Democratisation and Development

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- Discussion papers: Democratisation and human rights, industrialisation and economic growth, Democratisation and new information technologies
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Democratisation and Development
Discussion Series

Political liberalisation and economic reform in developing countries
*Overseas Development Institute*

Limits on the role of constitutions in developing democratisation
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Infotech: A tool of countervailing power?
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Human rights and participatory development: Stemming the rise of the ‘new anarchy’
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Waiting for Godot: Liberalisation in Singapore
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Democracy and development in a modernising South Africa
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Democratisation and social change in Indonesia: Recent development trends
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Issues on democracy and development: Ramos’ political will
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Democracy in the South Pacific: An overview
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Tradition versus democracy in the South Pacific: An overview
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Is Cambodian democracy being kidnapped?
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The moves towards political liberalisation and in some development countries democratic forms of government are a current feature of many developing countries. This has led to a growing debate about the relationships between democracy and equality, democracy and human rights, and democracy, industrialisation and economic growth. These are the themes for this issue of Development Bulletin.

Briefing papers

The two briefing papers that accompany this issue, 'The meaning of development reconsidered' by Joe Remenyi and 'The new world order: Implications for development', by Cherry Gertzel, provide two different perspectives on the role of politics in the development process.

Population and Health Update

We provide 'inside' information on the Cairo population conference from Helen Ware of AIDAB and Diane Proctor, Family Planning Association of Australia, and news of follow-up activities from the conference. Gordon Bilney discusses population and health in the Australian aid budget.

Conference Papers

This issue includes two important conference papers both of which provide new perspectives for development studies and a new way of considering the development process. Stuart Carr and Don Muoro from the Department of Psychology at the University of Newcastle consider the fundamental role of psychology in understanding dependency, equity and lack of sustainable economic development. Elise Boulding reviews the relationship between religion, peace and development.

Conferences

We provide reports on important development conferences, including the Network symposium 'Teaching for development', and information on future conferences in Australia and overseas.

Books

Four new books on social and economic development are reviewed and the latest books, monographs, reports, working papers, newsletters and journals are listed.

Network staff

The Network has a new arrival. Elaine Bliss had a daughter at the end of August. While Elaine was otherwise occupied Lisa Law helped us with the Teaching for Development symposium and with preparation for this issue of the Bulletin.

AIDAB assistance

The Network gratefully acknowledges the support of AIDAB in publishing the Development Bulletin.

Good reading.

Pamela Thomas, Elaine Bliss, Rafat Hussain, Lisa Law
Over the last decade a feature of much of the Third World has been an unprecedented move towards more democratic forms of government. The extent and types of political liberalisation vary considerably and in many African, Asian and Latin American countries have been associated with economic reform, industrialisation and structural adjustment. Aid policies have focused on promoting democratic processes with the stated assumptions that a democratic political system will provide a political climate conducive to economic growth, greater social and economic equality and hopefully, though less frequently articulated, to free-market capitalism.

There is little doubt that democratisation has heightened expectations and released hitherto suppressed social demands, however, the papers presented here provide little evidence that democracy per se improves social or economic performance and even less evidence that it may improve the situation of the poor. Most authors point clearly to the relationship between democratisation and an expanding and increasingly powerful and wealthy middle class. Research undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute shows that neither authoritarian rule nor political liberalisation offer an assured framework for economic reform and the key to sustained social and economic development is a competent, independent civil service.

Eric Paul reviews the situation in Singapore and suggests that democracy is unlikely to succeed in the short term and the future scenario maybe a new form of post industrial authoritarianism made possible by the government's ability to manipulate information. The relationship between information flows, new information technologies, democratic processes and market reform is discussed by Don Lamberton using Indonesia as an example. He concludes that while infotech opens up a lot of possibilities for a well informed public and a truly democratic process based on full information, if left to market processes, infotech will serve only the elites and further marginalise the poor. He asks "can infotech give voters more power to inform and control the political process, or must we continue to be pushed along what the technocrats think is the road to the 'global village' in cyberspace?"

An appropriate constitutional framework has in the past been considered a prerequisite to democratisation and in the 1960s and 1970s independence of many African and Asian countries was accompanied by constitutional revision which usually allowed for establishment of democratic processes. Anthony Regan reviews the role that constitutions play in establishing and maintaining democratic processes and concludes that without fundamental reform of the state and the emergence of strong civil societies, constitutions are of limited importance.

Kate Manzo considers the implications of democratisation in South Africa and the transformation of a developed country to a developing one. Ian Chalmers follows Indonesia's erratic path towards liberalisation and shows that these moves have not benefited the poor and that little official attention has been devoted to issues of economic equity.

The history of political transformation in the Philippines is outlined by Ben Kerkvliet and the new policy shift from politics to economics by Amando Doronila. Anita Chan outlines political change and the growth of capitalism in China and the relationship between democracy and traditional political systems in the South Pacific is discussed by Kuini Speed, Stephanie Lawson and Peter Larmour.
Political liberalisation and economic reform in developing countries

The last decade has seen unprecedented moves towards more liberal and democratic forms of political rule across the developing world. There have been expectations, in Africa and elsewhere, that such political changes would have a positive influence on economic reform measures. This paper first describes the nature of the reforms and the links between political systems and economic management. It then examines some recent evidence of economic reform under new, and more democratic, political regimes in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.

The nature of reforms

The current process of political liberalisation has been characterised by a series of reforms which involve greater respect for individual and collective rights, greater freedom of association and expression, amnesties for political prisoners and the institution of new constitutional changes such as the replacement of single-party by multi-party systems and the introduction of regular, free and fair elections for political succession. Democracy has been held to be consolidated when the new 'political rules' are generally recognised and become habitual, when elected assemblies have more than token power vis-a-vis the political executive and there is civil control over the military.

A number of Latin American countries have progressed beyond the process of political liberalisation which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and appear to be in the period of 'democratic consolidation'. Several East Asian countries are in the political liberalisation phase. In sub-Saharan Africa, since 1989, there has been some political liberalisation following initial popular protests. Typically, these began with largely urban interest groups - unions, business people, students - seeking to improve their specific conditions but also protesting against government corruption, repression and mismanagement. The degree of political liberalisation has varied widely and, in Africa especially, it is premature to talk of the consolidation of democratic rules or norms.

Economic reform (or economic adjustment) can be broken down into those policies which effectively achieve macro-economic stabilisation through the use of rigorous fiscal and monetary policy, and those moves towards market liberalisation which involve more freely functioning markets for foreign exchange, credit and labour, reduced government intervention and regulation of marketing and pricing of traded products; the dismantling of state foreign exchange management and import restrictions; and the introduction of more commercial principles into the management of public enterprises. There is near consensus that control of fiscal deficits and inflation is essential for the proper functioning of markets, though there are differences of view on the appropriate sequencing of some of the above reforms.

While domestic forces have been major influences on the rate of both political and economic reform in developing countries in the 1980s, the global movement towards greater freedom from the arbitrary power of the state, and external financial pressures, have also played a powerful role. In Latin America a major influence was the drying up of access to international finance after 1982; in sub-Saharan Africa donor pressure for economic and political reform was a key factor. In the 1990s the aid agencies are setting conditions for both political and economic reform before releasing programme aid to many poor recipient countries, mainly but not entirely, in sub-Saharan Africa (see Box 1).

Political systems and economic performance

Until the mid-1980s there was a widespread belief that tough authoritarian government was good for economic performance and adjustment programmes. This view was based on particular experiences of reform following military coups (e.g. Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, Argentina 1976, South Korea 1961, 1980, Ghana 1983).

This view is now less widespread, despite successful authoritarian economic management in, for example, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. However, authoritarian governance has depended on the specific nature and quality of the political leadership as well as reliance on patronage systems for survival. There have been explanations of why authoritarian regimes take a short-term perspective and seek personal gains from state-protected and subsidised activities. In contrast, some authoritarian leaders have taken a longer view and have promoted policies of economic stabilisation and effective industrialisation and development, with bureaucracies competent to implement the strategy.

More systematic research has now been done on the economic performance of different types of political regimes in the developing countries. This fails to show that more authoritarian regimes are better at controlling their public expenditure, budget deficits, credit ceilings or inflation. Nor does it show that economic growth has been greater under such regimes.

The economic reform credentials of democratic rule have similarly not been established. Nearly a hundred World Bank structural adjustment programmes were recently examined to discover the degree of initiative and commitment evidenced by the domestic political leaders and officials. No systematic connection was found with the type of political
system or regime: a high level of commitment was demonstrated in some politically liberal countries (e.g. Costa Rica, Mauritius), but it was paralleled in some less liberal ones (e.g. Korea, Ghana).

Box 1: Donors and their critics

In the 1990s, donors are setting the double requirement of political and economic reform as the condition for the release of aid to recipient countries. Political conditions have related primarily to improved behaviour on civic and political rights and on free and fair national elections. This has attracted three main criticisms:

- That donor understanding of appropriate and sustainable political changes has been weak. There has been excessive concern with multi-party electoral systems and insufficient concern with more fundamental issues of civic interest groups and political party mobilisation and articulation which will offer the public policy choices.
- That donors have not been explicit on how or why political liberalisation and wider participation in decision making will ensure more effective implementation of economic reforms.
- That donors who set political conditions and consider their implementation of fundamental priority need to relax the pace and extent of their parallel economic reform conditions, since there may be considerable incompatibility between them, especially during periods of political transition.

Why link democratisation to economic reform?

Given this unsurprising evidence of the lack of a clear link between economic performance and type of government, why have donors and some developing country governments argued for the need to link political democratisation to economic reform programmes? One reason is the current attachment to the idea of an affinity between ‘democratic’ and ‘market’ systems. It is argued, for example, that ‘markets require democracy’ to limit arbitrary political intervention in individual decision making and to protect property rights and freedom of contracts.

The prospect of simultaneously combining political liberalisation with economic reform is problematical but the following arguments are put forward to support it.

- New governments with commitments to a fresh economic agenda can be fairly elected and can gain some trust and legitimacy from the public. The new political coalitions can include representatives of those interests - business, intellectual, religious, labour unions - which genuinely want a change in the way the economy is managed.
- A new democratic government can more easily enlist support for wide-ranging reforms if the political change occurred because of failures in economic policy associated with the previous regime.
- Such governments can blame their predecessors for their difficult inheritance and hence win some patience from the public in their adjustment effort.
- The freer association and expression accorded to a range of newer civic groups (or old ones freed from state dependence) can be influential in lobbying for economic reforms. Rural constituencies and small farmers are often seen as particularly important because, as domestic food and export crop producers, they should support, and benefit from, reforms in the marketing and pricing systems.
- A more open and consultative style of government should ensure economic and institutional changes worked out by compromise and consensus politics.

It is recognised, however, that in times of simultaneous political and economic change some tensions are inevitable, for the following reasons.

- Both processes involve ‘new rules’ that raise great uncertainties about how they will work - for politicians, interest groups, producers, workers, consumers, etc.
- With new and perhaps excessive expectations and demands from previously frustrated groups, it may be difficult to control budget spending and deficits and to ensure a more productive use of public funds.
- Politicians and bureaucrats are often inexperienced in their new political roles. They have to reconcile the ‘insulation’ of policy in order to achieve stabilisation and inflation control with the novel openness and responsiveness of more politically liberalised politics. This also requires them to resolve the conflicts of interest between newly articulate civic interest groups.
- Urban groups, which are often a major force in political liberalisation may well lose jobs and protected markets and face an increase in their cost of living from economic policy changes.

These are the main considerations which appear to influence the outcome of simultaneous efforts at democratisation and economic reform. How, in practice, are the tensions being resolved? We look first at middle-income ‘new democracy’ countries, particularly in Latin America, and then consider sub-Saharan Africa where the problems of economic reform seem most intractable.
Latin America and other middle-income new democracies

Economic stabilisation: In the middle-income countries, to date at least, the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes has been associated with considerable macro-economic instability. The transitions have tended to increase budget deficits and inflation though this has often been a legacy of the outgoing regime's desperate attempts to survive unpopularity through expansionist policies (Argentina 1983, Brazil 1985 and Poland more recently). But with very high inherited levels of inflation, incoming new democratic governments, in particular, have found it difficult to bring monetary policy under control, compared with established democracies.

In the first place, democratisation has heightened popular expectations and released hitherto suppressed social demands and grievances. These have sometimes coincided with misjudgments on the part of inexperienced and insecure newly elected politicians. Populist governments have emerged and typically this has generated a sudden expansion of public spending on the creation of jobs (e.g. Brazil 1984-9). Nevertheless, in general, neither in election years nor in the years before or after elections, have there been larger fiscal deficits or higher inflation, perhaps because voters in these countries are not so obviously duped as is sometimes thought.

Secondly, when a country passes a certain 'threshold of crisis', public expectations about what the state can do seem to fall. Politicians become more experienced but also more aware that they will be held 'accountable' for the results of their stewardship. Hence they become more cautious and more realistic; they gain in authority and credibility by promising less than before (e.g. Menem in Argentina and Salinas in Mexico).

Where there have been 'democratic pacts' providing guarantees to the property-owning classes, it has been relatively easier to maintain control of inflation in the initial democratic period, although the situation tended to relax in the subsequent period when there is more political competition. On the other hand, when the transition to democracy has led to a temporary relaxation and the collapse of inflation control, it has then been followed by drastic 'shock treatment' to stabilise the economy. Both processes have placed a strain on economic adjustment and the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Argentina and Bolivia in 1982).

Thirdly, the margin for manoeuvre of the newly democratic governments has been constrained by the legacy of their predecessor authoritarian regimes; the military (e.g. Turkey); influential business groups with ties to the old regime (e.g. Chile), and continuity of personnel (e.g. South Korea). Yet, from a longer-term viewpoint, wider public participation in policy making, which goes beyond narrow democratic pacts, in Latin America especially, may fail to generate a wider 'social consensus' on either neo-liberal economic doctrines or on the priority for price stability as against the reduction of gross inequalities and the perceived obstacles to development.

Market liberalisation: There is growing evidence, in Latin America and the Caribbean, of far-reaching external trade policy reforms (reduced and harmonised tariffs and quantitative restrictions, export incentives, etc) which have accompanied or have been preceded by significant real exchange rate depreciation often leading to macro-economic stabilisation. So far these have suffered no major reversals and the incoming democratic regimes in many countries have adopted the trade policy reforms despite serious political opposition. This evidence is inconsistent with concerns that democratic leaders are particularly vulnerable to powerful interest groups.

By contrast there has been much less progress in the domestic liberalisation of industrial activities; in other words reducing regulations that distort domestic product and labour markets. This situation may arise from sensitivity towards those interests which stand to lose from such changes during a political transition.

There has been slow and fairly limited reform of public enterprises driven by the pressures to cut the fiscal deficit. The threat of job lay-offs resulting from public sector reform has often met with strong opposition from organised labour. Yet in some cases public enterprise reform, managed by technocrats insulated from the political arena and receiving support from heads of state, has been partially effective. It may be reconcilable with the transition to greater democracy where the public has been apathetic and interest groups poorly organised, so the specific changes have not become the sparking-plug for opposition on the part of the entrenched coalitional interests (e.g. India, Turkey and Mexico). There has been considerable privatisation in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is not obviously incompatible with political liberalisation provided that it is carried out in an open and transparent way - which has not always been the case - and does not arouse too much popular sensitivity about the underpricing of assets as a give-away to favoured buyers.

Much economic reform has been initiated by governments under pressure from the conditions imposed by external lenders, rather than from civic interests and pressures within their own societies. Yet changes in economic policy changes can themselves have both a positive and a negative influence on the degree of participation by the public. This is illustrated by the situation in Jamaica where the introduction of a floating exchange rate made private business groups immediately aware of any relaxation in the government's control of public expenditure and inflation and caused them to press for more effective state budgetary control. At the same time, the undoubtedly unpopular ceilings set for budget deficits, encouraged less than transparent handling of public finances which made it very difficult for the public to know what was happening.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa, the movement towards political liberalisation largely dates from 1989. Constitutional changes have led to multi-party elections in Ghana, Gabon, Cte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Mauritania, Kenya and Nigeria, although most of these have been marred by controversy. Countries with more genuine political liberalisation and freer elections include Cape Verde, Mali, Sao Tom and Principe, Congo, Madagascar and Zambia, apart from more durable democracies like Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius. In Zimbabwe there has been greater openness and consultation with a wide range of independent interest groups. Regimes in some countries have continued to withstand the new pressures (Burundi, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Zaire) or are still at the state of promises or in the planning phase (Tanzania, Malawi, etc). Some countries show signs of reversing their new political freedoms (Kenya, Benin, Nigeria).

National elections and the freedom to form different parties have provided only a first, partial step towards political liberalisation. Often the single governing party has been replaced by fragmented party systems. Effective opposition parties have rarely emerged or been allowed to emerge and have usually failed to offer alternative economic agendas (e.g. Tanzania), while pre-electoral debates have shown little concern with economic policy and programme issues (e.g. Kenya). Where more public debate has been encouraged it has indicated a low level of popular understanding of basic issues and hard economic choices. Indeed, public debate and elections can be viewed as more about the power of the state, personalities and human rights issues than economic policy choices.

The new 'electoralism' in Africa potentially offered scope for the election of governments representing fresh coalitions committed to more vigorous economic reform. Yet, so far, elections have resulted in only a few changes of government (Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Congo, Madagascar and Zambia). In Benin quite substantial economic reform had already taken place before the political liberalisation. However, the open debate before the elections (1989) generated demands to which the new government did not have the means to respond, and the reform seems to have stagnated. In Zambia, political reform and the change of government have accelerated economic reform efforts (see Box 2).

A new government has not always been necessary to propel economic reform. In Gambia, after considerable economic deterioration, the incumbent government party was re-elected in 1985 on a strong reform platform. It has carried out policy choices. The authoritarian government in Ghana has pursued major and effective economic reforms and stabilisation measures in the 1980s, well before the holding of national elections (though with limited political liberalisation) in 1992. Although successful economic reform efforts in the past were undoubtedly a factor in the re-establishment of the incumbent regime, the election itself weakened the previously successful fiscal stabilisation programme.

Box 2: Political and economic reform in Zambia

Zambia since 1990 is a rare case in Africa of a country that has embarked on the difficult strategy of simultaneous political and economic reform. The new government typically in such a situation, has inherited a legacy of economic mismanagement and decline. How does the balance sheet look after two years of experience of the Third Republic?

Novel political developments were free and fair elections which produced a government led by the newly established Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the emergence of newspapers outspoken in their criticisms of government action, and a more active and wider range of civic interest groups.

Economic reforms have included a major devaluation of the exchange rates, liberalised foreign currency management and cuts in some subsidies. The large budget deficit has over two years been turned into a surplus despite delays because of drought. An ambitious five year privatisation plan has been initiated, labour markets have been liberalised and interest rates deregulated.

Other economic reforms, including the reform of public enterprises and relaxation of state control over food and export marketing and prices, have been slow in implementation and there has been public suspicion about the way privatisation has been handled. There has also been resistance to change from the unions and disaffection in the townships.

Some commentators have suggested that further economic reforms (which adversely affect the dominant interest groups in Zambia), if too long delayed, may not yield their benefits soon enough to enable the fragile democratic structure to survive, with the MMD itself already suffering from internal disputes and breakaway movements.

Elections have not removed incumbent governments elsewhere, in Kenya, Cte d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Nigeria, and the momentum of economic reform appears threatened. These elections were contested and when the results were rejected by wide sections of society, this weakened the legitimacy of the government and its confidence in embarking on stronger economic measures, and may result in some inertia.

So far there is limited evidence of opposition parties and individual MPs within newly elected assemblies articulating more effective criticism of government economic policy or scrutinising and following up misuse of public funds more
vigorously. The traditional dominance of the executive over the legislature has remained little changed and this especially limits the scope for improvement in public expenditure management - an important economic reform.

Despite some moves towards fiscal stabilisation during the years of political protest and liberalisation, much remains to be done to bring inflation under control. There has been widespread liberalisation of marketing and pricing of major food crops in the last few years and, to a lesser extent, of major agricultural exports, but the rate of progress seems to have had little to do with the extent of political freedom, elections or changes of government, nor with the influence of small farmers and rural constituencies which have been seen as a new force under more democratic systems.

A key to sustained development is a more competent, independent civil service, motivated less by loyalties of patronage and more by performance-related incentives. However, civil service reform has proved to be a long-term problem everywhere and difficult to achieve in the current political transition.

Overall, political reform in sub-Saharan Africa has thus far been only partial and, together with the survival of patronage networks, has generated somewhat unfavourable conditions for maintaining the momentum of economic reform. Partial liberalisation brings about a politically mobilised but discontented population and the continuance of governments which lack widespread public support or credibility, and seems likely to paralyse economic change rather than to galvanise it.

Conclusion

Neither authoritarian rule nor continued political liberalisation offers an assured framework for economic reform. Several Latin American countries are in the process of consolidating democracy and there have been important economic reforms. In sub-Saharan Africa, partial political reform has so far not generated very promising conditions for democracy or economic reform.

Those seeking from outside to achieve simultaneous political and economic liberalisation will need to think through very carefully the pace and the means by which this is to be encouraged.

This is an excerpt from the Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper 1, February 1994.
Limits on the role of constitutions in developing democratisation

Anthony Regan, Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea

Moves toward democratisation in Eastern Europe and Africa since the late 1980s have contributed to the emergence of interest in democratic governance as a prerequisite for development. Such concerns have contributed to a level of interest in the potential roles of constitutions in establishing and maintaining democracy in post-colonial nations not seen since the immediate post-independence era.

Analysis of the roles played by constitutions in Africa and the developing countries of the Pacific suggest, however, that without fundamental reform of the state and the emergence of stronger civil societies, constitutions are likely to be of limited, although varied, importance.

Democracy and constitutions

Democracy can be defined as a system of government:

- which is participatory at least to the extent of providing for universal adult voting in regular and free elections which have the potential to change the government and may also extend to wider opportunities for participation in sub-national levels of government; and

- where there is basic respect for the right of individuals and concomitant acceptance of limits on the powers of executive government.

Constitutions are intended to set the parameters for systems of government. They define both the institutions of government and the ways they inter-relate as well as the limits on their powers. They seek to define the arena within which, and the rules according to which, national political conflict is managed.

It is only where constitutions enjoy a high degree of acceptance, rather than anything inherent in particular constitutional arrangements, that they are important. It is political and economic forces which ensure that a constitution is accepted.

Recent developments in Africa and the Pacific

In many African countries the high hopes for vibrant democracies being ushered in by independence were dashed quickly. It was soon evident that constitutions were seldom accepted as the framework within which political conflict should be resolved. In many countries there was little participation in government and few limits on executive power.

In the last few years, however, there has been more optimism about the prospects for democracy. Constitutional changes have done away with one-party or dictatorial states and established a multi-party democracy in a number of countries, such as Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya and Malawi.

In the Pacific, there has been much greater continuity of both constitutions and democratic government. However, there is growing evidence of a declining commitment to democracy. Governments manipulate constitutional arrangements in efforts to stay in power and their agencies commonly ignore limits on their powers.

In seeking to understand the apparently opposite trends in Africa and the Pacific, there is a tendency to compare their experience to what is perceived to be the experience of the North. For example, some countries of the North with interests in Africa encourage multi-party politics with the expectation that once an apparently democratic constitutional framework is in place, democracy will follow.

However, common perceptions of the North are arguably incorrect. Whatever theory of the state is supported, it is commonly agreed that a wide range of powerful interest groups impinge on the state. Complex relationships between a powerful state and civil society tend to ensure stability. In simple terms it is this factor, more than such things as a long history of the acceptance of the rule of law, that tends to explain the adoption of constitutional frameworks and the associated stability of democracy in at least some countries of the developed North.

In the post-colonial societies where the vast majority of the population are either subsistence farmers or peasants, the role of civil society is limited. There are few associational links beyond the clan or tribe. The state, though weak compared to the state in the North, is immensely important compared to civil society. Elite factions compete for control of the state, in large part because it is the major means for their economic advancement.

There are, however, some important differences between the political and economic factors at work, and therefore the experience of constitutions and democracy, in Africa as compared to the Pacific.

Post-colonial Africa

Among the few 'uniting' factors beyond clan and tribe in many African countries are major ethnic/regional and religious identities. There has been a tendency for elite factions to mobilize people around ethnic and religious identities in their struggles for state power. They have exploited fears as to the consequences if 'representatives' of...
some other groups gain, or are not removed from, power. In the process, existing divisions have often been exacerbated and new ones created.

In the absence of a strong civil society, there have been few pressures on these factions to stay within constitutional frameworks in their competition for state power. In deeply divided countries, there has been strong pressure for the state controlling faction to use any means at hand to retain power. Such measures have included seeking control of the repressive apparatus by ensuring domination by the appropriate ethnic or religious identity, and greatly increasing the size and resources of the repressive apparatus.

In the 1960s and 1970s such tendencies were often bolstered by state ideologies of development, which emphasised the need for stability. Superpower competition provided financial resources and legitimacy to many weak regimes, and often contributed to the development and increased capacity of a repressive apparatus. Patronage and subsidies (for example, of urban food prices) were used to shore up support for client groups and to reduce the potential for urban dissent.

Constitutions became simply legitimating devices, of limited use in many countries. They were ignored, overthrown or replaced where they were obstacles to accumulation of power and wealth of those in control. It has been the operation of political and economic factors such as these which help to explain the lack of democracy and the limited role of constitutions in Africa.

Tentative moves toward democratisation were sparked by a general fiscal crisis facing most African states by the late 1980s. The possibilities for patronage and subsidies were reduced. Loyalty of security force members was often undermined by lack of pay, and urban dissent emerged. Governments no longer capable of crushing or buying off dissent called national constitutional conventions (or were forced to accept them), amended constitutions, or were overthrown. A few, such as Zaire, have resisted change, but at the cost of interminable chaos.

When the dust settles, new elite factions are usually in control under multi-party political systems introduced by constitutional amendment (as in Zambia and Malawi) or under new constitutions, as in several francophone countries. But astute managers of reform such as President Moi of Kenya, have managed the transition and continue to rule in much the same manner as before under the new dispensation.

The post-colonial Pacific

By contrast, in the Pacific, only Fiji has experienced a deep ethnic divide comparable to those in many African countries. This helps explain why the recent Fiji experience of democracy and constitutions is in some respects closer to that of Africa than to other Pacific Island countries.

In most Pacific Island countries, ethnic groups tend to be both small and multiple, rather than based on deep ethnic and religious divisions, allowing more room for involvement of a wider range of elite factions in political competition. More importantly, the lack of such divides results in the general absence of strong pressure on the elite factions to take exclusive control of the state which has been so common in Africa. Further, none has the ability to capture control of the repressive apparatus by ethnic or religious stacking of positions, as commonly occurred in Africa.

There is, to some degree, a recognition of common interest between the elite factions. Nevertheless, it is also their common interest to plunder the state in the course of economic advancement, explaining the weakness of civil society which helps to explain the general trend toward reduced respect for constitutional limits.

This is not to say that constitutions do not play a significant role in the Pacific. Independence mythology combined with longevity gives them status. More importantly, the limited capacity of particular elite factions to capture exclusive state power (or their limited interest in doing so) has meant general acceptance of constitutional frameworks as the arena for management of elite competition. It remains, however, a framework with limited relevance to the majority of the population.

There may also be signs that as the stakes rise in terms of the economic benefits extractable from control of the state, that elite competition may become more ruthless. Events since the latter half of the 1980s in Fiji, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea seem to point in this direction.

Possible future directions

In the Pacific, prospects are likely for some continuity in the longevity of the constitutional framework as an arena for elite competition, coupled with increased instability and reduced restraints on the exercise of executive power.

In Africa, despite the hopes of a vibrant democracy, the same divisions exist, and are more open to manipulation by elite factions under multi-party systems (a fact manipulated cleverly by Kenya's President Moi in remaining in power). Despite the urban protest that contributed to recent changes, civil society remains weak, while the repressive capacity of the state is strong.

The main ameliorating factors in Africa are the removal of superpower competition and - at least to the extent that it reduces repressive capacity - the growing involvement of international financial institutions in efforts to reduce the role of the state, and the state's steadily declining capacity to face the deepening fiscal crisis. However, it is far from certain whether such factors alone will facilitate long-term progress toward stable democracies and constitutions.
It seems clear that any focus on constitutional change alone is unlikely to contribute much to democratisation. Political and economic forces tend to determine the role played by a national constitution. However, the most important factors are that the role of the state and the importance of civil society both change. Unless there is a marked reduction in the repressive capacity of the state and increased ability on the part of civil society to mediate state power, the prospects for long-term change remain uncertain. Constitutional change can play only a limited role in strategies intended to change these dynamics.

An example of an alternative strategy

As one of the few countries in Africa where attempts at more fundamental changes are being made, Uganda is worth brief examination. As a country which was long regarded as a 'worst case' example of the 'African problem', what is being attempted is of particular interest.

Constitutional change is being attempted, but is not being relied on as the main force for change. Rather the assumption is that major changes in both state and society are prerequisites to any constitutional framework being broadly accepted in the long-term.

Uganda's 17 million people are divided along overlapping and complex religious, ethnic, regional and economic lines. Of particular importance are regions (the 'North' - areas north and east of the river Nile - versus the 'South') and religion (Catholic versus Protestant). Each is important largely because of associated patterns of access to political and economic power since early colonial times. These divisions have long been manifested in party politics.

The divisions both played a role in, and were exacerbated by, the almost constant turmoil which swept the country from the mid-1960s until the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in January 1986 after a five year guerilla war. Estimates vary, but it seems certain that over half a million people died through state or state-inspired violence in the 15 years after Amin took power in a 1971 coup.

The starting point of NRM political strategy is incorporation of as many groups as possible in an interim government of national unity. It is interim in that its initial promise was to leave office on completion of populist constitution-making and engagement of the old political actors are incorporated through ministerial and other executive posts. The aim is a 'politics of inclusion' as opposed to the politics of exclusion of previous regimes, where the winner through the ballot box or military power tended to exclude even potential opponents from the exercise of power.

Their involvement together with strict limits on political party activity restricts the old actors' room to move. At the same time a populist appeal is made over their heads through two main sets of policies. First, a pyramidal structure of elected councils (Resistance Councils, or RCs) operates from the village level to the 39 districts. Second, the constitution-making processes themselves involve an unparalleled degree of popular involvement.

The aim is to create room for both major reform of the state apparatus and growth of more diverse mobilised interests in society. The policies intended to achieve reform of the state include:

- a thorough-going decentralisation programme spreading significant power through four tiers of RCs and bringing local officials under political control for the first time;
- imposition of a range of controls on the security forces;
- improved accountability through a human rights commission, an ombudsman institution and a leadership code, and improved performance of existing institutions such as the auditor-general and the public accounts committee.

The policies directed towards change in civil society include:

- vesting of power in small village level RCs which elect representatives to higher level RCs has created a new interface between state and society and encouraged people to organise and articulate needs at the local level;
- the constitution-making processes have sought to involve people to an unprecedented extent (about 25 per cent of the more than 40,000 village level governments submitted written memoranda to a constitutional commission between 1990 and 1992); and
- the participation of associations of women and youth have been encouraged in all levels of government, and representation of women, youth and trade unions is provided in national Parliament.

The basic aim of the whole strategy is to bring peace and stability, and to include all groups, so that the divisions in Uganda can gradually be resolved. It is hoped that a state will emerge which is responsive to the needs of all, rather than one which is a tool and source of enrichment for narrow groups.

To give concrete effect to these aims, a new constitution with a high degree of legitimacy and longevity is required. Legitimacy is pursued through both the populist approach to constitution-making and engagement of the old political forces in the processes. Longevity is the aim of both legitimacy and the transformation of state and society sought in the interim period.
There are weaknesses in the NRM strategy and in the analysis of the state and society on which it is based. In particular, the NRM has perhaps underestimated the strength of divisions in Uganda, and the grave problems involved in overcoming them, especially for a group such as NRM which is perceived as dominated by one region. The relatively weak position of the NRM at the time it came to power resulted in a form of government of national unity incorporating representatives of major groups without prior acceptance of a minimum political programme. This factor helps explain the high degree of corruption and inefficiency apparently accepted by the NRM and apparent obstruction in implementation of some of its policies such as the leadership code.

More importantly, the difficulties involved in transformation of civil society are likely to be immense. The roles and relationships of the state and civil society in any country are determined by fundamental economic and political forces. Civil society in Uganda or any other relatively poor country has few parallels with the diverse, complex and powerful set of forces it comprises in the developed North. Uganda's leadership recognises this fact, and part of its motivation in seeking a more modern and industrialised economy is to promote the changes in civil society that will be associated with such change. However, change of this kind will inevitably be slow.

In the meantime, the existing elite factions will continue to be the main forces contending for state power. In the medium-term, the exercise of state power is likely to continue to be subject to limited checks. This is not to say, of course, that the relationship of the state and civil society cannot be changed in a country such as Uganda without industrialising the economy. Rather, change is likely to be slow and painful. Further, the kind of civil society that emerges and the relationship it has with the state will certainly be very different from that of the developed countries of the North.

**Conclusions**

Experience in both Africa and the Pacific suggest that it is political and economic forces which tend to determine the role played by a national constitution. It is changes in the dynamics of the relationships of state and society which will most likely be crucial to democratisation. Constitutional change can play a limited role in strategies intended to change these dynamics.
Infotech: A tool of countervailing power?

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Rational utilitarian man, the Invisible Hand and the democratic vote have long been regarded as a trinity for an economic and political faith in a free enterprise democracy (Shubik 1967). All have been subject to continuous challenge. Rationality seems no easier to define now than a quarter century ago. We model the world around us in terms of well-defined wants, choices and resources. With rich and sure information, everyone can make quick, costless assessment of alternatives. The reality is limited and costly information; a constant battle against ignorance absorbs a considerable part of national resources. What about the Invisible Hand? Adam Smith did seem to link it with risk aversion and hence with uncertainty and limited information. And one leading critic of orthodox thinking contends that it may be invisible because it simply isn't there; or if it is there, it is too palsied to be relied upon (Stiglitz 1991). The last of the triad, the democratic vote, requires voters to be knowledgeable. They must be well-informed about the issues to be decided, about candidates, or about both. And they must have the time and facilities to interact and organise to achieve political objectives.

