Designing financial transfers for reduced deforestation


Event details

Date & time

Monday 13 September 2010


Miller Theater in Old Canberra House


Patrick Doupe


Emma Aisbett
6125 2190

A global mechanism to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) is built on the premise of developed nations compensating tropical nations for reducing deforestation rates. Whilst this premise is straightforward, ensuring accountability for emissions reductions contracts is subject to many technical difficulties. One difficulty is deciding on the appropriate channel of payments from international buyers to citizens, businesses and governments, both national and local, at the forest margin. An additional complication is the unintended increase in emissions that occurs where REDD does not provide an incentive to every agent at the forest margin, known as leakage. This research aims to investigate the carbon and welfare consequences of various proposed funding channels in the presence of leakage and binding governance constraints, including decentralisation and insecure tenure, that exist in candidate REDD nations. I propose to first investigate these issues via formal models of the underlying political economy, and secondly to draw conclusions for the design of national REDD systems, with particular attention to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.


Patrick Doupe is a PhD student in the Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program. His research looks at the design of financial transfers to reduce deforestation, with a particular focus on Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

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