In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for U.S. Foreign Policy?

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Abstract

Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the U.S. seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about U.S. foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? We examine this question using multinational surveys covering 58 countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the U.S. We draw our basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the U.S. to assess U.S. soft power. But we argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. We refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about U.S. foreign policy, an under-emphasized element of Nye’s approach. Our regression analysis shows that it has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies towards the International Criminal Court, and on voting decisions in the U.N. General Assembly. These results support our refined theoretical argument about soft-power: Public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies towards the U.S., but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.
Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the U.S. seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about U.S. foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? We examine this question using multinational surveys covering 58 countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the U.S. during the post-9/11 period.

We draw our basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who coined the term “soft power.”1 According to Nye, soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”2 This is an especially appropriate framework for us because, as Nye puts it, “soft power is about mobilizing cooperation from others.”3 As we do in this article, he commonly uses public opinion surveys regarding attitudes towards the United States, and its policies, in foreign countries.4 It is also appropriate, because soft power’s effectiveness hinges on the targeted country’s public attitudes (i.e., favorability) toward the country wielding, or attempting to wield, international influence (in this study, the U.S.).

In recent years, the concept has gained wide currency in academia, among pundits, and among some foreign policy makers.5 Although it may have intuitive or rhetorical appeal, little systematic evidence that soft power actually affects international relations has been produced. In


2 Nye 2004, x.

3 Nye 2004, 61.

4 For example, in only the first two chapters of his 2004 book, Nye uses such international opinion data to illustrate U.S. soft power; specifically, on pages 12, 14, 18, 29-30, 36-37, 39, 42-43, and 69-72.

5 For example, see Zubrow 2009.
a well-known recent study, Keohane and Katzenstein find no effect of anti-American views on a range of diplomatic issues pursued by the U.S., including some examined in this article.\textsuperscript{6} Few other studies address the question rigorously, and fewer still employ systematic analysis of large datasets.\textsuperscript{7} We contend that the role of public opinion as a meaningful factor in the dynamics of international relations deserves more general theoretical attention and empirical evaluation.\textsuperscript{8}

In this article, we attempt substantial new contributions, both to the refinement of a theory of soft power, and to its systematic empirical examination. Our objective is to improve understanding of the conditions under which soft power might have “hard” political consequences: identifiable foreign policy choices that can be tied empirically to mass-level perceptions. We argue that currently Nye’s theory is difficult, if not impossible, to test empirically, and so we propose a further specification. In Nye’s original specification, the foreign public’s affinity for (American) values, culture, institutions, and past policies of all sorts are “currencies” of soft power.\textsuperscript{9} By contrast, we focus on an under-emphasized element of Nye’s approach – foreign policy views of the public in the targeted countries – that we suggest is crucial for the country attempting to use soft power to favorably affect policy outcomes. As we discuss

\textsuperscript{6} Keohane and Katzenstein 2007.

\textsuperscript{7} Exceptions are Datta (2009) and Dragojlovic (2009).

\textsuperscript{8} We acknowledge the contributions of earlier theorists, especially Putnam (1988), Risse-Kappen (1991), and Keohane and Nye (1977). Of these, Putnam’s two-level games approach is the most focused on the type of short-term, political outcomes which concern us here, rather than underlying institutional or structural effects. But its attention to dynamics of public opinion, or other targeted persuasion and influence \textit{without} threat or inducements, is minimal (e.g., p. 436).

\textsuperscript{9} Nye 2004, 31.
fully in the next section, we see Nye’s currencies of soft power as structural or underlying factors, comprising a filter through which current foreign policies of a country are perceived, rather than factors directly affecting foreign policy makers’ decisions. We argue that in international relations soft power manifests itself in views among country B’s mass public about country A’s foreign policy.

With this theoretical focus, we develop a set of testable expectations about whether foreign public opinion actually matters for international outcomes and, if it does, when it might be most or least effective. Empirically, we analyze three distinct outcome variables and show that foreign opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policy towards the International Criminal Court, and on voting decisions in the U.N. General Assembly. These results of regression analysis support our refined theoretical argument about soft power: Public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies towards the U.S., but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.

We emphasize that our contributions go beyond the literature on soft power. We acknowledge the rich literature on the influence of public opinion on public policy, but the existing studies focus almost exclusively on the relationship between opinion and policy within the U.S.\textsuperscript{10} However, we demonstrate the importance of public opinion (about the U.S.) for policy outcomes outside of the U.S., which has rarely been studied. We also emphasize that our study is

\textsuperscript{10} For example, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson 2004.
about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy, while most of the studies of which we are aware focus on the effects of opinion on domestic policy.\textsuperscript{11}

In the remainder of the article, we first discuss our focus on foreign policy views as the pivotal factor in soft-power dynamics, presenting two testable hypotheses. We then discuss our data and variables. After examining the results of our analysis, we conclude by discussing implications for understanding international relations and avenues for future research.

**Theory and Hypotheses**

In this section, we first address Nye’s focus on cultural aspects of soft power, attempting to clarify the connections to foreign policy and proposing a refined theory of the soft-power process. We then derive two hypotheses about the effects of public opinion on foreign policy behavior and introduce the specific cases used in our analysis.

**A Refined Theory of Soft Power**

Nye draws on the ideas of Bachrach and Baratz to develop his soft-power framework, especially focusing on their “second face of power.”\textsuperscript{12} This refers to “the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to ‘safe’ issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures. To pass over this is to neglect one whole ‘face’ of power.”\textsuperscript{13} This is fundamentally a description of agenda setting at the structural level of basic

\textsuperscript{11} Exceptions are Jacobs and Page (2005) and Sobel (2001).

\textsuperscript{12} Nye 2004, 150n5.