The trinity therefore requires us to make big assumptions about information. Despite all the challenges, and with a curious disregard for some of the difficult lessons learned in economics, e.g., second best, the lubricating oil analogy holds wide sway. Information is what reduces uncertainty so more is always better: the market works better because producers are more competent and buyers of goods and services, as well as the framers and administrators of policy, make wiser decisions.

The analogy goes deeper. The mechanic knows just where oil is needed, in small quantity. So information is thought of as what makes the whole system work better, and not a costly matter. All this is in sharp contrast to the information sector analyses of both developed and developing economies. In the former case, information handling in all its forms now constitutes the major demand on resources; and even with the less adequate statistics of developing economies, we know that information workers make up quite a considerable share of the workforce.

Infotech, the incredibly complex mix of computers, satellites, fibre, telecommunications equipment, TV, software, multimedia, databases, and electronic publication must surely be having major effects. It opens up access to enormous stores of knowledge; it can facilitate learning; it can monitor the detail of the myriad transactions held in check by the Invisible Hand; politicians are only a phone call away. Can it not be decided, about candidates, or about both. And they must have the time and facilities to interact and organise to achieve political objectives.

In summary the findings were: In the six years covered by the field work, rural Indonesians who were able to watch the Palapa television learned approximately three times as much about eight principal developmental programmes as did non viewers. Television helped narrow the knowledge gap between the lower and upper social and economic strata. It contributed to the learning of the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, especially among those with little or no formal schooling... Television promoted the adoption of the political world untouched. Since then all the other components of the so-called intelligent electronics were quickly brought to bear on the pursuit of votes and office. But what was the overall contribution to democratisation?

The Indonesian experiment

Indonesia is an interesting illustration, having made an important decision in the 1970s to adopt the new satellite communication technology. The satellite, Palapa, was to reach most of the country's enormous rural and island regions, television coverage having been restricted to Java which had service by wire and microwave. August 17, 1976, the 31st anniversary of Indonesia's independence, was a very important occasion: it was marked by the ceremony to inaugurate Palapa, with a conversation between President Suharto and a district head in Eastern Irian Jaya. Was this a far-sighted innovation on Indonesia's part? After all, only the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union had at the time launched their own communication satellite.

Several circumstances certainly contributed to the decision. First, satellite technology was a highly appropriate choice for the archipelago nation for basic telephone and television services. Second, investment in communication facilities had been at a very low level. Fifteen years later in 1991 basic indicators still showed significant lags: telephone main lines per 100 population were 0.68 (cf., Korea 33.68 and Singapore 39.85); TV receivers per 100 population 5.7 (cf., Korea 28.8 and Singapore 37.2). Third, regarding adoption of electronic telecommunications switching, as at 1987, Indonesia had been amongst the laggards, being at the time a non adopter.

A major collaborative study of the impact of television was carried out by the Communication Institute of the East-West Center, Honolulu and the Indonesian National Institute of Economic and Social Research, with US National Science Foundation funding (Chu et al. 1991:xii)

In summary the findings were: In the six years covered by the field work,
family planning and modern health care, encouraged greater participation in village social organisations, and facilitated more active use of rural markets and public financial institutions. In the lower social and economic strata, television helped to raise the adoption of modern agricultural practices close to the level in the upper strata. Among viewers, television became the predominant source of information, surpassing in importance all other sources combined (Chu et al. 1991:xii).

The authors conclude that rural Indonesia became a better informed, more efficient and more participatory society, more oriented to consumerism and leaning somewhat to secularism.

Despite being a satellite TV innovator in the 1970s and despite this seemingly favourable assessment, Indonesia remains the subject of comments about poor prospects for democracy (The Australian 1994:7). How then should we try to assess the Infotech role? Are they Pool's 'technologies of freedom'? We should be mindful of his remarks:

> It is not computers but policy that threatens freedom. The censorship that followed the printing press was not entailed in Gutenberg's process; it was a reaction to it. The regulation of electronic communication is likewise not entailed in its technology but is a reaction to it. Computers, telephones, radios, and satellites are technologies of freedom, as much as was the printing press (Pool 1983:226).

### The international telephone network

Another recent study (Sun and Barnett 1994) helps clarify these complex issues. Starting with the telecommunications network as the primary means of international interaction, this study classified countries as core, semi-periphery or periphery in terms of that network and then asked what was the relationship between the network and democratisation, i.e., did a country's position in the network affect its process of democratisation.

The measures of democratisation centred around the extent to which citizens had the following rights and civil liberties: the right to vote in elections; the right to associate with and organise political parties; the right to petition the government; the rights of free speech, free assembly, and free press. AT&T data on the telephone network and Freedom House data on political rights and civil liberties were used.

Skipping over the mass of detail reported, this study suggests network position is stable and closely related to political development, the core countries being the western industrialised ones. Japan's position is less central, probably because of the former colonial links of other countries.

The correlations show network position to be strongly associated with democratisation — but without a time lag. However, while the telecommunication network seems to promise democratisation, it 'empowers the haves who can access technologies to control the have-nots who cannot access technologies' (Sun and Barnett 1994:419). In particular, it generates electronic colonialism.

While Indonesia was introduced earlier as an illustration because of its Palapa innovation rather than as a case study, it might nevertheless be of interest to note that all African, Asian and South American countries, other than the NICs, Brazil and Mexico, were peripheral in the network. In terms of network centrality, Indonesia was comparable to countries like Thailand, Morocco, Malaysia, Iran and Botswana.

Such a study illustrates the difficulty and the danger of trying to model the extremely complex process in such simple terms. Telecommunications in many ways is made to serve as a proxy for all the features of the information society. Another study has focused on 'telecom reform', i.e., privatisation and liberalisation, and sought a relationship with the openness of the political system. 'The not very encouraging conclusion is that, in LDCs, free market and participatory politics do not go hand in hand. On the contrary, economic liberalisation seems to build, at least in its early stages, in political suppression' (Petrazzini 1993:21).

If we focus on the media, we may well conclude that with information overload and information blizzards, the new technologies will shore up the power of existing establishments. Have not modern telecommunications had this effect, instead of decentralising much activity away from the big cities? This assessment rests on the notion of the newspaper reader/TV watcher as an efficient processor of information, with unlimited time. The reality is very different.

A growing proportion of information is never received, let alone interpreted. Most citizens...today also retain a native (if underdeveloped) capacity to reduce the complexity of information flows to manageable proportions, to select, criticize, reinterpret or - like tortoises - to shield themselves completely against flows of information...In addition, most citizens are at least vaguely aware that the media are engaged in story-building and story-telling...It is therefore not surprising that there is a strong tendency for citizens to attend to the messages and stories with which they already identify. They perceive mainly those features of ambiguous or complex stories that fit in with their perceived tastes (Keane 1991:538).

### A tool of countervailing power?

To the extent that it is possible to rely upon the tortoise shells, it may be wise to look to other aspects of the process of adoption of infotech. Two such aspects seem to be given inadequate attention.

What does the widespread adoption of the new technologies imply for income distribution? This is best approached by
focusing on the information flows and their use rather than the technologies and access. All too often, creating access is seen as the end objective of the policy intervention. However, giving equal access to individuals or firms of vastly unequal competence in the use of information, seems most likely to be a source of greater inequality. Economists have generally neglected this matter of competence and, in the case of information competence, we need to attend to the aspirations and the ‘state of readiness’ of those given access to new information sources.

General purpose technologies like infotech are pervasive and open up a lot of possibilities, but if left to the market, the outcome can be too little (but suited to the ambitions of dominant groups), too late (in terms of public and national interest). Perhaps general purpose technologies have something in common with the facilities to provide basic needs.

The second aspect meriting attention is the possibility that the more basic infotech can slowly develop as a tool of countervailing power. Can public interest thinking give the right kind of information to consumers, and lead them to use it, in order to weaken market power based on misleading product differentiation? Can citizen participation use the technologies to combat power in infrastructure developments? Can infotech give voters more power to inform and control the political process through issues referenda, local initiatives and the like? Or must we continue to be pushed along what the technocrats think is the road to the ‘global village’ in cyberspace?

References


Good governance and participatory development in Australia's aid programme

Gordon Bilney, Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs

Good management that fosters the association of effective, efficient, honest, equitable and accountable public administration with individual rights and opportunities is an essential element for sustainable, broadly-based development and sound economic performance at all development levels (extract from Agenda 21, Chapter 2).

Governance, defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as 'the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development' is now generally accepted as an important factor determining a country's ability to achieve sustainable economic and social development. Good governance emerged as an issue in the late 1980s when the World Bank produced a number of studies which pointed to the need for a properly functioning legal system and for governments to ensure the existence of an enabling environment for the development of the private sector. While the Bank has focused on the economic aspects of good governance, the debate on good governance in the international community has broadened to encompass political and humanitarian concerns.

In December 1993 the members of the DAC endorsed a set of Orientations on participatory development and good governance, outlining principles, approaches, and areas for action to promote participatory development, democratisation, good governance, human rights, and coherence and coordination of government policies. A number of donors now fund programmes specifically aimed at improving governance, and some are increasingly targeting their development assistance to countries showing a commitment to the principles of good governance.

Definitions and linkages

The DAC Orientations on participatory development and good governance paper indicates that the agendas for good governance, participatory development, human rights and democratisation include the following linkages:

- the legitimacy of government which depends on the existence of participatory processes and the consent of those who are governed;
- the accountability of the political and official elements of government for their actions, which depend on the availability of information, freedom of the media, transparency of decision making and the existence of mechanisms to call individuals to account for their conduct;
- accountability also at the political level through representative government and the political process;
- the competence of government to formulate appropriate policies, make timely decisions, implement them effectively, and deliver services equitably; and
- respect for human rights and the rule of law, to guarantee individual and group rights and security, provide a viable framework for economic and social activity and allow and encourage individuals to participate.

Promoting good governance facilitates development and helps to create an environment in which human rights are respected. Economic and social development, human rights and good governance are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. There is increasing recognition that community participation in development promotes accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, and is intrinsic to good governance. Participatory development can be seen as good governance at the local level. It offers many potential benefits, including: the contribution of local knowledge to activities; an increased chance of objectives and outputs being relevant to perceived needs; greater efficiency and honesty of officials and contractors; and 'ownership' of the activity by community-based organisations. Participatory development can also provide opportunities for communities at the grassroots to participate in the process of government decision making and resource allocation, and may lead to improvements in social equity. A strong civil society facilitates these processes of participatory development.

Democratisation can be a controversial term. Broadly defined, democratisation involves providing opportunities for participation in the political life of a country. The 'Western' model of democracy includes such features as periodic free and fair elections, a pluralistic civil society, free media, and market-oriented development. A number of donors have tended to equate good governance with Western-style models of democracy. While the Australian Government agrees that more open, accountable and democratic systems of government are inevitable, it nonetheless foresees that this relationship is a complex one, and Australia questions the inevitability of the causal relationship. We recognise that many of the countries of our region have systems of government and social organisation different from our own but which have nevertheless proven to be very successful models for development. Moreover, good governance and democratisation cannot be imposed from outside, but need to be built from within, based on national circumstances.
Donors can facilitate and support such processes, but if they are to be successful there must be a commitment to the process within the developing country.

Other donors: Policies and programmes

There has been considerable discussion in the donor community of positive methods for improving governance through development assistance, by providing financial resources, advice and technical assistance for projects supporting better governance. Donors are increasing assistance in areas such as public sector management, the administration of electoral processes, developing legal systems, and promoting professional, independent media services. Participatory approaches to development are also receiving increasing emphasis. Many donors have also indicated that developing country performance on human rights and democracy is one of their criteria for aid allocation.

The United Kingdom sees the promotion of good government as a priority objective of its aid programme, and takes into account issues of legitimacy, accountability, competence, respect for human rights and the rule of law. As well as supporting positive programmes in this area, the UK has stated that it uses good governance criteria in determining aid allocations.

Sweden also uses criteria including democracy and respect for human rights to determine aid allocations, and provides support for 'the prerequisites for democracy' (education, legal aid, and legal framework), the development of democratic systems (drafting constitutions, holding of elections, parliamentary operations and functions), and improving the effectiveness of central government administration.

The United States sees democracy and good governance as essential for sustainable, broad-based economic growth, and supports activities to promote constitutional mechanisms, legal systems including independent judiciaries and civilian-controlled police, credible and effective elections, organisations that promote human rights, trade unions, professional associations, women's groups, independent media outlets, and organisations that promote government accountability at all levels.

Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter includes the principle that 'full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratisation and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country'. Japan's approach, like Australia's, emphasises the need to strengthen indigenous institutions of democracy rather than impose principles or structures from outside.

The World Bank has actively addressed governance issues, and published a report on Governance and development in 1992, followed by a report on Governance: The World Bank's experience in May 1994. The Bank focuses on the economic dimensions of governance, such as public sector management, accountability, legal framework for development, and transparency and information.

Australia's policy on good governance and participatory development

Australia understands good governance as the effective management of a country's social and economic resources in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable and equitable. Australia's approach to governance and participatory development issues in the aid programme is positive and flexible, placing an emphasis on policy dialogue and on initiatives facilitating good governance and community participation developed through consultation with partner governments in the context of bilateral country programmes. The Government also recognises the capacity of non-government organisations to contribute to good governance and participatory development activities in the aid programme. As briefly outlined below, there are a number of ways that Australia seeks to promote and support good governance in the aid programme.

A number of donors have argued in favour of direct linkage, by which political reforms which lead to greater accountability, respect for human rights and democracy should be rewarded, while repressive political systems should be penalised. Australia doubts whether good governance can be successfully imposed by this kind of pressure from aid donors. Good governance needs to develop over time from within a society based on national circumstances. Systems imposed from outside are likely to be inappropriate and unsustainable.

However, in situations where the effectiveness of aid is likely to be severely compromised by human rights violations, ineffective or unresponsive government administration, the Australian Government's approach is to assess situations on a case by case basis, and focus on what is most effective in promoting development and improved governance in each situation. That might include, in extreme situations, the suspension of aid programmes, which by lending credibility to oppressive governments, could be seen to work against Australia's aid objectives. Overall, Australia's aim is to work constructively with partner governments to develop appropriate methods for promoting good governance and participatory development.

Australia is contributing to international debate on good governance issues, including in the context of the DAC Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance, and also through its participation on the governing bodies of multilateral development organisations. In international fora, Australia will continue to emphasise the importance of good governance and participatory development in promoting economic and social development, while noting the diversity of effective and valid models of governance.
Integration of good governance/participatory development issues into Australia's aid programme

All elements of the aid programme are planned and implemented within a framework which integrates economic, social, and ecological concerns within a long-term perspective. The aid programme promotes economic growth on the basis of equity, efficiency and long-term sustainability and the participation of all groups in development. In this context the aid programme continues to seek productive and creative ways to promote participatory development and good governance concerns throughout the project cycle. Sustainable development is closely dependent on strong participatory development and good governance practices.

Australia's aid programme directly promotes good governance through the following kinds of activities:

- public sector management and accountability - developing the capacity of the public administration to manage resources effectively, and to take responsibility for operations (e.g. institutional strengthening activities, training programmes for public officials, development of financial accounting and taxation systems);
- legal framework - support for an effective legal system which gives the individual legal protection, and facilitates a market-based economic system (e.g. assistance in framing legislation and support for legal institutions, land titling);
- transparency and information - openness of government and media strengthening (e.g. support for publication of government documents including budgets, and media training);
- electoral processes (e.g. provision of electoral observers, voter education); and
- strengthening civil society - through support for institutions outside of the government sector (e.g. non-government organisations, community groups, chambers of commerce and trade unions).

In addition to activities in these five areas specifically targeted at improving governance, Australia is active in promoting good governance in developing countries through components in a wide range of other projects. Institutional strengthening and human resource development are elements of most aid projects and can make a considerable contribution to improving governance capacity in partner countries. The Australian aid programme also encourages participatory development activities as important elements in a wide range of aid projects.

Examples of AIDAB activities which contribute to good governance and participatory development

Below are some examples of the range of activities undertaken under the Australian aid programme which promote good governance/participatory development efforts:

Education and Training: At 1 August 1994, 5799 AIDAB sponsored awardees from 60 countries were undertaking formal studies in Australian institutions. The most common fields of study are business, administration and economics, followed by engineering, health and the natural sciences. Formal education contributes to capacity building in these areas, in both the public and private sectors, on the return home of these students. Importantly, awardees are also exposed to the open, democratic Australian institutional environment during their time in Australia.

Australian Broadcasting Corporation - South Africa Broadcasting Corporation Links (South Africa): This project promotes linkages between the Australian Broadcasting Commission and the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation. The main objectives of this project are to provide training and advice to journalists, technical staff, media managers and policy formulators in South Africa in order to improve the quality and reach of radio and television broadcasts. Particular emphasis is to be placed on the provision of training in journalism and technical skills to non whites and women.

Constitutional Adviser (Uganda): Under this project, assistance has been provided for the development of the Ugandan Constitution. The project has involved the provision of a constitutional adviser, the supply of computers and printers, and technical support for key aspects of the recent elections for the Constituent Assembly.

Women's Food Security Project (Cambodia): This project aims to enable women-headed households to improve food security and self-reliance, to promote community participation in development, and to strengthen provincial women's associations to promote participatory development. The project is being implemented by the International Women's Development Agency, an Australian non-government organisation.

Land Titling Project (Thailand): This project supports the preparation and issue of land titles through a uniform system of cadastral surveying and mapping; a centralised system of land valuation; and an institutional framework for effective land administration through strengthening the relevant government agencies.

Vietnam National Construction Law Project (Vietnam): The project aims to encourage safe, cost-effective and socially acceptable development and construction in Vietnam through the implementation of a Vietnam National Construction Law (VNCL). Key project components are: drafting enabling legislation and regulations for eventual approval by the National Assembly; development of an effective facility and procedure for the ongoing review of the VNCL and its upgrading and modification; and dissemination of the enabling legislation and regulations to users; and establishment of user training teams and preparation of training materials.
Flores Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Indonesia): Key objectives of this project are: to rehabilitate and upgrade existing water supply schemes affected by earthquake and/or tidal wave; to improve the coordination and management skills of local government agencies responsible for water supply and sanitation programmes; to assist with the development of water supply and sanitation services throughout Flores; and to develop the capability of local communities and non-government organisations to participate in and effectively contribute to project development.

Corrective Institutional Services Development Project (PNG): This project aims to improve the effectiveness and integrity of PNG’s prison system. This is being achieved through reviewing the legislation and regulations which underpin the management of the prisons as well as providing assistance to strengthen the organisational, financial and managerial systems of the Corrective Institutional Services. It will also provide support for infrastructure upgrading by producing a physical master plan for a number of prison sites and provide better physical working and living conditions for both staff and prisoners.

Immigration and Citizenship Division Project (PNG): The project aims over two years to raise the capability of the Immigration and Citizenship Division of the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs to provide services to the Government and citizens of PNG and to private sector investors through improved operational systems, staff expertise, and management.
Human rights and participatory development: Stemming the rise of the ‘new anarchy’

Patrick Kilby, Programme Coordinator, Community Aid Abroad

Human rights and governance are terms prominent in the modern development lexicon. They also dominate the thinking of western aid donors and receive prominence in development debates. For example: how can aid be used to make developing countries meet certain minimum human rights standards? Australia has suspended bilateral aid to Burma; the United States has a long list of countries with whom it imposes sanctions of one sort or another. Human rights is then in turn linked with democratisation and good governance. The European Commission sees good governance, democratisation and human rights observance as axiomatic, and pushes hard for reform in the countries it assists.

Australia prefers not to use sanctions in its dealings with other countries but rather what our Foreign Minister calls ‘constructive engagement’. What this means in practice is unclear; AIDAB (1992:17) puts it in these terms:

Australia does not equate the promotion of good governance with the imposition of western styles of democracy. Good governance is understood as effective management of a country’s social and economic resources in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable and equitable.

Underlying the debate is a rather narrow definition of human rights. References to human rights abuses seem to refer solely to the Conventions relating to civil and political rights. The Conventions relating to economic, social and cultural rights - the so-called ‘right to development’ - are largely ignored and often openly flouted by donor and recipient countries. For example, much of the advice given by bilateral and multilateral donors in developing structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) directly contravenes the Conventions relating to economic, social and cultural rights. The right to a free elementary education is fast disappearing, freedom from hunger and the equitable distribution of world’s food resources is not happening, and the access for all to medical services is declining. These are all rights enshrined in UN Conventions.¹

Human rights and aid are inextricably linked. While national governments can take a lot of the blame for human rights abuses, the international aid community must also take responsibility. The advice given to governments in aid negotiations and for SAPs has played a central role in the decline in human rights as they relate to the ‘right to development’. Human rights are indivisible and include the totality of basic human needs, and individual rights and freedoms. What is required to achieve a full recognition and respect for human rights, is a new consensus as to how a state shall operate, given the limitations it inevitably faces, in terms of resources, and international pressures for an open and exposed economy.

The world economy has gone through fundamental structural changes in the past two decades. The decline in government and the rising domination of the international market make it more difficult for basic needs to be met. Robert Kaplan (1994:48) in his article The coming anarchy refers to the breakdown of the basic structures of nation states as we know them.

...a worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger [dominated by] ... the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasive nature of war. It is increasingly doubtful that an international aid effort will be able to alleviate these tensions, when the powerlessness of communities is a root cause. Kaplan calls it the ‘revenge of the poor’, who do not want so much the resources of the rich, rather vengeance for the humiliation and powerlessness that poverty has brought.

The role of so-called civil society is central to maintaining or restoring order. It includes community-based organisations and groups, non government organisations (NGOs), unions, women’s, peasants and student groups, as well as local level government structures. The approach of NGOs including Community Aid Abroad (CAA) is to strengthen those local level groups, often to have a direct role in the political process.

The Borama Peace Conference in Somaliland (Northern Somalia) is an example of this approach. It involved bringing elders of warring clans together from the area to resolve their differences which were leading to social disintegration. The Borama Peace Conference lasted three months and mapped out a framework for peace in the region and a stable local government. This is in stark contrast to the UN sponsored intervention in the rest of Somalia which has been shown to be an absolute failure. The US led war against Mohammed Farah Aiddeed served only to lose the UN its impartiality and therefore its credibility. The only place where security is improving is Somaliland where a constitution is being drawn up by a bicameral parliament. One could suggest that this is
because of, rather than in spite of, UN neglect of the area. The importance of local level action with local involvement and local communities cannot be underestimated.

In South Africa the civic associations in the townships, the "civics", were the core of the struggle for the end of apartheid. The "civics" were responsible for keeping the discipline in the townships to enable boycotts, strikes and mass actions to be effective. These "civics" are now forming the nucleus of the new South African local government structure.

In El Salvador twelve years of civil war have left the society weak, divided and in many cases passive. Consolidating democracy is essential to achieving reconciliation and an enduring peace. Support to indigenous and refugee communities, the main victims of the years of bloody civil war, has given them the power to negotiate their own peace deals and be able to return to their lands and be active in rebuilding their country. In the central and northern districts of El Salvador, leadership training, community education, legal assistance and the development of community radio and publications, are a practical approach to strengthening civil society.

Vietnam's doi moi or openness, has had devastating effects on the local or community level of government, the commune. Starved of resources from either national or external sources, local government in Vietnam is increasingly falling apart, incapable of fulfilling a positive role during the political and economic renovation process. In order for it to be effective not only must there be resources and technical skills, but more fundamentally the strengthening of community structures is necessary. In the case of primary health care for example, the delivery mechanisms for the communes no longer have access to economic and human resources. One approach is to strengthen the community's role and give them a greater say.

This is the approach of the AIDAB supported Vung Tau - Ba Ria Health Development Program implemented by CAA. The three main components of the programme are the strengthening of community health groups which go well beyond health staff and volunteers; environmental health including water, sanitation, food and hygiene and awareness raising on the links of these issues; and a special focus on the material and economic conditions of most disadvantaged households through small-scale economic programmes.

In all of these examples of CAA's work, the underlying principle is that change in people's conditions and their basic human rights can only come about when the focus is on the communities and empowering those communities. The strength of these communities is the best protection against abuse. The imposition of "what is right" from above or beyond, is ineffective and often irrelevant. Kaplan (1994:65) makes the point that people living in what may seem squalid conditions can live in dignity. He uses the example of the Golden Mountain, a slum on the outskirts of Ankara.

According to Kaplan it is the power of culture and community which can create dignity and pride in a situation deprived of resources.

The pressures arising from the "new anarchy" will call for a new approach to aid and its delivery if the world is to avoid increasingly expensive, often ill-planned and futile UN military deployments such as Rwanda and Somalia. At the macro level there needs to be fundamental changes in relations, especially financial relations between states. The unregulated flows of capital between states starve developing countries of resources and their economic security. Complementing this is the need for a micro approach to strengthen local communities and local government so that there is a real democracy and local communities can take a greater charge of their own destinies.

How that is to be achieved is the challenge which faces us all. While the approach of agencies like CAA to local level institutional strengthening is one step, the real question is how do we involve bilateral donors and multilateral agencies in bringing about this fundamental change at a much broader level? It is difficult for aid programmes, such as Australia's, which are predicated on technical assistance and transfers of technology to make the fundamental shift to more local level alternatives. The multilateral development banks with their straight-jacket of doctrinaire economic rationalist dogma cannot hope to change without a fundamental shift in culture and thinking.

Agencies have acknowledged that participation, empowerment and improved local governance must be backed up with innovative local financing and resource allocation mechanisms. Local development funds or LDFs are being developed by a number of multilateral donors. LDFs are based on earlier experiences with municipal development funds, and social funds which were initially designed to ameliorate the adverse effects of SAPs in the late 1980s.

The UN Capital Development Fund, for instance, has assisted local government in Vietnam, Zambia, Ethiopia and recently Palestine to create local development funds. Here LDFs, jointly managed by the community-based organisations and local government, are used to finance small-scale public infrastructure, like farm to market roads, irrigation schemes, schools and clinics, as well as provide credit to rural enterprises and producers.

AIDAB is taking tentative steps along the road to looking at innovative ways of providing resources to local communities and giving practical shape to its policy. AIDAB (1994:7)
eschews narrow technocratic-based definitions when it defines participatory development:

as a process by which people take an active and influential role in shaping decisions that affect their lives. It strengthens civil society by empowering communities and individuals, thus influencing public policy and providing a check on the power of government.

Practical examples of AIDAB's change in direction are its micro-enterprise development programme and its community-based approaches in family planning projects.

The big challenge for AIDAB and other bilateral donors is to broaden the focus of these programmes so that a substantial proportion of the bilateral programme can support these local level needs and involve participatory development. It is only through these innovative approaches that effective development can occur. It must be rooted at the local level, centred on strengthening civil society, and involve resourcing local level initiative. The challenge is to put the rhetoric into practice, to make major country programmes focus on participatory development. It is only through these strategies that the horrors of the 'new anarchy' be averted and all human rights respected and strengthened.

Footnotes and references

1 Articles 25 and 26 of the *Universal declaration of human rights*, and Articles 11 and 13 of the *International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights*.


Waiting for Godot: Liberalisation in Singapore

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It is widely assumed that industrialisation creates conditions which are necessary for the emergence of liberal democracy. Singapore is a wealthy society and a developed country, but Singapore is not a liberal democracy. The country has been called a dictatorship, a corporatist state, a hegemonic state, and a city-state for multinationals. Singapore's identity, location and smallness, all favour the maintenance of authoritarianism as the likely political regime for the near future.

Industrialisation transforms society first, by creating wealth which enables a high level of social and economic well-being for the majority. In turn, economic development leads to a pluralistic order: a highly differentiated society in terms of the division of labour and interests which are represented by a multitude of pressure groups and associations. In this way, industrialisation disperses economic and political power and through a changing balance of power prevents any one group from ascertaining hegemony. Higher overall living standards weaken class and ethnic conflicts and promote consensus that an open society is preferable to authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Democracy cannot evolve or survive unless the majority believe that the rules governing this type of political territorial association are not only desirable, but worth protecting at home and beyond. Higher living standards also make education for all possible, this being an important factor in the emergence of a political culture committed to the protection of the individual and the pursuit of democratic ideals. Another important factor is the role of the external environment on domestic political change. Huntington, for example, claims that democracy is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states (1984:206).

For a democracy to exist, according to Dahl, there must be institutions to guarantee: 'the freedom to form and join organizations; freedom of expression; right of political leaders to compete for support; alternative sources of information; eligibility for public office; and free and fair elections' (1971:1). Liberalisation in Singapore would require a number of changes to end the People's Action Party's (PAP) monopoly over political power, establish free and fair elections; dismantle the legislation which now restricts the civil and political rights of citizens; and end state control over organisations and institutions so that they represent and protect the people's interests.

Political economy

Given the economic structure and smallness of Singapore, the continued socio-economic well-being of the population is based on the capacity of the country to move towards a post-industrial society. Continued economic growth in this direction may also be necessary to secure the country's viability as a sovereign entity. These challenges form the basis for the ruling party's vision and strategy for an affluent information society and global city.

State capitalism is an important element in the country's economy and political regime. Local capitalism, is not a major factor in the country's political and economic development and is largely integrated into a wider geographical commercial network whose interests are dictated primarily by profit. Singapore's dependency on foreign investment is well documented. However, liberalisation would threaten the fulfilment of the PAP's grand vision because foreign capital would interpret political change towards a more open society as a major political risk and, therefore, alter their investment strategy in regard to the island's future as a regional development core and global city.

Singaporeans are unlikely to support liberalisation because of the fear that it would generate a climate conducive to political instability and threaten the country's continued industrialisation and affluent living standards. This is particularly so given the country's high level of dependence on the external world for capital and employment. A large middle class is critically dependent on foreign and state expenditures and patronage for employment and economic security. Thus symbiotic relationship suggests that the growing middle class is not likely to compromise their economic entitlements and living standards with a major shift in their political culture and allegiance. Although discontent among the poorer population has increased and many voted against the PAP in the 1991 election, their vote was not a demand for democracy, but for greater economic entitlements. The PAP is likely to regain their support with financial concessions and improvements in housing standards.

State and society

The power of the state, the core of which is the PAP, is considerable and magnified by the smallness of the island. Its ability to recruit talent and extend its power is sustainable and efficient. The ruling party controls all three branches of government as well as the organisations and institutions which articulate civil society in its relations with the state. From an increasing power and political role of the military to electronic surveillance of the population, state power in Singapore is getting stronger. However, from time to time the PAP's legitimacy is challenged as evidenced by the 1991 election indications of factionalism within the party. The
election results suggest that the majority of those who voted for the opposition are low-income earners. Their vote was not necessarily a vote in support of democratisation but, more likely in view of increasing levels of inequality, a demand for better economic opportunities and lower government charges. Factionalism within the PAP is not likely to change the ideological basis of the party, but modify the party structure by giving the semblance of an opposition. This could change, however, after the death of Lee Kuan Yew.

Because it has been largely depoliticised, civil society is weak. This means that the organisations which would normally protect the people from state totalitarianism and mediate their interests have been absorbed into government and largely neutralised by legislative and institutional means. This applies to labour unions, mass media, public housing, institutions of higher learning, religious groups, and professional organisations such as the Law Society. Legislation, intimidation, harassment, gerrymandering and residential controls are used to neutralise the political effectiveness of the opposition. There is also a climate of fear which has made ‘Singaporeans terrified of speaking freely and suspicious of outsiders who do’ (Sterba 1989:54). Buruma (1989:142) describes this aspect of the city-state’s uncivil society as ‘the fear one finds in a very small town, where everybody knows everybody, where all walls have ears, where careers are destroyed by neighbours who tell tales, where those that stick out, behave oddly, speak out of turn, are seen as threats to the perfect order and must be dealt with, as the fussy housewife deals with those shameful specks of dust’.

Political culture and identity

The political culture of the ruling party is right-wing authoritarian, although the more ‘liberal’ faction of the party supports some changes towards greater freedom of expression. However, these changes would not in any significant manner alter the nature of the political regime as the political culture of the masses may also be largely authoritarian in character. This is indicated by the dominance of Confucianism in the process of socialisation in the family and school system, the apparent success of the government’s social engineering policy to promote a patriarchal and hierarchical social order, and the significant diffusion of religious fundamentalism among the middle class.

Since independence there has been a concerted effort on the part of the state to create a sense of national identity. This process of social engineering has been conducted principally through the state-controlled educational system and other nation-building institutions. Among the younger generations the perception of being Singaporean appears strong. Alternatively however, another aspect of social engineering in Singapore’s identity formation has been to sharpen ethnic differences. Clammer points out that ethnicity is the ‘main form of socio-cultural classification in the country ... this ethnicity is inscribed on the individual’s identity card ... publicly ethnicity is the dominant mode to which there are no alternative officially approved possibilities’ (1985:142). Highlighting ethnic differences and emphasising the dominance of the Chinese character of the city-state has served to heighten the divide between the Chinese and minority groups.

The state’s policy of using ethnicity as a primary form of identification has reinforced Singapore’s authoritarian character. This process of pseudo-speciation has increased the psychological divide between cultures and has fuelled ethnocentrism and racism. The attitude of exclusiveness encouraged in the dominant culture has not been conducive to the formation of an open society because it legitimises inequality as a rightful social and political order.

External environment

The end of the cold war does not necessarily place greater pressure on Singapore to democratise. In view of continuing tensions in Asia, Singapore’s security role on behalf of the powerful industrialised democracies is likely to increase. This will help to sustain the industrialised countries’ support for an authoritarian regime on a critically located island. Tensions will also be generated by developments in Southeast Asia over domestic politics and territorial conflicts, trade and investment issues, and the threat of ecological constraints on industrialisation. These will put pressure on Singapore to maintain a firm government. Similar pressures will emanate from the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Whether the process of a free trade area in the next fifteen years succeeds or not, a number of regional conflicts will affect Singapore’s domestic political situation.

Given its identity, location and wealth, Singapore’s regional foreign policy will create tensions which are more likely than not to constitute major obstacles to democracy. Already there are indications of Singapore’s neighbours complaining of economic exploitation and of interference in their domestic politics. Serious concern also exists about the role of the city-state’s large and sophisticated armed forces.

Conclusions

Singapore’s viability is largely based on the city-state’s capacity to restructure relatively quickly to a post-industrial economy. But what are the implications of Singapore’s development as an information society? This process is creating a new social structure which differentiates and stratifies individuals on the basis of their position in the new economy. The emerging social structure is headed by less than one-third of its workforce. This group controls the production and distribution of information. Its members represent the new meritocracy: they are highly educated and have secured a high level of economic entitlements because of their competence. While they do not at this stage control the state, they plan the economy, and administer and control
the people's social relations and behavior. The culture of this dominant group can be called technocratic rationalism because it is based on the belief that technocrats should have a monopoly on political power. Singapore is fast becoming the regime of experts: the technocracy. Their role is to implement a grand design for a technocratic society against which there is no recourse.

