This paper is based on research conducted in Australia and the United States into Australian aims toward the Allied Occupation of Japan under the Chifley government between 1945 and 1949. It challenges the prevailing characterisation of Australian aims as solely seeking a ‘harsh peace’ with Japan. An alternative, two-platform model is proposed to assess Australian aims. The model incorporates the pragmatic and retribution aspects of Australian policy (known as platform-one aims) and the more complex pragmatic and idealist aims of encouraging democratisation in postwar Japan (known as platform-two aims). The paper focuses on platform-two aims, as these tend to be neglected in historiography on the Australian role in the Occupation.

The paper discusses three examples of Australian policies regarding the democratisation of Japan – constitutional reform, land reform and labour reform. These policies are placed in the context of Dr H.V. Evatt’s vision for the postwar world and the emerging Cold War. The paper assesses Australia’s ability to contribute to postwar reform in Japan during the Occupation. Obstacles to the implementation of Australia’s agenda included the difficulty to turn rhetoric into practice, problems in the Department of External Affairs, unilateral action by General Douglas MacArthur and the United States government, and the changing balance of global power with the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War.

Introduction

Australia’s aims toward Japan immediately after World War II have often been characterised as a crusade for a ‘harsh peace’. Demands for the indictment of Emperor Hirohito, trials of Japanese war criminals, opposition to the resumption of Japanese whaling in Antarctica, and insistence on demilitarisation were elements of this crusade. There was a perception in Australia that Japan could rise again to menace the region and endanger stability, as Germany had in Europe. A revived Japan could also jeopardise the new role Australia hoped to play in the Pacific. Economic motives had a role in this attitude – Australia realised that Japan’s defeat could benefit its economy. There were plans to move into Southeast Asian markets,
establish a domestic whaling industry and to make use of reparations from Japan. There was also widespread resentment in Australia of Japan’s wartime aggression and atrocities, for which they sought retribution. The standard analysis sees motives of self-interest and punishment, with little interest in the rehabilitation of the defeated nation: in short, a ‘harsh peace’.

The rhetoric of Australia’s postwar political leaders was partially designed for public consumption. As Dingman astutely observes, wartime passions ran so high that ‘they [may have swept] away the political leader who did not protect himself with a life jacket of anti-Japanese rhetoric’ (Dingman 1984: 102). Yet the attitudes and policies of the Chifley Labor government between 1945 and 1949 were more complex than this picture suggests. Another, perhaps less populist, aim of the Chifley government was to encourage democracy in Japan. In September 1945, Frederick Eggleston,³ Australian Minister to Washington, told Dean Acheson, US Under Secretary of State that, ‘The real solution would be to produce real democracy in Japan, as democracies do not fight one another’. Democratic ideals, he said, should be especially encouraged in the working and peasant classes (NA 1945a). Social and economic reform was therefore an integral component of Australia’s policy toward Japan.

‘Democratisation’, though a rather vague and open-ended term, was intended to support both security and economic aims.⁴ A democratic nation would be less of a security threat to Australia, and a stronger Japanese economy would benefit Australian exports and prevent a flood of cheap goods onto the international market.⁵ Yet the strategy was not only conceived in Australia’s interests – democratisation was intended to empower the Japanese people and contribute to world peace. There was greater concern for the Japanese people than Australia’s security and economic interests alone implied. The goal of democratising Japan was not only Australia’s – it was part of the Allied Occupation’s postwar platform. However, it was distinctly interpreted by the Labor government as the export of Australian ideals and an Australian ‘way of life’ to the Japanese people. Democratisation had an ideological and philosophical basis, one that was not always congruent with the aims of the dominant nation in the Allied Occupation of Japan – the United States.

The Australian Labor government followed a dual-platform policy toward the Allied Occupation of Japan. The first platform was based on security, retribution and economics – driven by both the emotional and the pragmatic. This set of aims best fits the clichéd ‘harsh peace’ view of Australian policy. The second platform, while also having a pragmatic underpinning, was more idealistically based on the vision of Labor and H.V. Evatt, the
Minister for External Affairs. This broadly liberal, social-democratic and internationalist vision put faith in democracy, in the ability of large and small nations to cooperate in formal bodies, and in the labour and trade union movement, and stemmed from the desire to improve the political, economic and social position of the people of the Pacific region. Each platform was driven by divergent senses of justice: the judgmental and the social, or the pragmatic and the idealistic. This dichotomy of justice contributed to the distinctiveness of Australian policies toward Japan during the Occupation. This paper focuses on the second platform of policy, the pursuit of democratic tendencies, by examining three examples of Australian policy: the revision of Japan’s constitution, land reform and support for the Japanese labour movement.

The context of Evatt’s policy toward Japan

Australian diplomacy under the Chifley government was greatly influenced by the ideas and actions of the Minister for External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt. In order to understand the approach taken by the Labor government toward the democratisation of Japan in the postwar period, a brief examination of Evatt’s political idealism in relation to the postwar international order is needed.

There were four main aspects of Evatt’s political idealism that related to the second platform of Labor policy toward the Occupation of Japan. T.B. Millar has described Labor’s foreign policy idealism at the time as devoted to the following principles:

- raising the standard of quality of living among the underprivileged;
- to promoting the right of individuals, peoples, governments; and to having large nations and small, rich and poor, working together for those ends on the basis of a formal equality. (Millar 1978: 386)

Millar’s analysis reveals two important aspects of Australia’s policies toward Japan, as influenced by Evatt. The first relates to the right of individuals to enjoy certain living standards and political, economic and social freedoms. These rights clearly influenced the second platform of policy toward Japan, as reflected in Eggleston’s observation to Dean Acheson quoted in the introduction. They were also integral to Evatt’s support of such doctrines as the Atlantic Charter, which he believed applied equally to the Pacific region, and his fervent faith in the United Nations. The historian Manning Clark described Evatt as a ‘true
believer in the Enlightenment ... that “as bad conditions were the cause of evil, good conditions would make men good”’ (Waters 1996: 100, quoting Clark 1980). So, ‘Evatt was convinced that international conflict could be resolved only if the root causes were identified and if the solutions decided upon satisfied the basic needs of the people involved’ (Waters 1996: 98). In light of Evatt’s international idealism and ‘instinct ... to support the underdog’, as K.H. Bailey stated (quoted in Buckley et al. 1994: 202), Labor government policy and actions in Japan refrained from blaming the Japanese people for the war and anticipated that improvements to individual living standards and political rights would remove the root causes of war. There was, therefore, a separation of responsibility for wartime atrocities that underwrote Australia’s dual approach to Occupation policy. While the Japanese militarists needed to be brought to justice, the Japanese people were seen as another of their victims.

The second aspect of Labor’s foreign policy illustrated by the quote was the notion of small and large nations working together ‘on the basis of a formal equality’. Here Millar was referring to Evatt’s hopes for the newly formed United Nations, but the statement could equally have applied to postwar Japan, where the basis of formal equality was the control machinery of the Allied Occupation – the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) in Tokyo. Evatt and the diplomats who represented Australia in these institutions fought constantly for a voice for Australia and the right to influence and contribute to the form, policy and substance of the Occupation.