\textsuperscript{13} Bachrach and Baratz 1963, 632.
beliefs and institutions. With this foundation, it is perhaps clearer why Nye’s framework for soft power has a heavy focus on culture and longer-term latent effects.14

By emphasizing general factors that show limited variation over time, however, we feel that Nye fails to provide a theory for understanding when soft power affects international outcomes. Indeed, he writes, “[w]hether that attraction in turn produces desired policy outcomes has to be judged in particular cases.”15 But he does not specify how this is to be judged. This leaves the causal mechanisms of soft power, and their empirical implications, underspecified. Nor is there an indication of what the relative importance of each currency of soft power is for any given foreign policy outcome desired by the U.S. An example from Nye’s own writing is indicative: while “American music and films are more popular in Britain, France, and Germany than they were 20 years ago,” he finds that U.S. policies received less support there than they did 20 years prior.16 Is this pattern consistent with the soft-power thesis, or does it contradict it? In short, how the theory might be tested is not readily apparent.

We argue that it is the public views about current foreign policy – rather than underlying public affinity – that are directly relevant in shaping international outcomes. For the case of U.S. soft power, foreign decision makers today care about their public’s potential reactions to specific foreign policy choices, such as signing a treaty or going to war, rather than the popularity of

14 For example, see Nye 2004, 15. Entman’s (2008) model of U.S. “mediated public diplomacy” is similar to Nye’s framework in its emphasis on relatively invariant factors. In Entman’s case, these include the congruence of the target country’s political culture with that of the U.S., regime type, and news media system.

15 Nye 2004, 60.

16 Nye 2004, 128.
Nike goods, reverence for the U.S. Bill of Rights, or opinions about the Vietnam War. Culture, values, institutions, and past policies – the four currencies of soft power – are important latent or underlying factors, public perceptions of which play roles in how views about current foreign policy are formed, but are relatively indeterminate on their own, as Nye himself suggests.17

Countries, perhaps especially major powers like the U.S., can have relatively enduring general images in the minds of people around the world.18 Each new issue on the global political agenda will almost certainly be interpreted in light of such pre-existing views. We anticipate, however, considerable scope for time-specific and context-specific variation regarding the extent to which, and how, such general images shape views on each new issue. A case in point would be the varying difficulty the U.S. had convincing its NATO allies, and their publics, to accept intermediate range nuclear missiles on their territory in the early 1980s, and to remove them later that decade.19

Given our focus on public opinion about a country’s foreign policy, we therefore refine and extend a theory of the soft power process. We focus on the specific process through which soft power has a policy consequence, divided into six stages. First, there must be an attempt to

17 Nye 2004, 31. It is important to point out that there need not be homogenous or linear relationships between the latent soft power currencies and the manifest foreign policy views. For example, strong affinity for U.S. values, such as respect for human rights, might actually reduce support for a U.S. policy, which is believed to be inconsistent with those values, such as the U.S. “enemy combatant” detention system at Guantanamo Bay. While such issues deserve exploration, further investigation is beyond the scope of this article.

18 Isernia, Juhász, and Ratinger 2002.

communicate a message from one state (Country A) to an audience or audiences in another state (Country B). Second, that message must be received by at least one relevant audience in the target state. Third, there is a process of assessment of the meaning and implications of the message, and communication within the target state about it. Fourth, there either is or is not some politically relevant change in views or priorities in response to the message. We argue that general views about Country A’s foreign policy are likely to be relevant for specific issues in Country B’s relationship with A. Fifth, if an issue is salient for the mass public (or another pivotal group), any shift in views or priorities may change the domestic political calculus on the issue, shifting the balance of costs and benefits for changing foreign policy behavior (discussed further below). Finally, if the decision makers perceive the costs to be sufficiently outweighed by the benefits, this will translate into a change in actual foreign policy behavior.

**Hypotheses about Soft Power Effects**

An important division in this process is that between the effort of influencing opinion, and the translation of opinion into foreign policy outcomes. For the purpose of the analysis in this article,  

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20 In this article, given the limited availability of cross-national data of elite opinion, we only deal with mass public opinion. It would be interesting to consider preferences of elite factions, as well as the interaction between mass and elite views, and we note the contributions of Gourevitch (1978) and Risse-Kappen (1991) as possible starting points for further work here.

21 For example, political leaders might make statements in response to the foreign message, attempting to spin or frame the issue for the mass public. The political context of the target state is important here, including the role of the news media, as Entman (2008) points out regarding public diplomacy.
we focus on the latter. This is an essential but under-investigated aspect of transnational influence; a necessary condition of soft power. Without some effect on international outcomes, the term soft power would, of course, be a misnomer. While Nye’s framework does not specify how generic attraction is translated into foreign policy influence (“power”), our approach proposes that this happens via the bridge of foreign policy views among the mass public.

Specifically, we formulate two testable hypotheses regarding the effects of public opinion about the U.S. on foreign policy behavior. First, we expect that public opinion about U.S. foreign policy will have an effect on behavior of states towards the U.S. Fundamentally, we expect the effect of soft power to run through public opinion about U.S. foreign policy, because leaders must be attentive to the balance of political costs and benefits before taking the foreign policy decisions U.S. leaders prefer them to.

**Hypothesis 1.** Public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in other countries affects the foreign policies of those countries towards the U.S.

It is important to emphasize that we do not reduce foreign policy views to views on specific issues – this overly narrow operational definition would dilute our ability to test soft-

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22 We developed testable hypotheses regarding the first stages of the soft power process, affecting opinion, in Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009).

23 We do not necessarily assume that only in democratic political systems are decision makers concerned with support among the mass public. In our preliminary analysis, we attempted to estimate the effect of public opinion interacted with regime type (e.g., democracy). Interestingly, we found no significant effect, although we are cautious about this result due to the relatively small number of observations.
power effects. The soft-power argument rests on the expectation that some general orientation in country B towards country A will affect a range of outcomes in country B’s relations with country A. Therefore, we must measure some general positive or negative assessment of country A which can be expected to have direct relevance for foreign policy.

While general orientation toward country A’s foreign policy is the relevant causal variable in our empirical analysis, we argue that the magnitude of its effect may be heterogeneous. Specifically, a more refined expectation emerging from our framework is that issues of greater salience or importance to key groups within a state – particularly the mass public – will be more susceptible to soft-power effects.

**Hypothesis 2.** The effect of public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in other countries on foreign policy decisions relevant for the U.S. will be most evident when the issue at stake is salient for the mass publics in the those countries.