Singapore's internal and external milieux suggest that democracy is unlikely to succeed in the near future. More likely is the emergence of an information society where authoritarianism is manifested through a regime of technocratic elites. With the instruments and infrastructure of effective social controls and surveillance already in place, the city-state may well exemplify the emergence of a new form of post-industrial authoritarianism which Huntington describes as 'a technocratic electronic dictatorship in which authoritarian rule was legitimated by and made possible by the ability to manipulate information, the media, and sophisticated means of communication' (Huntington 1991:294).

References

Democracy and development in a modernising South Africa

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In February 1990, South African State President F. W. de Klerk lifted the ban on all major opposition groups in South Africa and declared that his government intended to 'normalise the political process in South Africa without jeopardising the maintenance of the good order' (Southern Africa Report, 9 February 1990:2). The 'good order' has been imperilled since then by political violence and intimidation (prompting the former National Party government to request the services of international peace monitors), and by 'a remarkable increase in industrial strikes around the country' (The Star, 10 June 1994). And yet in a domestic context of industrial unrest, social disorder, slowed economic growth and the resignation of Finance Minister Derek Keys, business confidence has risen to its highest level in almost seven years. The 'peaceful transition to democracy' supposedly taking place in the country was cited by South African Chamber of Business as the reason for such optimism (Business Day, 7 June 1994). If that one factor outweighs all others in business assessments of the future, it is because of the wide-ranging effects of political normalisation.

The ideas of political normality in South Africa and elsewhere has become increasingly indissociable from that of multiparty elections. World players anxious to either re-establish or initiate relations with the country have typically cast evidence of movement toward 'democracy' as the sine qua non of their own engagement. American President Bill Clinton perhaps went further than most when he described the 1994 election as 'one of the new world miracles' (The Star, 28 September 1993). But Clinton's depiction of a country that is reconstituting itself as politically normal and thus as free to re-engage in normal international intercourse, is by no means unique.

In the wake of meetings a year ago between the International Monetary Fund/World Bank and a South African delegation (comprised mainly of representatives from the National Party and the African National Congress), the former 'declared their eagerness to see vast sums invested in what is now being hailed as the world's newest emerging democracy' (The Star, 29 September 1993). Conditional upon a handover of power to a representative government, loans from the World Bank will soon be made available to support South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Program (the very name of which reflects World Bank influence). Also forthcoming, now the election is over, is funding from the Group of Seven (G7) industrial countries. The G7 vowed recently to 'provide further assistance to help strengthen economic and social development, in particular for the poorest groups' (Business Day, 11 July 1994).

As a golden democratic age is presumed to have begun, the normalisation of South Africa's international relationships to international sport; in the return to such international fora as the United Nations, Organisation of African Unity (to which Nelson Mandela has been elected vice-president) and Commonwealth; in the restoration of ties to former investors and trading partners; and in the onset of a whole series of new relationships with developing countries such as China and Malaysia.

What all of the above changes add up to is a transformation in South Africa's identity as a country. In the classificatory order of things, South Africa has moved up in the world by being removed from the ranks of the global pariahs. But the country has simultaneously moved down - or gone backward - in the sense that it is now classified as developing instead of developed.

The shift was initiated by the National Party government in 1993. Its efforts to have South Africa reclassified from a developed nation to a developing country within the GATT system so as to benefit from preferential trade arrangements were supported by the ANC's economic advisers. The de Klerk regime was responsible too for the spatial reorientation of South Africa from a bastion of anti-communism on the African continent into what de Klerk called 'the vanguard of the developing countries of the world' (South African Press Association, 19 April 1993). Once Nelson Mandela became the new president, South Africa 'firmly placed itself among developing countries' by becoming the 130th member of the 'Group of 77' in the United Nations (The Citizen, 25 June 1994).

These changes are attributable in part to the logic of capitalist development in a post-apartheid, post-communist and post-colonial world. In the name of a development programme meant to effect social reconstruction, the Government of National Unity proposes to establish export-processing zones in the Cape Province while touting for foreign investment, trade and finance. Those in business circles who once worried that an ANC election victory would mean wealth and land redistribution and affirmative action, are now optimistic for the future. In a clash between the old solutions to problems (such as industrial action) and the entailments of capitalist development, the Mandela government has already sided with the latter against the former. As the imagery of development fills up the spaces vacated by anti-apartheid activity, 'radical reconstruction ... remains for the present in the realm of promise rather than performance' (The Star, 23 June 1994).

Post-apartheid development in South Africa is conditioned by the global capitalist context within which the country is now - as an ex-pariah - more fully situated. At the same time, the reclassification of the country as developing needs to be understood in relation to the racist and modernist logic.
of development that underpinned the former system of apartheid. By pushing black South Africans literally and conceptually beyond the boundaries of the Republic, 'separate development' facilitated the construction of South Africa as a developed state; the 'whiter' it became by being scrubbed clean of 'black spots', the more developed must it be. The political transformation of 'resident aliens' into South African citizens effectively dismantles the barriers erected to keep 'developed' Europeans from 'primitive' Natives. Faced with the impending social integration of those long considered to be less developed, the de Klerk regime set out to reconfigure the country's collective identity.

'Separate development' may have been racist, but it was nonetheless consistent with the modern European attitudes and practices that informed its architects. Throughout the modern age the supposedly advanced societies of the western world - with their seemingly superior standard of life given by art, writing, science, money and so on - have been placed in hierarchical opposition to those imagined as poor, tribal, underdeveloped and barbarous. Those defined as primitive or (more recently) as traditional are presumed to advance in direct proportion to their acquisition of western traits, so that modern development entails becoming, figuratively, a white adult.

The synonym for development in the post-colonial era is modernisation more often than civilisation, and overt references to black people as backward (as if they were retarded children) are certainly less common. But despite these changes there are important continuities between early and late modern discourses of development. The idea of the modern West as a model of achievement, and the rest of the world as an inferior derivative, remains integral to the concept of development. A world inhabited primarily by people of colour (the so-called Third World) continues to be constituted as poor, lacking and culturally inferior. And discipline continues to be meted out by so-called experts who claim to know more about local conditions than the local people themselves.

There is no need here to rehearse all of the critiques of modern development in circulation globally for many years. Liberation theology's notion of 'integral development', Paulo Freire's concept of 'conscientisation', discourses of empowerment, sustainability, capacity-building and participatory action research, are by now familiar to theorists and development practitioners alike. What is worth mentioning is that the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) of South Africa has been part of this global challenge to modern development despite its specifically South African and anti-apartheid orientation. The BCM tradition emphasises black pride in African culture and resistance to exploitative values imported into South Africa from the West. Though an indigenous BCM-inspired liberation theology, through popular theatre and trade union based performance poetry, and through community development projects in multiple sites, the BCM tradition lives on despite the political hegemony of the ANC.

If radical reconstruction remains at the level of promise in South Africa, it will matter little to the majority that development is no longer separate. Resistance, in a variety of forms, will continue.

A substantially longer version of this paper will appear as 'Black consciousness and the quest for a counter-modernist development', in Jonathon Crush (ed), The power of development, Routledge, New York, forthcoming.
Democratisation and social change in Indonesia: Recent development trends

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Indonesia appears to be experiencing a long-term process of democratisation. The process has not been linear, however, and there have been many delays and detours in the political liberalisation which has taken place over the last decade. Perhaps the most recent of such setbacks was the banning in June of the three most popular weekly magazines in Indonesia. This is likely to be only a slight hiccup in a longer political process, however, for over the last two decades new social forces have emerged to challenge the monopoly of power previously held by state and military officials. This article is concerned with the relationship between this liberal democratic impulse and the process of economic liberalisation which began in the mid-1980s. Major business conglomerates now dominate the economy, business empires have benefited from economic deregulation by expanding on the basis of market forces. In response, the government has devoted considerable attention to enunciating policies intended to satisfy the basic needs of the mass of the population. What effect, then, has the halting process of political liberalisation had on the government's development orientation? Are these 'basic needs' policies actually being implemented? And should the process of political democratisation continue and should new social forces be drawn into the political process, will economic policy makers come to emphasise poverty alleviation above wealth creation?

Indonesia's gradual democratisation has been nurtured by an expanding middle class, and the process of political liberalisation is therefore likely to continue. It might also be suggested that the change in Indonesia's demographic makeup has encouraged policies favouring wealth creation rather than a commitment to greater economic equity.

The erosion of the nationalist-statist development orientation

The benchmark marking a revival of economic nationalism in Indonesia was the 'Malari' riots of January 1974, when demonstrators protested foreign economic dominance during a visit by the Japanese Prime Minister. The New Order government which had been established in 1966-1968 under the then Lt-General Soeharto was a coalition of military powerholders and economic technocrats. The bankrupt economy they inherited initially left them little choice but to advocate a state retreat from the economy and pursue an 'open door' policy towards foreign capital.

During 1972 and 1973, however, a number of factors encouraged a rethinking on development. Growing concern amongst intellectuals about economic dependence led to a reassessment of development goals. State officials were emboldened by increasing oil revenues, and indigenous business had begun to lobby the government with greater effect, drawing on the ideological force of economic nationalism. Advocates of nationalist development policies were able to gain a wider and more influential audience for their policy proposals.

After the 1974 riots swept Jakarta and other major cities, foreign investors began to be subject to closer supervision, with economic policy generally directed towards promoting nationalist development goals. The riots marked an end to the "pragmatic 'let's work it out' philosophy...and the emergence of economic nationalism as perhaps the dominant force shaping government investment policies" (US Embassy 1975:5).

Official economic nationalism became notably more muscular in the following years. The 'second oil boom' of 1979-1981 further emboldened state planners, and the government began to implement long held aspirations for rational development. Grandiose schemes for industrial expansion were announced in manufacturing, and similar plans were hatched and implemented in sectors such as wood and ore reprocessing. In sum, the dominant policy orientation until the mid-1980s entailed closer state supervision of the economy - in the name of building national strength.

Behind this official economic nationalism, however, lay a modus operandi of private deals and inducements to national business. The growing self-confidence of state bureaucrats in their ability to control the development process, and the frequent ministerial pronouncements on development targets, masked the fact that the chief beneficiaries of state policies were domestic capitalist groups. Beginning in the 1970s, large corporate groups emerged who were protected from foreign competition and given privileged access to state contracts. The automotive industry, for example, came to be dominated by the major national conglomerates: the Astra, Krama Yudha and Salim groups. The nationalist-statist development strategies of the recent past were thus premised on a closed and exclusive relationship between government and business.

This policy orientation faced its first serious challenge in the mid-1980s; falling oil prices and the end of the so-called 'oil bonanza' caused a fiscal crisis. No longer able to dictate investment conditions, the government was forced to rely more heavily on private sector involvement. Moreover, the economic clout of the business groups that had already...
emerged meant that they no longer needed state protection. Indeed, many were able to further diversify their interests and expand overseas, based on their domestic capital resources. Their economic power thus outlived the policy orientation which had originally created them.

**Political liberalisation and the urban middle class**

State controls came under further challenge with the liberalisation of political debate in the late 1980s. Under the slogan of ‘political openness’, a range of political forces called for changes in the existing political order. Members of parliament regretted constraints on political parties; government leaders urged greater civilian involvement in politics; and senior officials of the Armed Forces (ABRI) called for open debate in a more tolerant political climate. Controversial issues such as the role of the presidency, the militarisation of society, and particularly, the widening gap between rich and poor were discussed more openly. By mid-1990 Soeharto was obliged to acknowledge that free debate may be necessary for future economic development *(Kompas 29 June 1990)*.

Since 1991 there has been something of a retreat from openness, with Soeharto reasserting his authority over recalcitrant members of the political elite. More outspoken members of parliament have not been nominated for re-election, while certain opposition figures have been coopted into state controlled organisations. The recent clampdown on the press indicates that the small clique of ministers around Soeharto still seeks to control political debate.

But politics in contemporary Indonesia is not so easily controlled using these twin methods of coercion and cooption. The political elite has become more diverse, lessening the capacity of Soeharto’s inner circle to determine political outcomes and opening up cracks within the Armed Forces leadership and between ABRI and civilian leaders. New social forces have entered the political process *(Chalmers 1991)*.

The middle class is perhaps the most important such force. The emergence of significant urban middle classes is immediately evident to the casual observer. The steady increase in private vehicle ownership, the vast housing estates on the outskirts of the major cities, and the plethora of new supermarkets and shopping malls all point to this fact. Significantly, there has been a steady increase in the number of readers of newspapers and magazines, providing the market for a far more diverse media than was the case even a decade ago.

What political impact is the growth of Indonesia’s middle classes likely to have? Much recent commentary tends to be sceptical of their political significance. Analysts have generally stressed the obstacles facing middle class reformers *(Taater and Young 1990; Crouch 1994)*. Others feel that the middle classes are still too few in number or too dependent on patronage to challenge political power structures.

Internally divided, dependent upon the state, and fearful of social and economic chaos they have been immobilised. The general assumption that middle classes represent sources of social power and wealth independent of the state and are therefore concerned with limiting its power and imposing accountability has not generally applied in Indonesia *(Robison 1992)*.

But while we can accept that the middle classes are generally apolitical and depend on others for employment, this does not mean they are politically irrelevant. Political sociologists note that the growth of the intermediate classes serves to reduce the political power of a dominant state or class, injecting a degree of unpredictability into political life *(Abercrombie and Urry 1983)*. In Indonesia, as elsewhere in Asia, the expansion of middle class groups has made society far more complex, complicating the task of an authoritarian government.

The term ‘middle class’ includes a broad range of groups, from small-scale traders and government officials to journalists and academics. But a common feature of this heterogenous social grouping is the consumption of printed and other media. It is this access to information which gives the politics of legitimacy added importance. Over a decade ago it was suggested that the increase in this ‘political public’ - regular readers of newspapers and magazines - was creating new political loyalties which were undermining state political domination *(Feith 1980:650)*. Now, the considerable growth of these classes in the last two decades has created a social mass whose loyalty is important to the survival of the regime, a relatively well-informed social force which must be accommodated by the political leadership. It is this social change which underpins the recent political liberalisation, a social transformation which is likely to encourage further democratisation.

**Development policy implications**

During the period of statist-nationalist development policies important attempts were made to alleviate poverty, and the welfare of the mass of the population undoubtably improved. Nutritional requirements were largely met, and we can predict that the famines of previous decades are now past. Much oil wealth was recycled into upgrading rural infrastructure via ‘Presidential Instruction’ (INPRES) funds. Finally, the Kampung Improvement Programme for improving sanitation markedly improved the average standard of living in urban areas.

Since the period of economic liberalisation began a decade ago, however, such ‘basic needs’ policies have lost favour in government circles. Even during the statist-nationalist period, advocates of these policy measures were not close to the inner circle of decision makers, and they had little direct political influence. The support of the rural and urban poor was largely irrelevant to the political survival of the regime; beneficiaries of INPRES projects, for example, were thus largely dependent on state largesse. By contrast, considerable
attention was given to the promotion of technologically sophisticated industries such as aircraft and automobile production. And as state policies have increasingly focused on promoting the upper reaches of the economy over the last decade, the share of the national budget allocated to INPRES programmes has declined.

The moves towards liberalisation have not directly benefited the urban and rural poor. The sectors of the middle class that have expanded most rapidly in recent times - laying the social basis for this democratisation - are those closely linked to an expanding corporate sector. Private schools offering MBA courses are flourishing; university graduates are increasingly looking for employment in the private rather than the state sector. Even Indonesia's two largest Muslim organisations - traditionally hostile to 'free-flight capitalism' - have gone into business with the major conglomerates. Finally, non government organisations (NGOs) have been traditionally concerned with the poor and promoting alternative, more equitable development strategies. In an increasingly competitive world, NGOs now find themselves competing with private organisations for business consultancies. In short, the middle classes have become drawn more tightly into the structures of Indonesian capitalism. With an interest in continued capitalist expansion, they are likely to continue favouring policies promoting economic growth above economic equity.

The last few years have seen a continuation of trends favouring both political and economic liberalisation. On the one hand, there is within Indonesia an almost tangible sense of political change; the political environment has become more fluid, with a new and far broader range of activists appearing on the national stage. An upsurge in labour demands for improved wages and protest against state restrictions has raised the possibility of a widening of political processes. More significantly, the continued lively public debate over human rights and the question of succession also indicate that the political influence of middle class activists is increasing.

On the other hand, the movement towards economic liberalisation and structural adjustment has gathered momentum. In a public discourse increasingly dominated by concerns directly relevant to the middle classes (housing, education and employment for university graduates) less official attention is devoted to issues of economic equity. There has, it is true, been a prolonged debate on the question of rural poverty, particularly in Eastern Indonesia; the 1994/95 budget announced new measures to tackle this problem. But a renewed focus on wealth-creation as wider sections of the middle classes sense that they too can benefit from a burgeoning business sector means that less and less attention is likely to be given to narrowing the gap between the rich and poor.

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Philippine elections and democracy

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Among Asian countries, the Philippines has had one of the longest histories of elections as a means for deciding who will hold public office. For decades the Philippine electorate has been as inclusive as virtually any other in the world - all adult citizens are free to vote whatever their gender, religion or ethnicity. These are impressive features of the country’s political system.

Yet looking at how Philippine elections are typically analysed, one could easily get the impression that elections are not to be taken seriously as a democratic institution in the country. Journalists and scholars, especially when residing outside the country, usually emphasise three things about Philippine elections. One is that they are violent, characterised by opponents killing each other and politicians winning office by using their private armies to intimidate voters. According to many observers, a second and even more pronounced feature is the buying of votes and, indeed, entire elections. The third theme is that, while guns and money may not always dominate Philippine elections, factions and alliances built around personalities and patronage do. Personal relationships such as kinship and patron-client ties and the exchanges of personal favours and rewards are often said to be the essence of electoral politics.

These themes are not wrong per se but they are seriously incomplete. Dwelling on those aspects of electoral politics means excluding additional important themes about the country. Among them are two that bring together elections and democracy in the Philippines.

The first is that issues are significant. Conventional analyses argue that because people are preoccupied with personal relationships, they are not interested in policy and other issues. Yet there is considerable evidence that Filipino voters are concerned about candidates’ stances on public issues, their abilities, and their integrity and other leadership qualities. Voters weigh their needs and make assessments of candidates’ positions accordingly. Those needs often do include personal relationships with a candidate and others who support or oppose that candidate. But it is also true that Filipino voters try to assess which candidate has the most to offer or is the least adverse in other respects, including for their perceived interests as workers, tenant farmers, fisher people, business people, students, mountain dwellers, Muslims, Catholics and so forth.

In other words, social, economic, and political issues actually are often major concerns for Filipinos. This is true in campaigns for national offices as well as for local elections. Cesar Climaco, for example, was elected mayor of Zamboanga City in 1980 largely because he explicitly opposed the policies and practices of President Ferdinand Marcos, including the martial law that was still in force. He was not alone: that year several other candidates for local government in Mindanao – an area particularly adversely hurt by Marcos’ policies – had similar platforms. Earlier, just before martial law, the 1970 election of delegates for the 1971 Constitutional Convention was electrified by issues regarding the structure of government, the Marcos administration and the US military bases to name a few. Since the end of martial law and the Marcos rule in 1986, issues such as land reform, corruption, insurgency, crime, unemployment and numerous other economic debates have been prominent in local and national elections, including the 1992 presidential election and the 1994 village elections.

The importance of issues is not a recent development. Vigorous debate on issues during elections goes back at least to the late 1930s when candidates for municipal offices in central Luzon in 1937 and 1940 were deeply immersed in debates regarding agricultural tenancy, workers’ conditions, social justice and Philippine-American relations. These again became major issues in election campaigns for congressional seats in 1946.

Related to this discussion of complexity of considerations during elections is another aspect of elections that most studies overlook. Since at least the 1930s, a pronounced theme has been contending claims and views about the purpose and process of elections themselves. While some Filipinos use elections to advance personal and factional interests and see elections as battles fought with ‘guns, goons, and gold’, many others strive to make elections be about legitimacy, fairness and democratic processes. They claim that elections are about making the country more democratic and following proper procedures to replace corrupt and self-centered politicians with candidates who come closer to upholding democratic values and want to serve the public not merely themselves. One can find numerous manifestations of ordinary Filipinos struggling to assert this second view of elections.

In 1969, for example, candidates who had lost the vote tally for the congressional seat in Batanes province protested that the ‘winner’ had employed armed men to terrorize and coerce voters and polling station clerks. The ‘winner’ denied the allegations and newspaper columnists believed him. When an official investigation began, eighteen Batanes teachers who had served as voting clerks stepped forward - defying threats against their lives - and testified that indeed armed men had forced them to endorse falsified tally sheets. Their
testimonies and subsequent evidence led to criminal charges against the 'winner' and the proclamation of one of the 'losing' candidates as the real winner.

In 1982, the nation held elections for village presidents. These were the first such elections in ten years and the first local elections since the partial lifting of martial law in 1981. Many villagers in San Ricardo, Nueva Ecija had long awaited this election in hopes that the incumbent would be replaced, even though they knew he had the upper hand due to his backing by the municipal branch of Marcos' Kilusang Bagong Lipunan political party. Using some of this political muscle, the incumbent president maneuvered to prevent a potential opponent from filing candidacy papers, thereby assuring his re-election. This disgusted not only those who had long complained about his poor leadership, but also many of his previous supporters. To show their contempt, two-thirds of registered voters either boycotted the election or voted for the person whose candidacy had been foiled.

In the 1988 gubernatorial election in Ilocos Norte, the very popular candidate Rodolfo Farìñas was thought to have little chance of defeating Manuela Ablan, even though Ablan was widely disliked in part because her family had smuggled in huge quantities of garlic from Taiwan, causing havoc for the local garlic industry. The Ablan family was expected to use its hold over certain mayors, military officers and policemen to take the governorship one way or another. A volunteer movement to keep watch over the polls in all precincts made the counting and reporting process honest, however, allowing Farìñas to win.

These examples reveal people trying to preserve or create some integrity and honesty in elections and turn them into expressions of actual sentiments or evaluations of candidates and issues. In so doing, they engage and oppose those who have different, often sinister understandings of what elections are about. From time to time, these conflicting views of elections burst onto the national scene as major confrontations.

One important period contained the elections of 1951 (for congressional and lower offices) and 1953 (which also featured a presidential election). They followed the 1947 and 1949 elections which were among the most serdíd in the country's history. Incumbents had brazenly used their offices, the police and the Philippine Constabulary to muscle and finagle their way to re-election. By 1951, many people were girding for even worse elections, despite electoral and other reforms aimed at trying to prevent a reoccurrence. Some were so disgusted and convinced that the elections would be nothing less than corrupt that they boycotted the elections and urged others to do likewise.

Many voters, however, went the opposite direction, throwing themselves into a struggle to prevent a repeat of 1947 and 1949. They protected polling stations against manipulation, monitored the counting of votes, publicised names of candidates and others who violated the rules, guarded ballot boxes, and often stood their ground against armed authorities who tried to intimidate them. These widespread activities, coupled with improved media coverage and electoral reforms, contributed to making the 1951 and 1953 elections far cleaner than before. The most well-known among the many organisations pressing for honest elections was the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), established in mid-1951. Even many remote villages had NAMFREL chapters to help make the voting, tallying and reporting that year surprisingly fair and peaceful. This was repeated in 1953 as more people became involved in NAMFREL to democratise the election process. In both years, numerous other organisations also became involved.

Both 1951 and 1953 show determination among wide spectrum of population to make 'elections' a major issue. They fought against elections being turned into a facade behind which people are coerced, intimidated, and abused, and ballots are treated cavalierly. They pressed, instead, that the country live up to the rhetoric of free, open and honest elections.

In 1986, a similar crisis over elections reached a crescendo, loosely referred to as the 'people power revolution' that forced Marcos' authoritarian regime to collapse. This event was certainly not only about the meaning and purpose of elections. The dynamics of that year, and the events leading up to it, were complex and their significance multifaceted. A credible argument would be that 1986 represented a confrontation between competing clusters of elites. Clientelism, factionalism, personal relations, regionalism and other factors also influenced many voters and their understanding of what the election was about. For many the election was about major economic and political crises within the country.

An additional and vital dynamic was that the 1985-86 campaign was also a struggle to make elections an expression of people's views and desires for their country. They were determined to make elections as free as possible of coercion, intimidation, cheating and fraud. They sought to make this election a method by which the majority could decide what person and what kind of government was better for the country, for Marcos and Aquino represented strikingly different choices. Closely related, there were strong feelings across a wide spectrum of the population that the government had to change, lest already terrible conditions become much worse. For millions of anxious Filipinos, the 1986 election was the best and perhaps last chance to peacefully change (for the better) who rules and how. A key question for many was, would the 1986 election be manipulated and subverted by Marcos and his political machine or would it be a more credible and democratic process? Millions of people were determined to answer the latter.

The Philippines illustrates that democratic processes are not born. They are created and fashioned over considerable time
and through enormous struggle. Mixed within the institutions of democracy are dynamics and practices at odds with those very institutions, such as the violence, vote buying, and personal ambitions and loyalties in the Philippine political system. To dwell on those, however, as many studies of Philippine elections do, is to miss the vibrant struggle joined by many Filipinos to give substance to democratic ideals.

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October 1994
Issues on democracy and development: Ramos’ political will

Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer

President Fidel Ramos is the first Filipino president who has put his administration on the line on economic performance. His grand vision for the country, ‘Philippines 2000’, expresses this fundamental shift of policy emphasis from politics to economics. The shift seeks to transform the Philippines into a Newly Industrializing Country (NIC) by the year 2000. For the first time in the political history of the Philippines, a democratically elected president is trying to produce economic results by depoliticising the national agenda and by decompressing politics. In a society which is politically over-developed, this change goes against the strong currents of national priorities and political experience. It creates powerful contradictions in effecting political and social change. It raises issues associated with the relationship between democracy and economic development.

The political implication of this shift is that Ramos has defined economic performance as the basis for the enhancement of the legitimacy of his regime beyond the 24 per cent electoral mandate he received in the May 1992 presidential election. That election was important because it was the first direct and democratic transfer of power after the People Power revolution of February 1986.

Previous presidents have rested their legitimacy on other - mainly political - criteria. President Ramon Magsaysay reinforced his legitimacy derived from a broad electoral mandate by crushing the Huk rebellion in the 1950s. Diosdado Macapagal sought legitimacy by campaigning against corruption engendered by a system of economic controls and the abolition of controls. Ferdinand Marcos sought legitimacy by posing as an anti-communist warrior stressing political order, stability and infrastructure performance, and Cory Aquino by restoring democracy after the Marcos dictatorship.

Ramos’ shift of emphasis is a response to the Philippines’ poor economic position in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region, and the challenge of adjusting the Philippines to the new international order that places highest priority to economic development and trade.

The question facing Ramos is whether he will succeed in transforming the Philippines into an NIC under a democratic polity. Most of the successful economies in East Asia have been governed by authoritarian regimes which started economic transformation with draconian political control.

The Philippines is trying to restart economic growth with a democratic system built on the concept of individual rights, rather than communitarian social responsibility. The challenge facing Ramos is put very well by the Economist (4 July 1992): ‘The challenge for President Ramos is to find the economic growth that will confirm democracy’s future’.

President Ramos himself has defined the context of change sought by Philippines 2000: ‘The crucial question is: can we reform an undemocratic economy by using a democratic political framework?’ In setting economic performance as the defining element of his government, President Ramos has put on the line the legitimacy of democracy as a framework which can foster sustained economic growth and development.

The tasks involved in this transformation are enormous. Philippines 2000 has five objectives, three of which are critically important: first, restoring political stability; second, opening the economy by dismantling monopolies and cartels injurious to the public interest, and levelling the playing field for private enterprise; and third, uprooting bureaucratic corruption and crime in the streets.

The specific goals for the strategic framework of Philippines 2000 are outlined in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan for 1993-1998. The plan seeks to obtain a GDP growth rate of six to eight per cent from 1992 to 1998, to reduce the poverty line to less than 30 per cent of the population, single digit inflation, double digit growth rates for exports and investments, and a GDP per capita income of $1000, from the present $740.

The enormity of the task has invited scepticism over whether Ramos’ government has the capacity to accomplish his goals, given its extremely cautious political style, its conservative outlook, its narrow electoral mandate, and a Congress with enhanced power under the 1987 post-Marcos constitution. For the first time since independence, minority government came into being in the May 1992 presidential election, and this slim mandate has forced Ramos to be cautious. In the history of Philippine elections, the country has had a long experience in majoritarian politics, which helped stabilise the two-party elitist system prior to the imposition of martial law in 1972.

The essential question is whether Philippines 2000 is a realistic plan, given the history of failed reforms in the country (a notable example is land reform) and the institutional constraints against social change that threatens to disturb the status quo.

Economic transformation requires drastic and structural reforms. So far, of the three basic goals, political stability has been established, providing Ramos the foundation on
which economic policies could be made. The government is clearly not in danger of being overthrown by a coup d'etat in the way the Aquino's government was always threatened by dissidents. The other goals are harder to achieve because this would mean battling the socioeconomic elite who have dominated the economy for the past 90 years. If Ramos were to carry out the goal of dismantling the monopolies/oligopolies and cartels, the question is whether such a campaign would be successful without causing a social counter-revolution, or economic dislocation.

The shift of economic strategy from import-substitution to export-orientation is not new. It began in the 1960s but the strategy bogged down in the face of strong resistance from entrenched protectionist interests and the weakness of government to implement outward looking policies. Under the Ramos government, the export-driven strategy for growth has been given a new momentum in an environment that is now more favorable to it than in the Marcos regime.

Following the failure of the regime of import-substitution beginning in the 1950s, the Philippines has found the policy mix that has propelled economic success, based on the experience of the East Asia miracles, especially South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. In a recent assessment of the Philippine economy, the World Bank pronounced that the Philippines has got its 'policy fundamentals right' and 'now faces its best prospect for sustained development in almost two decades. A window of opportunity exists for the new government'.

At the beginning of 1994, Ramos proclaimed that his government had established the 'foundations for economic take-off', predicting an increase in the GDP growth rate to 4 per cent, up from 2.5 per cent in 1993. Electricity shortages had ended by December 1993, although reserve power generating capacity must be built up for the increasing industrial demand for power. The privatization programme of state enterprises is underway, with the divestment of state shares in Philippine Airlines leading the way. Economic liberalization of investment is on the cards, and export-orientation has regained impetus as a strategy for growth. In short, the Philippines has benefited from models of export-oriented, successful East Asian economies in its search for the correct policy strategy.

Having learned the appropriate macro-economic policy mix, the issue facing Ramos and the Filipinos is whether they can summon the political will to match the ambitious goals of transforming the country into a high-performing Asian economy, and more specifically to implement policies effectively and coherently. This is a critical issue that leads to the examination of the capacity of the political system to respond to the challenges of reform and change.

Despite the assertion by Ramos that 'the time for authoritarianism has passed away - in our country and in the world' many Philippine neighbors are skeptical about whether it is possible, to quote Ramos, 'to reconcile our democratic politics with an oligarchic economy ... not by changing the political system, but by democratizing society'.

Of the critics of the Philippine democratic system, few have put its faults more sharply than Lee Kuan Yew. He said in a speech to Manila businessmen two years ago:

... The Philippines has an American-style constitution, one of the most difficult to operate in the world. There is a complete separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary ... a developing country faced with disorder and under-development needs a strong, honest government ... The Aquino presidency achieved the restoration of a democratic constitution. The Ramos presidency will have to prove that this democratic constitution can be made to work and that development is achievable. Many checks and balances have been written into the constitution to guard against the abuse of power ... But they must not lead to a paralysis of government. At the end of the day, the discussion and debate, the legislature must allow the executive to take the hard decisions.

A 1991 study of democracy and development in South Korea by Tun-jen Cheng and Lawrence Krause found that while an authoritarian regime 'can succeed in rapid industrial catch-up', it 'is not a sufficient condition' for (it), and that 'authoritarianism of the developmental type performed much better than democracy, while predatory authoritarianism performed much worse'.

Despite the economic disaster of the Marcos regime, the appeal of a strong democratic leadership, if that is at all possible, and even of a benevolent and honest authoritarian rule, is regaining currency in the Philippines as it responds to the challenge of industrial catch-up. It is hard to refute Lee Kuan Yew's thesis because he argues from a position of economic success.

Perhaps the fortunate thing about the debate over democracy versus authoritarianism in the Philippines is that it has moved away from a very simplistic black and white, either/or formulation. The issue is beginning to be understood in terms of effective democracies and effective authoritarianism that can deliver economic results. 'This differentiation follows the findings of a 1988 study by Erich Weede that 'some dictatorships out-perform others, some democracies out-perform others'. In a 1989 study of policy capabilities of democratic regimes in Latin America, Sloan found that 'policy evidence indicates that democratic regimes have the policy capabilities to achieve a variety of development goals without suffering the high levels of repression that often accompany bureaucratic-authoritarian rule'.

Going back to the reality on the ground in the Philippines, the critical issue is the political capacity of the Ramos government to proceed with economic reform against the
resistance of the oligarchy and monopoly - whose power he has pledged to break - in order to open up the economy and make it internationally competitive. He has to do this by democratic means and with the minimum of coercion and use of police powers of the state.

The key issues which affect the political will and policy capacity of Ramos are: (1) his relationship with Congress; (2) the move to replace the presidential system with the parliamentary system; (3) the tax reform package; (4) the breaking of the monopolies, starting with the telephone company; (5) the liberalisation of the banking system, which is the seat of the oligarchy; (6) the divestment of government enterprises; (7) the campaign against tax evasion; and (8) the definition of the now ambiguous relationship between the state and private sector (or what form should state intervention take).

These issues are related to building of power of the Philippine state. All point to a conflict between the state and an entrenched oligarchy whose rent-seeking ways are being changed to make way for a new business ethic described by government ideologues as 'levelling the playing field'.

The depoliticisation of the national agenda in favour of economics is preferred by a public which is now more aware of, and responsive to, economic priorities. Debate in the press and Congress has acquired a higher content of economic issues, although political debate over presidential/parliamentary systems tends to distract national attention from economic issues. With this background, the economic reorientation of the Philippines and plan for NIC-hood by the year 2000 have an auspicious beginning.
Self-limiting democratisation among the Chinese elite

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In its rhetoric the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would prefer to characterise itself as a socialist democracy. The emphasis is on the 'uniqueness' of its Chineseness, a construct that is manufactured to fend off any critical efforts to measure China against other countries.