Another facet of Evatt’s beliefs relevant to his Japan policies was his view of a multipolar postwar world rather than the bipolar one that was actually emerging. While the Australian Labor Party took a stand against communism in Australia, it took a less hostile view of communist activity abroad. Australian diplomats were often found voting on the same side as the Soviets in international bodies such as the United Nations or in the control machinery of the Occupation of Japan (Burgmann 1984: 49). In addition, Evatt did not view Japan as the ‘bastion of the Free World in Asia’, the position the United States came to adopt (Reynolds 1996: 157). The emerging bipolar world was incompatible with Evatt’s vision for the role of small and medium-sized nations. Evatt hoped the Commonwealth could provide a ‘third way’, especially considering Britain, Australia and New Zealand all had labour governments, as a letter from the UK High Commissioner in Canberra revealed (Williams 1948).

Evatt also hoped Australia would partially take over Britain’s role in the Pacific. Evatt wanted to establish a ‘buffer zone’ to Australia’s north, including Portuguese Timor, Dutch and Australian New Guinea (including New Britain and New Ireland), the Solomons, the New
Hebrides and New Caledonia (Buckley et al. 1994: 232). Such a zone, of course, verged on neo-imperialism and reflected Evatt’s obsession with Australia’s postwar security. It was also an attempt to reduce the influence of the United States in the region by keeping countries under Commonwealth leadership. While Japan did not fall into this zone, its wartime aggression meant it was of particular significance to Australia, and United States dominance in Japan concerned Evatt and the Australian government. There was a fear that the United States would rebuild Japan’s strength to the point where Australia’s ambitions to influence the region would be challenged, as Japan had been able to do in the 1937–45 period. Australia’s lack of authority over the postwar transformation of Japan increased its perception of the need for influence in the southwest Pacific region. Evatt’s concern with a security buffer zone may also help explain his tolerance of Soviet claims for a defensive buffer zone through Eastern Europe.6

There was therefore both a pragmatic and an idealistic basis to the second platform of Australia’s Occupation policy. Australia’s desire for postwar security and its wish to play a more active international role were mixed with ideals of the right of all people to decent living standards, to political freedoms and to be able to establish a strong and active labour movement. Since a reformed Japanese society based on such ideals also would be less likely to wage an imperialist war, security concerns cannot be totally divorced from ideological and social-reformist ones. In true Evatt spirit, Australia’s policy toward Japan was a combination of pragmatic and idealist considerations. These considerations often conflicted or contrasted with each other as well as with those of the other Allied powers (particularly the United States), when the attempt was made to turn rhetoric into action.

Evatt’s foreign policy ideals could not be applied to Japan in isolation – they came up against the postwar dominance of the United States, whether in the form of policies and practices of the United States government or the actions of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur. The two countries’ ideas as to what constituted a democratic political, economic and social system often clashed. These differences affected the degree to which each government embraced reform in postwar Japan. The Australian diplomat D.B. Copland described it as follows:

> it appears that, from the very beginning, American ideas as to reform were much less penetrating than those of, say, the British or the Australians. There is, of course, a fundamental difference between the American conception of a social structure and that of the
British. It may be described as a difference between free enterprise and social control, or even moderate collectivism. (NA 1947a: 1)

The British and Australian systems gave greater emphasis to government control of the economy, establishing a welfare system and the right for trade unions to participate in politics, for instance, than the American model of free enterprise. These divergent ideals were played out within the Allied institutions. The increased rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union served to further discredit Australian goals of social justice in the eyes of the United States, which believed they served to further the cause of communism in Japan. Therefore, Evatt’s policies toward Japan need to be viewed not only in the light of his own liberal, social-democratic and internationalist vision, but also in the context of the alternative views of the United States and emerging international tensions.

‘Rhetoric into practice’: Australian participation in the control machinery

Chifley in 1945 called for ‘a radical change in Japanese society’ (Bates 1993: 11), a call that was expressed in the policy aim of democratisation. Eggleston articulated Australia’s vision for Japan to US Secretary of State James Byrnes, stating that Japan’s underdevelopment had forced it to seek foreign markets and become an aggressor. The solution therefore was to make ‘every effort ... to improve the economic and social position of both agricultural and industrial populations’ and to ‘foster trade union and other movements aiming at raising standards of living’ (NA 1945b, c). Buckley et al. (1982: 264–5) state that Evatt:

wanted the total disarming of Japan and a revolutionary restructuring of its social and economic structure so that it would never again threaten the region. Its feudal institutions would be replaced by those of the West. A democratic constitution would be promulgated with protection of civil liberties. Trade unions would protect Labor [sic] and at the same time lead to higher levels of consumption.

Essentially, Australia wanted a labour-led recovery under a reformist government in Japan rather than the capital-led one under the conservative government that eventuated. Australia’s views were actually in line with early US aims, as the General Headquarters (GHQ) and the staff of the SCAP were dominated at that time by ‘New Dealers’. Evatt’s and
Labor’s liberal social-democratic vision was reflected in Australia’s approaches to three priorities for democratisation: Japan’s constitution, land reform and labour movement.

**The constitution**

The controversy surrounding the imposition of a new constitution on defeated Japan is well known. MacArthur’s handling of the issue appeared to break the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, which stipulated that constitutional reform was one of the areas that had to be placed before the FEC prior to taking any action. MacArthur’s actions did not deter the member nations of the FEC from discussing the constitution – they refused to accept what he presented as a fait accompli. Much of the concern espoused by the Allies, including Australia, rested not on the document itself, but whether it represented the will of the Japanese people. That is, was it a truly an indigenous document that would empower the Japanese people?

Australia was highly critical of the draft constitution, and circulated a commentary written by Eggleston among the delegates. The commentary was generally favourably received, and James Plimsoll, as an Australian representative to the FEC, assured Eggleston that, ‘Almost all the amendments which we were successful in securing were proposed by Australia’ (NL 1946a). Plimsoll felt that the main faults of the constitution arose because: ‘the Japanese were attempting to graft American constitutional procedures onto a constitution modelled on the British form of monarchy and Parliamentary executive. The trouble is that the Government Section of SCAP is entirely American and contains nobody who has any understanding of the workings of the British form of government’ (NL 1947a). Of course, the Australians were ready to offer their unwanted advice on this issue.

