and Ishin can build predictable routines for governing. Party leaders say they are setting up regular policy coordination talks. If those meetings produce common positions ahead of Diet sessions, attracting a few additional votes beyond the LDP and Ishin, the government may gain some breathing room. If coordination falters, each Diet sitting will become a referendum on the Prime Minister’s bargaining skill, and each close call will deepen doubts about durability.

This remains less a story about who Japan’s new prime minister is than about how she governs. Symbolism draws attention, but legislative arithmetic decides outcomes. Governing without Komeito, while depending on a partner that keeps its options open and refuses cabinet seats, will reveal the true limits of LDP power in the months ahead.

Charles Crabtree is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College.

Sona N Golder is Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University.