When Deng ascended to power at the end of the 1970s, he realised that he had to allow top-down political and economic liberalisation to release the popular pressures that had been building up during the prior decade of economic stagnation and political tension. The moment the lid was lifted, a Democracy Wall Movement blossomed from 1979 to 1981. But the aspirations for personal freedom and the anti-bureaucratic content of the protests were more than Deng could tolerate. He ordered suppression.

The intellectual elite

Before 1949, while the CCP on the left and the Kuomintang (KMT) on the right contested for power, there were groups of well-known intellectuals who would not join either. They were no less idealistic, nationalistic, or politically committed than the Communists in their opposition to right-wing KMT politics. They ran political magazines and newspapers, suffered KMT persecution and at times languished in jail. Ideologically they tended to be liberal social democrats and wanted to realise their socialist ideals through a democratic parliamentary system. Yet they were elitist and did not cultivate a mass base. In the years leading up to the Communist assumption of power, their minor parties had played a pivotal political role between the CCP and the KMT. Historians characterise them as a third force, though they did not truly contend for power, and ultimately threw in their lot with the Communists.

After 1949, the CCP was adept at co-opting them into playing satellite roles in the polity. The CCP reorganised them into eight Democratic Parties, each of which was assigned to recruit its members from one particular grouping: i) two of the DPs were reserved for high-level academics in the social and natural sciences; ii) three were reserved for doctors, educators and journalists; iii) one 'party' was for businessmen; and lastly, iv) three were specifically for people with KMT, Taiwanese and overseas Chinese connections. The CCP imposed strict limitations on the breadth and numbers of their membership. For example, they were not allowed to recruit from small towns or villages, from among peasants or workers or ethnic minorities. This served to reinforce and perpetuate their elitist nature. At the same time, the Party placed the heads of the DPs into high-level deputy ministerial positions, providing them with high social status and material benefits. The DPs acquired the reputation of being 'flower vases' of the CCP.

But these once politically active idealists ultimately were unwilling to be mere puppets. When the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957 presented an opportunity they spoke out with surprising alacrity, criticising the Party for being dictatorial, debunking the collectivisation and nationalisation programmes, and castigating emerging corruption. Some demanded political independence and political equality with the CCP. The CCP's crackdown on the DPs was quick in coming. Thousands of ordinary DPs members were sent off to the countryside or into labour camps. The DPs were effectively silenced for the next twenty years.

When Deng Xiaoping came to power he revived the DPs under the slogan of 'instituting multi-party cooperation under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party'. With the permission of the CCP in the 1980s up until the 1989 protest movement all of the DPs rapidly recruited new members, doubling or even trebling in size. They engaged in proto-party activities, reaching a climax in 1988 and early 1989 when ferment in society reached new heights.

In DP journals, members advocated numerous reforms, which if put into practice would have meant the emergence of independent political parties. Some suggested rewriting the constitution to legalise the status of the DPs as political.
parties. Others wanted equal status as the CCP, much as Japan's opposition parties enjoyed equal status with the Liberal Democratic Party even though the latter had monopolised the government for many terms. There were calls for a more independent recruitment policy and expansion of membership beyond their restricted recruitment pool. Some advocated development of political party consciousness. Some even went further than their forefathers in the 1950s calling for the establishment of horizontal linkages between the eight DPs, banding into a kind of coalition **vis à vis** the CCP. One article specifically claimed that the DPs collectively represented the interests of the intellectuals, whereas the CCP should represent peasants and workers.

At the height of the 1989 popular protest movement some DP members came out into the streets both as individuals and as party members. From February to June various members in the top hierarchy of the DPs signed petitions calling for the release of political prisoners, urging the CCP and the government to open a dialogue with the protesting students and calling for the ideals of democracy and patriotism to be upheld. In an unprecedented development, the Beijing Autonomous Workers' Federation that emerged on Tiananmen Square went to the DPs to seek help to have their organisation legalised. In short, other social groups were beginning to see the DPs as both influential and independent of the CCP.

But the DPs could not hold onto their claims to independence after the Beijing massacre in June of 1989. They entirely capitulated and reverted to moulding support for the CCP. Yet, their about-turn in position can also be interpreted as a sign of political maturity; pragmatic DP leaders preferred to lie low at a time of suppression.

The CCP soon decided that to ward off further major disturbances in China it was best to co-opt the intellectuals and professionals and to open up wider channels for the frustrated intellectual elite to participate in the polity. Thus, at the end of 1989, the CCP issued a major document promising to promote the influence of the DPs. Henceforth they were to be referred to as 'parties participating in government affairs'. It was specified, however, that the DPs were not to assume that they might have a turn to rule the country; as 'opposition parties do not exist in China'. There will be more consultation between the CCP and DPs, more important government posts would be opened up to DP members, and more DP members will sit in the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee. The DPs' agitation for influence in the 1980s had paid off after the 1989 upheaval.

The DPs have come a long way since their rebirth in the early 1980s. In their willingness to play second fiddle to the CCP there is simultaneously a strong urge to build up separate identities as a 'loyal opposition'. But will they ever become really 'democratic', living up to what their names imply? My reading is that they will not. The CCP seems willing only to share out a small slice of power among a larger circle of elites. Nor do the DPs have any intention of turning their parties into mass parties. Maintaining the 'quality' of the members is an oft-cited reason for not expanding their pool of recruitment. In fact, it has become more difficult to be admitted into a DP than into the CCP, since only those who have attained a certain professional ranking are qualified to apply, whereas anyone, by the soft criterion of political commitment, can apply to join the CCP.

**The capitalists**

The other elite which the CCP is incorporating into its fold are the new-born capitalists. Normally today they are referred to in China as 'entrepreneurs' because the term 'capitalist' cannot be applied in a state which espouses 'socialism'. It is in fact difficult to discern whether some of them are really capitalists in the Marxian sense. By social origin they are of three types: the new capitalists who rose from ground zero; the 'bureaucratic capitalists' or 'nomenklatura capitalists' who originated from the political elite or who sometimes still have one foot astride the political realm; and the 'red capitalists' from the pre-Liberation monied families.

The new capitalists tend to have started off small as 'self-employed labourers', and with wealth have attained the official status of 'entrepreneurs'. With the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the precarious nature of their status became evident when the government carried out a campaign against them, ostensibly to wipe out corruption. But more recently, as their numbers and assets increased geometrically, reaching 184,000 recognised 'entrepreneurs' by mid-1993, they have been granted a more positive official image.

The *nomenklatura* capitalists are the close kin of officials, and have recently amassed wealth by transforming power and state resources into private wealth. Understandably their assets are difficult to estimate.

The 'red capitalists', too, had a good headstart. The original 'red capitalists' came from prominent pre-revolution families of great wealth. They were used by the government under Mao in its contacts with overseas Chinese, and sometimes even held official positions: hence 'red capitalists'.

The two most prominent 'red capitalists', Kong Yiren and Wang Guangying, are prime examples. Reportedly, in the early 1980s Deng Xiaoping personally invited them to re-enter business and to make big money for the country. Kong was asked to head the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), the biggest of China's 'state' investment companies, with an outpost in Hong Kong. More recently, he was appointed Vice President of China. Wang, for his part, was sent to Hong Kong in 1983 to found the Guangda Company which has emerged as a powerful 'state-owned' development corporation. As one indication of the ambiguity in the distinction between state and private capital, the Guangda Company, an ostensibly state enterprise, includes in its title one of the Chinese characters of Wang's name.
To incorporate the interests of these three kinds of capitalists into the political structure, the ACFIC was revived early in the economic reforms with Rong as chairman. ACFIC was granted a status equivalent to that of the DPs, a sort of ninth Democratic Party. The ACFIC was to be another 'bridge' between the state and society, in this instance the country's new capitalists.

The DPs' and the ACFIC's increased participation in politics will only be meaningful if the NPC and CPPCC assume an increasingly independent stance as China's legislature and main consultative body. Their power has expanded in the past one-and-a-half decades, though this is generally not recognised in the western press and among western China scholars, where they routinely have been described as 'rubber stamps', as tools of the CCP.

Congresses indeed do not provide floors for open heated debates and dissenting views. But NPC and CPPCC are not as ineffectual as they seem. Contrary to being a mere rubber stamp, the NPC has been exerting a moderating influence on CCP's reform policies. True, its members are constrained by a political culture which puts a premium on a formal show of consensus, combined with a pragmatic recognition that the CCP is in command. Thus a facade of unity is maintained for public consumption at public meetings. But once the CCP had begun instituting economic and political reforms from above, behind the continued display of unity, divided interests and heated debates surfaced behind closed doors. Bills still get passed with few dissenting votes or abstentions, but this can be interpreted as a willingness by those with differing views to accept amended drafts and to compromise after genuine negotiations.

Representation in the NPC and the CPPCC is determined by quotas: so many seats are assigned to each DP and each 'sector' of society. In this schema the peasants and workers are under-represented by a large margin. This compares to the disproportionate representation for the high-level intellectuals. Worker and trade union representation in the NPC has been in gradual decline, from 26.7 per cent of all seats in 1978 to 11.2 per cent in 1993. At the 1988 NPC, each rural delegate represented eight times as many 'electors' as delegates from urban areas. Worse yet, these rural delegates are likely to derive from the rural monied elite, whose interests do not normally coincide with those of ordinary peasants. Workers and peasants are being marginalised and excluded from the formal polity at a time when the legislative and consultative bodies are becoming more important.

**Ideological convergence and loyal opposition**

In short, the contention for, and sharing of, power is confined within the elite circle of Party leaders and state bureaucracies, with some input from the DPs and the ACFIC, but with negligible bottom-up representation.

Today, some of the offspring of high-level CCP officials are more eager to join the ACFIC than the CCP. Among the DPs, the ACFIC and the CCP there seems to be little fundamental disagreement over ideology. The contention is over how to divide up representation in the political fora in a way that is perceived to be fair by those eligible to participate. The DPs are to be very junior partners in legislative decision making, or very much a 'loyal opposition'. Their common interests lie in ensuring that the peasantry and the workers remain quiescent and that political 'stability' is maintained during the period of major overhaul in the nation's economy, a period when several elites are gaining in wealth while some of the other sectors are not.

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‘Democracy’ is a contested idea that may not travel well. This article first compares the 22 island states of the region according to their achievement of representative democracy: all adult men and women having the right to vote; an executive responsible to an elected legislature, or elected directly; and freedom of speech and association. It then goes on to identify some issues in current debates about democracy in the region, particularly the relationship between democracy and self-determination: indigenous traditions; participation; ethnicity; gender; and development.

The pattern of representative democracy

In Table 1, the 22 island states of the region are ranked according to their per capita GDP (column 1). Population data is shown in column 2, column 3 gives the country’s constitutional status, and the remaining columns present indicators of representative democracy.

Column 4 shows when universal adult suffrage was achieved. As the right to vote is not much use if the legislature has no power over the executive, column 5 therefore shows when the executive became fully responsible to a legislature in the territory or, (through direct election of a president or governor), to a territorial electorate.

The date in column 5 is the date of independence or entry into free association, with two exceptions: when the army seized power in Fiji in 1987, the executive was cut loose from the legislature. Elections held under a new constitution in 1992 restored some accountability. Tonga has had a parliament since 1875, but the king and his ministers and governors are not responsible to it, though reformers are trying to make the executive more accountable.

The relationships between the United States and its Commonwealth (Northern Marianas), unincorporated territory (Guam) and ‘unorganised and unincorporated territory’ (American Samoa) are complex and contested, and it is difficult to apply the test of ‘executive responsibility’. Each have popularly elected governors and territorial legislatures, but with differing forms and degrees of supervision by the executive and legislative branches in Washington. Guam and American Samoa also elect non-voting delegates to the metropolitan legislature. The dates in column 5 refer to the first elections of governors.

The French ‘Overseas Territories’ make a distinction between ‘state’ functions (for which the High Commissioner is responsible to Paris), and a more modest list of ‘territorial’ functions, for which local officials are responsible to the territorial assembly. All voters in these territories also elect members to the National Assembly in Paris, for the French President and even the European parliament. So the ‘state’ executive is responsible to legislature, but one in France, to which all citizens in the Overseas Territories elect representatives.

Column 6 attempts to capture a third aspect of democracy, freedom of speech and association. It is little use having the executive responsible to the legislature if neither legislators nor the electors know what is happening, can consider alternatives, or campaign for them to be adopted. Non-government newspapers in Papua New Guinea (PNG), Tonga and Solomon Islands have played such an important political role, particularly by exposing instances of government corruption and incompetence, that the existence of non-government newspapers seems a reliable, if only partial, indicator of the presence of free speech and association. Tolerance of trades unions, or anti-government demonstrations would be others.

Only twelve countries of the 22 score an unequivocal ‘yes’ on each of the criteria for representative democracy. All but two now have a system of universal adult suffrage, the exceptions having populations of only 1,600 and 100. Fifteen of the 22 have an executive responsible to a legislature within the territory rather than in Paris, Wellington or London. However, Tonga’s executive is still responsible to the king rather than parliament. Fiji’s inclusion within the above totals is debatable. Lawson (1991) argues that Fiji was never a democracy, even before the coups - the opposition was never regarded as a legitimate alternative government. Its system of representation is ethnically biased, and the responsibility of the executive to the legislature is compromised by the reservation of key positions to ethnic Fijians, who now form about 50 per cent of the population. The media in most countries have a limited spread, and tend to be dominated by the executive.

The median date for a fully responsible executive is around the late seventies, with the median date for universal suffrage more tightly bunched around 1965-7. There are some interesting exceptions earlier and later. Western Samoa was the first to achieve a fully responsible legislature (1962), but the last to open it to universal suffrage (in 1991). Tonga was the earliest to extend the franchise to adult men, though there are some brief attempts at nineteenth century representative democracy in Guam, between Spanish and American rule, and in French Polynesia (Tahiti) and Cook Islands (Rarotonga).

The three French territories were relatively early in achieving universal suffrage in the early 1950s. Vanuatu did not achieve

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Table 1
GDP per capita, Population, and Representative Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 GDP/Population</th>
<th>2 Constitutional Status</th>
<th>3 Universal Suffrage Achieved</th>
<th>4 Responsible Executive</th>
<th>5 Non-Govt Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>22,418</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>19,745</td>
<td>201,400</td>
<td>French Territory</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>(Paris)</td>
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<td>16,350</td>
<td>173,300</td>
<td>French Territory</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>(Paris)</td>
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<td>N. Mariana Islands</td>
<td>12,851</td>
<td>49,100</td>
<td>US Commonwealth</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Guam</td>
<td>12,374</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>US Territory</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>6,660</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>4,837</td>
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<td>Associated (NZ)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<td>15,600</td>
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<td>111,600</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>1965</td>
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<td>151,900</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<td>96,900</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>1,245</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>161,100</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>328,000</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>73,500</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>NZ territory</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>(Wellington)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wallis and Futuna</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13,900</td>
<td>French territory</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>(Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitcairn</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>British territory</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>(London)</td>
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</table>

Sources: Larmour 1994; Robie 1990

universal suffrage until 1975, only five years before independence. As an Anglo-French Condominium it lost out both ways, missing out on the universal suffrage the French territories achieved in the 1950s, and that of its British neighbours in the 1960s.

Democracy, decolonisation and self-determination

Only nine of the 22 island members of the South Pacific Commission are constitutionally independent, while five more are in relationships of 'free association' with New Zealand or the USA. Majorities of voters in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianaas have voted for closer integration, rather than independence from the US. Majorities in the French territories have voted for continued rule by France. Do people have the right to remain colonised? Which people? Supporters of independence argue that majorities of indigenous people in New Caledonia are in favour of independence, but they are outnumbered by immigrants.

What right should people in parts of former colonial territories have to vote for independence separately, or for secession afterwards? Voters in the former US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony got the right to break the 'artificial' colonial territory into smaller parts. Voters in PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu did not get the same opportunity, but might well have voted for division. Now the PNG government opposes the idea of a referendum to settle the future of Bougainville.

Introduced principles, and indigenous traditions

The egalitarian principles of democracy seem to be contrary to the hierarchical principles that underlie chiefly political traditions in Polynesia. Western Samoa, for example, restricted the franchise to chiefly heads of households until as recently as 1981. Liberal individualism sometimes seems in conflict with indigenous communalism. Solomon Islands 1987 constitutional review found popular support for the restoration of capital punishment, limits on the introduction of new religions, limits on the number of political parties, limits on freedom of movement between provinces and discrimination in favour of indigenous people. Saffu’s survey of political attitudes in PNG found that 39 per cent of people did not regard casting their votes in elections as an individual matter, and most of these voted according to the recommendation of a community meeting, clan head, councillor or church leader (Saffu 1989:21).
Representative and participatory democracy

The average population of a South Pacific state, excluding PNG, is 105,000 (roughly the population of the Greek city states which provide western political theory with its images of democracy). Pre-contact political systems were even smaller. The largest political unit in Polynesia numbered about 40,000, and in Melanesia only a few thousand. So it was at least possible for adults to participate in political decisions, though in most places women, and, in Polynesia and parts of Micronesia, non chiefly men were excluded. Now all but the two smallest territories, Tokelau and Pitcairn, have systems of representative government, but traditions of participation have persisted, particularly at local level. Committees toured hundreds of villages in PNG and Solomon Islands to find out what kind of national constitution, land policy or system of provincial government people wanted. Turnout of voters in elections, and turnover of representatives, is high.

Democracy, ethnicity and indigenous rights

The politics of Fiji are constructed around deeply entrenched categorisations of 'race' reinforced by the 1990 constitution which reserves key executive positions for indigenous Fijians, and ensures an indigenous majority in parliament, whatever the population. Politics in New Caledonia are similarly polarised. Ethnic tensions have also contributed to political crises elsewhere: part of Bougainville landowners' complaint against the copper mine was that it attracted migrant workers from other parts of the country, and overseas.

In Fiji, New Caledonia and Guam the principle of majority rule comes into conflict with claims for indigenous rights. A leading civilian supporter of Fiji's 1987 coup denounced democracy as 'that crazy demon' threatening the racial survival of indigenous Fijians, who then amounted to 46 per cent of the population (quoted in Sutherland 1992:192). In New Caledonia and Guam outnumbered indigenous people claim that only they, rather than immigrants should be able to vote in referenda on independence.

Democracy and gender

Women tended to be the last in a sequence of European men, indigenous chiefs and the indigenous commoners to be enfranchised. Women in Tonga did not get the vote until 1960, and only matai women could vote in Western Samoa till 1991. Women are under-represented in legislatures and executives throughout the region.

Democracy and development

Table 1 ranks the countries by per capita GDP, as an indicator of development. There seems to be little relationship between development and democracy in this region. Per capita GDP is more closely related to constitutional status, with the independent states relatively poorest (except for Nauru) the French and US territories relatively richest, and the associated states falling in between. Fiji is the exception - independent but with per capita GDP more like an associated state, and an interrupted record of democracy.

The rather muffled conclusions that can be drawn from Table 1 are consistent with many of the conclusions Lane and Ersson drew from their review of research on the conditions for democracy (1990:68-73). They found that a strong association between democracy and development held only among the rich countries of the OECD (ibid:69). Lane and Ersson concluded that while there were correlations between democracy and cultural factors (such as ethnic heterogeneity) and political factors (such as persistence of institutions), these were 'of such moderate strength' that more research was needed to arrive at a theory of the conditions for democracy, while deviant cases would continue to require explanation.

A recent attempt to provide such a theory is comparative work by Rueschemeyer and others (1992), which concludes that the prospects for democracy depend on the domestic balance of class forces (particularly the relationship between landlords, who are generally anti-democratic, and the working class, which is generally in favour); the autonomy of the state from society; and transnational circumstances.

Applying this theory to the South Pacific, we find traditional landowners are relatively powerful, and working classes small, or absent overseas as migrant labour (except in Fiji, with its interrupted record of democracy). State autonomy from society is high in the colonies and associated states, but lower in the independent states, particularly those that have incorporated traditional forms of government. The transnational circumstances, however, have been generally favourable to democracy (Larmour 1994).

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Tradition versus democracy in the South Pacific: An overview

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Throughout the Pacific, appeals to a reified concept of 'tradition', which incorporates kindred concepts such as culture, custom, ethnicity and identity, have been common for some time. Depending on the context, these appeals have been used to serve a number of different purposes. Some of the ways in which the concept of tradition has been elevated has been seen as an appropriate and long overdue response to the negative and racist images of Pacific peoples and their ways of life projected by western colonialism in the region.

The images evoked by memories of colonialism in the Pacific, and contemporary responses to it, are comparable to post-colonial experiences elsewhere. In Africa, for example, the reassertion of traditional cultural values vis-à-vis western values has been evident in a range of developments in the social and political spheres. Ironically, much of the currency of tradition with respect to political institutions and practices was due, at least initially, to colonial systems of indirect rule. These systems made a virtue of necessity in establishing order on the basis of what were perceived to be existing systems of sociopolitical organisation. Furthermore, the forms of colonial administration, combined with the influence of earlier modes of political sociology and anthropology, and then with modernisation theories, have combined to produce an image of 'tradition' that is construed conceptually in opposition to that which is 'modern' or 'western'. In the contemporary Pacific there has been a marked growth of 'traditionalism' through which images of the distant, pre-contact, and definitely non-western past have been evoked in terms of the ultimate Pacific cliche - 'Paradise Lost' (Callick 1991:22).

The anti-colonial reaction is said to be part of the ideology behind 'the Pacific Way', an expression of identity launched on the international stage by Fiji's former Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, during an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1970. In elaborating the slogan's purposes, Crocombe (1976:1) says that the colonial experience 'left a common unpleasant taste in the mouths of islanders: a common humiliation, a common feeling of deprivation and exploitation'; experiences which promotion of, and identification with, 'the Pacific Way' can help to ameliorate. Similarly, the notion of a 'Melanesian Way' has emerged as another specifically reactive force which provides a basis for identity such that it is 'unnecessary for [Melanesians] to be perfect Englishmen or Americans' (Narokobi 1983:9). Another Islander has argued along more specifically political lines that the 'dictates of a Westminster democracy must not be allowed to typecast our lives so as to require us to aspire to become prototype Englishmen' (Mataitoga 1992:93).

These movements share many similarities with the négritude movement which, in the Caribbean and Africa, sought to inspire a regeneration of African values to counter the colonial legacy. Although Aimé Césaire's original idea of négritude represented a wholesale rejection of essentialism, the influence of later figures like Léopold Senghor of Senegal transformed it into 'a backward-looking idealism, a falsely naturalised, consistent African mentality that tends to reinscribe the categories of a romantic, sometimes racist African ethnography'. It was also ahistorical and out of touch with the class issues that had been central to the anti-colonial movements. Instead, it sought to 'recreate a romanticised African and Carribean past which had little basis in social reality' (Clifford 1988:177-78).

The kind of thinking that characterised négritude has also pervaded discourses about tradition and cultural identity in the Pacific. Carrier, citing Keeseing's characterisation of the Pacific rendering of kastom as 'an idealized reformulation of indigenous political systems and customary law', suggests that this is a method by which 'alien people' have created an essentialist notion of themselves - 'an ethno-Orientalism' (Carrier 1992:197). Elsewhere, Keeseing has also suggested that many aspects of these constructions, despite the counter-colonial character of their claims, are themselves derived from western ideologies. He points to the apparent incorporation of western structures, categories, and premises of thought in the 'counter-hegemonic' discourse espoused by those who are in the business of promoting idealisations of the pre-contact past. There is little doubt, then, that a reactive process has been at work that has elevated the value of selected elements of cultural traditions 'as symbols of the contrast between those traditions and western culture' (Keesing 1989:22-3, 28).

This focuses attention on the rather obvious dichotomy between 'traditional' and 'western' ways produced in this process, and the point that western values and institutions are very often a major focus of traditionalist criticisms. But on closer inspection we find that this too can be a very selective process, for not all western values and institutions are targeted in this way. As with cultural traditions themselves, only certain elements of western ways are subjected to traditionalist critique. Further, there is more than one ideological component of such constructs as the 'Pacific Way' - the liberating ideas and ideals associated with
it comprise but one aspect. Just as the search for an authentic African mode of politics resulted in the production of an ideology in support of the authoritarian one-party state in Africa (see Lawson 1993:183-205), so too has the 'Pacific Way' been employed at times as an instrument of social and political control by indigenous elites. This becomes evident when we examine more closely the positions occupied by the major proponents of the 'return to tradition' via the 'Pacific Way' - a trend that involves drawing on the past as a source of legitimate political norms for the present. These same people are also usually those who have most loudly condemned western democracy as an unsuitable form of political rule in the context of the South Pacific, especially vis-a-vis pre-existing political systems. It is in this sense that 'tradition' is ranged against 'democracy' in a contest for ideological supremacy.

One commentator notes that Mara's articulation of the 'Pacific Way' places a strong emphasis on the virtues of stability, tradition, and, by implication, on the value of 'traditional' chiefly rule (Howard 1991:7). Another critic has noted the extent to which the 'exaggerated mystique of custom' has been manipulated in a clearly instrumental manner as a means of legitimising the interests of ruling elites. He adds that many people in the Pacific know this full well, and are not necessarily 'blinded by their own symbolism and rhetoric'. But the people that suffer, in the end, from the 'romantic approach' to tradition are the ordinary people of the region (Ward 1992:90).

In one of the most incisive attacks on the South Pacific's privileged classes, Hau'ofa has also identified the 'Pacific Way' as an elitist regional identity, sustained by various regional institutions and bureaucracies that serve as something of a club for the region's political leaders. In addition, this elite has itself become increasingly homogenised as a distinct class in its own right. At the same time, its members have become more and more distanced from their own indigenous cultures as well as from the ordinary people of the islands that they purport to represent.

As part of the process of integration and the emergence of the new society, the ruling classes of the South Pacific are increasingly culturally homogeneous. They speak the same language, which is English ... they share the same ideologies and the same material life-styles, admittedly with local variations due to physical environment and original cultural factors, but the similarities are much more numerous than the differences ...

It is the privileged who can afford to tell the poor to preserve their traditions. But their perceptions of which traits of traditional culture to preserve are increasingly divergent from those of the poor, because in the final analysis it is the poor who have to live out the traditional culture; the privileged can merely talk about it, and they are in a position to be selective about what traits they use or more correctly urge others to observe; and this is seen increasingly by the poor as part of the ploy by the privileged to secure greater advantages for themselves (Hau'ofa 1987:7).

Hau'ofa goes on to draw particular attention to parts of Polynesia where, under aristocratic rulers and certain Christian church traditions, the ordinary people are at once urged to be more innovative and entrepreneurial so as to pursue 'development' strategies, while at the same time they are expected to continue to live under the 'dead weight' of other traditions. These traditions are urged on the poor in order to maintain social stability; 'that is, in order to secure the privileges that [the elite] have gained, not so much as from their involvement in traditional activities, as from their privileged access to resources in the regional economy'. In this situation, Hau'ofa (1987:12) concludes, 'traditions are used by the ruling classes to enforce the new order'.

It follows that it is essential to any critical study of tradition in a political context that the motivations of those who invoke tradition are scrutinised closely. And, although some would grant a privileged status to 'insider' accounts of these issues, there is no reason to believe that these accounts should be immune from external critiques, or that there is only one 'inside' view. Indeed, the last account that should be privileged is that of an entrenched elite. Furthermore, although 'tradition' and 'modernity' are central components of some of the most important contemporary political discourses, they should not be accorded primacy. For this can lead to the construction of the two components as absolute categories occupying opposing poles of a rigid dichotomy (see Robertson and Tamanisau 1992:30). This dichotomy also poses further questions concerning cultural relativism. In the past, this notion was exceptionally valuable in countering racist ideas. It implied that all cultures should be evaluated, not according to the arbitrary values of a single dominant culture, but in relation to each culture's own historical and social milieu. In the present context, however, it poses considerable problems for attempts to criticise or evaluate anything that is 'different' from, or outside of, one's own cultural milieu. In addition, it tends to reinscribe the essentialist framework referred to earlier.

The approach of the new generation of indigenous critics represents a completely different one from that taken by the proponents of the nègritude style of anti-colonial critique and their successors. Although it affirms the worth of various aspects of indigenous culture, it nonetheless rejects all temptations or tendencies to over-romanticisation, and takes criticism of indigenous sociopolitical structures as a primary starting point for the construction of a more positive approach to social, political, and economic problems.

One such critic takes issue with representations of the past through oral histories in terms of their propensity, at least in the hands of authoritative elites, to justify present political structures. He says that these oral traditions have become powerful ideologies which have been used, for example, to justify past events such as the establishment of the monarchy.
in Tonga. Their purpose is to fortify the prevailing sociopolitical structure and to maintain the status quo. In this respect, he concludes, most Tongans 'who make historical statements are more likely to be stating political rather than historical facts' (Kolo 1990:2-3).

In considering the various aspects of the 'politics of tradition', particularly in the context of pressure for democratisation, it is essential to distinguish between tradition and traditionalism, because critiques of traditionalism can all too easily give rise to the impression that tradition per se is the major target. It is also important to understand the extent to which tradition is an ineluctable element of all social life, and that it is not simply a residual, inert, and 'primitive' category of belief and behaviour. Furthermore, the notion of tradition has often been misconstrued as a particular property of non western societies. There are many features that are common to both western and non western social and political contexts, but which are often overlooked or implicitly denied in the treatment of western and non western polities, especially in discussions of democratic development.

The ideological rendering of traditionalism is a method of idealising the past, and of moulding the present by the assumed standards of a past era. Although often camouflaged by a variety of romanticised images, traditionalism can operate at the crudest level of instrumental propaganda in seeking to legitimise an elite power structure. Where the legitimate locus of power is seen to be fixed immutably in the hands of a particular 'traditional' class, then alternative sources of authority and legitimacy are excluded, and this ultimately undermines efforts to develop more effective democratic institutions and practices.

This paper is a modified version of the introduction to a book-length study entitled 'Tradition versus democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa'.

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Women and democracy in Fiji

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Democracy or representative government through universal suffrage has been in existence in Fiji for just a little over two decades. The first democratic elections were held in 1972 and since then the country has had seven elections.

Democracy as a political philosophy is an ideal which recognises the social condition of equality and respect for the individual within the community. The concept of representative government in a parliamentary democracy therefore acts as a philosophical banner aimed at highlighting such noble sentiment on behalf of the individual. In reality however, the social situation of various communities differs according to cultural conditioning and values. This is especially so in non-western settings where democratic culture as defined and understood by the West is relatively new and therefore perceived by some as a foreign institution.

A real and potential problem in countries with strong cultural values and where democratic institutions have not been around long enough to have made a difference in shaping the attitude of people at the grassroots level, is the temptation to manipulate the system or redefine the concept of a parliamentary democracy in order to suit local powerful interests. This is not to suggest that parliamentary democracy as practised in the West perfect. It is a known fact that in the West, parliamentary democracy and its philosophical ideals are equally driven by powerful interest groups and the more articulate at the expense of ordinary citizens and the poor within society. Indeed it can be said that any kind of parliamentary democracy is open to some degree of corruption wherever it is practised, but that the degree of manipulation varies.

An important point is that although parliamentary democracy and is subject to various distortions, it is a form of government which at least allows or attempts to provide ordinary citizens the freedom to express their feelings and aspirations. Whether these are the real intentions or are actually met, is another issue.

This paper will briefly outline how the concept of a parliamentary democracy has been deliberately designed to elevate a particular interest group within the indigenous Fijian community. Within this political context a discussion of women and democracy can be better understood. Notwithstanding blatant manipulation of the system, urban women in Fiji have achieved a remarkable degree of success in terms of education and workforce participation. What must be borne in mind, however, is that a discussion of women and democracy in Fiji can be a misleading as it assumes there is already a situation which promotes the equality of different racial groups, minority interests and individuals within the community.

Democracy and democratic culture in Fiji reflect the aspirations and demands articulated by the ethnic communities in Fiji. Elections have been arranged in Fiji’s Constitutions (two constitutions since independence), to ensure that ethnic groups in the country are represented in Parliament by their ethnic representatives.

In the 1970 Independence Constitution (abrogated by the military coups of 1987) a number of seats were allocated to promote the concept of national voting with voters having a choice in the election of other ethnic representatives. These seats were known as national seats as distinct from communal seats specifically demarcated along ethnic lines. The pattern of voting along strictly racial lines was strengthened and reinforced in favour of the indigenous population in the post-coup Constitution of 1990. Indigenous Fijians have now been allocated ten seats more than their Indo-Fijian counterparts, while the offices of President and Prime Minister can only be filled by members of the indigenous community.

In spite of a deliberate effort to stifle the political powerbase of the urban indigenous community in the 1990 Constitution, a number of Ministers in the current Rabuka Government include men and three women who have been selected primarily because of their personal achievements in education, public service and qualities of leadership.

It is both ironic and significant that Fiji currently has three women Cabinet Ministers in spite of the basic discriminatory provisions in the Constitution against the Indo-Fijian community on the one hand, and the progressive urban-based indigenous Fijians on the other. One of the reasons for this phenomenon is the equal opportunity in education and paid employment which Fijian women of all communities have progressively been beneficiaries of.

The colonial administration and the post-colonial governments have been assisted in the efforts to educate the local community by Christian missionaries and several Hindu and Muslim religious organisations. It is therefore no surprise that today one finds Fijian women working as lawyers, doctors, teachers, university tutors and Cabinet Ministers. The post of Director of Public Prosecutions is filled by an Indo-Fijian woman, and two indigenous women are presidents of minority opposition parties in the House of Representatives. There are also a number of women who have made their mark in the trade union hierarchy. A local indigenous woman scientist has achieved high reputation in the region as a researcher in alternative energy sources. Another woman has achieved the record of being the first indigenous Fijian to obtain a doctorate degree in demography, and the list goes on.
For a country which won its independence a little over two decades ago, the achievements of Fijian women have been quite remarkable. This is particularly significant when one considers that in both indigenous Fijian as well as Indo-Fijian societies, the traditional position of women is one which is subordinate to the men within the family unit and the wider community. Empirical evidence suggests that poorly educated rural women (whether indigenous or non-indigenous) have come to accept their socially subjugated position as normal. In this kind of setting, the concept of equality as defined by democracy and put into practice by educated urban women, can become an institution which is socially incompatible with the 'normal' conditions of life in rural Fiji.