This is so because support for, or opposition to, a country’s leadership, and thus the balance of political costs and benefits for the decision maker, will more likely be affected by issues of importance to the public. If an issue is of little salience to the mass public, then the foreign policy choice will not be likely to affect the public’s overall evaluation of the decision maker. If an issue is of high salience, however, then a choice which goes against the preference of the public will shift the balance of political costs associated with a given foreign policy decision. Thus, in anticipation of political consequences, decision makers will take heed of opinion on salient issues, but are more likely to ignore opinion on non-salient issues. As Lax and Philips write,
“political actors will shift attention to [public] opinion when salience is high and away from it when low… higher salience means greater responsiveness.”

Our framework has implications for the issues we examine. These are (1) the commitment of troops to the U.S.-led war in Iraq, (2) compliance with U.S. wishes regarding a waiver exempting its nationals from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and (3) annual voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) on issues highlighted as important by the U.S. in that year.

Our assumptions about the relative salience of these issues are, at this stage, necessarily generic for all countries. We expect that UNGA voting will be of low salience, since this is largely a symbolic act. The decision to grant so-called Article-98 immunity from the ICC to U.S. nationals is perhaps a more substantive foreign policy choice, but also highly specific and possibly obscure in the public mind. The choice of whether or not to commit troops to support the U.S. in a widely unpopular military action is the most salient issue for mass publics, and thus the one that will be most susceptible to the effects of public opinion.

How might we assess the level of salience of these three issues internationally? Media coverage should be an appropriate metric, as there is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that the frequency of news media coverage of an issue is closely associated with the importance or priority that the issue has for the public. Figure 1 presents monthly data on international print

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24 Lax and Philips 2009, 370.

25 In future research, we might refine our assumptions about issue salience based on target-country regime type, region, or other country-specific factors (also see Footnote 23).

26 Whether this is due to the effects of media agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw 1972), to the media following public preferences (Tahk, Krosnick, Lacy, and Lowe 2009), or to exogenous
media coverage (outside of the U.S.) of these three issues, for the period May through December 2003.

[Figure 1 about here]

This strongly corresponds to our expectations about issue salience, with the Iraq war generating about 10 times as many articles per month as the ICC, and usually more than 20 times as many articles as the UNGA. We will discuss each of these issues more specifically in the next section.

**Data and Variables**

To test our hypotheses, we use multinational surveys covering 58 non-U.S. countries for our key independent variable, and information about their foreign policy decisions during 2003 as dependent variables. Specifically, our independent variable (*Opinion about US foreign policy*) is the difference between the aggregated (in ratio) positive and negative response to the following survey item:

> “Generally, do you think American foreign policy has a positive effect on <your country>, a negative effect or does American foreign policy have no effect on <your country>?”

Factors is an important question, but not relevant for our purposes of demonstrating relative issue salience.

27 We note that Nye (2004, 53) also discusses the “ratio of the positive to the negative dimensions” of views of the U.S.
The data are taken from surveys conducted by Gallup International from June 2002 to May 2003: *Voice of the People September 2002, Gallup International Iraq Poll 2003, and Gallup International Post-War Iraq Poll 2003*. For each country, we take the average of these surveys.

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28 We obtained aggregated data for the *Voice of the People* survey from Professor Takashi Inoguchi, University of Niigata Prefecture (Japan). The aggregated data for the 2003 Iraq Poll and Post-War Iraq Poll are available from Gallup International’s website, http://www.gallup-international.com. Details regarding the methodology of each survey in each country, which we summarize below, are also available there. The *Voice of the People September 2002* poll covers 37 countries (including the U.S.) with a combined non-U.S. sample size of 27,218, with field dates from June 25 to September 1, 2002, varying by country. The *Gallup International Iraq Poll 2003* covers 40 countries (including the U.S.) with a combined non-U.S. sample size of 28,783, with field dates from January 9 to 29, 2003, varying by country. The *Gallup International Post-War Iraq Poll 2003* covers 45 countries (including the U.S.) with a combined non-U.S. sample size of 34,014, field dates from April 14 to May 8, 2003, varying by country. In most countries, samples are drawn nationally and questions are asked through face-to-face (mainly less-developed countries) or telephone (mainly developed countries) interviews.

29 As a robustness check, we also estimated models using only the *Voice of the People September 2002* and *Gallup International Iraq Poll 2003*. See the Results section for details. It is important to point out that we do not make assumptions about thresholds of support. We recognize the complexity of foreign policy making and the contextual nature of leaders’ political calculations. We only expect that, other things equal, more positive views, relative to negative ones, about
We use the Gallup International surveys for two reasons. First, they are among the most comprehensive multinational surveys satisfying the “time-order” condition given our theoretical expectation that opinion affects these outcomes; namely, they measure opinion prior to the foreign policy outcomes of interest. The selection of countries is not random, but includes over a quarter of all countries in the world, with a range of important political, economic, and historical relationships with the U.S. Second, and more importantly, the question asked is suitable for testing our hypotheses. It asks directly about the (perceived) impact of U.S. policy on the respondent’s country. Thus it measures what we intend to measure theoretically – the public’s general perceptions of U.S. foreign policy that are of political relevance for decision makers.

Potentially there are two alternative measures for the independent variable, but neither is linked as closely to our hypotheses. The first would be a measure of the foreign public’s affinity for U.S. culture, values, institutions and past behavior – Nye’s four currencies of soft power. As we have argued, we consider these to be underlying factors without direct relevance to foreign policy decisions. It seems sensible to assume that from the perspective of foreign policy decision makers, it is more important to know what the general public thinks about U.S. policy when their U.S. foreign policy, will make it more likely that leaders will choose policies that the U.S. prefers.