Plimsoll specified vagueness in drafting, the uncertain role of the Emperor, the concentration of power in the House of Councillors, the lack of provision for universal adult suffrage, the manner of selecting the prime minister and the lack of recall and impeachment of the judiciary as inadequacies of the new constitution (Australian Embassy 1946: 204). MacArthur was instructed by Washington to ‘persuade’ the Japanese government to incorporate the FEC’s endorsed revisions into the draft constitution that was before the Diet (MMA 1946a). Many of these revisions were based on Australian proposals. The revisions included: the selection of the prime minister and a majority of the members of cabinet from the membership of the Diet; a guarantee of universal adult suffrage; and the stipulation that the prime minister and members of state should be civilians (MMA 1946a, b). These instructions
were carried out reluctantly by MacArthur, who accused the FEC (seemingly without a conscious sense of his hypocrisy) of failing ‘to recognize that such actions would constitute a complete repudiation of the requirement that the constitution must be a free expression of the people’s will’ and warned the Japanese would ‘unquestionably bear some resentment against such allied interference’ (MMA 1946a).

Evatt particularly wanted to add a provision for revision to ensure that the constitution was the truly expressed will of the Japanese people and to allow the FEC to review the constitution after a period in operation. He proposed that the people should have a chance to vote on the constitution and any proposed amendments thought necessary by the Diet or a constituent assembly within 18 months to two years after its adoption. Evatt instructed Macmahon Ball (the British Commonwealth’s representative on the ACJ) to discuss the proposed review with MacArthur. The General’s reaction was to stride ‘excitedly about the room’ and while ‘trembling violently shouted his views at me [Ball] very fast’. He defended the constitution as ‘the finest and greatest thing that has emerged since victory’ and blamed the whole revision proposal as ‘inspired by the Russians’ (Macmahon Ball 1946).

On 17 October 1946, the FEC formally approved a provision to review the new constitution (NARA 1947: 11–12). The FEC’s decision stated:

> In order that the Japanese people may have an opportunity, after the new constitution goes into effect, to reconsider it in the light of the experience of its working, and in order that the Far Eastern Commission may satisfy itself that the constitution fulfills the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and other controlling documents, the Commission decides – as a matter of policy that, not sooner than 1 year and not later than 2 years after it goes into effect, the situation with respect to the new constitution should be reviewed by the Diet. Without prejudice to the continuing jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission at any time, the Commission shall also review the constitution within this same period. The Far Eastern Commission, in determining whether the Japanese Constitution is an expression of the free will of the Japanese people, may require a referendum or some other appropriate procedure for ascertaining Japanese opinion with respect to the constitution. (NARA 1946)

However, Evatt’s proposal for constitutional revision was only adopted by the FEC on the US-imposed condition that it would not be formally announced. Plimsoll opposed this condition on the following grounds: that if an announcement was not made, the Japanese could
accuse the Allies ‘of a breach of faith’; that it could be embarrassing if the condition leaked out; and that the Japanese should be aware of the provision for review so they could prepare for it. He also wanted the Japanese to be informed of the Commission’s contribution to the new constitution, and felt that MacArthur was against publication because ‘he does not want the Japanese to know that he is in any way subject to the FEC’ (NL 1946a).

MacArthur passionately opposed publicising the provision for revision. He appealed:

> The Japanese regard this constitution as of their own evolution, their enthusiasm for it is at a high pitch, and in my opinion it is fundamentally best that they [the Japanese people] be evolved by their own effort. Failure to give them the support of at least silent encouragement at this time would destroy all hope on their part and reduce them to a sense of despair. We would therefore begin to duplicate in Japan the desperate psychological condition now existent in Germany. We would destroy at one unnecessary blow the golden opportunity for reform which once lost can never be regained. History could not fail to regard such an incident as one of the monumental and tragic failures of all time ... Allied, and more particularly, American prestige would suffer immeasurably. (MMA 1946c)

To emphasise his argument, MacArthur used the example of another event to illustrate the effect that publication of the revision could bring. The publication of a previous FEC document on the rights of trade unions to strike and to have political associations, a document that also exuded Australia’s handiwork, had incited the Japanese labour movement into ‘revolutionary action against the Government’ – a general strike (MMA 1947a).11 MacArthur claimed publication of the revision policy would have similar repercussions: that is, it would provide the Japanese people, or at least segments of society, with ammunition to use against the Japanese government, against the Occupation forces and, most importantly, against the United States (MMA 1947a).

Plimsoll was equally passionate in his defence of the publication of the provision: ‘the question of publication is not simply an occupation problem’, he argued, ‘It is a problem that relates to the whole question of the faith and intention of the Allied powers’ (MMA 1946d: 11). Australia’s stand was well supported in the FEC. Sir George Sansom, the UK representative to the FEC, referred to MacArthur’s views on publication as ‘rich in metaphor. Not very strong on argument’ – typical of MacArthur’s style (MMA 1946e: 13). The persistent stand of Australia and its supporters on the FEC, combined with a fortuitous press leak (MMA 1947a, b), led to
a compromise – the provision could be published outside Japan, but not in Japan.\textsuperscript{12} Thus MacArthur’s prestige was preserved and the Allies silenced (NL 1946b: 2).\textsuperscript{13}

If MacArthur and the US government thought this would end debate over the provision for revision, they were mistaken. In December 1948 the Australian member of the FEC requested the reactivation of the Committee on Constitutional and Legal Reform with the precise intention of instituting the revision process provided by the FEC’s 1946 policy (MMA 1948a). MacArthur was equally vehement in his reply to this as he had been to publication of the revision process. He felt the United States should ‘firmly oppose an action designed to impose upon the Japanese Diet a mandatory requirement’ to review the constitution. To do so would be: ‘a grave mistake. Nothing could more completely destroy the progress heretofore made in the absorption of democratic concepts into Japanese thinking’ (MMA 1949a). The FEC did conduct its own investigations, but essentially the review was an arbitrary exercise – the Japanese people were never offered an opportunity to review the constitution.

Australia’s lack of say over constitutional reform demonstrated the bond that had built up between the United States and Japan, which excluded the allies of the United States, including Australia. The problems created by the partitioning of Germany into allied zones of occupation clearly influenced the stance taken in Japan by the United States, and by MacArthur in particular. The secrecy surrounding constitutional reform was designed to give the illusion of an indigenous document that had bypassed the FEC. The aim was to minimise the influence of the Soviet Union, but it had the possibly unintended consequence that all the allies were excluded from the process. Such actions did not, however, totally prevent the constitution from being discussed in the FEC, nor from revisions being made to it. The secrecy over the announcement of these revisions had meant the United States could continue to claim its pre-eminent role in the Occupation with little public acknowledgment of the contributions, no matter how large or small, of its allies. The perseverance of the Australian delegates to the FEC on this matter showed their determination to pursue the second-platform agenda toward Japan in a way that emphasised the will of the people.\textsuperscript{14} We can see how Evatt’s aims were played out from Australia’s experience of constitutional reform:

1. the pursuit of the provision for revision and other amendments supported Evatt’s desire for political rights to be assured for the Japanese people;
2. working through the FEC highlighted Evatt’s belief in that body as a place of ‘formal equality’ to establish Allied policy toward Japan, hence the strong adverse reaction to MacArthur’s attempt to usurp this role;
Land reform was a central part of the program to democratise Japan. Through the ACJ in Tokyo, Australia managed to contribute to the debate on land reform, although once again, its role was not widely acknowledged by the SCAP. The Australian government's enthusiasm for land reform reflected the importance of land ownership in Australia's history. Although the ACJ's role in land reform is often neglected in the literature, Ball and his economic adviser Eric E. Ward played significant roles.

