CONSENSUS IN CONFLICT: COMPETING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF JAPANESE POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR ERA

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CONSENSUS IN CONFLICT: COMPETING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF JAPANESE POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR ERA

The events of 1993 can be seen to be indicative of a fundamental change in the nature of Japanese politics. In the postwar era Japanese politics can be seen to have been characterised by two competing visions of the polity — ‘the constitutional’ and ‘the bureaucratic’. Each of these visions were underpinned by fundamentally different conceptual structures, and subsequently legitimated different concepts of politics and different centres of power. The hybrid institutional structure left by the Allied Occupation of Japan has been able to accommodate and facilitate either of the two visions, creating a political system with no clear centre of legitimacy and no clear centre of power. The relative prominence of the two visions has shifted over time; the bureaucratic vision dominating in the early postwar period, and the constitutional vision coming to the fore during recent events.

Introduction

In 1993 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was voted out of office after 38 years of governing Japan. This broke the tripartite alliance between the LDP, the bureaucracy and big business, which has characterised much of postwar Japanese politics, and paved the way for electoral reform. Analyses of these events have been largely mechanistic, focusing on how these structural changes affect the functioning of Japanese politics.

This paper seeks to show that these events are in fact indicative of a deeper shift in the nature of Japanese politics. During the occupation of Japan, the Allied powers attempted an ‘induced revolution’ (McNelly 1987, p. 76) transforming the polity into a liberal democratic society. However, the result was to establish two competing institutional power structures — the bureaucracy and the Parliamentary political structure; and two competing visions of the polity — the ‘bureaucratic’ and the ‘constitutional.’ These visions are underpinned by fundamentally different conceptual structures and subsequently legitimate fundamentally different forms of politics and centres of power. Consequently, the competition between them is not simply a competition between political adversaries; it is a competition over the nature of politics itself.
The co-existence of these two visions in the postwar period has given rise to a political system with no clear centre of legitimacy or power. Moreover, the relative prominence of these two visions has changed over time, with the ‘bureaucratic vision’ dominating during the 1960s and the ‘constitutional vision’ coming to the fore more recently, as highlighted by the events of 1993.

**Theory and methodology**

Implicit in this paper’s methodology is a theoretical position about the role of ideas in shaping political action. The methodology aims to substantiate this position by the explanatory power of the analysis it facilitates.

This position argues firstly that we all exist in constructed or interpreted realities. Stemming from the work of authors such as Geertz, Taylor and Winch, it argues that the way that we go about understanding the world around us is interpretive (see Geertz 1973; Taylor 1975; Winch 1963). We each collect information about the world and then build logical links between those pieces of information so as to construct an understanding of the world around us. In what follows, I refer to the internal logic of these constructed realities as their ‘conceptual structure’.

Secondly, ideas shape the way we build our constructed realities. Ideas mould the way that we interpret the world around us, making us more inclined to develop one understanding of the world or another. These ideas are public in that they are shared by communities of individuals, creating social cohesion by establishing a common understanding of the world. In the words of Ruggie, they establish ‘a dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention’ (Ruggie 1975, pp. 570–1). However, these ideas are also private in that they exist only within the minds of individuals. As a result, these interpretive realities can only be traced through expressed opinions about the nature of world, and through revealed action.

This leads to the third proposition that people’s actions are then shaped by their interpretive realities. How people behave, and what they consider to be legitimate behaviour in others, is shaped by their understanding of the world. Thus, people act in accordance with their interpretive reality, and, in doing so, increase the tendency for the world to actually conform to that reality. As a result, there is a general assertion that we can delineate broad trends in social/political behaviour by looking at broad trends in the prevailing interpretive reality, or what in this particular instance I will call a ‘vision of the polity.’
Behaviour stemming from ideas is of course subject to a myriad of practical constraints. The implementation of ideas is subject to having a medium for the ideas to be expressed and a means for the actions to take place. Sikkink highlights the importance of institutional structures in this process. She argues that ‘the institutional structure and the formal and informal rules that govern the state have a decisive impact on … the possibility of ideas becoming embodied in the institutions’ and that institutions play a vital role subsequent to implementation of any given set of ideas (Sikkink 1991, p. 248). As a result, one of the defining features of the Japan case has been not only the co-existence of these two very different sets of ideas about the nature of the Japanese state but also the existence of a hybrid institutional structure that has had the capacity to accommodate and implement either of these sets of ideas.

Finally, the ensuing discussion also engages in the debate about the roles of ideas and interests in political action and highlights the complex interrelationship between the two. On the one hand, some political actors unreflectively assume a view of the world, their interests are defined by that view of the world, and they act accordingly. On the other hand, however, other actors reflectively propagate particular views of the world so as to further their own interests by legitimating particular forms of action and by encouraging particular forms of action in others. In this analysis of Japanese politics, different actors can be seen to fall into each of these categories, and the same actor can be seen to fall into each category on different occasions.

The Occupation: the institutionalisation of cleavage

During the Allied Occupation of Japan, the Allied powers attempted to re-model the Japanese polity by dismantling the war-time state and installing a liberal democratic constitution. The constitution established the national Diet as ‘the highest organ of state power’ and ‘the sole law making organ of the state’ (Krauss and Ishida 1989, p. 36). It also relocated the basis of sovereignty, from imperial sovereignty to popular sovereignty, by making the Diet popularly elected and popularly accountable.

However, the Allied Occupation also inadvertently strengthened one of the great bastions of prewar political power, the bureaucracy. The Allied forces were dependent on the administrative expertise of the bureaucracy to administer the occupation. Hence, while 90 per cent of the military and 17 per cent of the political elites (including nearly all of the top conservatives) were purged, only 1 per cent of the bureaucracy (Kataoka 1992, p. 154) was targeted so as ‘to avoid the disruption of essential government functions’ (Pempel 1987, p. 160). Furthermore,
the Occupation reforms weakened the bureaucracy’s principal rivals for power; the military and the zaibatsu, creating a vacuum into which the bureaucracy could extend itself (Baerwald 1987, p. 136). As a result, ‘the bureaucracy came to constitute an independent political force … concerned primarily with preserving the status quo that assured it of its power’ (Kawai 1960, p. 118).