Despite such strong traditions and a democratic culture which is relatively new and already undergoing drastic political modifications, women in urban Fiji have made quite extraordinary progress. A book launched in July 1994 by the government's Department of Women, 'Women of Fiji - A statistical gender profile', nevertheless contains information which indicates that females in the country occupy only eight per cent of senior positions, 20 per cent of middle positions and 48 per cent of lower positions, with Indo-Fijian women in a more disadvantaged position than indigenous Fijians. The survey also indicates more predictable findings, noting how Fijian women dominate the nursing and teaching professions and are less likely to be promoted than men.

Fiji women's participation in Parliament was initiated by the election of a woman member to the House of Representatives in 1980. In the 1992 general elections, out of the four women who stood for Parliament, three were indigenous Fijians and one was Indo-Fijian. The only successful candidate of the four was an indigenous Fijian who became the first local woman to be appointed Cabinet Minister. Three indigenous women of chiefly rank have also been appointed senators. In the 1994 elections, three more indigenous women won seats in the House of Representatives and have all been appointed Cabinet Ministers in the Rabuka Cabinet. This is the first time in the country's history that Fiji's Cabinet has more than one woman member.

Notwithstanding the discriminatory provision in the Fiji Constitution with regard to the paramountcy of indigenous conservative interests, and the traditional social structures within the society which place women in a disadvantaged position, it is obvious that Fijian women have taken full advantage of the opportunities offered to them through education.

The current generation of women with sound academic qualifications, well paid jobs and forward-looking attitudes has also benefited from the universal impact and influence of feminist movements, trade union lobby groups and progressive political parties. Moreover, the mass media has played a critical role in disseminating information which these international movements and networks have highlighted with regard to exposing the discriminatory nature of social attitudes and institutions.

Conclusion

A discussion of any interest group or category - such as women within a democracy as in Fiji - should proceed with sensitive analysis and questioning of the basic assumptions underlying the concept of the term and its philosophical ideals as defined by the West, and applied or manipulated by those in various positions of power and social privilege. A basic assumption of democracy is that a given society is homogenous in its social and political makeup. Nothing can be further from the truth.

With the concept of 'one man-one vote' and a constitutional recognition of the equality of every individual and various ethnic groups within a democracy, some degree of social homogeneity can be achieved as a form of political compromise at the national or local government levels. Equal opportunities in education, sports and recreational activities, the labour market and industry, also go a long way in bringing about social integration and cohesion.

It is a contention of this paper that Fiji's case is unique to the extent that social cohesion has taken place at the level of ordinary people - through equal opportunities in education, sports and other social sectors - but the political interests of a powerful minority has frozen a progression of this basic democratic freedom. Moreover, by the forced takeover of an elected government in 1987, the unilateral declaration of Fiji as a republic, as well as the implied imposition of a Constitution (widely criticised as discriminatory in its treatment of non indigenous citizens and the urban progressive indigenous Fijians), Fiji's brand of democracy is doomed to the extent that it contains the negative features of discrimination for the sake of preserving the political interest of a small minority.

Notwithstanding the above, the urban and more educated women of Fiji have achieved remarkable success. Their success can be measured by looking at the current Rabuka Cabinet - three senior Cabinet posts are held by women. The post of Director of Public Prosecutions is also held by a local woman for the first time in Fiji's history. There are women lawyers, doctors, academics, trade union leaders, a few army and police officers, a handful of welders, mechanics, senior journalists, sub-editors and administrators. For a country which has undergone political upheaval within its young life as an independent nation, and where traditional cultures and values within the society are entrenched in the social system, the success of local urban women is a manifestation of democracy and its philosophical ideals of freedom and equality before the law. With both urban women in the poorer sections of the community and rural women in general, the view that a woman's place is in the home (supporting the husband and nurturing the family) is too culturally and economically entrenched to withstand the influence of democratic ideals such as individual liberty, and the freedom to choose one's preferred lifestyle.
As the results became clear, a coalition between Norodom Say. Due to a large voter turn out, the event was heralded as Cambodia its first opportunity to break the killing that has dominated Khmer society for over twenty years. The first free and fair elections allowed most Khmers to have their say. Due to a large voter turn out, the event was heralded as a victory for democracy and the end of the Khmer Rouge. As the results became clear, a coalition between Norodom Ranariddh’s FUNCIPEC (Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Co-operatif) and Hun Sen’s CPP (Cambodian People’s Party) was formed. The election results and the seemingly successful marriage of these former adversaries allowed the world community to make promises further to those made at the 1992 Tokyo conference, which resulted in US $800 million for the long term reconstruction of the country. Since the election, however, Cambodia appears to be turning away from that window of opportunity. If democracy and development are to be achieved major changes within the Khmer society need to be taken. Problems of corruption must be addressed; otherwise, further international aid would be wasted. Continuing assistance from countries like Australia, however, is crucial if normality is to be returned to this country.

The breakthrough which enabled UN elections to occur was the ‘Gareth Evans peace plan’. It was hoped this plan would not only result in elections but also the end of fighting. The Khmer Rouge, however, are as active as ever. The Evans plan achieved important goals, however, and it is hoped that, in the long run, the region will be a safer place. It is crucial that outside superpowers end military support for the various factions. No longer are China, the old Soviet Union or the United States arming or assisting different groups involved in the conflict. Concern still exists, however, that the Khmer Rouge are receiving support from the Thai military.

During and since the election there have been positive developments for the future of democracy: over twenty parties registered for the election, Cambodia has an elected government. The Australian and other governments realised that if democracy is to develop in Cambodia, the world community must continue supporting the elected government. Second, the Khmer Rouge are telling tourists to take their money elsewhere. Without investment, however, there will be no infrastructure improvements nor the creation of the employment so desperately needed for Cambodia to restabilise. This will result in continuing poverty for the majority of the Khmers playing into the hands of the Khmer Rouge. Third, the Khmer Rouge are telling tourists that Cambodia is unsafe. With magnificent sites such as Angkor Wat, Cambodia has the potential of becoming a tourist Mecca. The benefits of tourism, however, will not materialise with the continuing presence of the Khmer Rouge.

However the long term issue for Cambodians is whether the government can affectively stand up to the Khmer Rouge and allow democracy to develop. This paper briefly looks at the background to the 1993 UN held elections and the prospects of democracy in Cambodia.

The consequences of the Pol Pot years of 1975 to 1979, and the civil war following from the 1979 Vietnamese invasion, will be felt for generations to come. The infrastructure had partly been re-established before the election and this process could accelerate with the assistance of foreign governments. The problem, however, is not only the material well-being of the nation but also the damaged Khmer psyche. The killing years resulted in the death of a countless number and the loss of a way of life. Khmer society was devastated and education and health systems were destroyed. Khmer culture suffered greatly as many educated Khmers died or left the country as refugees. Furthermore, the population that did survive carried the demographic scars of the Pol Pot period, and will for decades to come. A catharsis to remove the bitterness of the genocidal regime was needed.

The May 1993 elections acted as this catharsis, giving Cambodia its first opportunity to break the killing that has dominated Khmer society for over twenty years. The first free and fair elections allowed most Khmers to have their say. Due to a large voter turn out, the event was heralded as a victory for democracy and the end of the Khmer Rouge. As the results became clear, a coalition between Norodom Simon Baker, National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University

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Episodes have shown how fragile democracy is, but more importantly they have demonstrated the spirit of reconciliation among the coalition government as all political parties have condemned these events.

The key to Cambodia's future still lies with King Norodom Sihanouk. He has been the only person that has been able to unite the various factions. Now he has cancer and is living out of the country, however, and his death could have dramatic consequences for the whole country. Who would replace him on the throne? Will Cambodia become a republic? These questions have the potential to create further divisions within the royal family. If he dies before the next election, what implications will it have for the royalist party FUNCIPPEC? FUNCIPPEC's success in the last election was due largely to Sihanouk's popularity.

If this fledgling democracy is to survive, the Cambodian government has to take drastic steps. With a gross national product per person of US$130 (Thayer and Chander 1994:18), Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Twenty years of war have resulted in damaged and inadequate infrastructure, a shortage of trained professional and technical personnel, and limited domestic and foreign capital. Health conditions are appalling. The majority of deaths in Cambodia are preventable given improved socioeconomic conditions. Deaths from diarrhoea, tuberculosis, dengue fever, malaria, and malnutrition are directly attributable to poverty, lack of simple facilities and medicines, inadequate education in health and generally poor sanitary conditions.

Reforms need to be implemented to close the vast socioeconomic gap that exists between Cambodians, and particularly between those in the countryside and the cities. Services such as education and health, although often inadequate, are centred on the capital Phnom Penh. Without improvements in income, education opportunities and health services for the majority of the people, the position of the Khmer Rouge will only be strengthened.

Even in the capital, comparatively wealthy compared to the rest of the country, the majority are struggling. Civil servants go for periods without being paid, while the government is forced to allocate a large proportion of the national budget to defence. As a volunteer teacher working in Cambodia in 1992, I saw first hand the desperate circumstances forcing many to engage in the black market. My fellow teachers earned only US$12 a month. For periods of time they would not be paid at all and when they were the money was in such small denominations that shop keepers would refuse to accept it. To supplement their incomes they would allow students to buy their entry into higher education, buy exam papers or even final grades. This is corruption, but it is also a question of survival.

Under such circumstances, and with the nation awash with weapons, there are activities far more profitable than normal employment. This predicament threatens the whole society. When an army is not being paid properly soldiers will take up banditry as an alternative. To ensure that the country's roads are safe, not just from Khmer Rouge attacks but also from government forces demanding road taxes, the government has to ensure that groups such as the army are assured of an income adequate to survive.

Although the plight of hostages has captured the attention of Australians, the future of democracy in Cambodia will be determined by how effective the Cambodian government is in resolving problems of inequality. The next elections, if Cambodia does get that far, will not be held by the UN. It will be up to the Khmer people themselves to hold their own free and fair elections. Australia has a role in ensuring that these elections take place by providing aid to Cambodia. What is required is aid that helps to address the economic conditions of the poor Khmer people such as improving the education and health systems. Unless the socioeconomic gap is reduced, the country is likely to lose the window of hope opened up by the 1993 election and return to its traditional form of government, where cliques and one party states have ruled to the detriment of the Khmer people.

Reference

Rivers froth, fume, murmur glide, singing eternally songs of movement. They create Bangladesh, where people have for centuries been the best managers of water. A knowledge alas forgotten by an overindulgent technology. They play a symphony weaving life’s exuberance, death’s profusion, shaping its soul - deep seeking and far looking, ever so home loving and yet never quite belonging, anywhere.

Waheedul Haque

The irony of water management projects in Bangladesh is that over the past three decades they have undermined the ability of local people to manage their own water resources. People who for centuries had learned to cope with the mood swings of the feisty, temperamental Gangamar (the river goddess), have found technology imposed upon them by engineers and technocrats. With no recourse to action through local political channels - public policies are frequently driven by patronage and corruption with little concern for public needs - villagers have taken matters into their own hands.

Consider, for example, in 1987 when the floods in Bangladesh reached crisis proportions. Villagers from one area in Rajshahi took decisive action to protect their houses and land. In response to the poor drainage and subsequent water build-up caused by siltation in the sluice gates of flood control embankments, a decision was made to cut them open. The action was conducted in 'commando style': a select crew made cuts in the embankment one night, while evading the armed guards posted there by those who opposed the cuts. It was followed up, amidst an atmosphere of legal recriminations, by village petitions and signature campaigns to highlight the problems of drainage congestion created by the embankment.

This is not an isolated case. There have been many examples in recent years where people living directly behind embankments have made 'public cuts' to allow water onto their fields, or to drain ponded rainwater that has caused the waterlogging of agricultural land.

The embankments were built as part of a master plan to increase rice production through utilising green revolution technology. The plan, however, ignored other important uses of water for the local people. Embankments cut off navigation routes during the monsoon, affected people's domestic water supply, and blocked migration pathways for riverine fish,
both reducing fish stocks and people's access to an important source of protein. The design of many structures compounded the error because the factors contributing to the poor drainage of the Meghna, Brahmaputra, Ganges river delta were poorly understood by designers. Rivers have breached much of the 4,000 kilometres of embankments already built in Bangladesh; even during the normal floods of 1990 many of these structures collapsed or became inoperative.

Dealing with the complex environmental, social and economic issues related to water management in Bangladesh is at the heart of an on-going US$150 million project called the Flood Action Plan (FAP). For a country whose agricultural economy is sustained by flood waters and silt deposits during the monsoon, and who suffers from water scarcity in the dry season due to the upstream diversion of irrigation water in India, sound water management policies are fundamental to the country's survival.

FAP was initiated by the Bangladesh Government in response to the devastating floods of 1988, which submerged half of the country, killed more than 2,500 people and forced millions to temporarily abandon their homes. FAP consists of 26 separate studies; it is supported by 14 countries and is coordinated by the World Bank.

Although the results of the 26 studies will not be known until late 1994, FAP has generated much controversy since its inception in 1989. Much of the debate questions the extent to which engineering technology provides answers to Bangladesh's water management problems. Central to this is the issue of public participation. Critics outside FAP - Bangladesh environmentalists, academics and leaders of NGOs - argue that past water management projects failed mainly because local people were not involved. They had no say in if or where the embankments should be located. Far from benefiting local communities, the end result has usually been increased community vulnerability and conflict.

A visit to the northeast district of Maulvibazar highlights this problem. Shafiqul Rahman, a 51 year old farmer, lives in Akhail Kura, a village situated between a dyke which protects the villagers and nearby townpeople, and an embankment located several hundred metres inland to protect farmland. In the initial planning the embankment was to be situated close to the river. Influential members of the community, however, were able to persuade government engineers to construct it further inland to better protect their own properties, thus placing the larger community at risk. In a low flood year the delicate equilibrium is maintained, but when the river rises to the level of the dyke the balance can be easily upset. When the dyke is cut, says Rahman, water is trapped by the embankment inland causing the flooding of the entire village. This has happened six times since the construction of the structures in 1983. When this happens villagers cut the embankment which in turn floods the farmland. In 1992 the cumulative impact of flooding affected several thousand families and damaged thousands of hectares of crops.

Breaching of the dyke is primarily a natural occurrence resulting from river bed siltation, but it is sometimes done by townpeople to protect their property: 'The city people pay more tax than us. They have many valuable business centres, so naturally they will try to save their property and land. Sometimes they cut the dyke without telling us. They come at night. We wake up to find the total area flooded', Rahman said.

The embankment has been a mixed blessing for small farmers such as Rahman. On one hand it keeps out the early season floods in May and allows him to cultivate two rice crops from his two hectare plot. On the other it has increased his vulnerability during high flood years. Devising flood protection measures which benefit all groups equally is almost an impossibility, particularly since there is little public agreement as to what should be done. Fishermen would like to see the embankment removed to increase the supply of fish to the farming areas. Rahman would like the embankment shifted to the river side of his house and the river diverted.

Studies carried out by the Canadian International Development Agency as part of the FAP study note that river diversion would displace people downstream. A more equitable solution, it is argued, would be to improve the drainage of the river through dredging at five to ten year intervals. Although dredging is the option least likely to cause conflict it is very expensive and is still being examined.

The situation at Akhail Kura demonstrates the difficulties inherent in trying to achieve public consensus on water management issues. Any attempt at consensus must take into account that participants have differing perceptions of what the problem is and varying degrees of political clout. Ultimately the questions must be asked: who takes responsibility for final decisions? who are they accountable to? who receives priority?

Both FAP officials and critics are currently grappling with the complex issues of public participation. What does it mean and how can it be implemented? According to Ross Wallace, the World Bank representative on FAP: 'FAP has been discussed widely. The parliamentary select committee has discussed it. The MPs have had meetings with other leaders, NGOs and interested parties. The regional studies have carried out literally hundreds of discussion meetings. This has been a refreshing change. It's the only major development project which has done that'.

An OXFAM funded study has raised questions concerning the commitment of FAP officials to public participation, however. In one case study of a pilot compartmentalisation project in Tangail (FAP 20), FAP officials have been criticised for ignoring the views of local people. FAP 20 is designed to test the technical aspects of compartmentalisation. This
involves the spreading of floodwater over the floodplain by establishing interlinked compartments. The objective is to provide a more secure environment for agriculture, fisheries, and rural and urban development through controlled flooding and drainage. The project is also a test case for public participation in project design and implementation. Although more than 25 separate meetings have been held with local people, the outcomes have been largely predetermined and have not been genuine attempts at addressing people's needs and problems, says the study.

Dipali Rani Dush, a woman who may lose land if the embankments are constructed, makes the wry observation that the communication breakdown may be the result of poor translation: 'In one meeting the foreigner thanked us for our cooperation even though we had said we had no intention of cooperating ... we are afraid of white people. People gather quickly if they see white people coming. If you went alone to the point where the sluice gate is to be built you would be beaten with sticks', Dush said.

Initial consultations reflected a public concern for improving drainage in the area. Although this concern was noted it was excluded as an option from subsequent meetings. According to the study FAP officials had bypassed the simple drainage improvement options because they did not fit with the structural approach involving the construction of embankments and sluice gates they wanted to test. 'What we have here is a kind of public consultation in which the domain of choice has been critically restricted by preconceived notions of the problem (flood), and its solution (controlled flooding). Under such restrictions the domain of choice available to people is likely to be almost meaningless', the study said.

FAP officials argue that public consultation has been extensive and that resistance has been isolated to villages where NGOs have been active in 'stirring up trouble'. They also maintain it is in the national interest to test out the compartmentalisation project so that it can be replicated in other parts of Bangladesh. This position is linked to the view that, in the long run, the development of monsoon crops is the only answer to Bangladesh's food needs given the present rate of population growth and the exhaustion of surface and ground water irrigation potential.

According to the study, however, the immediate priority of farmers in the area is increasing dry season rice production through improved drainage. Compartments could be introduced at a later stage only when farmers want to increase their monsoon cropping. The Tangail experience, as a test case for public participation, raises concerns as to how future FAP projects are likely to be managed. The fear is that the imperative of getting projects up and running will continue to override the need for public involvement in water management projects.

Much can be learned from the way local communities have managed flood in the past. Therese Blanchet, an anthropologist who has worked in Bangladesh for 15 years, and who has done extensive research into local initiatives in water management in the northeast region of Bangladesh, is a strong believer in the capability of local people: 'For generations people in the northeast have been blocking the rivers in February/March to ensure the water doesn't enter the hoars (depressed, bowl shaped tracts of land) before the winter boro rice crop has a chance to mature. Once the boro is harvested in many cases these closures are cut and then the hoar is flooded'. Villagers, she says, have a system of chanda tola where contributions are collected from local landowners and cultivators to construct temporary dams and canals to bring water to their respective plots of land.

Blanchet cites the example of one area where farmers came together to construct a 100 metre dam. The locally elected politician was able to organise almost 25 villages to build it. In contrast, local water management committees set up by the Water Board to operate flood control, drainage and irrigation structures, have been a dismal failure. According to Blanchet: 'I've never seen a single committee that worked. If you create projects because bureaucrats are instructed to create projects with no spontaneity on the part of the so-called beneficiaries, where they are not required to organise anything they fail. People call them "tea and biscuit committees". Such 'committees' can easily be manipulated by wealthy and influential people in the community. There are many stories of sluice gates not being opened and closed at the right times with the end result that the structure is a waste of time and works to the disadvantage of people. Moreover, says Blanchet, the superceding of local responsibility for flood control by government has contributed to a false sense of security among villagers: 'People used to build their houses on two feet high mud platforms but they don't anymore because they think they are protected. Before they had boats. Now they don't have boats and so when they are flooded they are worse off than before'.

Whether the FAP can successfully involve local people remains to be seen. With the study phase almost completed and millions of dollars of potential projects identified, the Bangladesh Government in consultation with FAP officials must now decide how FAP will proceed. The next phase may well determine if FAP represents a big leap forward in public participation in mega development projects as officials claim, or whether the concerns of local people will again be overruled by the 'imperatives' of project cycles and the interests of foreign construction firms and aid bureaucrats, as critics fear.

1 Phil Voysey was Save the Children Fund Australia's representative in Bangladesh from 1989 to 1992. He now works as a freelance writer.
Population and health

What was decided at Cairo?

Probably everyone who went to Cairo came home with a slightly different impression of what the conference was about and what was actually achieved. There appear to be two achievements, however, on which all are agreed. One is that, despite all the deep and, at times, bitter divisions, the final Programme of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (the Cairo Plan of Action) was agreed by consensus (with some dissent from the Holy See). The other is that the agreed document represents a remarkable forward advance to the point where the members of the United Nations, acting together, are prepared to put women's empowerment as a firm and urgent objective. Still, as with all such commitments, what happens next must depend upon the priorities of individual governments and their willingness to move to back up their words with cash and other resources.

Apart from the preamble setting out past history, the Cairo Program's 115 pages of detail all stem from the 15 core principles set out in chapter two. Eight of these principles focus on general aspects of human rights: the human rights defined in the universal declaration; the right to basic needs; the right to education; the rights of children; of migrants, of asylum, of indigenous people(s)-(an Australian contribution); and the principle that the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgment of human rights. The remaining principles are more directly focused on population and development. These cover the empowerment of women; that integrated development is essential for advancing the quality of life; that sustainable development requires reduction of unsustainable production and consumption as well as population policies to secure intergenerational equity; the essentiality of poverty eradication; the right to health, including family planning and sexual health 'without any form of coercion' for both couples and individuals; and the centrality of the family, in its many forms, as the basic unit of society.

The remaining chapters cover the interrelationships between population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development; gender equality, equity and empowerment of women; the family, its roles, rights, composition and structure; population growth and structure, reproductive rights and reproductive health; health, morbidity and mortality; population distribution, urbanisation and internal migration; international migration; population, development and education; technology, research and development; national action;
international cooperation; partnership with the non governmental sector; and, follow-up to the Conference. Summarising them is virtually impossible, since consensus is frequently achieved at the cost of brevity (or even logic) by incorporating all concerns and points of view. Hence the core statement that ‘all couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children’.

This was a conference in which the major divisions were not those between developed and developing countries, nor between the East and West, or North and South but between what the Egyptian Minister of Family Planning, in his concluding speech, defined as spiritualists and materialists, between those who believe in an after life where earthly wrongs will be righted and those who do not. Thus it was that days were spent in debating ‘moral issues’ such as the recognition of many forms of the family; the rights of individuals (including adolescents) to have access to family planning and sexual health; the use of condoms (even in the context of HIV) and the recognition of abortion (even as a health problem). In contrast there was very little mention of the immorality of a world in which children daily die of hunger, of violence or of AIDS. More remarkably there was very little debate as to whether there is, indeed, a population problem, and even less argument as to the costs to the international donor community which are set out as US$5.7 billion in 2000 and US$7.2 billion in 2015 (with the recipients still meeting two-thirds of the totals required).

What happens next? Developed countries will continue to debate whether they need to have population policies at all. The OECD donor countries will meet in November to debate population funding issues. India and China, who were both remarkably quiet in Cairo, may well continue much as before in their distinctive methods of addressing the world’s population problem. Africa’s suffering will increase. And the United Nations will move on in 1995 to the social summit in Copenhagen and the women’s conference in Beijing. But the Cairo programme of 1994 will remain to remind the world that sustainable development is ultimately about people and their needs both now and for future generations. To quote an Ethiopian televised by CNN, ‘I had children so that I might be immortal’.

Helen Ware, Assistant Director General, Programme Planning and Review, AIDAB

Inside the NGO Forum

The NGO Forum was a part of the International Conference of Population and Development in Cairo. The Forum was held in a huge stadium adjacent to the Conference centre. The programme was extremely busy with often 10 or 12 concurrent workshops and seminars being offered. Unfortunately because of the tight security, it was not easy to move from one Conference to the other. Women’s groups from all over the world attended the Women’s Caucus and there were various opinions within the group. However, they soon forged themselves into a very effective lobby group and they also had the foresight to arrange space in the main Conference centre, and also get a number of people accredited to the main Conference so that they could move in and out of both buildings.

There was some dissension within the NGO groups. A hearing was held on crimes against women through population programmes. Unfortunately, some very moving and good material about coercive programmes was lost in other discussions which seemed to imply that any modern contraceptive was harmful for women. Also very active in the NGO Forum were a number of youth groups and the 12 medical students from Monash university who attended the meeting ran an excellent seminar on their peer education programme. This excited much discussion as, many governments see offering sex education and services to young people as totally against their philosophy.

There were a number of anti-choice organisations involved in the NGO Forum. Many of them were also accredited to the main Conference and unfortunately made their presence well felt by constantly lobbying delegates as they entered the meeting rooms. At least six Australian anti-choice activists were present at the Forum.

Follow-up from Cairo

This includes another meeting of the national committee to be held probably in late October when the final document is expected to be ready. The document urges the countries to plan follow-up meetings, publications and audio-visual aids in both print and electronic media. The allocation of resources at both a domestic and international aid level is also encouraged. Countries are also encouraged to regularly assess their progress towards achieving the objectives and goals of the Cairo Program of Action and it seems likely that the UN will be requesting country reports similar to those required under the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women document.

Diane Proctor, President, Family Planning Australia

We must act now

The following speech was delivered by World Bank President Lewis Preston to the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo on 6 September:

I think it is important to keep reminding ourselves why we are here. Most of us have attended this kind of large
conference before. We meet; we highlight the issues; we reach a consensus; we make promises. Then we go home - and, all too often, there is very little action.

We cannot afford to let that happen in Cairo. The stakes are too high. Putting it bluntly: if we do not deal with rapid population growth, we will not reduce poverty, and development will not be sustainable.

A billion people already struggle to survive on a dollar a day. Two billion people are without clean water. Three million children die each year from malnutrition. And yet, population in the developing countries will increase more during this decade than ever before, by some 80 million people a year. Within the next 35 years, global population will increase by half. South Asia’s population will grow by two-thirds. Sub-Saharan Africa’s will more than double.

The Cairo Program of Action offers us the proper perspective on rapid population growth: it is a symptom of poverty, and an obstacle to poverty reduction. We know that as incomes increase, and people lead longer, healthier lives, fertility decreases. Rapid fertility declines in East Asia, for example, went hand-in-hand with steady economic growth and improved living standards. Our approach to population policy, therefore, must be part of a broader strategy to reduce poverty, through sustainable growth and investments in people.

Speaking for the World Bank, our support for poverty reduction focuses on the same investments required for a broad approach to fertility reduction. About half of the projects that we finance, for example, now include specific components aimed at empowering women. Last year, we committed almost $2 billion, much of it focused on keeping girls in school. Over the last five years, the Bank has also become one of the largest financiers of family planning and reproductive health services. Close to $200 million were committed last year, and this is projected to increase by 50 per cent over the next three years.

Quality, however, matters more than quantity. The Bank must do more to ensure the effective implementation of the programmes we support:
- by better targeting our resources, so that they reach the poor;
- by strengthening partnerships among all those engaged in this effort, to enhance overall impact; and
- by keeping population issues at the forefront of the policy dialogue.

The world’s rapid population growth will affect us all. Addressing it is a responsibility that we all share. The issue cannot be resolved around a conference table. It can only be resolved when individuals decide that it is in their own best interest to have smaller families, so that more resources can be made available for education, health and poverty reduction. The international community must help to create the conditions in which they can make that choice.

Reprinted from World Bank News, 8 September, 1994

Mutual cooperation in health

Development is often seen only in narrow terms: gross national product per capita is frequently the sole measure by which commentators measure development. However, development is much broader than this. It is about improving the overall quality of life of people in developing countries: of giving them access to better employment opportunities and to basics that we tend to take for granted, such as clean water, basic education, adequate shelter and access to a sound public health system.

Improving the health of people in developing countries is a vital component of development: without good health it’s very difficult to have a reasonable quality of life or to have a productive labour force. So we can rejoice that the last 40 years have seen a dramatic improvement in the health of peoples of the developing countries. Life expectancy at birth has increased from 40 to 63 years, whilst child mortality has fallen from 280 to 106 per 1,000. In our own region, success stories include Vietnam and Thailand where, in little more than a decade, the number of children dying before their fifth birthday has halved.

Development assistance through both multilateral and bilateral agencies has played an important role in these achievements. While figures alone do not tell the whole story, they do serve to show that the concerted efforts of the international community over the past 40 years have made a positive impact. Examples that are immediately evident include the eradication of smallpox, the control of river blindness and immunisation programmes which have dramatically reduced cases of measles and polio. Australia has readily supported national immunisation days in several countries including the Philippines which now reports immunisation coverage of 99 per cent.

While there is much to positive about, there is, unfortunately, much yet to be done. Millions of people in the developing world still suffer from preventable diseases and easily remedied maladies. Every year, some two million people die from both malaria and tuberculosis, 500,000 women die in childbirth and there are over two million cases of cataract blindness in India alone. The spectre of AIDS and the devastation that it can unleash on developing countries - particularly in our region - is a problem that we are all only beginning to address.

The challenge before us then is to build upon past successes and to translate our knowledge of disease prevention and treatment into policies and practices that ensure the benefits are received by all the world’s population.
I would like to briefly describe the main directions of Australia's aid programme. The largest share of our aid is provided to neighbouring countries of Asia and the Pacific. This geographic focus does not exclude assistance to other parts of the developing world and we also fund a range of activities in South Asia and Africa. Australia's commitment to international development is also reflected in our support for the global development programmes of the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, for example the WHO programme on immunisation and the global programme on AIDS.

Before I talk about our health assistance, I would like to make one very obvious point. The needs of developing countries are massive and disparate and our aid resources are finite. We could easily find quality projects to expend the total Australian aid budget in a single sector such as health, infrastructure or education. In practice we attempt to meet recipient's priority needs in areas of Australian expertise and to balance our overall sectoral involvement. This means that our health programme must be targeted very effectively to meet the highest priority needs of people in developing countries and that AIDAB cannot attempt to undertake activities in every area of the health sector.

The vast majority of our health activities are aimed at the primary level and are preventive in nature. This AIDAB policy accords with the internationally accepted objective of promoting basic, cost-effective methods of prevention and treatment, with an emphasis on community participation and directed towards those most in need.

Health is not a new sector for Australian aid. In the late 1970s, AIDAB developed its first major health policy statement which focused on primary health care. In the ensuing two decades, AIDAB has developed a strong framework for providing assistance to the health sector: this consists of broad policy guidelines, an implementation strategy and tools for effective programming. Within this framework there have been a series of funding initiatives focusing on women and their children's health (which many of you will have heard under acronym of WATCH) HIV/AIDS and population. The WATCH theme recognises that in general women have lower social and economic status than men, and also suffer from poor nutrition and the effects of early and frequent childbearing. Thus studies in Thailand show that although the incidence of malaria is the same for women and men, men are six times more likely to receive clinical treatment than women.

A further very closely associated area is that of population programmes. In the Australian aid programme, 'population programmes' is really a shorthand description for activities in the area of sexual and reproductive health. It is an area in which we have considerably raised our profile in the last year.

I would now like to expand on the programming of the new health initiative which will almost double AIDAB's expenditure on targeted health activities this financial year from approximately A$35 million to A$63 million. In addition, the move from budget support to programming in Papua New Guinea will increase the number of health activities funded by the aid programme.

The health initiative will concentrate on tackling four endemic diseases—malaria, neonatal tetanus, polio and HIV/AIDS. This financial year, additional funds have been allocated to the Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam country programmes, the Southeast and South Pacific regional programmes as well as to multilateral agencies.

AIDAB is currently producing an information brochure, 'Health aid - a vital contribution', which outlines the history and focus of our health programme.

Returning to the subject of this conference, may I once again say that it is extremely timely from our point of view as an input into AIDAB's health aid planning. This whole sector is an area of immense challenge and also opportunity, in which Australia's aid programme is committed to a vital role.

This is a summary of a speech given by Gordon Bilney, Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Islands Affairs at the Annual Public Health Association meeting in Adelaide on 27 September, 1994
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Democracy for the common good

As Asians become more prosperous and better educated, they naturally desire - if not always vigorously demand - to participate more in the way their society is run. Most Asian countries that don’t already have democracy are ready for it, and those that do are ready for more. But first they must decide what democracy is.

It is important for Asians to determine the parameters of a system that suits them. Democracy in this context may be defined as a broad participation by citizens in the making of public policy to protect and enhance those things, spiritual as well as material, that Asians cherish.

Asian democracy protects the welfare of the individual by enhancing the collective good. Few Asians will have a problem with accepting that if the two should prove to be in conflict, the collective good ought to prevail. The natural progression of maturing societies goes from political stability to economic development to prosperity. Then comes democracy.

Asiaweek, 9 February 1994, p.18

Uganda’s new constitution

A promising vision of the future for Uganda is emerging as the seeds of democracy take root under the leadership of President Museveni. One of the first duties of the newly elected Constituent Assembly will be to debate the draft Constitution. The draft was written by a Constitutional Commission, and has been described as a modern, enlightened and innovative document.

Against the background of Uganda’s unfortunate history, the Constitution’s chapter on fundamental human rights and freedoms is particularly noteworthy. This provides for a liberal Bill of Rights, expressly dealing with the rights of women, children and people with disabilities, as well as covering the rights of people to live and work in a safe environment.

The election of the Constituent Assembly was only the second suffrage election since Ugandan independence in 1962.

Focus, June 1994, p.23

Bananas as medicine

The Banana Group in the UK reports that bananas are much better for diabetics than fruits with a high fruit sugar content. They contain complex carbohydrates which are broken down and released in the blood slowly and do not push up the blood sugar level abruptly. They are recommended for people with high cholesterol levels and high blood pressure and are also believed to be good for those suffering from gallstones and gout.
Bananas provide complex carbohydrates, iron, magnesium, Vitamin C, the B Vitamins and fibre. They also contain 400 times more potassium than sodium. Most of us consume too much sodium in the form of salt and one way of balancing this is to eat bananas. Too much sodium increases blood pressure whereas potassium promotes urination and helps to eliminate excess sodium. Potassium is of particular importance to sportsmen and sportswomen because a deficiency of potassium can cause muscular cramp during physical exertion.

*Fiji Food and Nutrition Newsletter* 19(1), 1994, p.3

**The poor get poorer**

Since 1960, about US$1.4 trillion (in 1988 dollars) has been transferred in aid from rich countries to poor ones. Yet relatively little is known about what the process has achieved. Has it relieved poverty? Has it stimulated growth in the recipient countries? Has it helped the countries which give it? Such questions become more pressing as donor governments try harder to curb public spending.