Land reform was placed on the agenda for the fifth ACJ meeting on 29 May 1946. Armed with the Japanese government's documents on land reform and two days' notice, the ACJ members, including Ball, presented qualified findings on the issue until they had time for further perusal of the documents. Ward then set to work on a more concrete proposal. He sought the advice of Wolf Ladejinsky and William Gilmartin, the SCAP advisers on land reform in Japan and Korea. These two had prepared their own land reform proposal, but the SCAP had set it aside to consult, surprisingly, the ACJ. Ladejinsky and Gilmartin were astonished to find out that their proposal had been set aside and suspected that opposition had come from officers in the SCAP's agricultural section who were more concerned with increasing production (this was the height of the food crisis) than with reform (NL 1980). They sought the ACJ's support, and gave Ward a copy of their proposal.

One key point of Ward's research was the amount of land a landowner could retain as tenanted land (the Landlord Average Maximum Retained Area or LAMRA). The GHQ/SCAP reformers had decided on a LAMRA of three cho, as opposed to the recommendation of the Japanese government of five cho. Ward was surprised that no-one had calculated exactly what the LAMRA should be. The five-cho recommendation would release only 35 per cent of tenanted land for transfer, while the three-cho proposal would release 45 per cent. Ward decided that neither was sufficient: for land reform to be a success, 70 per cent of tenant land needed to be released. To achieve this, the LAMRA would have to be one cho. The one cho LAMRA corresponded, coincidentally according to Ward, to the average household mainte-
nance unit in Japan. Ward developed a 10-point program for land reform, and Ball submitted this as the British Commonwealth proposal at the sixth meeting of the ACJ.

MacArthur told Ball on 25 June that his proposals on land reform were ‘most constructive and valuable’ and would be incorporated into a directive to the government (Rix 1988a: 75). The Mainichi Shimbun reported on 2 July that the Japanese government had prepared the Bill ‘on its own initiative’ – and Ball was interested to learn that the Bill incorporated ‘in a most exact and detailed way the ten points program I submitted to the Allied Council’ (NA 1946a). The Asahi Shimbun did acknowledge that the Bill was based on the British Commonwealth proposal (Ward 1990: 77), but the SCAP did not give any formal acknowledgment of the ACJ’s role. Ladejinsky told Ward that no formal directive would be issued, only a memorandum incorporating the Ward-Ball proposal (Ward 1990: 78). A senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry who was directly concerned with the drafting of the Bill, Ogura Takekazu, wrote in 1979 that the British Commonwealth proposal ‘presented by Macmahon Ball, an Australian expert on international affairs’ contained the clear ideas which the US directive of 9 December lacked, and that it was primarily used to draft the Bill (Ward 1990: 74–5).

The Bill included the one cho LAMRA, but two other aspects of the Commonwealth’s proposal were not included. These were the limiting of land purchased by tenants to a household maintenance unit (one cho) and the placing of a restriction on the total amount of land a landowner may own (NA 1947d). The Commonwealth proposal had included provisions to prevent ‘dummying’19 and the use of hired labour. By the time the transfer of land had been accomplished, the government had purchased 72 per cent of all tenant land – as Ward had estimated (Ward 1990: 102). The success of the Australian contribution to land reform reflected the individual contributions of Ball and Ward rather than initiatives or instruction from Canberra (Rix 1988b: 24). Yet the land reform experience did conform to the framework of Evatt’s political philosophies:

1 a more equitable land ownership system assured a better living standard and accorded economic, social and political rights to Japanese farmers;
2 the ACJ was used as the appropriate forum to contribute to Occupation policy. However, it was hardly on a basis of ‘formal equality’ – MacArthur relied on the FEC and the ACJ more as moral support to get radical reforms through the Diet;20 and
2 Australia played a determining role in land reform as the representative of the British Commonwealth on the ACJ.
The labour movement

An issue integral to Australia’s policy of democratisation was the promotion of the trade union movement. ‘There will never be a soundly based democracy in Japan’, declared Evatt, ‘until there is a strong, enlightened labour movement and strong trade unions’ (Current Notes 1947: 471). It quickly became apparent that the United States was taking the initiative on this question as well. On 6 December 1946, in an attempt to counteract the United States’ agenda, the FEC Committee on the Strengthening of Democratic Tendencies adopted a policy paper on the ‘Principles for Japanese Trade Unions’. Evatt credited Australia with taking a leading part in the formulation of this policy, one of its key points being that unions could support political parties and participate in politics (Current Notes 1946: 602).

On the ACJ, Ball soon found that any requests for information on labour or welfare reform were regarded as ‘highly subversive’ (Buckley 1982: 84). At the ninth meeting, Kuzma Derevyanko, the Soviet representative to the ACJ, presented the Soviet proposal for labour in Japan, which George Atcheson, the US member and chairman, subsequently denounced as communist propaganda. Ball, after reading the proposal, declared he could find no such signs and instead ‘in comparison, say with the Beveridge Report, this strikes me as being quite a conservative document’. He went on to suggest ‘it would be unfortunate if when the Member of the Council [that is, Derevyanko] puts forward proposals protecting the social welfare of the industrial workers of Japan if such proposals were automatically to be stigmatized as Communist propaganda’ (NA 1946b: 1).

The Australian media did not appear to take the Japanese labour movement too seriously. The Sydney Morning Herald reported in February 1946 that the Japanese went on strike ‘just for fun’ (SMH, 15 February 1946, p. 2). MacArthur was not so nonchalant. Japanese unions planned a general strike for 1 February 1947. Ball stated that ‘a number of people held the view that a short General Strike was at that time the only effective method to right certain wrongs’ (NL 1946c: 2). In reaction to threats from General Marquat, head of the labour division at GHQ/SCAP, to prohibit the strike, Ball was approached on 31 January by Inagaki Masanobu and Goto Zenichiro for his opinion on the strike’s validity. At 2.30 p.m. that same day, MacArthur used his powers as Supreme Commander to prohibit the strike. The prohibition was justified on the grounds that it ‘would prevent the movement of food to feed the people and of coal to sustain essential utilities, and would stop such industry as is still functioning’. He alleged that this would result in masses dying of starvation and compared the perpetrators
of the strike to the minority who had led Japan to war (SCAP 1968: 762). The Australian Embassy in Washington communicated their interpretation of the MacArthur order to External Affairs. The order was an instruction to union leaders, not to the Japanese government, through which the Occupation authorities were supposed to work. While it was meant to be based on the needs of the Occupation (the only criterion described in the FEC policy on labour to justify Allied intervention), it was actually based on the needs of the Japanese people. These two points in effect amounted to Allied interference in domestic Japanese politics, which, it was argued, was outside the realms of Allied responsibility in Japan.24 Also, its reference to the responsibility of a minority for the strike was ‘a veiled reference to the Communist Party and fails to give a balanced picture of the genuine and widespread working class opposition to the present policy of the Japanese [Yoshida] government’ (NA 1947c). MacArthur’s order was contrary to Australia’s vision for the growth of the labour movement in Japan and was indicative of the conflicting ideals between the Australian Labor government and the US administration.