Consequently, the Occupation produced the paradoxical result of establishing a new liberal democratic constitution, while also augmenting the power of one of the prewar institutions—the bureaucracy. These two institutional structures engaged in fierce competition for relative influence and power over the Japanese polity.

One of the ways in which this conflict was manifested was in a struggle for control of the Diet. Bureaucratic domination of the Diet would render it a mere rubber stamp for a bureaucratic administration of the polity. However, if the advocates of the parliamentary political structure dominated the Diet, they could use the new constitution to assert themselves over the bureaucracy. This conflict was notably evident on the conservative side of politics.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s a group of conservative ex-bureaucrats came to prominence in the Diet. The group was lead by Yoshida Shigeru, an ex-high ranking bureaucrat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The group’s power base stemmed from the bureaucracy. In spite of their relatively small numbers ‘as experienced technocrats, versed in law and legislation and intimate with both the personnel and procedures of the bureaucracy, their influence was disproportionately great’ (Dower 1979, p. 314). Under the leadership of Yoshida, this group represented and advocated the power of the bureaucracy. ‘Yoshida’s objectives … were to protect the imperial family and the conservative power centring on the … bureaucracy from the occupation force’ and its reforms (Dower 1979, p. 309).

During the same period, a heterogeneous group of conservative ‘career politicians’ also emerged under the leadership of Hatoyama Ichiro. As ‘career politicians’, their power base stemmed from the parliamentary political structure. Under the leadership of Hatoyama, despite having some disagreements with the imposed constitution, they advocated the principles of democratic and constitutional government (Kataoka c1991, p.134).1

These two groups competed vigorously over (among other things) the role of the Diet and the relative power of the bureaucracy (MacDougall 1988, p. 59). The career politicians attacked the bureaucratic conservatives for their role in promoting the power of the bureaucracy and their technocratic vision of politics. In response, Yoshida belittled Hatoyama for placing so much
credence in the political process, describing ‘the Diet as a zoo and its members as monkeys’ (Dower 1979, p. 276). By the early 1950s Yoshida and his bureaucratic conservatives came to dominate the Liberal Party, and Hatoyama and his constitutional conservatives had established the Democratic Party.

In October 1955 the rising power of the socialists forced the two conservative parties to merge in order to maintain conservative dominance of the Diet, forming the Liberal Democratic Party. The threat from the left had taken precedence over their internal conflict about the relative influence of the bureaucracy and the Diet. Hence the conflict between the bureaucracy and the Parliamentary political structure was both manifested within the fabric of the Liberal Democratic Party and obscured by the need to maintain conservative unity.

This conflict was initially reflected in the factional breakdown within the LDP and, despite money politics and political pragmatism, the cleavage between these two groups has remained an important characteristic of Japanese politics.

**Competing visions of the Japanese polity**

The war of words that accompanied the struggle between these two groups reveals a subtextual debate over the nature of the Japanese polity. Despite the incongruencies created by political pragmatism and individual variations around the theme, two broad visions can be usefully delineated: the older ‘bureaucratic vision’ and the new ‘constitutional vision.’

Yoshida Shigeru, the leader of the ‘bureaucrat-turned-politician’ group in the Diet, was the man most closely associated with the ‘bureaucratic vision’. During his political career, as leader of the Liberal Party, he held the prime ministership initially in 1946–47 and again between 1948 and 1953. He was a defiant loyalist, committed to preserving the institutions of prewar Japan. He had been noted for his resistance to the new constitution prior to 1949. In 1949, in an act of political pragmatism, he changed his position to secure himself as ‘the cold war ally of the United States’ and claimed to support the constitution (Kataoka 1992, p. 158). However, he did not embrace the radical new values underlying the new constitution; rather, he argued that ‘it is simply that the old spirit and thoughts of Japan are being expressed in different words in the new constitution’ (Dower 1979, p. 325). Subsequently, Yoshida went about trying to rebuild Japan in accordance with old notions of the Japanese polity beneath the guise of the new constitution. This old notion of the polity was based on the concept of the family state.
The ‘family state’ is a notion of Japanese society as a single unit where all members of the society are united by their sense of a collective past and future. Yoshida articulated this concept of the Japanese polity as follows:

There is no distinction between the imperial house and the people. Sovereign and subject are one, as the saying goes. Sovereign and subject are one family. That there exists no antagonistic relationship between the sovereign and his subjects goes without saying (Dower 1979, p. 325).

In this vision of the polity, society is hierarchically organized, based on ‘vertical ties of hierarchy rather than horizontal ties of equality’ (Stockwin 1982, p. 29). However, this hierarchy should not be seen in terms of class. Rather, instead of people forming horizontal bonds with members of their own class, they form vertical bonds of mutual obligation, and of support and patronage with members of other classes. This serves to tie the interests of different social groups to one another, reducing antagonism and conflict. Micro-level manifestations of this form of social organisation can be seen in both the family unit and the much talked about organisation of ‘the Japanese firm’. In this idealised model of the firm, workers consider that their interests are tied to the profitability of the firm that employs them. As a result, wage demands tend to be sensitive to the financial status of the firm and employees work to ensure the firm’s long-term viability.

The fundamental unit of social organisation in this vision is the group, with the interests of the individual being subordinate to those of the group. It rests on ‘the citizen’s duties to the state [greater social unit] rather than popular sovereignty, local autonomy, checks and balances, or the rights of man’ (Cole and Levine, 1981). Furthermore, while it claims to be administered ‘for the sake of the citizenry’, ‘the nail that sticks up will be nailed down’, and thus the interests of the individual will be protected only so far as the individual is compliant with the ‘cohesive’ social unit. Therefore, the state is being administered for ‘the public’ and the ‘national interest’, not for the individual.

