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A macroprudential stable funding requirement and monetary policy in a small open economy

Vol: 
CAMA Working Paper 23/2016
Author name: 
Punnoose Jacob
Anella Munro
Year: 
2016
Month: 
May
Abstract: 

The Basel III net stable funding requirement, scheduled for adoption in 2018, requires banks to use a minimum share of long-term wholesale funding and deposits to fund their assets. A similar regulation has been in place in New Zealand since 2010. This paper introduces the stable funding requirement (SFR) into a DSGE model featuring a banking sector with richly-specified liabilities, and estimates the model for New Zealand. We then evaluate the implications of an SFR for monetary policy trade-offs. Altering the steady-state SFR does not materially affect the transmission of most structural shocks to the real economy and hence has little effect on the optimised monetary policy rules. However, a higher steady-state SFR level amplifies the effects of bank funding shocks, adding to macroeconomic volatility and worsening monetary policy trade-offs conditional on these shocks. We find that this volatility can be moderated if optimal monetary or prudential policy responds to credit growth.

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