The February 1947 ban on the general strike was not the last event to demonstrate these conflicting visions. The first half of 1948 saw a series of strikes in Japan, which culminated in a threat to strike made by public service workers in July. The Japanese government sought the SCAP’s advice, and was instructed to strengthen its National Public Service Law to prohibit all public service employees from striking (Dunn 1963: 75–6; Current Notes 1949: 1217). Patrick Shaw, successor to Macmahon Ball in the ACJ, stated that ‘the only Japanese who, to me personally, have ever expressed any regret about the war atrocities or starting the war, have been trade union leaders’ (NA 1948a: 32). There were suspicions that MacArthur had instructed the Diet to push through the legislation ‘to forestall interference by the F.E.C.’ – as had happened with the Constitution (NA 1949a). James S. Killen, a US trade unionist and head of the Labor Division in the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) of GHQ/SCAP, resigned in protest at the introduction of the new law, and stated that MacArthur’s ‘anti-communist policies were threatening to crush Japanese labor’ (Schonberger 1989: 127–8; NA 1948b).

Shaw presented the Australian position on the matter to the ACJ. The proposed Bill did not clearly distinguish between government employees proper and employees in government enterprises – that is, the type of employment that could also be found in private enterprise. The railways were the most important example. ‘In such Government enterprises Government employees should not necessarily be restricted in the same way as Government servants
proper', Shaw emphasised (NA 1948d: 18). More than the removal of the right to strike, it was
the lack of a compulsory independent third-party arbitrator and the subsequent ‘curtailment
of the right of Civil Servants to organise and bargain on a basis of equality’ that caused
Canberra anxiety (NA 1948d: 18). In his statement, Shaw insisted that ‘if the evils of
bureaucracy and authoritarianism are to be avoided, there must be ... adequate machinery for
the fair settlement of disputes’ (NARA 1948). While Shaw did not challenge the right of the
SCAP to restrict the rights of workers in an emergency, ‘great care should be taken ... in
curtailing any human rights by long term legislation’ (NARA 1948). He emphasised the stance
he was representing was not linked to the promotion of intimidating strike threats by public
servants, but that ‘a proper system of collective bargaining would obviate the need for strikes’
(NARA 1948). Shaw offered the assistance of the governments he represented to draft a labour
law that considered the above factors. MacArthur was infuriated by Shaw’s mildly critical
speech at the Allied Council. He viewed it as evidence that the Commonwealth nations and
the Soviet Union were forming a clique against the United States (Harper 1987: 180). His anger
was exacerbated when Shaw received a 13-person deputation from the Japanese League for
the Defence of Democracy. Issues pertaining to strikes were discussed at the meeting and the

Concern over Japanese labour legislation led the Australian delegation to the FEC to
submit its own labour proposal in March 1949 (NA 1949c). The proposal was ‘very well
received’ and was primarily an attempt to take the initiative away from the Soviet Union on
the question of labour rights in Japan (NA 1949c). When the proposal was put to a vote at
committee level, it received eight votes in favour, two abstentions (the United States, the
Philippines) and one opposed (the USSR) (NA 1949d). At Steering Committee level, George
Blakeslee, the US representative, questioned the proposal on the grounds it did not distin-
guish between government workers’ and other workers’ right to strike. Blakeslee pointed out
that ‘at least five countries of the FEC did not permit the right to strike in essential
government services’ (NA 1949d).26 What preceded and followed this debate was a concerted
effort by the SCAP and the US government to quash Australia’s proposal before it was pressed
to a vote at the Steering Committee of the FEC.

MacArthur attacked the efforts of the FEC to impose their reforms on the Japanese
labour movement, especially the right to strike for certain public servants. He hypothesised
that the Japanese labour movement was not sufficiently mature, and therefore was ‘much
more vulnerable to communist infiltration into positions of leadership’ (MMA 1948b: 4). He
admonished the Soviet Mission in Tokyo for inciting ‘labor extremism’, and also the British and Australian Missions ‘whose primary purpose appears to be to force British and Australian concepts upon the occupation, not because of any special interest in Japanese labor itself but rather furtherance of their own Socialistic experiments’ (MMA 1948b). MacArthur encouraged the United States to use its power of veto in the FEC to defeat Australia’s labour proposal, which was only supported, he claimed, by FEC members ‘notably having labor governments’ (MMA 1949b: 2).

The US government, however, viewed use of its veto power as unpalatable. Instead, it moved more covertly to have the Australian proposal withdrawn. In Canberra, the American Embassy was instructed to solicit an interview with Evatt or another official from External Affairs to convince them to withdraw their proposal. The United States argued that if the FEC adopted the proposal it would ‘require major rewriting’ of Japanese labour laws which ‘would undermine [the] position of the present [government] and jeopardize [the] Stabilisation Program’ (MMA 1949c). To push such a proposal was particularly ‘inappropriate’ at that time, as the ‘labor situation [in Japan] is seriously unsettled due to mass layoffs of surplus workers – a situation increasingly exploited by Commie troublemakers’ (MMA 1949c). Other arguments included the undesirable effect of giving public servants ‘unrestricted use of the strike weapon’ and loss of SCAP prestige (MMA 1949c). The United States, therefore, had no choice but to oppose the Australia’s proposal as, in its view, only the Soviet Union and the Japanese communist parties would benefit from such a scenario (MMA 1949c). These same arguments were presented to the governments that were giving their support to the Australian proposal in order to ‘divide and conquer’ – including France, the United Kingdom and Canada. It appears only France gave the United States its assurance it would abstain from voting if the proposal came to a vote (MMA 1949c).

When the Australian member of the FEC asked for the US position on the proposal, he was told the United States objected to the ‘unrestricted right to strike’ by public servants. The Australian member denied the charge emphatically, arguing that the SCAP still ultimately governed the actions of the Japanese and that compulsory arbitration would prevent most strikes from occurring (MMA 1949d). At this point the final strategy in the US plan was put into effect, with the Australian representatives to the FEC invited to a private meeting with US State Department officials. John Allison and Max Bishop of the State Department expressed concern that, if Australia pressed their proposal to a vote at the Commission, the United States would have to use its veto power, and this could prove to be ‘embarrassing’ for
them. They informed the Australian members that their proposal amounted to a reversal of what the SCAP had already authorised, and therefore could be used by the Soviet Union as a propaganda weapon. If MacArthur had made a mistake, they said, the FEC should support him to avoid the loss of his prestige with the Japanese. The Australians felt that such ‘loss of face’ could be transcended by the more important task of encouraging the growth of the labour movement in the right direction. And, as far as propaganda was concerned, the USSR had been opposed to Australia’s proposal. Allison and Bishop continued that a reversal of policy would provide ‘communist agitators’ in Japan with an opportunity to start widespread strikes that could ‘lead to serious riots and disorders’. Allison could provide no evidence for this argument, yet the prospect did alarm the Australians. Allison criticised the members of the FEC of ‘sitting in their “ivory tower” at a remote distance from Japan to prescribe detailed methods for handling labour problems in Japan which may be appropriate in their own mature labour movements, but are not necessarily appropriate for immature labour unions in Japan which are “riddled with communism”’. The Australians retorted that their proposals were based on ‘well informed’ opinion obtained by their Mission in Japan and that they were restricting themselves to the ‘broadest possible principles’.