30 The selection of countries by Gallup International is presumably based on their resources and capacity to conduct cross-national surveys, rather than on foreign policy decisions of non-U.S. countries (or Gallup International’s consideration/expectation of these decisions). Thus, we think that our estimation does not necessarily suffer from selection bias. See the Results section for a robustness test which attempts to cope with the selection issue.
own and/or their country’s interests are concerned, rather than the extent of favorable attitudes across these four currencies, or even general favorability for the U.S.\textsuperscript{31}

Another measure would be a question closely related to a specific policy issue – such as a question about sending (or not sending) troops to Iraq. As we argued in the previous section, however, soft power implies general effects across issue areas. Therefore, overly specific operational definitions are not suitable to examine soft power processes. Furthermore, even if there existed three distinct issue-specific survey questions,\textsuperscript{32} it would be difficult to test our hypotheses without using the \textit{same} independent variable. Methodologically, our study is similar to a non-equivalent dependent variables (NEDV) design in experimental research.\textsuperscript{33} By using the same variable to predict somewhat different dependent variables, we can be more confident about the (internal) validity of our findings.

The three policy-related dependent variables in our study differ in terms of the degree of salience for non-U.S. publics. As we emphasize above, these three policy decisions were announced \textit{after} the field dates of the surveys which measure our causal variable. Thus, reverse causality in the form of decisions affecting opinion in our analysis is implausible. We acknowledge, however, the issue of elite influence on public opinion \textit{prior to} a decision being

\textsuperscript{31} As a robustness test, we use survey items measuring favorability towards the American people and the U.S. as instrumental variables (IV). See the Results section.

\textsuperscript{32} Another fundamental problem is that such questions are typically included in a multinational study only when issues became salient, which would make it difficult or impossible to test our second hypothesis. There are no questions about the ICC or UNGA votes, for example, in any multinational surveys of which we are aware.

\textsuperscript{33} Cook and Campbell 1979, Chapter 2.
If decision makers intend to take an action which is controversial (i.e., send troops to Iraq) and/or salient for the public, it is plausible that they might attempt to sway public opinion prior to the announcement of the decision. We conduct robustness tests in connection with this potential risk of omitted variable bias in the Results section.

The first dependent variable (Sent troops to Iraq in 2003) is coded 1 if a country sent troops to Iraq by the end of 2003 and 0 otherwise. Most countries which had sent troops to Iraq as of 2009 did so by the end of 2003. For this reason, we focus on decisions made by the end of 2003. The focus on this period is also useful because decisions by “latecomers”, such as Japan, are likely influenced by political factors which are consequences of the post-war situation in

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34 Of course, decisions might be taken sometime before they are publicly announced or implemented.


36 The data were collected and cross-checked using several sources:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm;

http://geocities.com/jdejoannis/Coalition/#coalition;

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInIraqFactsandFigures.htm;


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq; and various news media articles.

37 Tago 2009.
Iraq. Furthermore, if we expand our period of investigation beyond December 2003, we would also need to model the decisions of countries to withdraw troops from Iraq, which began to happen in February 2004.

Clearly, whether to send troops to Iraq was an important, if not the most important, decision for many countries during the period of our study. In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union address to Congress, pointed to Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as part of an “axis of evil,” and started pressing Iraq to accept unfettered inspections for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He and other top members of his administration began calling for a “coalition of the willing” to stand against Iraq. Policy debates heated up worldwide and news media focused on issues and problems in Iraq, and U.S. intentions. When foreign policy makers make decisions on such a highly salient and well-known issue, public opinion is a key factor. Cross-national surveys have shown that public opinion can influence government decisions, with people being more likely to support actions if they perceive the government is acting in their interests and if they believe the government is capable of accomplishing its goals. However, public opinion is not the only factor influencing government decisions. Other factors, such as national security, economic interests, and international relations, also play a role. Therefore, it is important to consider both the role of public opinion and other factors when analyzing government decisions.

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38 Methodologically, these factors can be influenced by both our independent and dependent variables and thus difficult to deal with. Note that variables that are at least in part consequences of the causal variable must be dropped to avoid post-treatment bias (Rosenbaum 1984).

39 Although it is worth examining how non-U.S. public opinion affected both deployment and withdrawal decisions (and/or decisions to shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan), conducting such time-series or event-history analysis would be difficult for some methodological reasons. Most importantly, we only have limited data for time-series or event-history analysis of the effects of public opinion on policy decisions, which would require multinational surveys conducted regularly enough (e.g., monthly or at least yearly) in a sufficiently large number of countries.

40 For example, see Dao 2002; Kessler and Graham 2003; Loeb and Ricks 2002.
opinion should be an important matter of consideration. Therefore, we expect our independent variable to have a large, positive, and significant effect on the first dependent variable.\footnote{We note that Keohane and Katzenstein (2007, 290-291) find no association in a correlational analysis of opinion about the U.S. and countries which joined the 49-member “coalition of the willing” as reported by the U.S. However, inclusion on this list does not necessarily imply the serious step of troop commitments (as opposed to financial or other sorts of support), and apparently did not always even imply the country’s actual consent, as Keohane and Katzenstein themselves point out in the case of Turkey. Thus, the foreign policy outcome they study is clearly heterogeneous across countries on their list, and this might help explain why their finding differs from ours.}

Evidence from case studies suggests initial support for our expectations. For example, while leaders in both Bulgaria and Turkey had strong strategic incentives to support the U.S. in Iraq, and publicly expressed their preferences, only Bulgaria was able to follow through on this.\footnote{Vassilev 2006.} Turkey’s cabinet was actually overruled by a parliamentary vote heavily influenced by public opinion.\footnote{Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010.} In Bulgaria, 15% of Bulgarians had favorable views of the effect of U.S. foreign policy on their country, and 28% had negative views in the September 2002 Gallup Voice of the People survey. In Turkey, while the percentage of people with positive views was similar (14%), a much larger share of people (66%) expressed negative attitudes.\footnote{The percentage of people with neither positive nor negative views (i.e., those who thought the U.S. foreign policy has no effect on their country, who refused to answer, or who chose “Don’t Know” option) was larger in Bulgaria.} Similarly,
traditional U.S. allies Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia all provided troops to the U.S.-
led effort in Afghanistan and seriously considered sending troops to Iraq, as well. In the end,
Australia and the U.K. did so, but public opinion was a “significant” part of the Canadian
decision not to.\textsuperscript{45} Views regarding U.S. foreign policy were more positive in Britain and
Australia prior to their decisions, with 30\% of Britons and 31\% of Australians believing U.S.
foreign policy had a positive effect on their country, and 42\% of Britons and 51\% of Australians
believing it was negative in the January 2003 Gallup International Iraq Poll. The differences
between positive and negative responses were 12 and 20 percentage points, respectively. In
contrast, only 22\% of Canadians had positive responses and 53\% had negative, a difference of 31
percentage points.