It has been common for the above form of social organisation to be coupled with economism and called a ‘corporatist state’, ‘Japan Inc.’ or a ‘Capitalist Development State’ (Johnson 1982). However, this represents a failure to make the distinction between the organisation of the polity and the goals of the polity.
In Yoshida’s bureaucratic vision, economism was a national goal that would act as a unifying focus for the Japanese polity, returning it to consensus from the turmoil of the postwar period (MacDougall 1988, p. 62). Yoshida saw the pursuit of economic growth as providing the basis for consensus among the people, the bureaucracy and the zaibatsu. It was to achieve this on two levels. Firstly, it would ease the economic hardship on the people, provide the zaibatsu with profits and provide a (superficially) apolitical and ideologically neutral focus for the whole society. Secondly, it provided a goal that could be couched in nationalist terms, enabling the bureaucracy to rally the whole country together to ‘catch up to the West’ (Johnson 1982, p. 24).

In the ‘bureaucratic vision’, the national bureaucracy is considered, not surprisingly, to be the legitimate apex of society. The bureaucracy had traditionally drawn its authority from its association with the emperor. They were not ‘civil servants’ but ‘servants of the emperor’, assisting the emperor in pursuit of the national interest. They had been selected through a process of highly competitive exams and hence were considered to be ‘Japan’s aristocracy of ability’ (MacDougall 1988, p. 63). It is widely acknowledged, however, that the emperor held little actual power and that it was the bureaucratic elite that effectively governed (Johnson 1982, p. 38).

The overarching nature of this ‘bureaucratic rule’ is highlighted by its relationship to law. In contrast to the Weberian notion, where power of the bureaucracy lies in the clearly defined parameters of the office, Henderson argues that bureaucrats have been ‘largely above the law in the sense of independent judicial review’ (Henderson 1975, p. 166). This position is supported by Isomura and Kuronuma, who argue that bureaucratic rule has constituted ‘administration through law’ rather than the ‘rule of law’ (Johnson 1982, p. 38).

The supremacy of bureaucratic rule continued to be legitimated in the postwar period on the basis that the bureaucracy can act in ‘the national interest’ while individuals only act on the basis of ‘private’ or ‘selfish interest’. This line of argument was used by Yoshida and his supporters in their battles with the Diet:

The bureaucracy fought for its policies, and against the interference of the none too competent political parties of the time, by invoking the old idea that the bureaucracy speaks for the national interest and the political parties only for local, particular, or selfish interests (Johnson 1982, p. 49).
As a result, advocates of the bureaucratic vision claim that ‘interest groups exist in Japan in great numbers, but there is no theory of pluralism that legitimates their activities’ (Kojima, as cited in Johnson 1982, p. 49).

This philosophy effectively discounts the potential legitimacy of a pluralistic political system. An elite bureaucracy that acts in the national interest must have primacy over political interests that act only in private or selfish interests. Hence, in this vision, the political structure is subordinate to the bureaucracy and is rendered a mere structure for the representation of individual self-interest and for the distribution of material interests.

In contrast, the ‘constitutional’ vision paints a very different picture of the Japanese polity. It is useful to outline this vision with very broad brush strokes so as to capture its many variants. The central elements of this vision were reflected both in the imposed constitution and by the views presented by Hatoyama, the leader of the conservative ‘career politicians’.3

The constitutional vision was based on liberalism and respect for the individual. ‘The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a drive for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly freedom of religion, assembly, speech and the press’.4 Hatoyama advocated this view and ‘rallied those who had defended the isolated ramparts of liberalism ... during the long period of the war’ (Uchida 1987, p. 312) in order to form one of the first postwar political parties.5 It was considered that this individualism would inevitably give rise to social pluralism and that ‘They [the Japanese people] shall … be encouraged to form democratic and representative organisations’ to embody and represent that pluralism (Uchida 1987, p. 312).

This vision also entailed constitutional government and the rule of law. ‘By upbringing and profession, [Hatoyama] was thoroughly wedded to Parliamentary democracy and constitutional Government’ (Kataoka c1991, p. 134). He outlined this commitment in an essay he wrote as part of his promotional material for the 1942 election.6 The form of constitutional government he, and the new constitution, advocated was a ‘democratically responsible political system’.7 This system established the national Diet as the ‘highest organ of state power’ and the central body for the government of society.

The Diet was to be popularly elected through a legally defined democratic process, thus locating sovereignty clearly with the people. Through the democratic process, the Diet would represent the pluralistic interests in society, institutionalising the conflict between the groups and governing the polity through its legal process. As a result, in contrast to the bureaucratic vision, in the constitutional vision the Diet is the legitimate political actor and the centre of
political power. The bureaucracy is simply a mechanism for implementing and processing the decisions made by the Diet.

It is a core argument of this paper that these two visions have fundamentally different conceptual bases. The bureaucratic vision, as asserted by Yoshida, is underpinned by what I refer to as a groupist conceptual structure, while the constitutional vision, as advanced by Hatoyama, is underpinned by what I refer to as an individualist conceptual structure. The conceptual structures are the internal logic by which we ‘make sense’ of our interpretive realities and construct our ‘visions’.

**Figure 1 Conceptual structures of political process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groupist conceptual structure</th>
<th>Individualist conceptual structure</th>
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<tr>
<td>Meritocratic elite</td>
<td>Democratic process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupist</td>
<td>Telocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Nomocratic</td>
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The groupist conceptual structure entails groupist social organisation, goal orientation and the legitimation of a meritocratic elite as the rulers of society. In groupist social organisation, the society perceives itself as a unified whole, such as the family state. As a result, the welfare of the group is foremost, and individual’s interests are subordinate to those of the group.

The groupist conceptual structure also entails a goal-oriented or telocratic state, where all things are measured in terms of their effectiveness in pursuit of achieving an overarching goal. This is distinct from a regulatory or nomocratic state, which concerns itself with the forms and procedures by which society is governed, enforcing the rules or laws and leaving the market mechanism or the mechanisms of law to derive the outcome.