Brian Atwood, appointed by the Clinton administration to run America's Agency for International Development, inherited an organisation encumbered over the years with 33 official goals by a Congress that loved using aid money to buy Third World adherence to its pet ideas. Now, faced with a sharp budget cut, Mr Atwood is trying to pare down to just four goals: building democracy, protecting the environment, fostering sustainable economic development and encouraging population control. Not, however, anything as basic as the relief of poverty.

*The Economist*, 7-13 May 1994, p.19

**Kiribati gets too much aid; must learn to say ‘no’ says Opposition Leader**

Kiribati Member of Parliament, Roniti Teiwaki, said Kiribati was the recipient of ‘too much aid from too many sources’ and did not have the experience or the ability to choose its donors well.

The focus of the aid programme on infrastructure and causeway building was criticised, with Teiwaki saying ‘it is about time Australia invested more money in empowering i-Kiribati to paddle their own canoes in international waters’. Teiwaki said Australia would be better to fund education and training schemes so that i-Kiribati would have ‘the necessary skills to become workers in their own right, not economic refugees’.

Kiribati receives A$4 million from Australia, $2 million from New Zealand and $7 million from the European Community as well as aid from Japan. ‘We don’t know how to handle that kind of aid’, Teiwaki said. ‘We have to learn to say no’.

*Tok Blong Pasifik* 46, February 1994, p.25

**Land mines - their global impact**

Sixty-five to 110 million land mines contaminate over 60 countries around the world, according to the United States State Department. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that each month at least 800 people are killed and 450 injured by these lethal weapons.

Land mines are covered by the 1980 International Weapons Convention and its Land Mines Protocol. This Convention does not ban land mines, rather it seeks to limit their use. Australia has both signed and ratified the Convention. The Convention is likely to come up for review, some time in the next twelve months. Meanwhile, Community Aid Abroad’s recently formed Urgent Action Network has been mobilised to push for continuing support for the Cambodian Mines Action Centre (CMAC). CMAC has trained over 2,000 Cambodians, organised into 40 de-mining teams.

Senator Evans is also being urged to support the setting up of an international fund for clearance operations, paid for by the manufacturers and sellers of land mines. A review of the Convention, with the aim of a tighter régime is also being called for. De-mining - removing the millions of land mines planted overwhelmingly in developing countries - is essential for rural development, economic prosperity and political stability.

*CAA Campaigner*, Summer 1993, p.1

**Papua New Guinea patrol system to aid health, development**

Patrols are scheduled to begin in five provinces this month to extend basic health services in remote areas. The patrols will be a joint operation of the Health Department and the Village Service and Provincial Affairs Department. The first priority will be to vaccinate children against measles, tuberculosis, and polio. The patrols also will offer basic health care and education. Their other major functions will be to collect village census data, offer guidance on the new conditional grants to local councils, and to collect feedback from villagers on major problems in their areas.

UNICEF and USAID are helping pay for supplies and technical support. Further funding is being sought from other international aid donors.

*PNG Social Development Newsletter* 14, July 1994, p.3
The Development Studies Electronic Forum

This Forum was established by the Australian National University to provide a world-wide communication and a central electronic archive for anyone working on, or interested in, the study of social and economic development, with a particular focus on Third World countries. It was established on the 7 July 1994 on the joint initiative of the Coombs Computing Unit, Research Schools of Social Sciences and Pacific and Asian Studies and the Australian Development Studies Network, the National Centre for Development Studies, the Australian National University.

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A new style of psychology for development studies

Stuart Carr and Don Munro, Psychology, University of Newcastle

Speaking of Nicaragua, psychologists Ring and Vazquez (1993:8) confessed 'It is a humbling experience to lecture on anxiety and stress in a place where so many have lived in unimaginable situations of fear and trauma'. Those words perhaps encapsulate the way many psychologists have felt about their relevance in developing countries generally. Aid organisations might agree. AIDAB for example does not currently employ any psychologists, except as counsellors for student visitors to Australia. Our aim in this paper is to speak directly to such reservations, arguing that psychology does have a good deal to offer the development process.

To illustrate our case we shall use psychology in Malawi, one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa (House and Zimalirana 1992) and therefore a tough testing ground. The past five years in Malawi have witnessed a quintupling in student numbers (MacLachlan and Carr 1993), a fourfold increase in professional posts; more than two-thirds of employers (including government ministries and international aid organisations) expressing interest in employing psychology graduates; and the major aid organisations such as UNICEF beginning to commit large-scale funds to conduct applied psychological research, for instance on AIDS prevention.

In the somewhat more developed African countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria and South Africa, much of the teaching and research has been driven by academic aims and predominantly western methods, focused on the industrial and clinical problems of more advanced economies. Comparatively little attention has so far been paid by psychologists to the special problems of aid, or indeed to rural and poor urban populations generally. Seriously underdeveloped nations like Malawi may thus provide the impetus for a psychology re-focused on development. To exemplify how, we will describe a small selection of applied research, from the psychology of motivation.

Realisation

The first requirement of what we might dub a 'psychology for development' is to realise that development policy may be psychologically awry. During Malawi's 1992 drought and famine, circulating anecdotes told of a village community refusing to assemble donated well equipment.
unless wages were paid; of a town community stonewalling delivery of its own donated maize consignment; of academics refusing to attend development workshops unless the per diem enabled income to be generated; and of school children refusing to participate in educational research unless recompensed for their help (Carr et al. under review).

In a psychological survey, these scenarios were presented to Malawian university students, who estimated that between 10 and 33 per cent of the members of the various groups would indeed display the reaction 'Pay me!'. When asked to explain why this reaction would occur, the reasons given included more fully alleviating dire poverty; galvanising free riders; the influence of western economic values; and providing ordinary members of the community with at least some sort of explanation for the work. Although these may be eminently reasonable grounds for the 'Pay me!' reaction, the latter is nevertheless divorced from the givers' perspective of aid as 'helping others to help themselves' (Kellogg Foundation 1992).

Reconstitution

A further realisation that development policy may be awry occurred following an investigation of salary differentials between expatriate and local development workers doing the same job (Carr and MacLachlan 1993). In Malawi, the expatriate typically takes home 10 to 20 times the salary of the local counterpart (Machika 1992). Yet several separate elements in western psychology, if reconstituted, would combine to predict a potentially devastating impact on motivation. Equity theory predicts that lower paid workers will reduce their input to equate with their (lower) salaries, while any 'belief in a just world' may lead to an interiorisation of lower (salary-based) status. Currently, half of Malawi's desperately needed medical doctors have opted to practice overseas (Southern African Economist 1993), while the expatriate-to-local doctor ratio stands at 3:1 (MacLachlan and Carr 1993a).

Psychology further predicts that the higher paid, western expatriates may become demotivated, particularly those with a relatively low level of commitment to begin with (Huseman et al. 1987). For this group, the theories of Equity (Adams 1965), Just World (Lerner 1980) and Intrinsic Motivation (Deci 1975), each predict that the 'high paid' expatriates are at risk of developing inflated views of their own capacities and correspondingly deflated views of their lower paid, local colleagues.

Thus, through a type of 'psychological alchemy' which draws together disparate elements from western psychology, we arrive at a disturbing double-edged prediction: both local and expatriate development workers will become demotivated. This 'double demotivation' hypothesis is currently being tested in both Africa and Asia. As well as endorsing the psychological wisdom of 'local salary' policies in organisations such as the Overseas Service Bureau, this study may eventually suggest more productive and sustainable methods of managing local and expatriate salaries. It is therefore relevant to development.

Restatement

Psychological principles established in the West may also be productively restated, i.e., qualified by adding elements in order to accommodate local context and culture. In Malawi's western style workplaces, Malawians are not only motivated like westerners to compete (Festinger 1954), they are also likely under some circumstances to develop intense hostility towards individualistic achievers. As one student cogently remarked of African culture, '...people...always develop hostility towards those who are better than them. For example, there is too much witchcraft going on to reduce the ability of colleagues... We, Africans, we don't accept the superiority of the other without feeling jealousy'.

In another study to illuminate such phenomena, local anecdotes of managers and shopfloor co-workers sabotaging one another were transcribed into survey scenarios, and presented to managers and trainee managers (Carr et al. 1994). Clear tendencies emerged for these respondents to estimate that Malawian managers would 'push down' (rather than pull up) subordinates, while shopfloor co-workers would be motivated to 'pull down' each other - predictions which were significantly more negative among the experienced managers. These same gravitational tendencies were predicted in subsistence agriculture, the major occupation in Malawi's economy.

As psychologists assess the explanations for these tendencies, they are beginning to suggest strategies for managing fear of success and even for turning its psychological foundations to business advantage. In addition to ramifications for organisational development, the management of such 'motivational gravity' (Carr et al. 1994) may have severe consequences for personal welfare among employees. In Malawi, it was recently discovered that more than 40 per cent of psychiatric patients attributed their predicament to motivational gravity, most frequently in the workplace.

Refutation?

These psychiatric patients also frequently mentioned in one breath both witchcraft and modern medical causes for their plight. A similar observation was that western-trained nurses relied on protective spells to defend themselves against the envious wishes of colleagues competing for promotion. Realising that such pluralism would undermine the existing western rationalist model for managing health in Malawi, these apparent contradictions were investigated more closely. Empirical surveys of traditional and modern medical beliefs about health care were conducted with regard to malaria and schistosomiasis; 'mental illness'; epilepsy; and AIDS.

October 1994
In each case, knowing whether the person endorsed one type of cause, prevention or treatment did not guarantee that same person would reject the logically different alternative. Malawians are apparently very tolerant of different health care systems. This may amount to a refutation of a central feature of western psychology, which is that people are motivated to eliminate inconsistent or 'dissonant' alternatives (Festinger 1957). Such tolerance may however be viewed as a vital human resource asset (Porter et al. 1991). Schumaker (1990) suggests that it is an adaptive reaction to reality in any culture.

In Malawi, there is a highly practical development implication of the tolerance finding. The Ministry of Health is attempting to 'develop' a western style health system, with traditional healers perhaps occupying at best a relatively marginal position. But locally-based psychologists have been arguing for the reintegration of traditional healers. This integration has already occurred in Zimbabwe, where the former Professor of Sociology - now Vice-Chancellor of the national university - is also President of the Tribal Healer’s Association.

Since it is widely accepted among clinical psychologists and medical doctors in the western mould that an understanding of a patient’s perspective may of itself enhance recovery, the psychologists’ case for incorporating the Malawian traditional healer has a therapeutic payload. There may also be prevention benefits accruing to such integration. With regard to AIDS prevention for example, young Malawians - even with the most intensive exposure to western education - are far from ruling out the numerous traditional healers as ‘credible’ sources of valuable advice.

Reaffirmation

It is easy, and indeed fashionable, to criticise aid efforts as intrusive, dependency-creating, self-defeating and culturally imperialistic among other things. Seen in this light, the application of psychological ‘tricks’ is viewed as further manipulation of local populations for national or international aims. What is the reaction of the psychologist to this accusation? To some extent, it may be the defence of the tyrant: ‘I am only following orders’. That is, if a decision has been made on political or moral grounds to give aid, then it seems irrational to allow it to fail on technicalities. Somewhat more subtly, it might be argued that the use of psychology to ease the way to acceptance of aid has to be part of the aid itself, in the same way that the marketing of a product involves selling the image and the advertising as well as the item itself.

But the most cogent argument in favour of psychological principles is that they might open the way for testing whether local populations really need the aid which is given to them, in the sense that they are ready to ‘buy’ it - that is, pay the cost of making adjustments to their lifestyles and belief systems in order to open themselves to the aid. It may simply be that much aid is not in the form that is wanted, or even needed. Or it may be that the package it comes in is undesirable.

Whatever the case, any outside intervention is bound to change any system - this is an axiom of any systems theory approach at least. Systems change when they incorporate something (or the reverse, lose something). This has led one of us to suggest that psychology in non western cultures is like a cuckoo’s egg: it has to be introduced as something the host wants enough to care for (Munro 1982), although we must recognise that it may hatch into something that is not anticipated by the host, or by the donor.

What psychology really has to offer is insight into the mental processes surrounding this bargain, and the possibility that both donor and recipient are more aware of these and thereby more in control of the process of aid.

This is an edited summary of an address presented by Stuart Carr at the Australian National University on 27 May 1994.

References

Holy war and holy peace: The role of NGOs in religious and ethnic conflicts

Elise Boulding, International Peace Research Association Foundation

In every religious faith, the teachings about peace exist alongside teachings about the Holy War. The concept of crusade recurs every time we have a war - we had it in World War I, World War II, and as recently as the Gulf War, justifying the military action against Iraq as a Holy War. There are also, in each society, extremist groups that glorify violence itself, including extremist religious groups such as fundamentalists in Islam, in the Christian and Judaic tradition. The teaching about the Peaceable Kingdom, meanwhile, is that we are to live in peace with one another, dealing with one another non violently. We are to live as brothers and sisters in equality, we are to share.

Interestingly, even the strongest warrior society had visions of what a peaceable society would be like. So the Homeric warriors had the visions of the Elysian Fields where they would go and lay down their swords and shields and sit down together; men and women, rejoicing, feasting, sharing. We find it in the Hebrew Bible, and the origins of Christianity. It was not until the time of Constantine that it was possible to be a Christian and bear arms.

For us, the traditions of these peace teachings have stayed right through the centuries. There have been Christian peace movements century after century from those earliest times, regardless of Constantine and all of the Holy War teachings. The same is true of Islam regarding the teachings about non violence; and in Hinduism we think first of Gandhi, who exemplified the peace teachings and non violence; and for Buddhists we have the example today of the Dalai Lama.

But our problem, at this point in the 20th century, is the cultural balancing act - with sometimes the warrior tradition getting much stronger and sometimes the peace tradition, moving back and forth. We might say that we are at a point when that balancing act is all out of kilter, so what we have is an overlay of war culture. The peace culture, which has not disappeared, has become almost underground for our media and our public discourse. And yet the truth is, that roughly 80 per cent of all human interactions in fact are peaceful. If we think of our daily lives in our families, in our places of work, in our communities and in the civic and public sphere, we're negotiating all of the time. The same is true for the international system - from the Hague Peace
Conference at the beginning of the century and the setting up of the League of Nations followed by its successor, the United Nations. We have a solid base of negotiating behaviour as the undercurrent of our lives and a lot of material evidence that states have tried hard to do things peaceably.

However, we also face a runaway militarism that has completely overwhelmed those capabilities. You might say that everything we do in the effort to negotiate is distorted by the global forcing system of the military. We are struggling to create peacekeeping forces, trying hard to use the UN system for peace building, but we’re simple overrun by our own weapons systems.

One particular problem we face is the existence of ethnic minorities whose diverse needs are often not taken care of in a system of monoculture-based nation states. There are in fact 10,000 such societies spread over 185 nation states. So, one of the things that will need to happen as we move into the 21st century is to be more inventive about the constitutive orders to deal with the needs of these ethnic groups. The problem with being inventive about these new arrangements is that the sheer threat of the military system reduces our problem-solving capabilities. Because we can threaten people we don’t stop to figure out how to deal with the problem - we just use threat instead.

So I am sharing tonight thoughts about what the resources are that can make this ethnically divided and militarily overwhelmed world one in the 21st century that will be a peaceful one for all of us. An important part of those resources is the rise of the international non governmental organisations (NGOs). These are people’s organisations, as opposed to those of the state. At the beginning of this century there were 200 of those and there are now 18,000. These people’s organisations are continent spanning and they address the whole range of concerns of human beings from art, music, culture, welfare, health, economic justice, peace, the sciences, sports, anything that human beings like to do. Included in these are networks that cross national borders and deal with problems of human concern in a problem-solving way. As members of these NGOs we want to make the world better. Through these NGOs, with their national and international interfaces, we have a capability to act for peace building, whether through ethnic, religious or other realms of human activity.

Under the people’s associations is another layer which we are just becoming aware of now. They are the GROs, the grassroots organisations, and these are the ones that spring up wherever people get together to solve their problems, in rural areas where people deal with drought, desertification or destruction of forests. Whatever a local problem is, farmers, townspeople will get together, form a grassroots group and work at problem-solving. Those GROs do reach up to the people’s organisations that have contacts across national borders. We can go right from the local household, and grassroots through these national and international people’s organisations up to the UN system. And the important thing for each one of us as a citizen of the planet is to learn how to use that system because that is our problem-solving system. Most of us do not begin to use the resources that are available to us because we don’t know how to work our way through the system - but it can be learned.

There are ethnic people’s associations, such as the Unrepresented People’s Organisation, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and a whole set of national and continental indigenous people’s organisations. It is very important to pay attention to the ways these people are defining their problems and to link with them because that can lead us to peaceful problem-solving rather than to ethnic warfare. That is specifically in relation to indigenous peoples but it is also true with every ethnic group. Every people has some tradition of conflict resolution, and becoming aware of these peacemaking traditions of ethnic groups is absolutely critical for future conflict resolution.

The NGOs of the communities of religious faith are very hard at work dealing with the problem of how to move their own religious faiths away from the Holy War concept and into the peace traditions. The peace NGOs within these groups are doing their best to engage in dialogue to hold up the peace teachings of that tradition and to train their people in conflict resolution, which they see as a religious mandate.

Some other people’s organisations include the International Peace Research Association - a peace researchers’ people’s NGO. There is a whole range of social inventions and institutions that have been proposed by peace research and are being used or considered by governments at this time, including the concepts of non offensive defence, zones of peace, and economic conversion. And there is the International Council of Scientific Unions which is a coalition of all science NGOs. Their research on nuclear winter turned the tide on the acceptability of nuclear weapons for actual nuclear war fighting. Then we have collections of social science NGOs in the International Social Science Council from where the concept of the World Cultural Development Decade came. Women’s organisations have also had a very special role to play in teaching each society the relation between violence against women and children, and violence in the family and the violence of war, making us aware of how this template of patriarchy can insidiously infect human relations. And there are the many peace organisations based on professional groupings - teachers for peace, lawyers for peace, doctors for peace, and so on - who are finding ways to incorporate a peace culture into their working lives.

Finally, I mention a new yet old development. It starts in recent times with a shanti sana that came out of Gandhi’s teaching where you have peoples training for non violent
direct action in the midst of conflict. The development of Peace Brigades International is a direct descendant of shanti sana and there are perhaps a dozen different kinds of peace teams under different auspices that are now at work in various countries where there is conflict - Somalia, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Bosnia. Groups of 8 to 12 highly trained volunteers do the work of interpositioning, standing between the wielders of violence and the people who need to be protected. The inability of the UN peacekeeping forces to reduce violence in so many of the countries where they are suggests that the NGO community, the people’s organisations, have to take the responsibility of unarmed peacekeeping. As long as you have armed peacekeepers you have threat and the response to threat is violence. If you’ve got unarmed peacekeepers you do not have threat. Therefore this is one of the most important arenas for people’s associations to make possible unarmed peacekeeping, creating protected space for the expansion of normal peace time activities.

There are many resources for the recovery of our peace culture and many that I have not mentioned. People can change - cultures can change. We have to realise, if we are going to have a cultural transformation - and we are - that people want adventure, they want challenge, they want to be making, doing, creating, inventing. We have an imagery of a tattered maiden called Peace and it is the wrong image - maybe a Valkyrie riding off without a sword. The idea of adventurous peace building is terribly important to this new culture of peace that is coming out of our time. Along with that journey is a real spiritual, intellectual journey as we redefine all these teachings that are nested so deep in our beings about the God who sends us to war. That is a personal, spiritual journey I think each of us has to undertake and transform it into adventurous peacekeeping. Because we are an inventive people it is very unsatisfying to only have violence to fall back on - that is when you cannot think of anything else to do and we can think of other things to do. So the adventure of peace building lies ahead of us for the 21st century.

This is a summary of an address presented by Elise Boulding at the Australian National University on 18 May 1994. The summary was prepared by Wendy Lambourne, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University.

Conference reports

Teaching for Development: An international review of Australian formal and non formal education for Asia and the Pacific

Canberra, 28-29 September 1994

This symposium, organised by the Australian Development Studies Network, provided the opportunity to review Australia’s role in providing education in social and economic development for the Asia-Pacific region. Particular attention was paid to looking at ways to improve the quality, relevance and perceived value of this education and at how to ensure that Australians are well informed about the Asia-Pacific region.

The papers and discussion fell into five major categories - the aid programme and the developmental impact of educating Asian and Pacific Island students in Australia; the role of development studies as a discipline; teaching Australian students about social and economic development in the region; providing short courses and in-country training; and using new technologies for teaching for development.

The conference provided the opportunity to look at the history of teaching for development in the region. The establishment of the Colombo Plan in 1951 marked the start of Australia’s official involvement in providing education to assist the social and economic development of countries in the region. The numbers of students coming to Australia was limited and these students enrolled in existing Australian courses. The situation changed dramatically in the mid-1980s following the Goldring and Jackson Reports. New government policy allowed for marketing education and the entry of unlimited numbers of overseas students on condition they met the training institution’s entry requirements and paid the full cost of their courses. There was a quadrupling of overseas students, from 16,000 in 1985 to 63,000 in 1993 and a rapid increase in short courses and courses marketed to overseas students. The quality and relevance of the courses offered was seldom questioned.

Professor Dean Terrell, Vice Chancellor of the Australian National University noted that in 1992 international education as an export earner for Australia was only marginally behind wheat, bringing in A$1.6 billion a year. He warned that there was the danger of Australian educational institutions becoming blinded by dollars rather than seeking to maintain high quality and relevant courses. ‘It is becoming increasingly important that the education provided in Australia is mutually beneficial and that it results in social, economic and political benefits to recipient
countries', he said. This required high quality Australian courses, high calibre teachers and appropriate student services. ‘Many Australian institutions are now making their courses relevant, but I believe there is some way to go, and there remains the temptation to cobble together courses, often packaged attractively, but whose content and relevance to the needs of developing countries have long since passed their use-by date’.

Bob Stensholt, AIDAB, pointed out that to date around 100,000 students from developing countries have been sponsored by the Australian aid programme to study in Australia. The proportion of the aid budget that goes to education and training is increasing. In Southeast Asia education and training account for around one-third, (A$120m), of all aid expenditure to the region. In addition to tertiary scholarships, AIDAB funds a variety of technical training, short courses both in Australia and in-country in a variety of sectors including agriculture, forestry, health, population, environment. There is also a considerable amount of on-the-job training which is not included as part of the education aid budget. AIDAB is currently reviewing the way in which it allocates aid funds for education and is seeking educational projects which best fulfill developing country requirements for social and economic development.

Helen Hughes stated that it was easy to forget that the aim of teaching for development should be to train people to run their own countries better. Australia still does not do this very well. ‘There is great potential for training graduate students, if we get graduate education right. We haven’t got it right so far. There are few formal graduate education courses around Australia that are properly structured’. Professor Hughes said she supported the idea of international education where students from the region could spend a junior year at university in Australia and Australian students could spend a junior year in the region. Senator Robert Bell expressed his belief that if Australian education was to provide benefits to both the region and to Australia it needed to be further deregulated and taken out of the hands of the Department of Employment, Education and Training, whom, he said ‘had made an appalling mess of it’.

The symposium papers pointed to the need for Australian tertiary institutions to put more effort into structuring courses to meet the specific needs of countries in the region and to ensure that the skills learned in Australia could be applied in the home country. Frank Sheehy, Faculty of Education, Curtin University of Technology, gave examples of the way in which they had designed their skills upgrading programmes. This had involved needs analysis undertaken in the students’ country prior to developing the curriculum, post-course follow-up and programme evaluation.

Tracer studies and the personal experience of participants at the symposium have shown that students’ inability to apply skills learned together with the lack of support and follow-up have seriously reduced the beneficial impact of Australian education. Dissatisfaction with selection criteria was also voiced and it was felt that selection of tertiary level students coming to Australia needs to be more closely controlled.

The cost effectiveness, impact and sustainability of in-country training versus overseas training was a major topic of discussion. Ross Forman, University of Technology, Sydney showed that in-country language training conducted in Laos allowed three times the participation rate that would have been possible in Australia. It also allowed training to be more relevant to Lao needs and made it possible for 50 per cent of participants to be women thus satisfying issues of gender equity which are now an important component of the Australian aid programme.

Teaching methods were discussed in several sessions with considerable agreement about the benefits of using participational teaching methods from community-based training, through intensive tertiary short courses, to tertiary post-graduate degree courses. Ian Oxenford, University of New England, Christine McMurray, National Centre for Development Studies, Roland Lubett, a freelance trainer, and Jim Muldoon and Deborah Cavanagh of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, all reviewed their experiences with participational teaching and stressed the importance of training as a two-way process rather than a top-down dissemination of knowledge. The use of simulation games, role play and workshops which demanded hands-on skills were also discussed.

The role of specialised, intensive, short courses as an effective means of teaching for development was widely discussed. Christine McMurray pointed out that short courses had the advantage of imparting a lot of information in a short space of time and of having participants away from their jobs for a relatively short period of time. They also allow more women to participate and provide an optimum learning atmosphere. As participants come from similar work situations, short courses promote exchange of ideas between participants, so they learn not only from lecturers but also from each other. However, short courses run in Australia or in an overseas country are often perceived as a holiday opportunity. As several participants at the symposium pointed out, teaching intensive short courses is extremely hard work as the contact hours are very high and require considerable preparation and a high level of organisation. As Christine McMurray stressed, ‘A boring lecture which lasts one hour is unfortunate, a boring day or week is a disaster for an intensive course’.

Innovations in teaching for development covered a variety of distance learning and open learning courses provided in Australia for students in Asia, Africa and the Pacific. Bob Stensholt outlined the AIDAB-funded ABC Television English Language Training which is being provided via ATV1 to most Southeast Asian countries. Carla Treloar, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences at the University
of Newcastle, outlined their distance learning courses in epidemiology and biostatistics and the experience of their students in China, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, and David Jones discussed new ways to market open learning courses.

In the final plenary session of the symposium there was discussion on the importance of development education within Australia and the need to ensure that Australian students from primary to tertiary level be well informed about the region in which they live and to understand the issues fundamental to relieving poverty and supporting social and economic development. Non-government organisations involved in development education, such as the Ideas Centre in Sydney, One World Learning Centre in Canberra, Community Aid Abroad and the Overseas Service Bureau have provided important support for school teachers and the community in learning about development. There was a well supported request from the symposium participants for AIDAB to reinstate funding to the Ideas Centre, which has recently been forced to close through lack of funding.

With regard to future Australian policy on teaching for development, the symposium did not reach agreement. However it widely recognised that changes in policy were required to ensure improved quality of Australian education and to ensure its improved relevance to the region. There was also recognition that there should be an increased move to in-country training and support for upgrading educational organisations, teaching methods, and teaching facilities in the region. There was support for further Australian aid focus on educating women.

Proceedings will be available soon from the Network.

Ecopolitics VIII

Canterbury, 8-10 July 1994

More than 150 conference delegates debated, as usual for Ecopolitics conferences, a wide range of issues, such as green and greenhouse politics, women and the environment, biodiversity, energy politics, environmental philosophy and environmental education. The theme of the conference, 'Pacific Visions', was addressed in a number of papers on views and issues regarding the environment in the Pacific context, with contributions on: ecopolitical uses of indigenous knowledge (William Clarke); mining policy in Papua New Guinea (Samson Polume); Maori participation in resource management in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Margaret Mutu); and biodiversity and native title (David Bennet), amongst others. An aboriginal perspective was expressed by Darryl Pearce as one of the keynote speakers, and a Cook Islands view was provided by another keynote speaker, Makiute Tongia. Maori speakers were Sandra Lee, Hirini Matunga, Shane Jones, Margaret Mutu, Joan Ropila, and Nganeko Minhimnick.

A common thread in many of the presentations was the growing assertiveness of indigenous people regarding their rights to manage the environment on their own terms. The view that indigenous people have the right to make their own decisions about how to balance resource use and environmental protection, irrespective of the dominant culture or moralism of environmentalists, was particularly strongly expressed by Darryl Pearce, who emphasised that indigenous people's needs have priority, even over the protection of species. This view found echoes in a forum on the theme of 'reconciling development and conservation on Maori land' where Hirini Matunga made the point that environmentalists should not project some kind of preservationist puritanism on Maori when it comes to the management of undeveloped lands owned by Maori. The right of Pacific Island nations to define for themselves what is sustainable and required when managing resources was also expressed by Makiute Tongia, who spoke of the need of these nations to get hold of modern technology: 'give us e-mail!'

That this rise in assertiveness of indigenous people regarding resource management has the potential of pitting indigenous people against environmentalists was acknowledged by Sandra Lee, who referred to this problem as the emergence, in recent years, of a wall between Maori and conservationists in New Zealand. She also indicated, however, that Maori and conservationists have a lot to offer each other, and that it is much better to have Maori 'as an ally than as a foe'. This point of view was shared by Guy Salmon, chief executive of the Maruia Society in New Zealand, who stressed the importance of genuine dialogue between Maori and conservationists.

The conference confirmed the value of Ecopolitics conferences as a platform for discussion among all those (academics, civil servants, environmentalists, resource managers and others) with an interest in environmental politics, and as a meeting ground between theory and practice. The proceedings of the conference (to be published later this year) can be ordered from: Centre for Resource Management, PO Box 56, Lincoln University, Canterbury, New Zealand. Please enclose payment for NZ$45.

Ton Buehrs, Lincoln University

Environmentally sustainable development conference

Washington DC, 19-21 September 1994

The World Bank's Second Annual Environmentally Sustainable Development (ESD) conference focused its attention on issues of poverty reduction, environmental protection and economic development in cities. Bruce Alberts, president of the US National Academy of Sciences, predicted that three-quarters of the world's population will live in cities by the year 2025. Bank President Lewis Preston forcefully confirmed the Bank's commitment to reducing
poverty, which is an essential precondition to reducing urban environmental degradation. The Bank has increased by ten times its lending for environmental projects, he said. Five years ago, the Bank made US$245 million in environmental loans. It is also helping more than 50 countries develop Environmental Action Plans, and is playing a lead role to the Global Environmental Facility.

While considerable attention has been paid to the 'green agenda' of global warming, deforestation, resource-depletion and biodiversity, the 'urban environmental agenda was considered a local problem', said Bank's Vice President for ESD Ismail Serageldin. This 'brown agenda' which has been shunted to the margins, is the one in which the poor, who are increasingly concentrated in cities, face the most severe and urgent environmental hazards.

Keynote speaker Henry Cisneros, the US Secretary for Housing and Urban Development, challenged the divide between environmental protection and economic development. 'Environmental problems have often been perceived as luxurious concerns' he said. He reflected on the relationship between poverty, racial and ethnic segregation, and environmental neglect and deterioration.

Maurice Strong, Secretary General of the 1992 Earth Summit, encouraged participants to think boldly. He emphasised the deepening deterioration in many urban areas, but refused to be pessimistic. 'The answer', he said, 'surely lies in devising much more effective means of mobilising the human resources of urban communities in the planning, development and management of their communities. This will require new institutional mechanisms and programmes to enable people to acquire the skills needed at various levels to build sustainable communities and give them access to the information and the facilities required to play an active role in the process of building a sustainable basis for the future of their community.'

Challenging the 'fuzziness' of the concept of sustainable development, Mahbub ul Haq, Special Adviser to UNDP said 'present needs' can be interpreted as 'a quiet acceptance' of the status quo, or 'a radical plea' for redistribution of global consumption. He asserted that the implicit dichotomy between poverty alleviation and preserving natural resources is actually a false one. 'What must be sustained is human life' he said. 'Preservation of natural resources is only a means.' Population growth need not mean scarcity and inevitable poverty, Haq argued, saying 'It is time to give Malthus a decent burial.'

Lester Brown, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, cited reasons for hope for the future of cities, particularly regarding energy and materials, but suggested that a less sanguine, Malthusian perspective may yet apply to food and water. 'The enormous urbanisation of the last four decades has been underwritten by an enormous growth in food production' Brown said, asserting that food prices have fallen, and cities have benefited at the expense of rural areas. During the last decade, however, growth in food production has slowed to one per cent a year, compared with three per cent during the prior 34 years, pushing down food consumption, particularly in Africa and the former Soviet Union.

William Alonso, a professor of population studies at Harvard University, strongly disagreed with the implication that urban growth might slow down. He said, 'if there is a reversal of trade between cities and the countryside, it will not reduce urban growth'. The most pressing problem in cities in the former Soviet Union are pollution and housing. In megacities like Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Calcutta, the needs are more basic. 'Our task is to get the water in, the excrement out, and deal with problems like lead', Alonso said. 'Without this, poverty reduction and economic development won't work', he added.

Peter Hall, Professor of Planning at the Bartlett School of Architecture and Planning, at University College, London said the problem is how to develop workable strategic frameworks and plan for sustainable development. Much research has been done on the interface between land use and transportation in developed country cities. Hall posed the question of how much of this research might apply to the developing world, particularly to large middle-income cities? These cities share some common features but also have differences. They tend to have moderately high rates of car ownership, which resembles patterns in the 1960s in the developed world. Most of these cities have invested in rapid transport schemes during the last 20 years. And most have decentralised people, and to some extent jobs, into wide suburban belts. In fact, topics for future research in these two types of cities are more similar than they might first appear.

Reprinted from World Bank News, September 22, 1994

NGO forum for World Summit for Social Development

Melbourne, 1 October 1994

At this forum the participants agreed that it is imperative that the Prime Minister, Mr Keating, attend the Summit, to ensure that the issues of poverty, unemployment and social integration become a high priority on our government's agenda.

The participants also urged the Australian Government to continue to promote Summit outcomes which commit the states of the world to:

* Strengthening the framework for international cooperation:

Developing effectively the framework for international cooperation in economic and social issues which was agreed to in 1945 in the Charter of the United Nations, especially the leading role that was envisaged for the Economic and
Social Council.

- **Improving the international economic environment:**
  Developing an international economic environment which encourages long-term investments and enterprises that are productive, create jobs, are socially responsible and respect the environment.

- **Improving international financial assistance:**
  Ensuring that the supply and utilisation of international financial assistance for developing countries is improved substantially, especially for the purposes of eradicating extreme poverty and meeting basic human needs, with special attention to the position of women and children.

- **Strengthening the human rights regime:**
  Ensuring that the existing international regime of human rights instruments, which already imposes binding obligations in relation to many key aspects of social development, is applied more widely and effectively.