Our second dependent variable (\textit{BIA entered into force in 2003}) is coded 1 if a so-called
“Article 98 agreement” between a given country and the U.S. entered into force by the end of
2003, and 0 otherwise. The Rome Statute establishing the ICC was signed by 120 states in July
1998, and it entered into force after ratification by sixty states in July 2002.\textsuperscript{46} The Statute
includes, however, Article 98(2), which states, “The Court may not proceed with a request for
surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender
a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the
sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.” In mid-2002, President Bush explicitly
renounced U.S. intention to join the ICC and, based on Article 98, began negotiating bilateral

\textsuperscript{45} O’Connor and Vucetic 2010.

\textsuperscript{46} As of 2011, there are 115 states, which are parties to the ICC (http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/).
immunity agreements (BIAs) with ICC members and non-members, so that no U.S. nationals could be surrendered to the ICC from these countries without U.S. consent. The agreements began entering into force early in 2003, and 95 such agreements were concluded as of 2011.\(^{47}\) Importantly, over half (54) of these countries put the agreements into force within a short period from May to December 2003.\(^{48}\)

The U.S. rationale for Article 98 agreements was explained by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher in 2003:\(^{49}\) “United States military forces, civilian personnel and private citizens are currently active in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in more than 100 countries. Article 98 Agreements… allow the United States to remain engaged internationally with our friends and allies by providing American citizens with essential protection from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, particularly against politically motivated investigations and prosecutions.”

Although it is a potentially important decision for another government to enter into such an agreement with the U.S., we assume that foreign publics are less aware of this issue and/or simply do not care much about it. Boduszyński and Balalovska show through case studies of the issue in Croatia and Macedonia that, even when the BIA debate was highly politicized due to international pressure, public opinion was only moderately engaged, and only one factor among many figuring in a country’s decision.\(^{50}\) Kelley’s four brief case studies provide similar evidence

\(^{47}\) http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/article_98.cfm.

\(^{48}\) Four agreements entered into force before May 2003 (Uzbekistan, Tuvalu, Egypt and Gabon), but these countries are not included in Gallup International surveys.


\(^{50}\) Boduszyński and Balalovska 2004.
– only in Costa Rica, where a local judge was nominated to sit on the ICC, is there evidence of strong domestic opposition to a BIA among the mass public.\(^{51}\) We see it as unlikely to be very salient or entail serious potential political costs (or benefits) for leaders. Therefore, we expect that opinion about U.S. foreign policy will have a relatively small effect, if any, on Article-98 decisions.

The final variable (\textit{UN voting with US in 2003}) is the proportion of “important” U.N. resolutions in 2003, on which voting by a given country and the U.S. are the same.\(^{52}\) By law, the U.S. State Department must track the voting behavior of UNGA members on resolutions and other matters deemed to be of most importance to the U.S., especially as they relate to the State Department’s official “Strategic Goals.” Each year the State Department issues a report to the U.S. Congress identifying the “important votes” and how the U.S. and other UNGA members voted on these items. For the 58th UNGA in 2003, there were 15 such votes. These included resolutions on the U.S. embargo against Cuba, the rights of Palestinians, Israeli occupied territories, Palestinian refugees, Israeli human rights practices in the occupied territories, confidence building in South Asia, the U.N. register of conventional arms, human cloning, rights of children, democracy promotion, globalization and human rights, human rights in

\(^{51}\) It should be noted that Kelley (2007, 583) reports no effect of public opinion regarding the U.S. on whether a country signs a BIA. This briefly reported result also forms a considerable part of the evidence for Keohane and Katzenstein’s (2007, 289) conclusion that anti-American sentiments have little or no soft-power effect. However, the specific question Kelley addresses is more limited than ours, since she is only interested in factors determining whether a country that has become a party to the ICC will subsequently sign a BIA with the U.S.

\(^{52}\) \url{http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gares1.htm}. 

22
Turkmenistan, human rights in Iran, human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and UNGA reforms.\footnote{http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/. The UNGA reforms resolution “Provisional Program of Work for the Second Committee, A/Dec/58/554” is not included in our data because the vote outcome is unavailable from the U.N database. Thus, the denominator of this variable is 14 rather than 15.}

To perhaps a greater extent than in the case of Article 98 agreements, we expect that the impact of public opinion on U.N. voting decisions is small, if not nil. Knowing that these issues are “important” for the U.S., policy-makers in other countries may consider whether their decisions at UNGA are consistent with the general feeling of their nationalists towards U.S. foreign policy. However, these U.N. votes, largely symbolic, are less likely to be salient to mass publics in most countries.

Tables 1 and 2 provide a list of the 58 countries in our data and the values of our independent and dependent variables.

Table 1 includes the 29 countries with below-median values for Opinion about US foreign policy, while Table 2 includes the 29 countries above the median. The average of Opinion about US foreign policy is −0.36 for the bottom 29 and 0.07 for the top 29. Overall, from mid-2002 to mid-2003, global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy was more negative than positive.

Simple comparison of our dependent variables between the two groups suggests the plausibility of our hypotheses. First, among the bottom 29 countries, only 21% sent troops to Iraq in 2003, but this goes up sharply to 55% among the top 29 countries. Second, among the bottom
29 countries, 10% had a BIA in effect with the U.S. by the end of 2003, whereas this triples, to 31%, among the top 29 countries with more favorable public opinion about U.S. foreign policy. Finally, the percentage of UNGA votes consistent with those of the U.S. is almost the same between the two groups, 52% for the bottom 29 and 51% for the top 29. In short, these tables indicate that the effect of public opinion on foreign policy is likely to be larger if the issue at stake is important and relevant for publics.