To sustain national unity and coordination, a group must have a single focal point. Even if each member of the group has a separate task, there must be a common objective towards
which the structure is oriented. Conversely, setting a goal for a group of self-interested individuals would be a contradiction in terms. Thus, the existence of a widely agreed-upon common goal is also evidence that society is acting as a social unit. In the bureaucratic vision, this goal has been the pursuit of rapid economic growth.

In a goal-oriented environment, any outcome is assessed in terms of its contribution towards achieving the group’s goal. The means or process by which this end is achieved becomes irrelevant or manipulable (De Jouvenel, cited in Kelly 1979, p. 27).

Political legitimacy in the groupist conceptual structure stems from its capacity to achieve the group’s goal. In practical terms, this translates into the benevolent dictatorship of a technocratic elite that acts in the ‘national interest’. In the bureaucratic vision, that technocratic elite has been the economic bureaucracy. In this context, the political sphere is regarded as subordinate and simply acts to mediate between competing claims over the distribution of material interests between different groups in society.

The constitutional vision, on the other hand, is underpinned by an individualist conceptual structure. The clear delineation of the individualist conceptual structure based on liberal democracy is problematic, as numerous variants of this form of political and social organisation exist. Furthermore, it is not clear exactly which variant is being embraced by Hatoyama and advocates of the constitutional vision. However, for the issues under consideration in this analytical structure, adequate threads of commonality can be drawn from the different variants of liberal democracy to establish an individualist conceptual structure.

Liberal democratic forms of socio-political organisation that relate to the individualist conceptual structure can be divided into two broad groups — civil and civic. The ‘civil’ or minimalist state model of liberal democracy is based on the notion of the individual being governed by non-discretionary indiscriminate rules or laws being enforced by a ‘night watchman’ state. The ‘civic’ or social model of liberal democracy is of a self-governing community of individuals.

These forms of organisation should be distinguished from groupist forms of social organisation. The distinction between the groupist form of social organisation and civil forms of organisation is quite apparent. The distinction between social models of civic society and groupist models of organisation is equally substantial, though perhaps not as obvious. In the civic model of liberal democracy, the community provides a forum for the interaction between individuals, governs individuals within the society and protects the rights and interests of
individuals. Thus, civic models of liberal democracy are also based on the primacy of the individual and provide a contrast to the groupist models.

The second element of the individualist conceptual structure is that it is process or nomocratically oriented. A nomocratic or regulatory state concerns itself with the forms and procedures by which society is governed. It enforces these rules or laws and leaves the mechanisms of law, democracy and the market to derive the outcome. While these outcomes may involve the establishment of particular goals for a specific period of time, the structure of social organisation itself is not oriented towards achieving particular goals. This is consistent with Hatoyama’s concept of the Diet as acting to arbitrate between pluralistic groups through the legal process.

The conceptual link between individualism and a nomocratic orientation is the basis of the decision-making process. As discussed above, the groupist conceptual structure evaluates policies and decisions on the basis of its contribution to achieving the social goal. In a society based on individualism, where individuals have different goals and interests, decisions cannot be evaluated on the basis of their outcomes. Instead, there must be an acceptance of a just process through which decisions are made. The product of a just process will then be deemed to be just, irrespective of its outcome. Adversarial law and democratic process are examples of these processes.

The individualist conceptual structure entails popular sovereignty and locates political legitimacy in a democratic process. An individualist-based society inevitably results in social pluralism. The existence of this pluralism necessitates a nomocratic state. The democratic process acts to manage and reconcile that pluralism by institutionalising conflict into a system of debate. It establishes the laws and regulations through which debate occurs, but it does not concern itself with the outcomes of that debate. It does not impart directives as to the outcomes nor does it embody any social, political or economic goals (beyond those embodied within the democratic process.)

As Hatoyama’s constitutional vision is underpinned by the individual conceptual structure and Yoshida’s bureaucratic vision is underpinned by the groupist conceptual structure, it can be seen that the competition between these two visions is not simply a competition between political adversaries. It is a conflict over the nature of politics itself. It is a conflict over the basis of political legitimacy, and a competition over where power should reside in the Japanese state. That these two visions were competing and overlay one another is evident in the characteristics of Japanese politics in the 1960s.
The era of the bureaucrats

By the end of the 1950s the bureaucratic elements of the LDP had out-maneuved the career politician elements and established themselves in a position of relative prominence within the party. This period of bureaucratic dominance lasted until the early 1970s. During this period, whilst the two visions continued to exist in a state of tension, the bureaucratic vision had gained a clear ascendancy. As a result, the characteristics of Japanese politics during this period can be seen as the bureaucratic vision being overlayed and constrained by the constitutional vision.

During the period from 1957 to 1972, bureaucratic factions dominated the LDP. While the number of former bureaucrats in the LDP was relatively small, making up only about 25 per cent of the LDP Dietmen, their policy experience and their extensive ‘old boy’ networks with the bureaucracy made them the predominant force in the party (Allinson 1993, p. 133). The three prime ministers of the period, Kishi Nobusuke (1957–60), Ikeda Hayato (1960–64) and Sato Eisaku (1964–72), were all well-known ex-bureaucrats. The bureaucratic factions also dominated the Cabinet and held most of the powerful ministry positions. Nearly 60 per cent of the individuals chosen to head the three most powerful ministries — the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) — were former bureaucrats (Allinson 1993, p. 133). The bureaucratic domination of the LDP, and hence the Diet, enabled the development and implementation of the bureaucratic vision. The distinguishing features of this period can be reconciled with, and explained by, the prevalence of this vision.

The pursuit of rapid economic development was the national goal in this period. It emerged in the late 1950s and was established in earnest in December 1960 with the government’s announcement of the Income Doubling Plan. The targets of the plan were quickly outstripped, and throughout the 1960s the people were spurred on to pursue ‘high speed growth’ (Taira 1993, p. 170).

