Governments struggle with the reality that the beneficiaries of anti-poverty programs
are powerless to influence policies and stem the possibility of capture of benefits by the nonpoor.
Networks – social and political – are supposed to increase the ability of the lesspowerful
to access their entitlements. The paper assesses whether socially and politically
networked households do in fact have better awareness of the components of the program and
of the processes of decision making, and whether such networking makes them more likely to
vocalize their dissatisfaction when their entitlements are threatened. India’s national rural
employment guarantee scheme’s (NREG) institutional design (mandating village assemblies
to authorize decisions on the projects) makes it a good test case. Our results show that links to
social and political networks do significantly increase the awareness of the villagers on the
program’s components and enhances their ability to seek redress of their grievances.