H.A. Graves, a UK delegate to the FEC, had been similarly approached because of Britain’s support for Australia’s proposal. Graves ‘regarded Allison as having painted a deliberately exaggerated gloomy picture in an attempt to frighten the United Kingdom out of its support’ for the proposal (NA 1949e). Eventually, the Australian government and Australia’s representatives on the FEC decided not to press their proposal to a vote on the FEC. Allison was appreciative of this, and assured the Australian delegation that the State Department empathised with Australia’s aims and that the SCAP would be made aware of this position. The Australian legation pointed out to Allison that trade unionism was a matter of principle for the Australian government and it was ‘well qualified to assist’ the SCAP in this domain (NA 1949f). Australia’s offer of help was never acted upon. The abortion of the Australian labour proposal provides a singular example of the SCAP’s and the State Department’s ability to frustrate Australia’s attempts to pursue its platform-two aims, even when these aims had strong support from other FEC member nations. It also exemplifies how Australia was eventually forced to acquiesce with the views of the United States.

Once again, it can be seen that Australia’s commitment to protecting the growth of labour movement in Japan fits into Evatt’s political vision, although not necessarily conforming to the direction the Occupation was taking:
The protection of labour rights obviously promoted the political, economic and social rights of the workers of Japan.

More obviously than in the previous examples, the conflict over the protection of labour rights between the United States and its other allies conveyed the impotence of those bodies in which Evatt placed his faith – the ACJ and the FEC. Australia continued to pursue its agenda and make its voice heard in these bodies, but it was far from a basis of ‘formal equality’. Australia’s voice was increasingly becoming a hoarse whisper.

Despite increasing barriers, the Australian representatives continued to see themselves as pursuing distinctive Australian interests in the region.

The conflict over labour rights accentuated the differing visions of Evatt and the United States on the postwar world. Recommendations pertaining to labour rights could easily be seen as sympathising with communism and the Soviet Union because of America’s emerging and dominant view of a bipolar world. Meanwhile, Evatt clung tenaciously to his multipolar view, despite the seeming inability of Australia to contribute on such ‘matters of principle’ as the labour movement.

The Cold War context

As we have seen, Australia’s role in the Allied Occupation of Japan cannot be divorced from the international circumstances that impinged upon it. US–Soviet rivalry in Japan did not begin with the so-called reverse course of 1947–48, but the moment the decision was made to drop an atom bomb on Hiroshima. The compulsive need to prevent the Soviet Union from taking a major role in the Occupation of Japan began with this event, which was intended to prevent a repetition of the expansion of communism that was occurring in Europe and Korea.

US–Soviet rivalry was clearly apparent to the Australian diplomats who arrived to take their positions in the Occupation control machinery in Tokyo and Washington. Macmahon Ball, after his arrival in Tokyo in April 1946, wrote to Evatt that MacArthur’s:

analysis of the existing political situation in Japan was dominated by his urgent and repeated warnings against Russian policy towards Japan. He said that Russia’s policy was directed towards sabotage of Allied policy, in order that Russia might subsequently build here upon the Japanese communist party a satellite state. MacArthur is convinced that the Japanese communist party is completely controlled by Moscow. He said that the Russians here in pursuit
of this policy made bitter vituperous [sic] attacks against the Allies, and that these attacks were based on deliberate falsehoods. (NA 1946c)

Both Macmahon Ball and his successor, Patrick Shaw, defined their roles on the ACJ as finding the middle ground between what they regarded as the extremism of the Soviet and US positions (NL 1946d: 2; Kay 1982: 1234–5; NA 1948c) Macmahon Ball and, to a lesser extent, Shaw were accused by MacArthur of having ideological sympathy, if not affinity, with the Soviet Union (Buckley 1982: 44, 83; Harper 1987: 180). US–Soviet tension was also reflected on the FEC, as seen in the example of the reaction of Allison and Bishop to Australia’s labour proposal.

The combination of the Cold War and US usurpation of control of the Occupation encouraged Evatt to search for alternative approaches in order to protect Australian interests – on both platforms. If the international forums were not developing according to Evatt’s postwar vision, he had to find a substitute. Evatt believed the solution to be an early peace treaty with Japan. To help accomplish this task, Evatt set up two committees in Australia to draft a peace proposal. These included the Preparatory Committee for the Pacific Settlement (PCPS) and the Advisory Committee on the Japanese Peace Settlement (ACJS). The former was made up of experienced diplomats and members of External Affairs, while the latter included government and opposition members, in addition to ‘interested and informed’ members of the public. The establishment of these bodies led to the preparation of a draft peace treaty.

The members of the PCPS agreed that the United States was too generous in its estimations of the progress of democratisation and that Japan should not be used as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. ‘The most important strategic question involved in the Peace Treaty with Japan is as to the role which Japan will play in the balance of power in the Pacific’, wrote Eggleston to Evatt (NL 1947b). Eggleston thought it was preposterous to rely on Japan to counter the Soviet Union, believing it more likely that Japan would eventually fall into the Soviet orbit because of their territorial proximity (NL 1947b, c). Ball felt the peace settlement should be part of a general Pacific settlement requiring the cooperation of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Such a settlement meant that Japan ‘should not be used as a strategic pawn in US–Soviet rivalry’ (Macmahon Ball 1948: 14).

Preparations for the draft treaty coincided with Evatt’s plans to hold a British Commonwealth Conference on the Peace Settlement in Canberra. The conference began on
26 August 1947, with Evatt elected unanimously to the chair. The focus was on the PCPS draft treaty. Although the conference was declared a success, Eggleston was disappointed that there had been no clear distinction made between the enforcement of punitive measures and the control or tutelage necessary to secure democratic growth (NL 1947d).