This goal unified the polity through the establishment of ‘consensus’. It achieved this on two levels: firstly, through the establishment of an initial broad social consensus, and secondly, through ‘the politics of inclusion’. The crux of the initial consensus lay in the ability of rapid economic growth to deliver benefits to all of the major groups in society. The promise of ‘income doubling’ and increased material well-being drew the people into the consensus after the hardship and deprivation of the war years (Allinson 1993, p. 135). While the government’s financial and investment policies were aimed at enhancing economic growth, they also promoted the interests of the city banks and big business, drawing them into the consensus.
Finally, ‘high speed growth’ could also be couched in nationalist terms. It offered a means by which Japan could regain its national prestige after the humiliation of defeat in the Second World War and reassert itself as a regional economic power (Johnson 1982, p. 24).

The LDP sustained and consolidated this consensus by marginalising potential opposition through what has become known as ‘the politics of inclusion’. Due to the rapid growth of the economy, the government was flush with funds and was able to engage in discretionary forms of patronage. The LDP ‘used the government purse to reward its supporters, [and] to cultivate new support’ (Curtis 1988, p. 46). Moreover, the government was able to use this flexibility to coopt potential opposition interests. In so doing, they incorporated potential opposition into the mainstream and tied their interests to ‘the national interest’ of continued economic prosperity.

This had the effect of unifying the polity in the pursuit of a single national goal.

The achievement of this national consensus through the pursuit of economic growth had flow-through effects on the political system. ‘Consensus building’ and marginalisation of opposition enabled the government to substantially ‘de-politicise politics’. It reduced debate largely to issues of economic management. Due to the lack of ideological debate and consideration of social policy issues, LDP politics became merely a ‘structure for the representation and distribution of material interests’ (Masumi 1992, p. 47). This development was facilitated by the tendency in Japanese politics for the individual candidate, rather than the party, to be responsible for voter mobilisation.11 Due to this tendency, each candidate had a personal support organisation, a koenkai, with whom the Dietmen developed a client–patron relationship. Access to decision-making allowed Dietmen to promise benefits to individuals or groups in return for electoral support. As a result, the politician became ‘a supplicant promising to deliver more pork-barrel than his competitor’ (Curtis 1988, p. 222) and ‘politics became a matter of peddling civil engineering projects’ (Masumi 1992, p. 43). These characteristics more closely approximate the ‘representation of private and selfish interest’ notions of politics associated with the groupist conceptual structure than the pluralist notions of democracy associated with the individualist conceptual structure.

Finally, the achievement of national consensus over the pursuit of economic growth and the ‘depoliticization of politics’ established a leadership role for the bureaucracy. The reduction of politics to issues of economic management paved the way for bureaucratic prominence. As experts in economic management, the bureaucracy exerted disproportionate influence over the policy-making process. Some authors even argue that ‘the bureaucrats initiated all major policies’ (Johnson 1990, p. 80). Furthermore, the bureaucrats ‘became famous for the results
they achieved, further legitimising their policy role’ (Johnson 1990, p. 77), with leadership being ‘legitimised’ on the basis of its prowess in achieving the national goal. That the bureaucratic dominance of the LDP enabled this to occur has led some commentators to characterise the period as a ‘virtual bureaucratic dictatorship’ (van Wolferen 1989).

Thus, it can be argued that it was no accident that ‘the phase of bureaucratic elites coincided with an era of stable politics, rapid economic growth, and general social quiescence’ (Allinson 1993, p. 134). Rather, Japanese politics in this period conformed to the bureaucratic vision and the groupist conceptual structure.

**Continuing conflict between the visions**

Despite the dominance of the bureaucratic elements during this period, the constitutional vision still held significant power. It compelled the bureaucrats to legitimate their actions in constitutional terms and was able to constrain and impede them as a result. This can be demonstrated through an analysis of the events surrounding the Special Measures for the Promotion of Designated Industries Bill.

This bill embodied the economic bureaucrats’ strategy for Japan’s economic growth. It contained a policy approach called ‘administrative guidance’, which is widely regarded as the key element in Japan’s ‘economic miracle’. Consequently, this was probably the most important policy issue in Japan in the 1960s.

The bill was drawn-up by MITI. It outlined provisions for the bureaucracy to intervene in the economy in order to achieve international competitiveness. These interventions would include the encouragement and support of strategic industries and the manipulation of existing industry structures so as to achieve optimal levels of domestic competition and economies of scale. The bill’s provisions for implementing these interventions included the use of financial incentives, trade controls and technology transfers.

On 22 March 1963 the Cabinet voted to formally support the bill, and on 25 March 25 it was introduced to the House of Representatives. The bill was highly controversial, and was attacked by the opposition amidst vigorous public debate. The LDP ultimately withdrew its support for the bill, rendering it ‘sponsorless legislation’. The bill was never passed; it was never even brought to the floor for a vote. However, on 26 June 1964 the MITI minister told the Cabinet that ‘the motivations and purposes of the Special Measures Law had all been sound and that it should be adopted as a tool of general industrial policy even though the law had failed to pass’ (Johnson 1982, p. 260). Hence, the bill was for all intents and purposes implemented.
These events highlight the ongoing tension between the two visions on two levels. Firstly, it is notable that the bill was taken to the Diet at all. That the bill was implemented only a matter of months after failing to pass in the Diet indicates that authorisation from the Diet was not needed to enable its implementation. The bureaucracy and the bureaucratic elements within the LDP were fully capable of effecting the bill without Diet endorsement. This adds weight to the view that the only purpose in taking the bill to the Diet was to have it legitimated by the democratic process. That the bureaucratic elements, both within the LDP and within the bureaucracy itself felt compelled to legitimate their actions in this way indicates that the constitutional vision still held substantial influence. That the bureaucrats felt compelled to do this, but also felt that it could implement the bill in their own right, indicates the two notions of legitimacy working in parallel. Thus, the ongoing tension between the two visions is apparent.