- **International follow-up and monitoring:**
  Ensuring that the agreements made at the Summit are effectively facilitated and monitored at the international level, and that further initiatives are then agreed.

  Hazen Waller, Australian Council for Overseas Aid

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**Women, power and politics**

*Adelaide, 8-11 October 1994*

The following recommendations to the Women’s Suffrage Steering Committee for the development of an action plan over the next 12 months were accepted at the conference:

**Women in government**

- all political parties examine their procedures to ensure that no barriers, actual or perceived, work to the detriment of women participating fully at all levels of their party structures; and all political parties implement strategies or rules to ensure at least 50 per cent representation of women in their legislative assemblies within the next decade;
- international networks be developed between women’s groups, organisations and parliamentarians, to maintain the pressure for equal rights and power for women around the world;
- women of non English speaking background be included in the number of women targeted for executive positions in the bureaucracy and positions for state boards and commissions;
- the Federal Office of the Status of Women be asked to send ‘Register of Women’ forms to all Australian delegates of this conference; and
- the Department of the Prime Minister to ensure adequate representation of women on regional economic development organisations and those boards be required to establish clear accountability procedures back to the local/regional community.

**Women in economy**

- This conference notes with dismay that in 1994 women in Australia still have not achieved pay equity with men. In particular we are concerned about part-time and casual workers, the majority of whom are women.
- That the establishment of an organisation, similar to the catalyst, be supported, to use corporate sponsorship to promote women’s success in business and representation on corporate boards; and
- the Australian Government instructs its representatives at the ILO to resist to the utmost any dilution of the ILO conventions.

**Women and learning**

- the Council of Australian Governments be called on to resource women to develop a national vocational employment and training Action Plan for Women, setting goals and targets to be realised by the year 2000;
- State and Federal funding be directed to providing professional development for teachers in order to assist them in the issues of domestic violence in schools, and to develop strategies aimed at boys and girls which assist in developing conflict resolution skills; and
- women be resourced through subsidised government programmes to read and write in their own language or the language of their choice; formulate and implement international and indigenous programmes on reading and literacy; and the National Statement on English be amended to ensure that 50 per cent of authors studied be women.

**Women’s rights and human rights**

- that the indigenous peoples of the world and their struggle to survive, to maintain their culture, and to achieve political, social, economic and spiritual rights be honoured;
- the UN Conference on Women be informed of the following:
  - that government representatives be women and the UN be more representative;
  - that they use the platform to insist that the documents of the conference include the aim of universal and complete disarmament; and
  - that rape in war be designated unequivocally a punishable war crime;
- Australia’s Defence and Foreign Affairs goals be increasingly framed in terms of peace and international peacekeeping rather than military security;
- women be increasingly involved in both national and international peacekeeping initiatives;
• Aboriginal women be supported through government policy to be more politically empowered, and funds be available for the inclusion of Aboriginal women to all conferences at both national and international levels;
• prostitution be decriminalised;
• exemptions for religious groups from the provision of the sexual discrimination legislation be removed; and
• recognise that women with disabilities experience violation of human rights on the basis of their gender and disability in all areas of life such that:
  - disability issues are affirmed as women's issues, and are to be raised at the Beijing Conference; and
  - women with disabilities should be provided with opportunities and funding to enable them to participate in the lead up to Beijing and at the Conference itself.

Suzette Mitchell, WID Adviser, Australian Council for Overseas Aid

Seventh national conference of the Australian Population Association

Canberra, 21-23 September 1994

The theme of the conference was 'Australia's population: Towards the 21st century'. About 250 population experts and students met in Canberra for this conference during the National Capital's annual Spring celebration, Floriade.

A major plenary session on the opening day of the Australian Population Association (APA) conference was devoted to the Cairo meeting, with several speakers (Professor Jack Caldwell from ANU and Dr Helen Ware from AIDAB) having just returned from it. Their reports to the APA did not centre on those aspects of Cairo which had captured the main attention of the media (the abortion debate and the alliance of the Roman Catholic Church and fundamentalist Muslim delegations). They noted that the 1994 conference had moved on from the family planning and economic development orientations of the earlier (1974 and 1984) meetings, and focused more on ecological and social issues (environment, empowerment of women) and on the importance of human rights and increased NGO participation. The bottom line was still money, however, with an estimated annual US$17 billion needed for the implementation of the revised Plan of Action (to cover the next 10 years) in order to keep world population growth down to a 'manageable' level. An interesting new issue mentioned was the right of populations in countries threatened by greenhouse-induced environmental catastrophes (i.e., rising sea level) to settle in other countries.

Professor Caldwell also presented the APA's Borrie Lecture during the conference. He chose for his topic 'The strengths and limitations of demography and the works of W.D. Borrie'. He noted that despite the best efforts of pioneers in the field, like Professor Borrie (the first professor of demography at the ANU and indeed in the world), the discipline of demography is still associated in official and popular thinking with family planning and population limitation efforts and with doomsday scenarios. In reality, demography is more akin to the 19th century positivist school, with its emphasis on factual positions rather than speculative ones, and its use and scepticism of empirical data. He described the contemporary literature on the environment, pollution and carrying capacity as belonging to the tradition of the 19th century romantic movement, with its anti-urban biases.

These views were carried into the closing plenary session on population and environment, where Caldwell questioned the use by two of the speakers of the now familiar I = PAT formula for describing the impact (I) of human activity on the environment as being a function (multiplicative) of population (P), per capita consumption (A for affluence), and pollution per unit of production (T for technology). Caldwell noted that 'I' would nearly always be positive, but that earlier, more complex formulations (such as the ones developed in The Limits to Growth in the 1970s), despite their scenarios of disaster by 1994, were more illuminating.

Several sessions were devoted to population issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Three demographers at the ANU gave papers in the 'Views from Asia' session. The potential for using small towns as magnets for internal migrants in Nepal to avoid the problems of rapid growth in the larger cities was discussed by Dr Bishna Bajracharya. Mr Li Wei, (visiting from Peking University), presented his research on the changing employment structure in the Liaoning region of China, where employment in agriculture is increasing apparently at the expense of employment in the industrial sector. The population policies of Mongolia were examined by Dr Ricardo Neupert, who discussed the difficulties facing the country in adjusting the former pronatalist measures to the new market-oriented economic system.

Migration issues in developing countries were the focus of another session. Dr Philip Guest from Mahidol University, Thailand, analysed the influence of migration in delaying age at marriage in Thailand. The other two papers looked at international migration, one by Dr Jean Louis Rallu, the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris, on the continuing migration of Pacific Islanders to the more developed countries of the Pacific rim, and another by Mr Ghulam Arif, a PhD student at the ANU, on the history and changing nature of international contract labour migration. Four other PhD students from the ANU and University of Adelaide also made presentations in a lively panel discussion of fieldwork experiences in developing countries.

Paul Meyer, National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University
Pacific Islands Population Association planning workshop

Nabua, Fiji, 6-8 June 1994

The meeting was jointly organised by the South Pacific Commission and the University of Papua New Guinea. A small group of participants was selected from the major organisations engaged in population research, teaching and technical assistance in the region.

Discussions focused on the present status of technical collaboration and cooperation between technical personnel involved in population programmes in the Pacific Islands. The haste with which new programmes were being introduced and developed raised concerns about whether sufficient attention and support were being given to substantive demographic issues affecting the region. Problems identified included:

- the specialised nature of specific mandates and individual expertise;
- the isolation of technical personnel in programmes consisting of only one expert;
- the inefficiencies associated with technical assistance and applied research; and
- the potential for duplication and overlap of activities as the number of agencies in the population field increases.

The need for a mechanism by which population specialists might collaborate to improve the quality and relevance of technical assistance available to governments and non-government organisations was acknowledged by all participants and there was strong support for the concept of a Pacific Islands Population Association. The potential benefits of such an association include:

- better technical support and backstopping;
- more efficient use of resources;
- collaboration and complementarity in teaching, training and research;
- greater efficiency and improved quality of technical assistance;
- promotion and publication of research;
- local capacity-building through the support and encouragement of Pacific Islanders in the population field;
- advancement of informed discussion of population issues in the public arena; and
- improvements of links between pure and applied research.

The workshop also had a session devoted to key population issues in the Pacific Islands. The focus of the presentations in this session varied from substantive issues of demographic change through to issues concerning the role of population scientists in research, technical assistance and policy formulation. Several speakers identified shortcomings in the regional database and noted that policy formulation was taking place in the absence of up-to-date statistics on the demographic situation in the region. The need to pay more attention to analysis and interpretation of existing data sets was emphasised. Some of the problems associated with interpretation of statistics where the base populations are small were highlighted. The workshop noted that policy makers and advisers need to be sensitive to statistical fluctuation as well as to conceptual problems associated with definitions drawn from the analysis of very large populations. The need for greater efforts at local capacity building for demographic data collection and analysis was also stressed.

South Pacific Commission, 1994

October 1994
Conference calendar

International year of the family: National conference

Adelaide, 20-23 November 1994

This national conference is planned as a culmination for the International Year of the Family. The theme of the conference is 'Australian families: The next ten years'. It will provide an opportunity for issues central to family policies and services to be considered by a wide cross-section of Australians.

For more information contact:
Elisabeth Eaton
Festival City Conventions
PO Box 986
Kent Town, SA 5071
Australia
Tel (08) 3631307
Fax (08) 3631604

Economic liberalisation in South Asia

Canberra, 30 November - 2 December 1994

This three day international conference is being presented by the Australia South Asia Research Centre (ASARC). All South Asian countries are now involved in the process of economic liberalisation. But, knowledge of the nature and extent of reforms and liberalisation in the five major South Asian countries is fragmentary and incomplete. The conference is a first step by ASARC towards building a comprehensive knowledge of the on-going reform process throughout the region. It will also assist in guiding the Centre's planned research programme.

For more information contact:
Dr Ric Shand/Carolyn Sweeney
Australia South Asia Research Centre
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 0200
Tel (06) 2494482
Fax (06) 2493700

AURISA '94

Sydney, 21-25 November 1994

The theme of the 22nd annual international conference and technical exposition of the Australasian Urban and Regional Information Systems' Association is 'Information systems ... the bottom line'. The conference will focus upon identification and discussion of benefits and costs of information systems in today's technologically rich, but information poor environment.

For more information contact:
AURISA '94
c/- Australian Convention and Travel Services
GPO Box 2200
Canberra, ACT 2600
Australia
Tel (06) 2573299
Fax (06) 2573256

Global change and the British Commonwealth

Hong Kong, 1-3 December 1994

The Commonwealth Geographical Bureau is planning a Silver Jubilee Symposium to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its founding under the theme of 'Global change and the British Commonwealth'. It has four sub-themes, namely, physical change, technological change, economic change and sociocultural change, to enable a wide range of countries and geographers to participate. The conference will be held in collaboration with the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies and the Department of Geography of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

For more information contact:
Prof Yue-man Yeung
Department of Geography
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, NT
Hong Kong

Educating all the family

Melbourne, 4-7 December 1994

This conference is sponsored by the Australian and New Zealand Comparative and International Education Society. The conference will focus on comparative and international perspectives on gender and equity, post-compulsory schooling, pre-school education and education for immigrant and refugee families.

For more information contact:
Mike Read
Dept. of Social and Educational Studies
The University of Melbourne
Institute of Education
Parkville, VIC 3052
Australia
Tel (03) 3448693
Fax (03) 3473916

International Association for Community Development

Cotonou, Benin, 5-9 December 1994

The theme of this conference is 'Contribution of community action to sustainable development and democracy'.

For more information contact:
International Association for Community Development
179 Rue de Debarcadere
B-6001 Marcinelle
Belgium

Ecotex 94

Canberra, 7 - 9 December 1994

The Environment Technology Exchange - ECOTEX - is a conference and expo initiative of the ACT Government and...
is supported by the Federal Government and industry. The three day conference will focus on issues of sustainable environments (coastal zone, land resources, cleaner water); ensuring sustainable lifestyles (healthy cities, environmental quality, waste minimisation); and supporting a sustainable future (local level finance, tools, preparation, awareness/education).

For more information contact:
ECOTEX 94
PO Box 3683
Weston Creek
Canberra, ACT 2611
Australia
Tel (06) 2871937 / 2411975

Disasters, environment and development

Delhi, 9-12 December 1994

This conference is being convened by the International Geographical Union’s study group on Development Issues in Marginal Regions. Themes for the conference include: Monitoring and prediction through remote sensing and GIS; land use systems and changes, geomorphological response consequence for global change; and teaching about disasters, environment and development.

For more information contact:
Dr R.B. Singh (Convenor)
Department of Geography
Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi
Delhi 110007
India
Tel (91-11) 7257725 ext. 215

The culture/sex/economies

Melbourne, 16-18 December, 1994

This conference is sponsored by the Australian Feminist Law Foundation Inc., and Women’s Studies Program of La Trobe University. This is an interdisciplinary conference on the cultural forms of producing economic order, value and sexed identity.

For more information contact:
Judith Grbich
Women’s Studies Program
School of Law and Legal Studies
La Trobe University
Bundoora, VIC 3083
Australia
or
Glenis Massey
Conference secretary
Tel (03) 479 2284

International development conference

Washington, DC, USA, 16-18 January 1995

The theme of this conference is ‘Global human security’.

For more information contact:
Kathy Morell
International Development Conference
1401 New York Ave., Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005-2160
USA
Tel (1-202) 6383111

17th annual Pacific telecommunications conference

Honolulu, 22-26 January 1995

The theme of the conference is ‘Convergence: Closing the gap’. The conference will explore many of the critical technological, economic, and policy questions facing the users and providers of telecommunications throughout the Pacific and around the world.

For more information contact:
Pacific Telecommunications Council
2454 South Beretania Street, Suite 302
Honolulu, Hawaii 96826-1596
USA
Tel (1-808) 9413789
Fax (1-808) 9444874

Towards Beijing, women, environment and development in the Asian and Pacific regions

Melbourne, 9-11 February 1995

This conference hosted by the Victoria University of Technology’s Department of Social & Cultural studies and Centre for Asia Pacific Studies will provide an opportunity for Australian women to participate in discussion of the major issues facing women throughout the Asian and Pacific regions and to plan for workshops at the 4th Non Governmental Forum at the 4th World Conference on Women to be held in Beijing in September 1995. Keynote speakers from Asia will introduce topics such as population, biodiversity, violence against women, objectification of women, religious fundamentalism, and how they affect the empowerment of women. Strategies for empowering women through the international legal system, educational and women’s views on international trade and arms race will also be on the agenda in a variety of workshops.
World summit for social development

**Copenhagen, 6-12 March 1995**

This World Summit is being convened by the United Nations and will bring together Heads of State or Government to define social development and human security priorities and to agree to action at national and international levels. The summit will address three core issues: reduction and elimination of widespread poverty; productive employment and the reduction of unemployment; and social integration.

For more information contact:
Secretariat of the World Summit for Social Development
DPCSD, Room DC2-1370, United Nations
New York, NY 10017
USA
Fax (1-212) 9633062

The international women and environment conference

**Melbourne, 24-26 March 1994**

The conference is being organised by the Australian Conservation Foundation and funded by the Office of the Status of Women, Canberra, as a contribution to the women's conference in Beijing in September 1995. The conference will focus on key environmental issues for the 21st century and will encourage interaction between environmental professionals and community activists.

For more information contact:
Ms Gabrielle D Gelly
Australian Conservation Foundation
340 Gore Street
Fitzroy, VIC 3065
Australia
Tel (03) 4161166
Fax (03) 4160767

The second international conference on language in development

**Bali, Indonesia, 10-12 April 1995**

The theme of the conference is 'Language and communication in development: Stakeholder's perspectives'. The conference aims at broadening and strengthening a network of practitioners and researchers involved with language and communication issues in development, providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and dissemination of information on the effective design, implementation and evaluation of language training components within development activities; and enabling stakeholders in development to discuss their views on the roles played by language and communication in development.

For more information contact:
Professor Christopher Candlin
Executive Director
NCELTR
Macquarie University
North Ryde, NSW 2109
Australia
Fax (02) 8507849

Southeast Asia conference on geomorphology

**Singapore, 18-23 June 1995**

This conference is organised jointly by the National University of Singapore and the Nanyang Technological University. Papers on any topic in geomorphology may be presented. However, papers on environmental themes and those based on low latitude regions are especially welcome.

For more information contact:
Avijit Gupta
Department of Geography
National University of Singapore
Singapore 0511
Fax (65) 7773091

AWRA annual summer symposium

**Honolulu, 25-28 June 1995**

The theme of the American Water Resources Association's symposium is 'Water resources and environmental hazards: Emphasis on hydrologic and cultural insight in the Pacific rim'. Deadline for abstracts is 28 October, 1994.

For more information contact:
A. Ivan Johnson
7474 Upham Court
Arvada, CO 80003
USA
Tel (1-303) 4255610
or
Michael C. Fink
American Water Resources Association
5410 Grosvenor Lane, Suite 220
Bethesda, MD 20814-2192
USA
Tel (1-301) 4938600
Fax (1-301) 4935844
Resources, development and politics in the Pacific Islands


As a collection of writings on Pacific issues, this book provides a succinct overview on resources, development and politics in the Pacific. Drawn from a wide background of work experiences and intellectual pursuits of government officials, consultants and scholars in the different fields, it successfully bridges the gap between theory and practice. The portrayal of political, economic and sociocultural issues as reflected in the various studies and conceptual discussions, reinforce the notion that a good grasp of critical issues in development entails understanding the linkages between the different dimensions.

The layout of the book in the form of a 20 chapter outline, provides an easy guide for the reader, as it integrates the past, present and future trends in a fairly comprehensible form. For those who are not aware of developmental issues relating to the Pacific, this book is bound to trigger an interest in trends and concerns in development of these island societies. On the other hand, for those of us who claim to be knowledgeable, this collection provides an innovative perspective to the on-going debate on development in the region.

The introductory chapter by editors Henningham and May is an excellent summary of the different perspectives contained in the book. It would seem that if one of the aims of getting this book out was to provide a readable piece of writing to both scholars and officials, then this readily available precis in the first chapter lays down the basis for doing just that.

Although it has been stated at the outset that this collection does not attempt to be a comprehensive one, the insights of the various studies in the areas of mining, forestry and fisheries have contributed significantly to the development of a holistic framework for understanding social change in the Pacific. The focus therefore, on the main extractive industries of the region has somehow touched upon the very core of island existence. In societies where things of the earth, sky and sea form the essence of one's being - and the rituals of the Pacific region reflect this very symbolism - it is not difficult to understand the processes of dislocation that have and continue to take place.

The influx of foreigners into the Pacific, their technologies, their values and norms, their motives, their bonding...
mechanisms in host communities, their modes of operation, and their forms of governance have all impacted on these island communities. Highlighting these issues help in understanding the emergence of contemporary scenarios in Melanesia. Studies on mining by Nelson, Connell, MacPherson, Henningham and Jackson indicate that mining in Melanesia has had its fair share of problems. Although mining is identified as an economically viable industry, the political and social dysfunctions that emerged in due process in Bougainville and Kutubu in Papua New Guinea, and in nickel mining in New Caledonia, have provided some hard-earned lessons of what to do and what to avoid in interventionist measures of resource development.

Forestry and fisheries like mining are often centrally planned and managed, and as the studies in all these sectors have shown, the interests of the different stakeholders to a large extent determines the direction and pace of such development. As one plies through the studies given, it becomes quite obvious that the politics of survival through resource control and distribution is not entirely foreign to island communities, and all the writers allude to this in one form or another. An additional highlight of these studies is the recognition given to the notion that the process of sustainability only becomes viable when the beneficiaries of development maintain their key or core positions in their highly interdependent social systems. It seems logical therefore that once these core roles become marginalised without proper substitutes, the development process becomes disruptive and detrimental.

The contributions of Barnett, Taylor, Deklin, O'Collins, Qalo, Waugh and Rodwell indicate that in the attempts to develop resources, there is a continuous process of restructuring, deconstructing and reconstruction of implementing agencies, strategies and policies, institutions, social groupings, norms and values, legal frameworks, administrative practices and so on. The environmental concerns highlighted by Wendt focus on the context in which all this takes place, and of the growing awareness of the damage that development has had on the Pacific environment.

The indigenous question in the context of Australia and New Zealand provides comparative insights into the similarities of issues experienced by their Pacific Island neighbours, namely land rights and resource management. The insights provided by Mahuta, Altman and Williams indicate that the constant debate surrounding the recognition and support for the needs of the Maoris and Aborigines reflect the continuing dilemmas experienced in the dialogue surrounding the benefits of development.

The last three chapters in the book provide general frameworks through which the politics of resource development and management can be conceptualised. The multidisciplinary arguments which surround development concerns indicate that there is no ready made answer to all the issues raised throughout the earlier discussions. As Lal points out, humanising development will require Pacific leaders to take on hard decisions that in the long-term would be more conducive to better management of future resources of the region.

In conclusion, the book has managed to draw attention to the development debate in both the Pacific and Australasian countries and has indeed opened the doors for a continuing assessment of the whole process of resource development. Although there is no model for ensuring that resource utilisation matches the needs of the host community, the studies in this book have posed interesting questions that will continue to be a challenge to anyone interested in development in the Pacific Islands.

Eci K. Nabalarua, National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University

Sustainable development of small island economies


I picked up this book with eager anticipation - a topic seemingly dear to my heart, and an alluring title besides. What could be more relevant at exactly the time that Australian government policy was firmly encouraging small Pacific Island states to achieve more self-reliant forms of development? Sadly this book is far from the answer. Not only does it ignore many relevant texts that have preceded it, perhaps most obviously McKee and Tisdell's *Development issues in small island economies* (Prager 1990) but there is no discussion of what sustainable development is or might be (and only a trivial discussion of the competing 'rent seeking model'). What is even more extraordinary, and this is not even hinted in the sub-title, is that all the case studies are of places where any notion of sustainable development no longer even generates rhetoric, let alone provide genuine prospects for alternate strategies. The case studies are of Northern Marianas (especially Saipan), Hawaii, the Ryukyu Islands and Singapore. That they have much to do with models for self-reliance is improbable, and this book certainly does not show that they do.

The book contains eight chapters on various economic issues of some significance in the island Pacific, including Papua New Guinea. Only Singapore takes the book beyond the Pacific, though this too is never indicated. The first three chapters are overviews of general development problems, trade and diversification, and aid and self-reliant development. The other five constitute the case studies. All eight chapters were originally published elsewhere, mainly in relatively obscure places where they should have been allowed to remain. The introduction, perhaps wisely titled 'A genealogy of self-reliant development', has no reference more recent than 1983 (and a few from later than the 1970s). No wonder that the word 'sustainable' appears just once other
than on the cover and title page. Perhaps even more surprisingly Kakazu manages to advocate both greater self-reliance and economic integration.

There is nothing in the first three chapters that will surprise those familiar with the literature on development issues in the island Pacific; they are largely a litany of familiar problems and themes, overwhelmingly economic, rather than social, cultural, political or administrative. The discussion of rent seeking is mildly interesting (but lacks any knowledge of the now considerable literature on MIRAB). The specific chapters on tourism and diversification in the Marianas, water conservation in Saipan, agriculture in Hawaii and economic changes in Ryukyus are at least relatively novel, though the conclusions are largely predictable and banal. This is even more true of the chapter on industrialisation in Singapore.

There is an opportunity wasted, and sadly, a good book title lost and gone forever. Perhaps it was too much to expect from the self-proclaimed author of 'one of the best accounts on the economy of Ryukyu Islands'. It is hard to see who the book was aimed at, why it was published or who will read it. At least I received a review copy and was not lured into buying it.

John Connell, Geography, University of Sydney

**Views from interviews: The changing role of women in Papua New Guinea**


Recent debates within the social sciences stresses the problems of writing about the lives of women in countries that were former colonies. This book sidesteps the issue of post-colonial correctness and avoids difficult debates about the representation of others by simply presenting material from interviews. Where it raises contentious views about the rights of women in Papua New Guinea, these are the observations of Papua New Guinean women, not judgements of the author.

The women interviewed are by any standards outstandingly successful. Dr Naomi Martin is Head of the Commission for Higher Education; Nora Vagi Brash is a poet and playwright; Margaret Taylor is her country’s Ambassador to the USA; Rose Muingepe is Chairperson of the Papua New Guinea Council of Churches; and Rose Kekedo is the Controller of Personnel for the large private company, Steamships. In a country renowned for its cultural diversity, the force of a single cultural tradition is manifest in the personal achievements of all these women - that tradition is Christianity. Each of the women stresses the role of Christianity in her education and the formulation of her world view. The women also share a humanistic understanding of globalisation and the rights of all citizens. The confidence with which they voice their hopes for the future, and the generosity of spirit that each derives from her religious faith, provides an interesting counterpoint to generalising arguments about the silence of Third World women and the destructive influences of missions introduced by colonisers.

These women’s shared experiences of religious education, university studies outside Papua New Guinea and the rather strange mixture of extraordinary opportunity (mainly due to the small number of highly educated Papua New Guineans at the time of independence) and structural disadvantage makes their success in a number of different professional fields at once comprehensible and astonishing. While it is depressing to think that at present female parliamentary representation is virtually non existent, this collection of interviews reassures us that there is at least a ‘tradition’ of gifted, intelligent and successful women whose vision of the future for their nation is asserted outside and beyond the confines of parliament.

Martha Macintyre, Anthropology, University of Melbourne

**Peasants versus city-dwellers: Taxation and the burden of economic development**


The achievement of sustained growth in real incomes raises difficult tradeoffs between various individually desirable objectives, particularly in LDCs in which current income levels are so low. Unless sources of inefficiency can be identified and corrected, the diversion of resources towards investment for the benefit of future generations must be at the expense of members of the current generation, who are represented in this book by the inhabitants of the rural sector, the peasantry, and those of the urban sector, the urban proletariat. As the authors point out, it is easy to think of historical episodes that contain such conflicts at their heart, for example, the Corn Laws in Britain in the early nineteenth century, and the debates over industrialisation in the early days of post-revolutionary Russia.

Although economists have long taken an interest in such matters, the standard framework within which their debates have taken place has, until recent years, been limited in a number of ways that greatly reduce the relevance of the resulting analysis. For example, there was for a long time a tradition of dealing with efficiency and distributional issues separately. This allowed economists to advocate policies that produced Pareto efficient outcomes - such as, policies of free trade - regardless of their distributional implications, on the grounds that one could separately fix distribution with some other set of policy instruments. Such advocacy has not always endeared economists to students of economic development and its problems.

A major achievement of economics during the last 25 years has been the development of a framework that goes some
way towards overcoming some of these limitations. Joseph Stiglitz, besides maintaining a long interest in development economics, has been a significant contributor towards this development. This book is an attempt to analyse the conflicts between the three groups mentioned above, the current generation of rural peasants, the urban proletariat and future generations. The last are not modelled explicitly, but their interests are represented through the level of tax revenue, the assumption being that increments of revenue can be devoted to investment that yields future benefits. In particular, the analysis seeks to evaluate the various types of tax/subsidy policies that might be, or have been, employed in the course of attempts to promote investment activities in LDCs. There is little quantitative information in the book. Rather, the objective is to construct a series of simple formal models that are consistent with some of the 'stylised facts' of LDCs in order to investigate the consequences of tax/subsidy policies.

The formal analysis begins in Chapter Four, and it is worth spending a moment summarising the model of this chapter. There are two sectors, rural and urban. Each produces one good - these are, respectively, food and an industrial good. The latter can be used for consumption or for investment. Two notable simplifying assumptions mark this model. First, both goods can be traded on world markets at a given price. The world price of food relative to the industrial good is \( P \). The small open economy assumption greatly simplifies matters by avoiding the need to determine \( P \) within the model. A second assumption concerns the determination of the price faced by each of the domestic sectors. The surplus of rural output over rural consumption is sold either to the urban sector or abroad. It is assumed that, through its tax/subsidy policies, the government can confront rural and urban sectors with different relative prices, respectively \( p^r \) and \( p^u \). On the one hand, rural food producers receive the international price of food less the tax imposed on their food surplus. By itself, this does not affect urban dwellers, who can buy food at world prices. Such a tax reduces rural welfare, but raises revenue equal to the tax level times the quantity of rural surplus. On the other hand, the government can tax food purchases in the urban sector, thereby reducing urban welfare while gaining revenue equal to the tax level times the quantity purchased.

Clearly, to determine the consequences of changes in the two taxes requires us to work through the responses of the tax bases - the level of the rural surplus and the level of urban demand for food. This the authors do, and they identify conditions that, if satisfied by appropriate demand and supply responses, would enable existing tax rates to be changed so as to produce a Pareto improvement. For example, a reduction in the tax on the rural food surplus neither hurts nor helps the urban sector. It certainly helps the rural producers, who face a better price for their product. It is therefore Pareto-improving if it also generates a 'sufficiently large' increase in the rural surplus, so that the total tax revenue, and therefore investible surplus, are increased. The condition for this to be so is easily stated using the price elasticity of rural surplus. In addition to Pareto improving price reforms, they also consider welfare-enhancing price reforms.

In Chapter Five, the authors drop the assumption that the government can maintain different prices in the urban and rural sectors. After all, if the economy is sufficiently integrated, and if it is not too costly to trade between the two sectors, the presence of large price differences would be difficult to maintain, since one would expect a market to grow up to arbitrage the price difference away. If \( p^u > p^r \), then farmers would have an incentive to sell direct to the urban sector, evading the tax collector, and if \( p^u < p^r \), then they would have an incentive to buy food from the urban market and resell it back to the government. If, indeed, we suppose that no price difference is sustainable, this reduces the set of policy instruments available to the government, since the tax must be such that \( p^u = p^r \). Again, the authors consider both Pareto improving and, more generally, social welfare improving tax changes.

Chapter Six considers the closed economy, in which domestic market clearing conditions determine the equilibrium prices. In this chapter the authors assume that the urban wage, hitherto treated as fixed, can be controlled by the government. Other equilibrating mechanisms are also considered. Whatever the precise mechanism, the analysis shows clearly that, in this context, the government cannot simply change one price - the domestic price of food relative to the industrial good - without there having to be changes in other variables, such as the urban wage, that are relevant in assessing the overall distributional and welfare consequences.

The authors use the results of their analysis in Chapter Seven, where they revisit some of the old debates by Preobazhensky and others concerning the Soviet industrialisation process. Their analysis supports what they call Preobazhensky's first proposition, that the state can increase capital accumulation by moving the terms of trade against the peasants. However, it does not support the further proposition, that by so influencing the terms of trade the state can accumulate without hurting the industrial proletariat. On the contrary, once the necessary equilibrating consequences are taken into account, a price squeeze must hurt the proletariat just as it hurts the peasantry. Their dissection of this debate is a good example of the helpful role of formal models in tracing through the complex relationships that characterise all but the very simplest models.

In Parts III and IV of the book, the authors take a more detailed look at the rural and urban sectors. Their analysis of the rural sector incorporates such institutions as sharecropping and plantations, and examines the implications of rigidities that lead to unemployment. They also examine disaggregated models in which the structure of taxes on different goods can be discussed. The treatment of the urban sector addresses the issues of rural-urban migration, the
possible link between the level of the urban wage on the one hand and the productivity of labour on the other, and also considers optimal tax structures.

In order to fully appreciate the authors' analysis, the reader will require a good training in the modern style of formal modelling in the optimising tradition. The analysis is very much in the tradition of the optimal taxation literature. Although some analysis is tucked away in appendices, there is no avoiding algebra within the main body of the chapters themselves. As already indicated, the exercise is one of formal model-building. However, the issues are important ones, and it is difficult to see how to make much progress in understanding the possible outcomes without the help of this kind of analysis. The discussion of the Soviet industrialisation debates in Part II is not hard to follow and is a good example of the value of such models as an aid to clear thinking. The sceptical reader might be advised to sample this analysis before deciding whether to plunge into the more intricate analysis of Parts II and IV. Throughout, the authors take pains to justify their assumptions and to express their conclusions in a straightforward way. Close acquaintance with the technicalities is not, therefore, necessary in order to derive benefit from the book.

In summary, even for those who find the formal analysis forbidding, and who are sceptical of this tradition of modelling, there is important material here on the problems of taxation and investment in LDCs. It should at least be skimmed by readers with a general interest in taxation and development, and a closer study of the formal analysis would provide useful ideas for further theoretical and empirical research.

Richard Cornes, Federalism Research Centre, Australian National University
New books

Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism

K. Hewison, R. Robison and G. Rodan (eds) 1993, Allen and Unwin, 249pp., A$22.95

The book takes as its starting point the rapid pace of social, economic and political change in the region. More specifically, the concern is to address the political dynamics which have produced trends towards ‘democratisation’ or ‘liberalisation’. In approaching these concerns the editors provide a survey of the major theoretical approaches to the study of political power in industrialising capitalist societies, especially in relation to the nature of democratic development.

Feeding and greening the world: The role of international agricultural research


Will overpopulation, global poverty, widespread hunger and environmental degradation lead to the collapse of human civilisation? This book provides a dispassionate analysis of the state of these problems in the world. Avoiding hyperbole and without minimising the dangers, it explains why the future should be faced with confidence. Progress in managing the world’s resources in ways that are sustainable - environmentally, economically, socially and nutritionally - is too slow because knowledge is too limited. The increased knowledge that is urgently needed can only come from a global network of agriculture research. Yet governments in both the North and South are starving research of the resources it must have. The author argues his case in a jargon-free way that will appeal to a wide range of readers concerned with the future of humankind.

The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia


The book provides a set of case studies on Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. Through these, the author seeks to show that by looking at the particular character of the state in each case, a more satisfactory basis for exploring development and political manifestations of ethnic consciousness in relation to the power structure can be attained. In addition, this focus offers an explanation of ethnic behaviour on political stability, ranging from the enduring violence of Burma’s ethnically-driven rebellions to the ‘polite expressions of ethnic concern in Singapore’s press’.

Communities, education and sustainable development

Meg Keen (ed) 1994, ISBN 0 86740 429 9, 110pp., A$25.00

The aims of this book are to broaden our understanding of sustainable development and present a number of possible ways to resolve the sustainability dilemma. The papers have been written by authors from varied backgrounds, including Thai and Australian activists, philosophers, community workers and academics. It will provide the educator and the practitioner with some practical insights into the implications of pursuing sustainable development in a diverse world.

At risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters


This book reasserts the significance of the human factor in disasters and establishing that the social, political and economic environment is as much a cause of disasters as the natural environment. The book draws practical and policy conclusions with a view to disaster reduction and promotion of a safer environment.