Evatt had visited Japan before the conference, arriving in Kure on 24 July, with clear instructions from Chifley to ‘adopt a more accommodating approach to American policy’ (Crockett 1993: 223). In Japan, Evatt, who previously applauded Macmahon Ball’s efforts, now excluded him from diplomatic functions and denounced his stand on the ACJ. Unable to continue under such conditions, Ball tendered his resignation from the ACJ to Chifley on August 18. Ball’s removal greatly relieved the Americans in Tokyo. If Evatt sought support from MacArthur for an early peace settlement and the establishment of a long-term supervisory commission for Japan, perhaps the demise of Ball and veneration of MacArthur’s accomplishments were the prices to pay. Ball was a ritual sacrifice to MacArthur in Evatt’s attempts to pursue his wider agenda for Australian influence through an early peace treaty.

Evatt’s other reaction to the emerging Cold War was to turn for support to two alternative institutions. These were the British Empire, now Commonwealth, where Australia’s role was stronger than before 1941, and the United Nations. Evatt’s vision for Australia was as a ‘third force’, or a mediator between the two great powers (Meaney 1992: 326). He told the British government that ‘it was vital that the three Labor governments of the British Commonwealth [Australia, New Zealand and Britain] should devise a common policy and form some kind of social democratic union that acted a mid-way power between United States individualism and Soviet communism and so secure the peace of the world’ (Williams 1948). This social democratic union was Evatt’s alternative to Britain’s invitation to the Australian government to join a Western alliance against the Soviet Union in Europe. Such an alliance was an anathema to Evatt, because it took the focus away from the Pacific. Evatt also believed such a policy would become self-fulfilling; that is, an alliance against Soviet expansionism would provide justification for precisely such an expansion. Evatt considered the United Nations to be the more appropriate body to solve such a dispute, and his views on Soviet expansionism differed from those of the US and the UK governments. The Australian government did not believe that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable (Meaney 1992: 130, 317–18).

The developing Cold War continued to inhibit Australia’s ability to influence the progress of postwar Japan. By 1948 the United States had lost its patience with the Australian
Labor government. There were allegations made by US intelligence that the bureaucracy of the Australian government had been infiltrated by communists. Their suspicions focused on the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the defence establishment, and the exchange of classified military information between the US and Australian armed forces was subsequently discontinued (Meaney 1992: 323; Edwards 1978–79: 553; Alcorn 1987: 88). It is perhaps ironic that while Evatt’s political philosophy envisaged a greater relationship between international and domestic policies and practices, it was exactly this relationship that, in the final construct, obstructed Australia’s attempts to influence the Allied Occupation of Japan.

Conclusion

Australia’s approach to the Allied Occupation of Japan deserves to be seen as a more complex mosaic than the label ‘harsh peace’ suggests. Australia followed a dual-platform approach. On one platform, the Australian government was concerned with security and the economic opportunities it hoped would flow from the Allied victory, and with retribution for wartime atrocities. The second platform was more idealistic, albeit with paternalistic and expansionist overtones: it was an opportunity to share the economic, social and political ideals of Evatt and the Labor government with the defeated nation. The Japanese people were categorised according to Australia’s perception of their responsibility for the war. The wartime leaders were charged with militarism, but the bulk of the Japanese people were considered as another of its victims. This division of responsibility allowed the government to pursue its dual policy. It also reflected Evatt’s convictions that the causes of wars had to be attacked at their source – social and economic discontent. The two platforms were mutually supporting: a democratic nation was perceived to be less of a security threat, while a labour force with greater economic strength was a potential market for Australian goods. The literature on Australia’s involvement in the Allied Occupation of Japan has primarily focused on the first platform – the ‘harsh peace’ motive. Consequently, Australia’s aims toward Japan have not been portrayed adequately, nor has the importance of Japan in Evatt’s and Labor’s postwar planning for Australia. The two platforms mirror Evatt’s sense of justice: the need for the punishment of crimes and for the building of a just society.

The perennial problem for Labor governments, as Millar states, has been the attempt to turn idealistic rhetoric into practice (Millar 1978: 386). This was an obvious problem for the
Chifley government in its policies toward the democratisation of Japan. Grandiose rhetoric was not generally matched by detailed policy planning. The Australian National Archives is full of in-depth reports on various issues coming from the Australian Mission based in Tokyo, and from the Australian embassy in Washington. Yet there was an obvious lack of detailed response to these efforts from the Department of External Affairs. The exceptions are the cases of labour and constitutional reform outlined in this paper. More often, Australian contributions were based on the initiative of its diplomatic staff on the spot, as in the case of land reform. Reliance on the initiative of diplomatic staff undoubtedly reflected the rapid growth of External Affairs during Evatt’s ministerial leadership and the great variety of issues the department was dealing with in the postwar period. Evatt attempted to run External Affairs in much the same way MacArthur ‘ran’ Japan – as his own private domain. The diplomats did their best to follow his policy in the absence of detailed instruction – but if Evatt’s tactics changed, staff could easily be dispensed with, as in the case of Ball. Such inconsistencies affected to some extent Australia’s ability to influence the Occupation of Japan.

A more compelling factor, though, is the wall Australian diplomats came up against when dealing with the Americans. The wall materialised in two main, interrelated forms: the unilateral actions of MacArthur and US–Soviet rivalry. MacArthur’s quasi-messianic usurpation of the role of leader of postwar Japan and his talent for self-mythologising was combined with a crusade-like mentality against communism. His crusade led him to push through many reforms in Japan without consulting the FEC or ACJ, where the Soviet Union would have been able to contribute to Allied policy. Consequently, the views of all the other allies were also bypassed, leading to resentment. Yet the attitude of the US government was that MacArthur’s prestige with the Japanese must be preserved at all costs. Such an attitude is reflected in all the cases discussed in this paper: the lack of public recognition for the change to the constitution and for Ball’s and Ward’s contributions to land reform, and the prevention of Australia’s proposal for the labour movement from going to a vote on the Steering Committee of the FEC. In relation to the labour proposal, the Australian delegation to the FEC were told that the US government ‘would be most reluctant to take up a position which would in effect repudiate what S.C.A.P. has already done’ (NA 1949g) – even if they agreed it was a good idea.

Australia’s attempts to influence the Occupation of Japan faced the greatest obstacle of all – international tension created by the Cold War and the changing balance of global power from Britain and the Empire/Commonwealth to the United States and the Soviet Union. This
situation helped render the bodies in which Evatt had placed so much faith – the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied Council for Japan and the United Nations – impotent in implementing a joint Allied policy on the future of Japan. The very fact that the Soviet Union, at war with Japan for six days, was able to exert such influence, albeit inadvertently, over American policy toward Japan was a slap in the face to the Australians who had fought in the war for four years. The intrusion of the Cold War into the Japanese peace settlement also highlighted the clash of civilian reformist ideals and military-based economic and strategic preoccupations in Japan. The desire to turn Japan into a bastion of American democratic strength in East Asia and halt the perceived march of communism both southeast and east in Asia, meant the Occupation was seen as an American concern rather than an allied concern. It meant the ACJ and the FEC had to be bypassed in relation to policy development. It also meant that industrial production and economic stability took preference over democratic rights. And it meant the sponsorship of a more conservative government in Japan (NA 1949h). Reform was replaced with rebuilding. In this climate, Evatt’s ideals could easily be characterised as sympathising with communism. Such characterisation was not unique to the Australian experience – many of the American reformists in the SCAP, such as those influenced by the New Deal, were later victims of McCarthyism and the Un-American Activities Committee.