A closer look at these tables, however, suggests some other systematic differences between countries in these two groups. For example, many European and/or developed countries tend to have lower values of our independent variable. They are also less likely to have an effective BIA with the U.S. in 2003, although they are more likely to have troops in Iraq at the end of 2003. To allow us to estimate the effect of public opinion about U.S. foreign policy, we include a range of control variables potentially correlated with our independent and dependent variables.⁵⁴

We include two variables expected to have strong correlations with the first two dependent variables (troops in Iraq and BIAs) and possible correlation with the other (UN voting). *Troops in Afghanistan* is a dummy variable measuring whether or not a country had troops in Afghanistan in 2002.⁵⁵ *ICC member* is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a country is an ICC member as of the end of 2002.⁵⁶

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⁵⁴ Since all these variables are only added for better control, we are not here interested in their statistical and substantive effects and do not discuss the expected direction of effect parameters, or their estimates.

⁵⁵ Data were collected and cross-checked using several sources: 
NATO’s SHAPE Public Affairs Office for International Security Assistance;

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Countries with troops in Afghanistan (there are 19 in our data) are likely to be either important U.S. allies, and/or have sufficient military capability to send troops abroad. Thus, as compared to others, they are more likely to have sent troops to Iraq, as well, by the end of 2003. This variable is clearly relevant as it is expected to affect our independent variable – the perceptions about U.S. foreign policy by non-US publics as of late 2002 or early 2003 (before the war in Iraq began).\(^57\)

Non-membership in the ICC (there are 16 instances in our data) probably indicates a state’s opposition to the ICC for its own domestic or foreign policy reasons. This would presumably significantly reduce the costs of signing a BIA with the U.S. (note that non-ICC members can also sign them), and thus is an important factor to control to avoid a biased estimate of the effect of public opinion.

We also include five variables measuring hard-power-related security and economic factors. These correspond to the likelihood, in Nye’s framework, of “threats and inducements” affecting opinion and decisions. *Alliance portfolio* measures the commonality in alliance “portfolios” between the U.S. and each country, as of 2000. It is developed by Signorino and

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_deploy.htm;

\(^{56}\) The data source is http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html.

\(^{57}\) We also think that the *observed* variable for troop commitment in Afghanistan (as of 2002) may be a proxy for the *expected* variable for troop commitment in Iraq (i.e., an expectation about decisions in 2003, formed in 2002), which should be correlated with our causal variable.
Ritter (1999) and widely used in quantitative studies of international relations as a measure of common security interests. 58 Another alliance indicator, NATO, is a dummy variable for members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 2002. US economic aid and US military aid measure the per capita amount of U.S. military and economic aid to each country in 2002. 59 Trade with US is the natural log of the total amount of trade (export and import) with the U.S. divided by each country’s GDP (in 2002). 60

The remaining variables are reasonable proxies for economic, political, cultural and historical relationships (or the lack of such relationships) with the U.S. GDP per capita is the natural log of GDP per capita in 2002. 61 Democracy score is the sum of two indicators (political rights and civil liberties, for 2002) published annually by Freedom House. 62 Muslim population

58 The data source is EUGene data generation software, http://www.eugenesoftware.org/.
59 The data source is the “Green Book” on loans and grants, http://qesdb.cdie.org/blk/. We code 0 for missing observations. The unit is 2006 U.S. dollars.
60 The data source is the International Monetary Fund’s Data and Statistics website, http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm. The unit (for exports, imports and GDP) is current U.S. dollars.
61 The data source is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/. The unit is constant 2005 international dollars in PPP.
62 The data source is http://www.freedomhouse.org. We do not use another commonly used measure of democracy, Polity score, because it is not coded for three countries surveyed by Gallup International – Luxembourg, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iceland. The correlation between Democracy score and Polity score is high (0.834).
is the ratio of Muslims in the total population before 2002.\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Europe} is a dummy variable for Western European countries, which include the so-called “EU 15” (member countries in the European Union prior to the accession of ten candidate countries on 1 May 2004), Norway, and Switzerland.

Finally, in order to address a potential criticism, we emphasize a basic methodological point. As long as we do not expect, in theory, that certain variables have direct effects on policy decisions by non-U.S. states, we need not include them in our analysis. These would include a range of soft-power variables, such as public diplomacy efforts by the U.S., exports of U.S. culture to foreign nations, and visits by U.S. sport and music stars. The omission of these variables should not lead to biased causal estimates, because, as our theoretical framework specifies, if they have any effect on our dependent variables (i.e., policy decisions), this should only be through changing public opinion about U.S. foreign policy, our independent variable.\textsuperscript{64}

Results

We estimate two sets of regressions for each dependent variable – one without the covariates and another with them. Since the first two dependent variables (\textit{Sent troops to Iraq in 2003} and \textit{BIA entered into force in 2003}) are dichotomous, we estimate the coefficients based on probit regressions. The effects on the third dependent variable (\textit{UN voting with US in 2003}) are estimated by OLS regressions.

\textsuperscript{63} The data source is http://islamicweb.com/. We code 0 for missing observations. This is the best comprehensive data source we could find for pre-2003 figures. Specific dates for each country’s percentage are not given, but the website implies they are current as of 1998.

\textsuperscript{64} We use such underlying attitudinal variables as instrumental variables in a robustness test.
The results of our regression analysis are presented in Table 3.

Without control variables, the effect of *Opinion about US foreign policy* is positive and significant on the first two dependent variables, but it is negative and insignificant on the third dependent variable. Not surprisingly, this is consistent with the patterns noted in Tables 1 and 2. The estimates with the eleven control variables, however, suggest that non-U.S. publics’ feelings towards U.S. foreign policy have significantly positive effects on all three dependent variables. This is expected given our framework, but nevertheless striking given that a variety of variables measuring security, economic, cultural and historical relationships with the U.S. are controlled. This is strong evidence to support our first hypothesis that non-U.S. public opinion indeed matters for foreign policy outcomes regarding the U.S.