On another level, these events also indicate ongoing conflict between the advocates of the two visions. To analyse these events in this way, it is necessary to first recognise that the bill had fundamentally groupist underpinnings. One, it was goal oriented. It had the single objective of assisting Japan to achieve international competitiveness. It could use a variety of means to achieve these ends, with any particular tool being engaged purely on the basis of its contribution to achieving the goal. Two, the bill implicitly called upon a groupist notion of the polity. This is evident in the initial couching of the goal. It was based on the assumption of a unified national action in the face of the wider international economy. Also, the implementation of the law would invoke the supremacy of the national interest over the individual interest. MITI would be able to decide which industries should develop and along what lines, and the individuals that owned the companies would have little recourse to protect their private interests. Three, the bill invoked the role of the elite economic bureaucracy to ‘guide’ the economy in the pursuit of the national goal of international competitiveness.

The conflict that the bill generated in the Diet was indicative of ongoing conflict between the constitutional and bureaucratic visions. Firstly, the response to the bill by the public and the opposition parties reflected the fact that the ‘bureaucratic vision’ was by no means universally embraced during this period. ‘As expected, the opposition denounced the law as a return of bureaucratic control’ (Johnson 1982, p. 260), indicating the opposition resistance to the bureaucratic vision. The public response was more varied. The views expressed in the media ranged from condemnation of ‘the economic constitution’ and the ‘charge of the Sahashi brigade’ to the much more innocuous references to the ‘save MITI’ bill. This reflected the diversity of views in the community and the ongoing debate over the two visions.
Secondly, the LDP’s actions in these events are also illuminating. Johnson argues that the principal reason for the bill’s failure was not the protests of the opposition parties but the lack of support from the LDP. ‘The cabinet, the LDP and even … [the] minister had decided not to make a fight’ (Johnson 1982, p. 260). The reasons behind this back-down indicate the ongoing tension within the LDP. The bill obviously had support among the most powerful bureaucratic elements in the party: one, because the cabinet voted to sponsor it; and, two, because it was implemented only a matter of months after failing to get through the Diet. That the bill was implemented shortly after failing to get through the Diet discounts arguments that pressure was being applied behind the scenes by business groups. The most compelling explanation of these events is that the career politician factions opposed it because they found ‘it too reminiscent of the war time bureaucratic control apparatus’ (van Wolferen 1989, p. 90). The party leaders subsequently backed away from the legislation to avert an LDP split within the Diet.

Consequently, the 1960s saw the establishment of the bureaucratic vision as the dominant form of political organisation in Japan. However, it existed in a state of tension with the constitutional vision, and was often compelled to legitimate itself in accordance with that vision. The tension between the two visions began to increase in the later part of the 1960s as structural changes in the political sphere enabled it to increasingly constrain bureaucratic dominance.14

Consensus in conflict

During the 1970s the bureaucratic vision began to lose its grip over Japanese politics. Japan’s economic success created a crisis within the bureaucratic vision and the groupist conceptual structure. It has been established that the stability and unity of the groupist form of political organisation requires that it has an integrating social goal, and in the bureaucratic vision that goal has been economism and high-speed growth. The achievement of that goal has rendered it obsolete. During the 1970s and 1980s it was weakening as an integrating focus for society, facilitating a shift towards more individualist forms of the polity.

Japan has achieved its goal of high-speed economic growth with outstanding success. In the period from the early 1950s until 1971 Japan’s economy grew at an annual rate of 9.3 per cent. This growth slowed after the oil shock in 1973 but remained above that of most industrialised countries with average real GNP growth of 3.8 per cent from 1974 to 1985 (Lee and Yamazawa 1990, p. xxiv).

As a product of this success, economic growth and ‘catching up to the West’ ceased to provide a rallying point for the Japanese people. People felt that the goal had been achieved and
now they wanted to enjoy the fruits of their labour. They were no longer prepared to ‘live as we do in order that the economy may prosper even further’ (Inoguchi 1987, p. 33). This change in peoples’ attitudes reflects a movement from the national interest to individual interests. The new generation increasingly focused on issues of individual consumption and individual quality of life rather than national economic performance. This shift from a group goal orientation to an individual interest orientation undermines the notion of society acting as unified nation and constitutes a gradual erosion of the groupist conceptual structure.

The shift towards the focus on individual consumption has also been a product of the economic orientation itself. The focus on economic growth and income doubling had generated a consumer society. ‘The cultivation of high-level consumer desires … on the basis of newly acceptable ‘privatism,” “productionism” and “modernism” values [was] fully entrenched by the … late 1960s and 1970s’. Consumer goods had become status symbols and ‘signs of middle class inclusion’ (Ivy 1993, p. 249). Thus, the focus on economic growth had generated a social ethos of individual consumption and contributed to this erosion of the groupist conceptual structure.

Furthermore, there was also increasing insight into the social costs that had accompanied economic growth and awareness that these costs were not being shared equally. One of the most publicised of these costs was environmental damage. In the wake of crises such as the methyl mercury poisoning of hundreds of people in the Minamata area of Kumamoto prefecture (Taira 1993, p. 173), public attitudes to ‘GNPism’ began to change. In 1970 the Asahi Shimbun, a popular news daily, ran a long series of reports and articles entitled Kutabare GNP! [Down with GNP]. They assessed the costs of economic growth on the environment and people’s quality of life, and contributed to the emerging view that ‘the nation prospers but the people perish’.15

An increased level of political pluralism developed in parallel with this shift in public attitudes. The increased focus on quality-of-life issues created an increased social consciousness about a wider range of social issues. ‘In the late 1960s and early 1970s Japan experienced [the emergence of] a variety of social protest movements: environmentalists, welfare rightists, citizens, workers, students’ and disadvantaged groups (Taira 1993, p. 167). During the 1970s this began to translate into the political sphere. In the late 1970s there was an ‘explosion’ of minor parties on the political scene (Hrebenar 1986, p. 220). These minor parties reflected mostly single-issue groups such as the Japan Women’s Party, the Green Party and the Wheelchair Party, indicating an increasing consciousness of interest groups. This increased
social pluralism signals an end to the notion of a unified national interest, and the expression of that pluralism through the Diet highlights movements towards individualist notions of politics.