Australia did make some contributions to the second-platform agenda through helping to shape constitutional and land reform, while making its preferences well known on labour and trade union issues. Considering the obstacles coming from both the US government and MacArthur, these were real accomplishments for a medium Pacific power. Australia’s influence was primarily a reflection of Evatt’s efforts and the tenaciousness of his diplomats. But as John Burton (1996: 2) says, Evatt was a ‘man out of his time’, a man who did not subscribe to the ideological formula of a bipolar world. Thus, Australia’s ideals and policies related to the democratisation of Japan, along with its Labor-government proponents, were diminished and ultimately lost in the anti-communist obsession increasingly driving the foreign policy of the United States and its other allies.

Notes

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Norfolk, Virginia, for their generous support in aiding the research on which this paper is based.

A significant proportion of the current literature on the Allied Occupation of Japan tends to cast Australia’s role, if it is mentioned at all, in the ‘harsh peace’ category.

Eggleston was one of Evatt’s main advisers on foreign policy issues, especially on issues related to Japan.

Democratisation can also be seen as a type of punishment, with the victor nation able to dismantle the indigenous social fabric that has developed over centuries. Hamilton (1976: 80) feels that democratisation is ‘a very gentle euphemism for a punitive action’. The allied aim of ‘democratisation’ trivialised the fact that Japan already had been developing its own democratic path prior to the 1930s and World War II.

This was typical of Western thought on international relations in the immediate postwar period – a mixture of enthusiastic idealism with outright economic and military pragmatism (see, for instance, TL 1947).

For instance, Evatt charged the British Foreign Office with distorting its reports on the Soviet Union and stated that ‘this unfortunate suspicion of Soviet motives’ meant there was a ‘real danger of dividing Europe into East and West by giving way to this obsession’ (cited in Waters 1996: 86). There is evidence that Evatt saw the Soviet Union as a counterweight to United States, China (before 1949) and a resurgent Japan in the Pacific region. See Reynolds (1996: 156–7).

Australia attended the surrender ceremony as a separate belligerent, participated as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) under an Australian commander-in-chief, was a member of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington, presided over the International Military Tribunal of the Far East in Tokyo, and represented the British Commonwealth on the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) in Tokyo. It was an appropriate blend of Commonwealth participation and representation combined with a more independent role, congruent with Australia’s stance at the time.

The New Deal was US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administrative and legislative program of the 1930s that aimed to achieve economic recovery and social reform. Advocates of his policies were generally known as ‘New Dealers’.

Eggleston was now back in Canberra working for the Department of External Affairs.

There was one expert in Continental European Law, Alfred C. Oppler, but he was not very involved in shaping the new constitution. He published his memoirs in Oppler (1976).

See the section of this paper on ‘The labour movement’ for more details on the general strike and Australian policies toward Japanese labour.

Yoshida, though, was informed of the provision for review by MacArthur (MMA 1947d).

In MacArthur’s autobiography, Reminiscences, he states that ‘one of the more important amendments to the new constitution [that] was made as the result of the free and open debate in the Diet during the summer of 1946 was the provision for
amendment by national referendum’ (MacArthur 1964: 302). No mention is made of Evatt’s or the FEC’s contribution to the provision for revision or other amendments.

14 The question needs to be asked: who was deciding what the ‘will of the people’ was? Macmahon Ball succinctly pointed out the potential dilemma when he asked: ‘What are we to do if a Japanese government with majority support in a freely elected Diet shows no inclination whatever to pursue the policy that we consider essential?’ (NA 1947b: 8).

15 For example, the Robertson Land Acts (1861) in New South Wales.

16 For example, Finn (1992) and J. and G. Kolko (1972) do mention the ACJ’s role, albeit briefly. Others, including Schonberger (1989) only acknowledge MacArthur’s and Wolf Ladejinsky’s roles. Cohen (1987) credits Ladejinsky as the ‘father of land reform’, and Ladejinsky in various articles attributes the program entirely to the Japanese Minister for Agriculture, Hiroo Wada.

17 These included SCAPIN 411, a directive to the Japanese government outlining what the SCAP expected in land reform, sent on 9 December 1945, and the submission of the Japanese government of a land reform program to the SCAP on 15 March 1946.

18 1 cho = 2.45 acres or 1 hectare.

19 ‘Dummying’ refers to the practice of holding more land than legally permitted, through using family members or agents as proxy proprietors.

20 It is not difficult to reconcile MacArthur’s conservatism, especially his anti-communism, with his sometimes-radical reform program in Japan during the Occupation. Oppler touched on it when he stated he had always looked at reforms in Japan ‘as effective instruments for taking the wind out of the sails of communist propaganda’ (Oppler 1976: 203). MacArthur was like an 18th- or 19th-century European monarch or conservative (e.g., Bismarck) who offered certain concessions to the people in order to neutralise the influence of those liberals who were demanding a reduction in the power of the throne or far-reaching social reforms. MacArthur was doing just that in Japan – protecting the role of the Emperor and neutralising communist propaganda. Land reform is an excellent example of this.

21 MacArthur recruited an advisory committee on labour made up entirely of Americans.

22 At the end of 1942, a report by Sir William Beveridge (the Beveridge Report) for the British government outlined the plan to provide extensive social services, enact education reform and achieve full employment.

23 Inagaki and Goto were Foreign Liaison Officers on the Propaganda and Information Committee of the Central Disputes Committee.

24 Australia’s argument was based on the ‘United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’ of 29 August 1945. Part II – Allied Authority in this policy states that ‘domestic administration’ lies in the realm of the Japanese government, as long as the policies being carried out were in line with Occupation objectives. Modification and elimination of ‘feudal and authoritarian tendencies’ were to be encouraged. Also, ‘In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme
Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation'. The Australian government saw the strike as the power of the people against authoritarian forces, and therefore that interference was both unjustified and contrary to the Occupation objectives. MacArthur used the same section of the Policy to justify his actions, claiming the attainment of Occupation objectives and the protection of the Occupation Forces were at risk. A copy of Part II of the Policy appears in Sackton (1984: 13).

25 The League for the Defence of Democracy was a Japanese left-wing group of trade unionists. The meeting between Shaw and the League was widely reported in the press.

26 The Australian Public Service Law, s. 66, forbids the right of essential government servants (administrative and clerical) to strike, but does provide means of arbitration.

27 Chifley made a statement before Evatt’s visit: ‘You can forget all suggestions that Dr. Evatt is going to Japan to quarrel with General MacArthur. We aren’t getting into rows about minor matters with people who helped us in the way he did during the war’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 26 July 1947).

28 US concerns were slightly allayed with the creation by the Chifley government of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the transfer of sections of the CSIRO into government departments.

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