To examine the validity of our second hypothesis, however, we need to compare the magnitude of effects across the three sets of models. Table 3 does not easily allow us to do so, because we use different methods of estimation (probit and OLS) and because the interpretation of probit coefficients is not straightforward. To interpret substantive effects and test our second hypothesis, we simulate the marginal effect of our independent variable on each dependent variable when it changes from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. All control variables are held constant at their means. The results are graphically presented in Figure 2.
We also simulated the degree of uncertainty: Each vertical bar indicates the 95% confidence interval of the estimated probability (for the first two dependent variables) and the expected value (for the third dependent variable).65

The figure clearly suggests the validity of our second hypothesis that the effects of public opinion on foreign policy depend on the importance of policy issues for publics. The probability of sending troops to Iraq increases dramatically from 0.2% to 64.1% when Opinion about US foreign policy changes from minus one to plus one standard deviation from the mean. Although the effects on the other two variables are positive and significant, our post-estimation simulation suggests that they are small. The probability of a BIA entering into force in 2003 increases from 0.8% to 5.6%. The percentage of common U.N. voting decisions with the U.S. increases from 47.5% to 55.8%.

Tests of Robustness

Through four additional analyses, we demonstrate that these results are robust to three potential sources of bias – sampling bias, selection bias, and omitted variable bias.66

First, we address an issue of potential sampling bias. We add a dummy variable for countries not using national samples. Since countries using urban samples tend to be developing countries, and since we control for GDP per capita, we expect that adding this control will not

65 To estimate uncertainty, we use a stochastic simulation technique (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).

66 In some of these additional models for robustness tests, a few covariates were dropped due to data problems (e.g., multicollinearity with others). The selection of control variables, however, does not affect our conclusions.
change coefficient estimates substantially. The results of this robustness check are consistent with our expectations. The effect of public opinion about the U.S. on whether a country sent troops to Iraq in 2003 is always positive and statistically significant. Marginal effects are substantially large. The effects on the other two variables are always positive, and statistically significant in most models. As in our main models, however, the magnitudes of the effects are small.

Second, to show that our findings do not depend on the particular set of countries included in the Gallup surveys, we estimated our models using an expanded dataset and a method of multiple imputation. Applying this method is suitable in our study, because it is only our key independent variable which has limited cross-national coverage: all three dependent variables and eleven control variables do not have missing values in most countries in the world. Analysis using the 189 countries for which we have data for all three dependent variables shows that the effect of opinion remains positive and significant in all three models with control variables.

The third set of robustness tests addresses the concern, already noted, that policy elites may attempt to manipulate public opinion before an important policy decision is publicly announced or implemented. Given that the unannounced intention to commit troops to Iraq, sign a BIA, and/or vote with the U.S. in the UNGA is unobservable (at least, difficult to measure with validity), this methodological issue of potential omitted variable bias is challenging to address. We approach this issue by conducting two additional robustness tests.

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67 For example, see Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1997).

68 See note 30 regarding selection issues.

In one test, we drop data for the latter of the three surveys used in our analysis. Specifically, we re-run our analyses using only the 2002 Voice of the People Survey (June-September 2002) and the Iraq 2003 Poll (January 2003). These predate not only the point at which the U.S. began publicly asking for troop commitments for the occupation (from May 2003, the point from which the vast majority of commitments were made), but also the initial invasion in March 2003 (involving troops from three U.S. partners: U.K., Australia, and Poland). They also predate U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech at the U.N. Security Council in February 2003, in which he presented intelligence on Iraq’s WMD program. At that point, we believe there was still considerable uncertainty about what the timeframe might be if a war were to occur, and which countries might join or oppose it. We therefore believe that surveys taken from June 2002 through January 2003 measure our causal variable well prior to our outcome variable, even for those states which participated in the original invasion.

The results show that the effects of Opinion about US foreign policy on Sent troops to Iraq in 2003 and UN voting with US in 2003 are positive and significant at the 1% level, even after controlling for other variables. The marginal effects are smaller, but this is to be expected. The longer the gap between when public opinion is measured and when foreign policy decisions are taken, the smaller the expected strength of their association. The effect on BIA entered into force in 2003 is positive but not significant. This is not a surprising outcome, as we argue that the effects of public opinion should be small for less salient issues (Hypothesis 2).

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70 We prefer to use our data based on three surveys, which reduces potential non-random measurement error. By using the three surveys, we also increase the number of countries in our sample, because each survey was not conducted in exactly the same set of countries.
The final robustness test to deal with potential problems of omitted variable bias is to use instrumental variables which are strongly correlated with the causal variable (*Opinion about US foreign policy*), but whose effects on the dependent variable only occur through the causal variable. Consistent with our theoretical discussion, we choose two measures of general favorability towards the U.S. (“Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the U.S.?" and “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the American people?”) in a multinational study conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Pew) before the war in Iraq began (*Summer 2002 44-Nation Survey*). We expect these instruments (specifically, the percentage of respondents saying “favorable” minus the percentage of respondents saying “unfavorable”) to have strong correlations with our causal variable. But it is difficult to imagine that the foreign publics’ favorable/unfavorable attitudes towards the U.S. and American people

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71 We run standard two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions for all the three dependent variables. An alternative model for *Sent troops to Iraq in 2003* and *BIA entered into force in 2003* is to use instruments in Probit regressions. We, however, prefer to use 2SLS because it is easier to conduct comprehensive specification tests after running 2SLS regressions, and because instrumental-variable Probit regressions do not always converge to produce coefficient estimates. In one model, which produced estimates while using as many control variables as possible (specifically, *Troops in Afghanistan, ICC member, Alliance portfolio, US economic aid, trade with US*, and *Europe*), the Wald test of instruments suggests that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Therefore, we do not need to be overly concerned about endogeneity. (Note that in this model, the effect of *Opinion about US foreign policy* on *Sent troops to Iraq in 2003* is still significantly positive at the 5% level and the instruments are highly significant at the 1% level.)
directly affect their country’s important foreign policy decisions; rather, such general attitudes should affect foreign policy decisions via their effect on the foreign policy views of the mass public.