**Crisis of legitimacy**

In the late 1980s a crisis of legitimacy can be seen to have been emerging. The period was characterised by a run of corruption scandals, a disregard for public opinion and a lack of vision for Japan’s future. However, the challenge to the Japanese system was not that these issues arose, as they had done so before; the problem rather was that the public’s expectations had changed and they would no longer accept those forms of politics. While the LDP continued to engage in groupist forms of politics, the electorate was calling for political reform along the lines of constitutional notions of politics. This discrepancy generated a crisis of legitimacy.

There were a number of corruption scandals in the late 1980s. The largest was the Recruit Cosmos Scandal in which the then Prime Minister, Takeshita Noboru, reportedly received ¥201 million (Hrebenar 1992, p.75). The scandal brought down Takeshita and four of his ministers. Despite their magnitude the most substantial product of these scandals was to reveal a change in public attitudes. The Japanese public had traditionally been remarkably tolerant of corruption, but this was no longer the case:

> Covert political handouts by companies with expectations of favours are not unusual. The Recruit Cosmos Scandal surfaced only because its donations were handled clumsily … but the Japanese population is increasingly viewing such behaviour as unacceptable … the Japanese public has changed and is much more politically conscious (*EIU Country Report*, No. 3, 1989, p. 12).

This change in public expectations can be seen to reflect a change in the public perception of where power and legitimacy should lie between the bureaucracy and the Diet. If the bureaucracy is governing the country and the parliamentary political structure is simply a mechanism for the distribution of material interests, political corruption does not seriously undermine the legitimacy of the governmental structure. Hence, in the past the Japanese public was relatively tolerant of political corruption, as long as the bureaucracy remained untainted. In contrast, if the Diet is the centre of power, corruption inhibits its capacity to fulfil its
representative function, and seriously undermines the legitimacy of the governmental structure. Consequently, this change in people’s attitudes to political corruption can be seen as a shift from the bureaucratic vision to the constitutional vision.

The Diet’s deficiencies in performing its representative function were also highlighted in these years. The LDP leadership attempted to force a number of highly unpopular pieces of legislation through the Diet, most notably a consumption tax. The consumption tax legislation was opposed by the opposition parties in the Diet, attacked by the media and ‘hated’ by the public. Despite this popular ground swell against it, the tax was pushed through the Diet. (CIU Country Report, Japan, No. 1, 1989, p. 11). This highlights a shift in the popularly construed basis of sovereignty. The electorate was no longer prepared to submit itself to an all-knowing bureaucracy’s management of the ‘national economic interest’, nor was it prepared to be excluded from the decision-making process. Hence there had been a shift in sovereignty from an omniscient bureaucracy to popular sovereignty.

The LDP’s attempts at asserting these groupist notions of politics was no longer acceptable to the electorate. There was a view that ‘the nation deserved, and could now afford, a more clearly democratic political system’ (Stockwin 1991, p. 6). The Japanese people had come to expect an individualist conceptual structure notion of democracy. They were no longer prepared to tolerate a notion of politics as merely as structure for the distribution of personal interests, nor were they prepared to be ruled by bureaucratic decree. In early 1989 the LDP’s public approval rating dropped to less than 5 per cent. In the Upper House election held in July of that year, the LDP lost its majority for the first time since its formation in 1955. The number of seats held by the LDP declined from 140 to 109 out of a total of 252.

However, the LDP’s defeat in 1993 did not stem from being voted out of office; rather, it occurred because the party split. This split can be seen as a product of an intensified conflict between the career politicians and the ex-bureaucrats. The career politicians took the opportunity to ride the wave of public disenchantment with bureaucratic notions of politics. They claimed to represent the constitutional vision of politics in an effort to gain public support and to assert themselves over the bureaucratic elements of the LDP.

In 1993 Kanemaru Shin, vice-president and ‘king maker’ of the LDP, was forced to resign after being implicated in the massive Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin bribery scandal. This sparked a battle within the party over who would succeed him. The two principal candidates were Ozawa Ichiro, a career politician, and Obuchi Keizo, a man linked to the bureaucratic elements of the
party. Despite the general expectation that Ozawa would take the position, Obuchi was appointed to the vice-presidency.

In response to this decision, Ozawa, one of his colleagues, Hata Tsutomo, and 46 of their fellow Dietmen formed a new faction within the LDP — Reform Forum 21. This group drew on the mood of the electorate and advocated the constitutional vision of Japanese politics. Ozawa stated that the aim of this group was ‘to transform post-war Japanese politics itself’ (Delfs 1993, p. 11). One of the central elements of Ozawa’s ‘new politics’ was to end the tradition of the bureaucratic dominance of politics. In doing so, he hoped to make the Diet ‘a place in which real discussions can be held’ and in which real decisions would actually be made, thus relocating national leadership from the bureaucracy to the Diet. Furthermore, the new faction demanded electoral reform to ‘clean up’ politics and eliminate corruption, thereby transforming politics from a mechanism for the distribution of material interests to representation of the electorate. Finally, Ozawa and Hata advocated the end of the ‘consensus seeking’ form of politics (Delfs 1993, p. 11). Thus, they were rejecting the notion of the polity as a ‘family state’ and embracing the concept of social pluralism.

In response to Ozawa’s criticisms and increasing public pressure, the then Prime Minister, Miyazawa, had no choice but to promise to implement a substantive program of political reform. He failed to make the promised reforms and on 18 June a no-confidence motion was filed against him. The members of Ozawa’s new faction abstained or voted with the opposition, resulting in the dissolution of the parliament. In the lead-up to the 18 July poll, the LDP splintered and the Ozawa faction broke away from the LDP and formed two new parties — Shinseito and Shinto Sakigake. These parties joined the New Japan Party, a reformist party that had broken away from the LDP months earlier.

The dissolution of Miyazawa’s government and the subsequent splintering of the LDP was therefore a direct product of the conflict between the career politicians and the bureaucrat-turned-politicians. It can also be seen that these two groups competed on the basis of their respective concepts of Japanese politics, each propagating the vision that legitimated their basis of power.

