

Property Rights and Land Degradation in China 中国的产权保护与土地退化问题

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- China has a major land degradation problem
中国土地退化问题很严重
- The policy response needs to address the cause
对策需从根源上加以应对

- Secure and well-defined property rights to agricultural land would:
 - Provide farmers with incentives to reduce land degradation (as well as increased productivity)
 - Reduce the costs of government programmes to reduce land degradation

- 稳定而明晰的农用地产权保护将会：
 - 激励农民减少土地退化的程度（同时提高生产率）
 - 减少政府为降低土地退化而推出的项目成本

- Soil erosion in 367m hectares
 - Nutrient loss = 5% loss of crop yields = USD 700m (1976-89)
 - Dust storms = loss of 670,000 ha arable land + 2.35m ha range land + negative human health impacts
- Salinity in 100m hectares
- 3亿6700万公顷的土壤侵蚀
 - 养分损失=农作物产量5%的损失=7亿美元（1976-89）
 - 沙尘暴=损失670,000公顷耕地+235万公顷牧区+对人类健康的负面影响
- 1亿公顷内的含盐量

- Increased flood frequency
 - Biodiversity loss – 15-20% species threatened
 - Direct cost = USD7.7b per annum
 - Indirect cost = USD31b per annum
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- 洪水频率增加
 - 生物多样性损失——15-20%物种受到威胁
 - 直接损耗=每年77亿美元
 - 间接损耗=每年310亿美元





Why? 为何?

- Large population + fragile ecosystems ??
- No ... look to policy causes.
- 人口众多+生态系统脆弱? ?
- 不是 ... 请关注政策原因。

1. 1949-1978: collectives + production targets (regional food self-sufficiency) + state monopoly procurement = short term production focus + no long term incentives for production or resource stewardship
1. 1949-1978: 集体所有+生产指标（地区的粮食自足）+国家统收=热衷于短期性生产+生产长期性或资源管理方面缺乏激励

2. Household Responsibility System: land use rights assigned with communal land ownership + 'sovereign risk' + land transfer restrictions = production incentives + weak resource stewardship incentives (especially with livestock)
2. 家庭联产承包责任制：土地使用权下放而所有权归公+"主权风险"+土地转让限制=生产积极性+资源管理的激励乏力（尤其在牲畜方面）

- Land over-exploitation in short term
- Little incentive to invest in conservation works or fixed agricultural infrastructure
- 短期内土地使用过度
- 几乎没有积极性投资于资源保护或固定的农业基础设施

- Gains from the transfer of land from low to high productivity uses restricted
- Property rights matter
- 限制了土地使用优化所产生的收益，即从生产率低的领域转向生产率高的领域
- 重要的是产权

- Recognition of the importance of property rights:
 - Extend duration of land use tenure
 - User rights can be transferred, exchanged and assigned
- 认识到产权的重要性：
 - 延长土地使用权的期限
 - 使用权可转移、交易和转让

- Address the consequences:
 - Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Programme (CCFGP) – payments to farmers who change land use covering 20m+ ha
 - Natural Forest Protection Programme (NFPP) – logging ban with modest or no compensation

- 处理后果：
 - 退耕还林和退耕还草计划(CCFGP) ——给涉及两千多万公顷土地用途转变的农民提供经济补助
 - 天然林保护计划(NFPP) ——限制砍伐，同时给予适量补偿、或不给补偿。



- CCFGP:
 - Enthusiastic take-up due to improved financial position of farmers
 - Land use changes are profitable to farmers in some areas even without the CCFGP payments
- 退耕还林还草计划
 - 由于农民从中可获经济利益，该计划得到积极响应
 - 有些地区，在退耕还林还草过程中即便没有补助，土地用途的改变也是有利的。

- Why weren't these changes taken up?
 - Capital?
 - Knowledge?
 - AND insecure property rights.
- 为什么过去不作这些改变？
 - 资金？
 - 知识？
 - 还是不稳定的产权？

Without secure tenure ... 若无稳定的保有权...

- Incentive to grow annual crops not tree crops that take 5-10 years to provide a return
- Less incentive to reallocate labour to off-farm employment under a 'use it or lose it' regime
- Cycle of inefficiency and environmental degradation
- 更乐于种植一年生作物、而不是那些需5-10年才有收益的林木作物
- 在“土地不用就收回”的制度下，劳动力不大乐于转向农场外的工作
- 出现低效率和环境退化的循环

Policy viability without secure rights 产权不稳定情况下的政策可行性

- Without on-going CCFGP payments most farmers would no longer maintain their tree crops and most would return to working on-farm
- 倘若现行的退耕还林还草项目没有了经济补助，大部分农民会不再继续种植林木作物，而重返农耕作业

- Property rights (including more secure tenure and enhanced leasing rights) needed to ensure long-term viability of land use changes that protect the environment
- 需要保护产权（包括稳定的保有权和增进的租用权），以确保长期推行土地用途流转之策，从而保护环境。

Policy cost-effectiveness

政策的成本效用

- Increasing the CCFGP subsidy increases participation
- Property rights reform would also increase success
- 增加退耕还林还草项目的补助，就会提高响应参与度
- 产权改革也将增加成功机率

- 50% participation achieved with:
 - CNY370/mu/annum payment WITHOUT property right reform
 - OR
 - CNY145/mu/annum payment WITH property right reform
- 要达到50%的参与度，需要：
 - 在不改革产权的情况下，每年每亩地补助370元；
 - 或者
 - 在进行产权改革的情况下，每年每亩地补助145元

- Chinese farmers have a strong preference for more secure land property rights
- Concerns that reform would undermine the 'social safety net' offered by land are ill-founded
- 中国农民非常希望土地产权能更加稳定
- 虽有各种担忧，认为改革会破坏土地所提供的“社会保障网络”，但这些观点缺乏依据

- Offers a significant opportunity for economic and environmental gains
- But property rights reform may not be enough
- 提供了一个对经济与环境均有益的重要机会
- 但产权改革也许还不够

- Need policy instruments that are better targeted environmentally and economically
 - Land Use Change Bidding Trial in Sichuan Province
 - Funding based on 'net benefit' test
- 需要在环境和经济方面更具针对性的政策工具
 - 四川省土地使用权招标试验
 - 依据“净收益”检测而提供资金

More information? 更多信息?

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