From heaven to earth: Images and experiences of development in China

Elisabeth Croll 1993, Routledge, ISBN 0415 101 875, A$38.95

Information on events, processes and structures are combined into a comprehensive introduction to the study of reform in rural China. The author draws on her extensive research and frequent visits to China, and on her first-hand studies of villages in many different regions, to look behind the simplistic notion of ‘reform’ as merely a ‘return to capitalism’.

The changing geography of Asia


This book presents a systematic review of 25 years of development, covering the physical, economic, social and political environments of contemporary Asia.

Aboriginal autonomy: Issues and strategies


After more than two hundred years, one of the most important moral issues facing Australian society since the 1990s remains the need for reconciliation with its indigenous people. In this selection of essays, the author reflects on the nature of Aboriginal identity and the importance of autonomy for Australia’s Aboriginal people.

Health and development

David Phillips and Yola Verhasselt (eds) 1993, Routledge, ISBN 0415 085 292, A$44.95

A broad and detailed description of the multifaceted aspects of health and
development across the globe are presented in this book. Always alive to both the global and local implications, the authors focus in particular on the critical issues surrounding environmental impact, the interaction of poverty and health, sociocultural factors in HIV/AIDS transmission, the use of traditional and community health resources and women's health.

Children's lifeworlds: Gender, welfare and labour in the developing world

Olga Nieuwenhuys 1993, Routledge, ISBN 0415 097 517, A$44.95

Nieuwenhuys examines how working children face the challenge of having to combine work with school. Moving beyond the usual concern with child labour and welfare to a critical assessment of the daily work routine of children, this book questions how class and kinship, gender and household organisation, state ideology and education influence and conceal the lives of children in developing countries.

Social dimensions of development


This book reflects the new goals and directions of development policy and practice in Australia and overseas looking towards the next century. It raises issues which bear strongly on the upcoming United Nation's World Summit for Social Development in March 1995.

Feminist theory and international relations in a postmodern era


This book argues that the identities and activities commonly associated with women have been eliminated from the theories formulated about international relations. The author points out that these theories often rely on the hidden activities of women and their assigned tasks in life to establish a sphere of politics that is for men only. Using case studies of Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp in the UK, and of Zimbabwean women's efforts to secure international funding for producer cooperatives, the book explores the possibility of undermining the masculine identity of the politics of international relations.

Introduction to sustainable development

Jennifer Elliot 1994, Routledge, 124pp, A$21.95

With world population, resources, economics and the global environment inextricably linked, this introductory text examines the complex challenges presented by the goal of sustainable development at the local and international level.

New protectionism

Tim Lang and Colin Hines 1993, Earthscan, A$32.00

The authors argue that free trade serves only a narrow range of established interests, and challenge the established view that further trade liberalisation will benefit everyone and lead to greater social and economic harmony. Instead they advocate greater regional self-sufficiency and environmental protection instead of more unfettered global growth and expansion.

The rape of the innocent

Ron O'Grady 1994, ESPAT, ISBN 0 9597971 2 2, A$12.50

There is worldwide concern at the escalation in numbers of children in prostitution. In Asia, more than a million children live each day in this modern form of slavery. Why is this medieval practice still flourishing? How widespread is it among the tourists? What is being done to stop it? These are some of the questions considered in this book by the coordinator of the international campaign to end the practice of child prostitution.

Third Revolution

Paul Harrison 1993, Penguin, 380pp, A$16.95

Population growth, rising consumption and damaging technologies have combined to create the biggest environmental crisis in human history. Just as crisis spurred the agricultural and industrial revolutions, it may now speed the 'third' revolution - the transition to sustainable development.

World without end

David Pearce and Jeremy Warford 1993, Oxford University Press, 440pp, A$55.00

This comprehensive volume is the outcome of several years of research and fieldwork connected with environmental economics in the developing world. The authors make extensive use of the background papers and research methods employed by the World Bank, and also review a wealth of literature on this subject.

Road from Rio

Michael McCoy and Patrick McCully 1993, International Books, 112pp, A$27.95

This book provides information on what was agreed and disagreed at the Earth Summit and why. Which international business and governments are making the crucial decisions today? What strategies should the non governmental organisations now be adopting for environment and development?

Victims of development: Resistance and alternatives

Jeremy Seabrook 1993, Verso, ISBN 0 86091 611 1, A$39.95

This book looks at the connections between development, economic growth, social justice and the environment, not in theory, but as this tangle of relationships affects people in their daily lives. It is rooted in the experience and
struggles of people all over the world, in the Himalayas or on the islands of Malaysia, in the slums of Manila and Delhi or the tenements of Sao Paulo as well as the inner-city areas of Liverpool or the council estates of Cornwall. From all these places, the author brings vivid stories and images of unbearable suffering and unwavering resistance.

The moral economy of trade: Ethnicity and developing markets

Hans-Dieter Evers and Heiko Schrader (eds) 1994, ISBN 0 415 09290 6, 256pp., £40.00

This book investigates the agents of trade during the process of transformation from an indigenous rural subsistence economy into a cash crop producing market and a more or less integrated market system in Southeast Asia. Drawing on earlier anthropological and sociological studies of trade and markets in tribal and peasant societies, the contributors make use of a new perspective on traders and their relation to society. By looking at the situation from the viewpoint of the individual trader or group of traders they explore their action strategies and the dilemma they face; on the one hand, fulfilling a moral obligation to share proceeds with kinsfolk and neighbours and, on the other, realising profits and accumulating trading capital.

Urbanisation and the status of women


The results of surveys of approximately 300 females in the labour force, mostly migrants, conducted in Cebu, Colombo, Hat Yai and Ho Chi Minh City are presented. The summary chapter contains policy recommendations and suggestions for further research.

Technology and innovation in the international economy

Charles Cooper (ed) 1994, United Nations University Press, Tokyo

This book considers the implications of technological innovation on the international economy and in particular on the prospects for sustainable development in the Third World. To the developing country planner, new technologies can be both a menace and an opportunity. They may threaten low wage jobs in the country, but at the same time they also can offer a way to expand export trade (through, for instance, new loom techniques for traditional textiles).

In detailed essays on two key areas of technological innovation - microelectronics and biotechnology - the work examines their impact on production, trade, employment, and welfare in developing countries.

The uncertain quest: Science, technology, and development


New technologies - robotics, informatics, exotic new 'intelligent' materials, and the like - are reshaping the very fabric of the human endeavour. The record suggests the new theories, models, and creative approaches in the application of science and technology are long overdue. This sourcebook provides a scholarly assessment of the role of technological innovation in the development process, including a critical analysis of the social, economic, and political dimensions of the problem.

Newsletters and journals

Asian Studies Review

This is a journal of the Asian Studies Association of Australia. Published three times a year, it contains articles, book, film and video reviews, and information on conferences and seminars. The July 1993 issue focused on the issue of democracy in Asia with case studies from Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Japan and Korea.

For more information contact:
Dr John Fitzgerald
Treasurer, ASAA
Department of Politics
La Trobe University
Bundoora, VIC 3083
Australia

Agenda

Agenda is the quarterly journal of the Faculty of Economics and Commerce at the Australian National University. It promotes debate about all aspects of economic policy, including its social, legal, moral and philosophical foundations and implications. Agenda provides a medium through which researchers in the private and public sectors can contribute to the policy debate in Australia, New Zealand and beyond. As well as refereed full-length articles, Agenda contains shorter pieces on various topics, and reviews of books and government publications.

For more information contact:
The Managing Editor
Agenda
GPO Box 3265
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia
Tel (06) 2490385
Fax (06) 2495124
Development in Practice

This journal is a forum for NGOs, practitioners, policy makers, official aid agencies, and academics to exchange information and analysis concerning development and emergency relief work. As a multidisciplinary journal of policy and practice, it reflects a wide range of institutional and cultural backgrounds and a variety of professional experience.

Recent articles include: 'The role of Salvadorian NGOs in post-war reconstruction' (Alvarez and Martin); 'Research into local culture' (Anacleti); 'Population control in the New World Order' (Hartmann); 'A water program in Vietnam and its impact on women' (Hitchcox); 'Emergency relief programs for pastoral communities' (Kilby); 'NGOs and social change: Agents or facilitators' (Pearce); and more.

For more information contact:
Carfax Publishing Company
PO Box 25
Abingdon, Oxfordshire
OX14 3UE, United Kingdom
Tel (44-0) 235-521154
Fax (44-0) 235-553559

Pacific Viewpoint - Special Issue

The Volume 34(2) issue of Pacific Viewpoint focuses on 'Pacific village economies: Opportunity and livelihood in small communities'. Articles included are: 'The rhetoric and reality of change and development in small Pacific communities' (James); 'MIRAB' processes and development on small Pacific islands: a case study from the Southern Massim, Papua New Guinea' (Hayes); 'Between the forest and the big lagoon: the micro-economy of Kotu Island in the Kingdom of Tonga' (Perminow); 'Melanesian economy on the periphery: Migration and village economy in Choiseul' (Friesen); 'The Fiji connection: Migrant involvement in the economy of Rotuma' (Rensel); and 'The MIRAB transition in Fakaofo, Tokelau' (Hooper).

For more information contact:
Pacific Viewpoint
Information and Publications
Victoria University
PO Box 600
Wellington
New Zealand

Newsletter of the National Clearinghouse on Violence Against Women

This newsletter is published twice a year and gives information about the Clearinghouse materials as well as recent developments in what is happening around Australia on the issue of violence against women.

For more information contact:
Ingrid Wilson
National Clearinghouse on Violence Against Women
c/- Australian Institute of Criminology
GPO Box 2944
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia
Tel (06) 2740279
Fax (06) 2740201

Information Update

Information Update is a quarterly research-based journal which informs about South African business and economic issues, social and political trends, community events and matters in the daily news. It reports on both quantitative and qualitative research, and provides you with guidelines and recommendations on using this research. The journal monitors public opinion through regular opinion surveys, and supplies the reader with information about the attitudes and perceptions of all South Africans on a variety of topics.

Some of the regular features in each issue are: a consumer confidence index; a chronology update listing events in the news; a report on party political support; and a political stability scale.
everyone, in fact, who is working on Agenda 21. It is a valuable tool for decision makers, researchers, students, educators and practitioners - from local community projects to global conferences and workshops, ranging from facts and analyses, views and initiatives, organisations as well as government. The August 1994 issue included articles on: Australian funding to help train foresters in tropical timber production; how the media can be a catalyst for raising people's awareness of the challenge of tradition and change for the region; Pacific 2010; Australia's commitment to SPARTECA; and more.

For more information contact:
The Editor
Australia-South Pacific Newsletter
PO Box 214
Suva, Fiji

Focus on Gender: Perspectives on women and development

This new journal is published by Oxfam. It is the first regular periodical publication in Britain to focus specifically on gender and women's issues internationally and to explore the links between gender and development initiatives around the world. Focus on Gender is essential reading for all development practitioners and planners, offering articles based on the experience of Oxfam's project partners and non-governmental community development organisations.

Each issue has its own distinctive thematic focus. Past and forthcoming issues offer a gender perspective on environmental issues, conflict, emergencies, population and international linking. The journal features contributors - academics, practitioners and activists - with particular expertise in aspects of gender and development work. Theory, experience and insight from the South and North is gathered together to provide a forum for debate, with contributions from writers from developing countries providing a high proportion of the views offered in each issue.

For more information contact:
Carfax Publishing Company
PO Box 25
Abingdon, Oxfordshire
OX14 3UE, United Kingdom
Tel (44-0) 235-521154
Fax (44-0) 235-553559

Global Agenda

First published in 1978 as Third World Bulletin, this publication is a useful resource to learn more about aid and development issues. It provides a high level information service, with an increased focus on environmental issues and complex matters such as sustainable development and project evaluation. Each issue of Global Agenda provides abstracts of the most important articles found in the 200 journals subscribed to by the Ideas Centre, and articles can be ordered though this network.

For more information contact:
Oxfam
PO Box 25
Abingdon, Oxfordshire
OX14 3UE, United Kingdom
Tel (44-0) 235-521154
Fax (44-0) 235-553559
CAETA Newsletter

The Commonwealth Association for the Education and Training of Adults (CAETA) is one of over 30 Commonwealth Professional Associations and NGOs supported by the Commonwealth Foundation, part of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. It seeks to enhance the competence and professional understanding of its members by means of a quarterly newsletter, regional workshops, study visits and exchanges, participation in Commonwealth meetings as observers and the occasional Assembly. Recent issues have covered topics such as health education, popular education, peoples theatre and other innovative approaches to adult education being used throughout the Commonwealth of Nations.

It is hoped that a South Pacific regional workshop will be organised for 1995.

For more information contact:
Dr Helen Hill and Robb Mason
CAETA Newsletter
GPO Box 302B
Melbourne, VIC 3001
Australia

Participation in Governance

This newsletter is published by the Society for Participatory Research in Asia. It is based on the observation that the concerns for participation and governance by citizens in shaping their own destiny have become paramount in today's context. The restructuring of nation-state and its system of global governance is opening up possible spheres for greater participation by citizens. More than ever before the opportunities for local self-governance and greater popular participation have to be seized through a determined, sustained and competent effort by the civil society itself.

For more information contact:
The Society for Participatory Research in Asia
42 Tughlakabad Institutional Area
New Delhi 1100622
India
Fax (91-11) 6471183

PHNFLASH

PHNFLASH is an electronic newsletter of the World Bank, concerned largely with population, health and nutrition issues. A recent newsletter included information on: a postdoctoral position in health informatics research training; a conference on health and communication in the Americas; and a table of social indicators of development.

For more information contact: owner-phnflash@tome.worldbank.org

October 1994

Working papers

Australian National University

Department of Political and Social Change

No. 11 C. L. Chiou, Democratizing China and Taiwan: Cultural and institutional paradigms, 1993

No. 12 Glen Petersen, Ethnicity and interests at the 1990 Federated States of Micronesia constitutional convention, 1993

No. 13 Stephanie Lawson, Tradition versus democracy in the Kingdom of Tonga, 1994

No. 14 Michael Vickery, Cambodia: A political survey, 1994

Papers available for A$7.00 each (plus p and p) from:
Department of Political and Social Change
Divn. of Politics and International Relations
RSPAS, ANU
Canberra, ACT 0200
Australia

Australian National University

Economics Division Working Papers, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies

Development Issues

No. 94/4 Cliff Walsh and Christine Fletcher, The subsidiarity principle and decentralisation: Perspectives from Australia's federal experience, 1994

No. 94/3 Ngo Huy Duc, Intra-industry trade among Asia-Pacific economies: A case study of econometric analysis, 1994

No. 94/2 David Robertson, Environment, trade and development, 1994
Monographs and reports

**A profit in our own country**


This report presents the proceedings of a seminar by the same name conducted by the Crawford Fund for International Agriculture Research in May 1994.

Available from:
The Crawford Fund for International Agriculture Research
Hilda Stevenson House
1 Leonard Street
Parkville, VIC 3052
Australia

**Land mines: Legacy of conflict**

Rae McGrath 1994, Co-published by Oxfam and Mines Advisory Group, ISBN 0 85598 264 0, £7.95

Land mines constitute a major threat to civilians long after a conflict ends. The cost of clearing mines is enormous and, as these deadly weapons are increasingly used in counter-insurgency operations and other conflicts, the problem is escalating. This manual for development workers provides full description of types of mines, groups at greatest risks and outlines precautionary measures and life saving procedures.

Available from:
Ideas Centre
PO Box 100A
Sydney South, NSW 2000
Australia

**Economic security in Melanesia**


This study explores the management of mineral resources development as a means of promoting economic security in Papua New Guinea and applies these
lessons for potential mineral resources development in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

Available from:
East-West Export Books
c/o University of Hawaii press
2840 Kolowalu Street
Honolulu, HI 96822
USA

Industrialisation in Papua New Guinea: Unrealised potential?

In accordance with its official support for private sector development, the government of Papua New Guinea is concentrating on providing the preconditions conducive to the development of manufacturing activities. However, the authors argue that reform policies have a genuine impact only to the extent that change is accompanied by an international competitive advantage for Papua New Guinea.

Available from:
East-West Export Books
c/o University of Hawaii press
2840 Kolowalu Street
Honolulu, HI 96822
USA

Tonga: Development through agricultural exports

During the 1980s the Tongan economy underwent important structural changes: a nascent manufacturing sector, growth of tourism, and diversification of agriculture. Despite these encouraging events, unsatisfactory problems are now developing.

Available from:
East-West Export Books
c/o University of Hawaii press
2840 Kolowalu Street
Honolulu, HI 96822
USA

Monitoring adjustment and poverty in Bangladesh
CIRDAP Study Series No. 160, ISBN 984 8104 05 1, US$30.00

This volume contains reports of the first phase of activities under the Monitoring Adjustment and Poverty Project for development of a regular poverty monitoring system and analytical capability to evaluate the impact of macro-economic policies at the micro level in Bangladesh.

Available from:
Documentation Officer
CIRDAP
17 Topkhana Road
GPO Box 2883
Dhaka 1000
Bangladesh

Australia's national report to the UN Commission on sustainable development

This report on the implementation of Agenda 21 deals mainly with issues such as international cooperation to accelerate sustainable development in developing countries and related domestic policies; changing consumption patterns, financial resources and mechanisms; transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation and capacity building; promoting sustainable human settlement development; and environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals and hazardous waste.

Available from:
Department of Environment, Sports and Territories
GPO Box 787
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Crisis in transition in foreign aid?

This report assesses the current issues and the future role of foreign aid in ten of the leading donor countries (UK, USA, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark).

Available from:
Publication Sales
Overseas Development Institute
Regent's College
Inner Circle
Regent's Park
London NW1 4NS
United Kingdom

Economic prospects for developing countries: Changing patterns of investment, trade and development in the 1990s
Sheila Page 1993, ODI Publications, ISBN 0 85003 196 6, £35.00

Produced for ODI's annual conference on the economic prospects for developing countries, this report analyses the forecasts for 1993 and beyond produced by the major international economic organisations.

Available from:
Publication Sales
Overseas Development Institute
Regent's College
Inner Circle
Regent's park
London NW1 4NS
United Kingdom

The impact of economic development on rural women in China

This report examines some of the effects of recent economic and social changes in China on women in two areas of the country with different levels of economic development - focusing on their education, occupations, marriage and family relations, and attitudes and outlook - and finds evidence of both real differences over time and of persistence of older patterns.
Community Aid Abroad

The following monographs, reports, briefing papers have been published by Community Aid Abroad.

GATT: What do the poor get?, A$12.50

This report summarises some of the more likely effects of GATT. The first section briefly outlines the main agreements arrived at and looks at their implications, while the second section looks particularly at the new World Trade Organisation (WTO). New issues likely to be covered in future WTO negotiations are considered in the third section, and some recommendations to the Australian Government are made in the fourth and final section.

United Nations interventions in conflict situations, A$9.95

This is a joint submission from Community Aid Abroad and Oxfam, UK and Ireland to Australia's ambassador to the UN. It is based on four case studies of UN intervention - in Somalia, Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador.

Mabo - its meaning for Australia, A$8.00

This report explores the broader social and legal implications of the Mabo debate.

Australia's trade: Green and just?, A$14.95

This report is a compilation of papers given at a three day conference held in October 1993. The papers reproduced in the report include background papers, keynote addresses and workshop papers.

Briefing papers

No. 8 Bougainville - Civil war and human rights abuses on our doorstep, July 1993

No. 9 Human rights in Guatemala, August 1993

No. 10 Human rights in Sri Lanka, November 1993


No. 12 Australian mining companies in the Asia-Pacific region, September 1994

Polliewatch Briefings

No.16 Australia's aid program: Putting people first?, January 1994

No. 17 Regulating transnational companies, April 1994

Papers are available for A$1.50 each from:
Community Aid Abroad
136 George Street
Fitzroy, VIC 3065
Australia

Electronic mail

DEVLINE

DEVLINE is the DEVevelopmen t information service on LINE from the British Library for Development Studies (BLDS). DEVLINE serves all those with an interest in economic and social development and the relationships between rich and poor countries. DEVLINE is a free service now available over the INTERNET. DEVLINE and BLDS are based at the Institute of Development Studies. DEVLINE provides access to IDISDB, the online catalogue and journal articles database of the British Library for Development Studies, with over 80,000 records.

For more information about DEVLINE and the IDISDB database contact:
Debbie Beer, Systems Librarian
e-mail: d.beer@sussex.ac.uk

ReliefNet

ReliefNet is a new feature of the Internet that promotes online humanitarian aid. ReliefNet enables internet users to instantly help global relief efforts and make online pledges to relief agencies, for the first time.

Charter participants in ReliefNet include Oxfam America, CARE, American Friends Service Committee, Operation USA, Food for the Hungry, YMCA, Lutheran World Relief, International Medical Corps and Doctors Without Borders.

For more information contact:
World Wide Web: http://
www.earthweb.com:2800/
Gopher: earthweb.com 2801
Mailbot: info@earthweb.com
Pledge via telnet: telnet
earthweb.com 2803
Pledge via e-mail, send empty letter
tp: pledge.reliefnet@earthweb.com
Victoria University of Technology

Bachelor of Arts in Community Development: Asia-Pacific Stream

This is a vocational course aimed at providing training in a wide range of community development roles and skills, including work in urban and rural communities. The course is both for overseas as well as Australian students with experience in, or intending to work in an Asian-Pacific context. The course is suitable for project officers and field staff in government and non-government development organisations, managers and coordinators of social and community development programmes and policy and research officers in the social and community development field.

For more information contact:
Community Development Course Coordinator
Faculty of Arts
Victoria University of Technology
St Albans Campus
PO Box 14428 MMC
Melbourne, VIC 3000
Australia
Tel (03) 3652148
Fax (03) 3652242

The University of New England

International Development Training Program

The following short courses are being offered for 1995.

Agroforestry Management

16 January-17 February 1995

This course is intended for agriculturalists, foresters and rural development practitioners from developing countries. The main resource person for this course will be Dr Peter Huxley, former Director of the International Centre for Agroforestry, Kenya. The five week course will focus on the following topics:

- agroforestry systems case studies;
- woody and non woody plant interactions;
- competition in agroforestry systems;
- soil improvement, site modification and environmental benefits of trees;
- maximising animals and food production in agroforestry;
- multi-purpose trees; and
- research and experimentation for agroforestry.
Water Resource Planning and Management

8 March-4 April 1995

This course will be run in collaboration with the Centre for Water Policy Research, and aims to address environmental issues in the context of resource allocation and management in the river valleys of northwest New South Wales. The target audience for this course are water resource planners and managers, both in government and non-government sectors. Participants will gain a firm grasp on the principles involved with water management, along with the planning methodologies necessary to achieve their water policy objectives. Topics include:

- water supply and demand marketing options;
- management information systems;
- water resource systems;
- water and the environment;
- catchment management; and
- integrated approaches to river basin management and planning - principles and practices.

Urban and Rural Planning and Local Development Policy

3 May-6 June 1995

This course will be run as a joint venture with the University of New England's Department of Geography and Planning. This course provides an introduction to a range of relevant topics relating to the management of change in town and country, and the facilitation of economic development in small town situations. Topics will include:

- strategies for local development;
- community education as a strategy for change;
- transport and land use;
- infrastructure policy and planning;
- introduction to site evaluation and planning;
- urban applications of vector-based geographic information systems;
- use of remote sensing; and
- computerised census data mapping.

Development Studies Program

The following short courses are being offered by the Development Studies Program.

Management of Agricultural Research

16 January-10 February 1995

This course is aimed at agricultural research managers from developing countries. Topics include:

- systems approach to agricultural research, including on-farm research;
- impact of international agricultural research centres on agricultural performance;
- induced innovation in developing country agriculture;
- environmental considerations and sustainability of farming systems;
- agricultural research and technical change - impact analysis;
- monitoring and evaluation of research programmes; and
- financial aspects - funding, budgeting and control.

Economics of Resource and Environmental Management

24 April-16 June 1995

Course outline includes:

- environmental issues, sustainable resource use, especially forestry and shifting cultivation;
- resource and environmental planning strategies;
- benefit-cost analysis, valuation of non-priced goods, especially retention of biodiversity;
- approaches to resource allocation, natural resource policy, market failure and externalities;
- resource inventories, including geographic information systems, environmental impact statements; and
- collection and analysis of relevant socioeconomic data.

Benefit-Cost Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment

3 July-28 July 1995

Topics include:

- project identification, the project cycle, monitoring;
- principles of benefit-cost analysis, private and social analysis;
- application of benefit-cost analysis, valuation of unpriced effects, partial analyses; and
- resource investment planning.

Rural Development Policy

28 August-8 September 1995

This course will provide a workshop environment in which participants will be challenged to analyse contemporary issues in rural development policy making. Some of the issues to be covered include:

- goals and objectives of rural development;
- rural research and technology;
- agriculture and rural employment;
- the agrosystem and rural development; and
- rural financial markets.
Planning for Sustainable Rural Development

9 October-1 December 1995

Course outline includes:

• development issues, defining growth and development, history, theories, strategies and their successes/failures;
• introduction to planning, levels and strategies, approaches;
• environmental aspects of development, watershed management, shifting cultivation; and
• principles and strategies for agricultural extension.

For more information contact:
Ian Oxenford
Executive Officer
Development Studies Program
University of New England
Armida, NSW 2351
Australia
Tel (67) 733248 / 732232
Fax (67) 711531 / 733799
email DSP@UNE.Edu.au

AIDAB Centre for Pacific Development and Training

Development Training Group

The following short courses are being offered for 1995.

Ecotourism Planning and Management

13 February-23 March 1995

The course introduces environmental aspects of 'ecotourism', an industry which has grown up around visits to natural areas, and is aimed at those involved with management of natural areas with ecotourism potential or plans, at professionals in the tour industry, either directly or as community leaders concerned with ecotourism issues.

Project Management for Non Government Organisations

13 February-23 March 1995

The course aims to provide an opportunity for NGO personnel to develop their skills in project identification, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The emphasis is upon sharing experiences of community development planning and the application of formal systematic planning procedures and processes. The course is aimed at individuals who occupy management positions in NGOs and have a direct role in identifying, implementing, monitoring and evaluating community development programmes and projects.

Project Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

1 May-8 June 1995

This course aims to provide senior and middle management with the opportunity to upgrade their skills in project identification, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The emphasis is on project preparation and application within a systematic framework.

For more information contact:
Development Training Group, ACPAC
Middle Head Road
Mosman, NSW 2088
Australia
Tel (02) 9609500
Fax (02) 9602942

Australian Council for Overseas Aid

Human Resource and Organisation Development Cooperation

A series of five day short courses will be conducted over the next two years for Australian NGOs. The following will be offered in Sydney and Melbourne:

• introduction and cross cutting issues: covering poverty alleviation, environment, gender, human rights, community participation, health;
• project planning, monitoring and evaluation;
• financial administration of development programmes and projects; and
• strategic planning.

Additionally, the following three courses will be run once, in either Sydney or Melbourne:

• ecologically sustainable livelihoods: people, environment and development;
• gender analysis and training the trainer in gender analysis and awareness; and
• democracy, development and human rights

For more information contact:
Robert Crittenden or Patricia Bakke, ACFOA
14 Napier Close
Deakin, ACT 2600
Australia
Tel (06) 2851816
Fax (06) 2851720
Organisation profiles

SEICA

Established in 1993, the Sustainable Energy Industries Council of Australia Inc. (SEICA) aims to create new business and employment opportunities emerging from the development of a global ecologically sustainable energy system. Members are drawn predominantly from business, scientific, professional and research fields but also include education, government, environmental and other community organisations working in these areas. SEICA monitors, provides information and gives voice to members' concerns at the national and state government levels.

For more information contact:
Sustainable Energy Industries Council of Australia (SEICA) Inc.
PO Box 411
Dickson, ACT 2602
Australia
Tel (06) 2419260
Fax (06) 2419266

APACE

The Appropriate Technology for Community and Environment Inc. (APACE) is a non governmental charitable institution. Its mission is to promote the use of renewable energy technologies while providing education, training, design and advisory services. APACE assists in the development of indigenous capacity to ensure that the technology is appropriate to, and sustainable by, the community.

For more information contact:
APACE
University of Technology, Sydney
PO Box 123
Broadway, NSW 2007
Australia
Tel (02) 3302554
Fax (02) 3302611

Transparency International

Transparency International (TI) is a new non profit, non governmental organisation formed in 1993 with headquarters in Berlin. TI has been established by individuals and organisations concerned about the need to combat the increasingly pervasive problems of grand corruption in international business. TI has a particular emphasis on the misuse of development aid funds and the related increase in the debt of developing countries.
TI has support from the Governments of France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom, as well as several large private corporations such as Boeing and General Electric. TI is already actively working with the Governments of Ecuador, Benin and Russia. Anti-corruption programmes are soon to start in Tanzania and Uganda and are under negotiation with the Governments of Philippines, Bangladesh, South Africa and Namibia.

TI's programme of action includes:

- building coalitions of interest, as National Chapters of TI in all developing and developed countries where individuals and organisations are interested and concerned about the rise in corruption;
- at the request of a government, assisting with in-country anti-corruption programmes, including review of existing legal and institutional frameworks and practices. The review will outline appropriate recommendations for combating corrupt practices and promoting transparency;
- promoting the use of TI Standards of Conduct by businesses, aid agencies and governments as clear statements of acceptable practice; and
- serving as an international clearinghouse for information exchange, ideas and e-mail discussion on ways of combating corruption.

For more information contact:
Isabel Blackett
Transparency International
12 Collins Street
Box Hill, VIC 3128
Australia
Tel (03) 8998534
Fax (03) 8991455
e-mail: saniti@peg.apc.org

Centre for International Economic Studies

The Centre was established in 1989 by the Economics Department of the University of Adelaide to strengthen teaching and research in the field of international economics and closely related disciplines. Both theoretical and empirical policy-oriented studies are emphasised, with a particular focus on developments within, or of relevance to, the Asia-Pacific region.

For more information contact:
Dr Kym Anderson
Centre for International Economic Studies
University of Adelaide
Adelaide, SA 5005
Australia
Tel (08) 3034712
Fax (08) 2231460

The Global Education Centre

The Global Education Centre is a non profit, non government organisation which provides materials and expertise on global issues to schools, groups and individuals. It also maintains a Resource Centre which contains reference materials and resources on a wide range of global issues. In general the Centre provides a vital alternative to mainstream information sources.

For more information contact:
The Global Education Centre
First Floor, 155 Pirie Street
Adelaide, SA 5000
Australia
Tel (08) 2235795

National Clearinghouse on Violence Against Women

The primary role of the Clearinghouse is to respond to information needs through the provision of up-to-date, comprehensive information about violence against women prevention activities, services for survivors, programmes, projects and research on the issue. Through its role as a national information resource, the Clearinghouse aims to strengthen and empower those working towards the elimination of violence, but more specifically to: encourage the sharing of experience and expertise by disseminating information; provide a forum for discussing ideas and issues; facilitate collaboration and solidarity among those working in the area; raise community awareness of the issues; provide a map of existing activities which highlights the gaps; and help groups avoid duplication in programme development.

For more information contact:
Ingrid Wilson
National Clearinghouse on Violence Against Women
c/- Australian Institute of Criminology
GPO Box 2944
Canberra, ACT 2601
Tel (06) 2740279
Fax (06) 2740201
Materials

Micronesia - An introduction to the US territories

The video contains a wealth of information about this little known region of the world. It begins with the ancient latte stones on Guam and the ruins of Nan Madol on Pohnpei. With the arrival of Magellan in 1521 the waves of Spanish, German, American and Japanese colonisation follow. The story continues through the battle grounds of World War II to the nuclear testing sites and military bases of the United States. Finally, the contemporary issues that now face the people of Micronesia are explored.

Available from:
Pacific Community Development
58 Paxton Street
Spotswood, VIC 3015
Australia

On our feet: Taking steps to challenge women's oppression

This is a handbook on gender and population education workshops. This book is full of ideas and training materials for running workshops for women within the framework of popular education. On our feet was first published as a supplement to the German publication Adult education and development No. 41, 1993.

The original A4 version is available for US$12.00 from:
Centre for Adult and Continuing Education
University of the Western Cape
Private Bag X17
7535, Belleville
South Africa

Guidebook for development and production of literacy materials

This new guidebook has been published by the Asia/Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO in cooperation with UNESCO and UNESCO member States in Asia and the Pacific. The guide explains the development and production of learning materials, reading materials such as books or booklets, posters, audio-visual materials and games.

For more information apply to:
Asia/Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO (ACCU)
6 Fukuroomachi
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162
Japan

In Common

This is magazine of the Commonwealth Youth Program. Issue No. 12 focuses on NGO involved in youth training, reviews recent publications and training materials for young people on topics such as HIV/AIDS, young women in business, and substance abuse.

Available free from:
Commonwealth Youth Program
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1Y 4HX
United Kingdom

The trade trap

In all the countries in which Oxfam works in the South, small-scale producers are facing an increasingly uncertain future. In this 15 minute video, banana farmers from the Windward Islands visit London and Brussels to find out how the new Single European Market will affect them, and coffee farmers from Peru and the Dominican Republic visit the London Coffee Futures Market and look at alternative markets for their coffee that will give them a better price.

Available for £14.95 from:
Sales Ledger Clerk
Oxfam Publishing
PO Box 120
Oxford OX2 7FA
UK
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Manuscripts
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Style
Quotation marks should be double; single within double.
Spelling: English (OED with ‘-ise’ endings).

Notes
(a) Simple references without accompanying comments to be inserted in brackets at appropriate place in text, eg. (Yung 1989).
(b) References with comments should be kept to a minimum and appear as endnotes, indicated consecutively through the article by numerals in superscript.

Reference list
If references are used, a reference list should appear at the end of the text. It should contain all the works referred to, listed alphabetically by author’s surname (or name of sponsoring body where there is not identifiable author). Authors should make sure that there is a strict correspondence between the names and years in the text and those on the reference list. Book titles and names of journals should be italicised or underlined; titles of articles should be in single inverted commas. Style should follow: author’s surname, forename and or initials, date, title of publication, publisher and place of publication. Journal references should include volume, number (in brackets), date and page numbers. Examples:

Publication/resource listings
An important task of the Network is to keep members up-to-date with the latest literature and other resources dealing with development-related topics. To make it as easy as possible for readers to obtain the publications listed, please include price information (including postage) and the source from which materials can be obtained.