In the July election the LDP lost its majority in the House of Representatives for the first time since its establishment in 1955. Out of a total of 511 seats, the LDP won only 223. The Renewal Party won 55 seats, the Japan New Party won 35 seats and Sakigake won 13 seats. In the wake of the election, a ‘rainbow coalition’ of seven anti-LDP parties was formed and took office, deposing the LDP for the first time in 38 years.
Conclusion

Karel Van Wolferen (1989) characterised the Japanese state as a truncated pyramid, as a hierarchical structure with no clear centre of power or legitimacy. This can be seen to have been a product of two competing visions of the Japanese polity, where the visions legitimated two different concepts of politics and two different centres of power. Japan’s institutional structure contained adequate ambiguity to accommodate and facilitate the implementation of either of these visions. The malleable nature of the institutional environment has produced the opportunity for Japanese politics to undergo fundamental change, making the shift from one vision to the other, without necessitating an overhaul of the institutional environment.

In the early postwar period the bureaucratic vision was predominant. It legitimated the role of an elite bureaucracy to lead and guide a unified polity in the pursuit of a national goal. It has viewed politics as simply a structure for the representation and distribution of material interests. The constitutional vision existed and acted to constrain the bureaucratic vision in this early period but only started to emerge more strongly in the 1970s. The constitutional vision legitimates the democratic process as a mediator between pluralistic interests, in a polity premised upon individual interests.

In 1993 this movement culminated in Ozawa and the Reform 21 forum attempting to harness the growing public disenchantment with the bureaucratically dominated LDP’s forms of politics. They did this by appealing to the constitutional vision of politics, which ultimately resulted in the LDP losing power for the first time in 38 years.

While these events represent a crucial turning point in the struggle over the nature of Japanese politics, they are not conclusive. Firstly, the struggle between the two respective visions is by no means over. Much of the electorate is still in a state of flux and advocates of groupist notions of Japanese politics are desperately searching for a new basis on which to re-establish consensus and to reassert groupist notions of politics. This ongoing struggle is highlighted by the LDP’s return to power and the appointment of Hashimoto, a man who is known for being sympathetic to the bureaucratic management of political affairs, as Prime Minister.

Secondly, the implementation of a more policy-oriented ‘constitutional vision’ of Japanese politics is being inhibited by a series of practical and institutional constraints, not least of which has been the electoral system. The multi-member electoral system, and the subsequent dependence on koenkai as the primary source of vote mobilisation, has sustained the ‘pork
The recent electoral reform introducing single member districts theoretically removes the necessity of *koenkai* for electoral success. However, as most of the incumbent politicians’ power bases still stem from their *koenkai*, it is likely they will continue to be important, if in a modified form, under the new system. As a result, it is unlikely that this institution of Japanese politics, with its subsequent ramifications of the nature of political debate, will disappear, at least in the short to medium term.

Finally, the scramble for power in the wake of the LDP’s split has created a period of Japanese politics characterised by unstable coalitions and short terms of office. It has produced many unlikely bedfellows as issues of policy and ideology have become secondary to the procurement of power. How the final re-alignments will emerge is uncertain. Whether a group with adequate strength to usher in this new period in Japanese politics will emerge is by no means apparent. Hence, while voters continue to have their voice on policy issues muffled by pork-barrel politics, the bureaucracy may again find a political structure so weak and volatile that it can again assert its influence on the basis of bringing continuity and good management to Japan’s affairs.
Notes

1 It is important to note that while these were the values advocated by Hatoyama, a range of other views also existed within the party.

2 This idealised model of the Japanese firm was developed by authors seeking to explain Japan’s economic success on an institutional basis. It is by no means the only form (or even the common form) of firm organisation in Japan. See Cole and Levine (1981).

3 Hatoyama did have a number of points of contention with the new constitution and was a strong voice in the call for constitutional reform. However, these reforms focused on Article 9 and the issue of Japanese rearmament. Hatoyama also resented the imposition of the constitution, considering it to be undemocratic. These points of contention, however, did not undermine his underlying commitment to constitutional government.

4 Text from the ‘United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’, which was published in Japanese newspapers on 24 September 1945, as cited by Uchida (1987, p. 308).

5 However, P. K. Roest noted that Hatoyama was ‘more of a well educated Tory’ than a ‘laissez faire liberal’. P. K. Roest, Memorandum for the Record, ‘Interview with Hatoyama Ichiro’, pp. 4–5. (Roest was a member of the government section during the Occupation.)

6 Hatoyama was also fiercely nationalistic, and anti-communist. He advocated some draconian means towards achieving these ends. His vision of political pluralism was one in which the two dominant parties would be conservative.


8 Consider the social contract theorists, particularly Hobbes in his arguments that society is a number of individuals bounded together for their mutual protection and to escape the ‘state of warre’.

9 It is controversial to define democracy as nomocratic. It implies that democracy is simply the democratic process. There is debate as to whether democracy is simply an impartial process of arbitration of individual interests, or whether, while the democratic process is important, the essence of democracy is the ‘democratic values’ it embodies. However, as both concepts of democracy acknowledge that the democratic process is core to their concept of social organisation, for the purpose of this analytical structure I simply draw on this commonality. Therefore, this limited definition of democracy simply refers to ‘democratic process’. Democratic process is nomocratic as society is governed by subjecting individuals to impartial processes, and laws.

10 This is so possibly with the exception of the pursuit of democratic values.
This tendency is widely attributed to the country’s first-past-the-post, multi-member electoral system. This system means that candidates from the same party often run against one another. See Kraus and Ishida (1989, p. 43).

The bill was in the Diet for three sessions: the 43rd 44th and 46th sessions. The 46th session of the Diet concluded on 26 June 1964. See Johnson (1982, p. 260).

Sahashi Shigeru was a senior bureaucrat and MITI vice-minister.

These developments included the emergence of the zoku, which were policy cliques of politicians that enabled the politicians to develop policy expertise to rival the bureaucrats.


Hata Tsutomu, as quoted by The Daily Yomiuri, 24 June 1993, p.1.
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