The results of our instrumental variable regressions show that the effect on Sent troops to Iraq in 2003 is still positive and significant at the 5% level.\(^7\) The effects on the other two less salient issues are not significant. These results remain consistent with Hypothesis 2. Since the number of observations used in this robustness test is small, we interpret the estimates with caution.\(^3\) But the results reinforce our argument regarding the direction of causation: when an issue is highly salient, public opinion about U.S. foreign policy affects foreign policy behavior toward the U.S.

**Conclusions**

Our regression analyses are solidly consistent with our arguments. Public opinion about U.S. foreign policy indeed appears to matter when countries make decisions on issues of importance to the U.S. The estimated effect of public opinion about foreign policy is particularly large and robust if a specific foreign policy issue is salient for foreign publics, as we hypothesized. Foreign leaders, it seems, do pay attention to the attitudes of their own publics when they weigh decisions

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\(^7\) The results of over-identification tests suggest that instruments are valid, while the results of endogeneity tests suggest that we do not need to treat Opinion about US foreign policy as an endogenous variable, in the first place.

\(^3\) Only 25 countries are included in both the Pew study and at least one of the three surveys in our dataset.
– such as whether to send troops into harm’s way – which might incur significant public concern or opposition.

We acknowledge that while our dependent variables cover a range of issues, the period of investigation is specific. Thus, we are unwilling to make a general claim that foreign public opinion is always important for the U.S. In fact, our analysis may imply that it has real policy consequences only when issues are highly controversial and discussed among foreign publics extensively and intensively.\(^7\)\(^4\) Our study also does not examine the time-frame or the full process of soft-power effects. Additional empirical studies using data from other periods and using other policy variables are necessary to further understand the soft-power process connecting country images, targeted messages, foreign public opinion, and foreign policy outcomes. But we believe our study lays the foundation for such future investigation.

Three decades ago, Keohane and Nye first advanced a theory of international relations which placed considerable significance on transnational agenda setting as a source of real power in international relations.\(^7\)\(^5\) Although we would argue that military capabilities certainly have utility in the global terrorism issue area, it seems to us that the U.S. has often tested the outer bounds of the utility of military force since it launched the war in Afghanistan in 2001. Even in a situation of considerable unipolar preponderance in military capabilities, the U.S. has been far from exercising control over outcomes in many key areas.

Our analysis here is timely, given that the Obama administration seems to place greater emphasis on soft power than its predecessor, and to be more capable of generating a positive

\(^7\)\(^4\) Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009.

\(^7\)\(^5\) Keohane and Nye 1977.
image for the U.S. globally.\textsuperscript{76} Our previous research has shown the potential for the U.S. to influence perceptions of itself and its policies abroad, and the constraints and limits of such efforts.\textsuperscript{77} This article provides evidence for the next necessary link in the causal chain: the impact of international public opinion on foreign policy outcomes. In sum, this study suggests that soft power is not only rhetoric for leaders or a catchy phrase for pundits, but has real ramifications for international relations.

\textsuperscript{76} Knowlton 2009.

\textsuperscript{77} Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009; Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Inoguchi 2005.
References


Table 1: Observations, Below the Median of Causal Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Opinion about US foreign policy</th>
<th>Sent troops to Iraq in 2003</th>
<th>BIA entered into force in 2003</th>
<th>UN voting with US in 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-0.560</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>-0.560</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-0.524</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.333</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>-0.505</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.417</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-0.458</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-0.437</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>-0.430</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>-0.420</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.401</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.417</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>0.667</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.583</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.417</td>
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<td>0.167</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.583</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0.167</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>-0.287</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.727</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev.</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For our causal variable (Opinion about US foreign policy), we use the average ratios (positive and negative) for the survey item ‘Generally, do you think American foreign policy has a positive effect on <your country>, a negative effect or does American foreign policy have no effect on <your country>?’ in surveys conducted by Gallup International from June 2002 to May 2003.
Table 2: Observations, Above the Median of Causal Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Opinion about US foreign policy</th>
<th>Sent troops to Iraq in 2003</th>
<th>BIA entered into force in 2003</th>
<th>UN voting with US in 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.833</td>
</tr>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.250</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.667</td>
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Note: See Note to Table 1.
### Table 3: Regression Results

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<th>Model</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<td>Opinion about US Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>2.04**</td>
<td>3.33*</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>15.78**</td>
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*Note*: The number of observations is 58. See Note to Table 1 for measurement of the causal variable (Opinion about US foreign policy). Models 1 – 4 are estimated based on probit regression, while Models 5 – 6 are based on OLS regression. The NATO and Europe dummies are dropped in Model 4 because all countries that put Article 98 into force are neither NATO members nor in Europe. The UN voting with US (a ratio in Tables 1 and 2) is multiplied by 100 (and thus is % in this table) for better presentation of estimates. The robust standard errors are in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Figure 1: Issue Salience Measured by Number of Articles

Note: Data represent to the total number of articles per month based on a search of the Factiva database (http://global.factiva.com) in the following sources: ‘Major News and Business Publications’ for Africa, Asia Pacific, Australia/New Zealand, Canada, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and UK. The search terms were: ‘Iraq SAME (United States OR U.S. OR Bush) AND war’ or ‘International Criminal Court OR ICC’ or ‘(United Nations General Assembly OR UN General Assembly OR UNGA) NOT Iraq’. This search strategy requires that Iraq be mentioned in the same paragraph as the U.S., and limits hits to instances in which the word ‘war’ is used, thus setting restrictive requirements for our expected salient issue, while allowing any articles mentioning the ICC, and any non-Iraq related articles mentioning the UNGA, thus setting liberal requirements for our expected non-salient issues. The 58th UNGA was convened in September 2003, corresponding to the jump in media coverage.
Figure 2: Marginal Effects

Note: Each panel shows how much each dependent variable would change if the causal variable (Opinion about US foreign policy, see Note of Table 1) changed from –1 standard deviation from the mean to +1 standard deviation from the mean when all the other variables are held constant at their means. Each vertical bar indicates the 95% confidence interval of estimated probability (P) or expected value (E).