Development Bulletin
No. 67 April 2005

Effective Development in Papua New Guinea

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- Positive stories on development in Papua New Guinea
- Community-level agricultural development
- Self reliance in rural development and health
- Community approaches to law and order
- Empowering local communities
- Successful entrepreneurs
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Viewpoint

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The Development Studies Network
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Local Initiatives and Community Innovation
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This is an unusual issue of Development Bulletin. While we regularly hear about the developmental problems Papua New Guinea faces, including failed electoral processes, the ailing health and education systems and the multitude of problems with governance and the bureaucracy, this issue includes a number of case studies which highlight a neglected aspect of development — the good news — the small and successful initiatives that communities and entrepreneurs organise and undertake for themselves, usually without assistance and outside the usual development assistance structure. As a change from the bad news, these case studies provide a more positive picture of what is happening on the ground and what people are doing for themselves. The combination of papers is also unusual in that it includes academic analyses together with a number of personal perspectives — people’s short accounts, in their own words, of their first-hand experiences with successful community-based development activities.

These papers were presented and discussed at the Good News Workshop held in November 2004 in Madang, Papua New Guinea. It was organised by the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) Project at the Australian National University in collaboration with the Divine Word University, Madang. SSGM extends particular thanks to Michael Bourke, Tracy Harwood, John Imbal, Hartmut Holzknecht, Mike Lowe, Marion Jacka, Abby McLeod, Mark Solon, Jerry Singirok, Paul Pasingan, Catherine Nongkas, Sue Rider and Seryl Moriarty for their efforts in editing and coordinating the papers. Finally, the publication of these papers would not have been possible without the practical and financial support of AusAID.

‘Viewpoint’ and ‘From the Field’
This issue includes other perspectives on the situation in Papua New Guinea and in particular, the situations of women in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. If you have a particular point of view regarding developmental issues or have a new perspective on development based on your work in the field, please let us know as we may be able to publish your paper.

Our next issue of Development Bulletin will focus on East Timor and include some of the papers and discussion, as well as additional papers, from our East Timor conference. The conference will be held at Victoria University, Flinders Street Campus, Melbourne, 17–18 June 2005 and will include a number of participants from East Timor. It is being organised by Victoria University and the Development Studies Network. For further information contact Dr Helen Hill, Victoria University, Melbourne, email helenh@alphalink.com.au. If you work or have undertaken research in East Timor and would like to offer a paper for publication please send us an abstract.

Illegal drugs and development: Implications for Asia and the Pacific
From the good news to the bad — our third issue for 2005 will focus on the relationship between development and illegal drugs and will cover the impact on development of the production, trafficking and use of drugs, and the impact of development or underdevelopment on drug production and use. It will consider international drug policies, legislation, alternative development, the impact of crop substitution, harm minimisation, and the role of transnational criminal networks.

Meanwhile, all of us here at the Development Studies Network hope you enjoy the gud nius.

Pamela Thomas
Managing Editor
Making good news happen for
Papua New Guinea

Father Jan Czuba, Divine Word University, Madang

All men dream but not equally. There are those that dream at night, reaching into the
dark recesses of their minds to wake in the morning to find it was vanity. But the truly
courageous men are those that dream in the day with their eyes wide open for they can
make their dreams come true.

TE Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)

Every conference or symposium that is understood as a national debate is an important
occasion for everyone involved in the development of this land and who cares for this
nation and the people of South Pacific. This important conference takes place on the eve
of Christmas and 30 years of Papua New Guinea's independence. Here, I will talk about
the need to inject some new strategy into our thinking processes about ourselves, our
political system, our values and the country as a whole if we wish to celebrate 100 years of
PNG independence in prosperity, peace and happiness.

We know that human beings are teleological by nature. By 'teleological' I mean that
they have the ability to seek out or be directed towards end results, hence the saying 'he
who does not know to which port he is sailing has no favourable wind'. Being teleological
in nature, we need to have a vision or idea of where we want to end up. A teleological
instrument has the power to make corrections as it proceeds towards its goal. It is also
essential to any teleological device that it has an accurate feedback system. In the case of
humans, the feedback system is the senses, which continually pick up information as to
where we are in time and space relative to where we choose to be.

We know how important it is to state an objective clearly in order to be aware of
resources and information that will complement achieving that objective. This knowledge
should invest us with the confidence to establish positive visions and goals about the
future of PNG before we have visible knowledge or proof of the resources with which we
will accomplish them. While traditional thinkers needed evidence before attempting to
establish the nature and scope of a goal or end result, it should be the aim of this conference
to offer us a knowledge that allows us to first establish the positive vision for better PNG
and then perceive the means to achieve the goal. It is hardly the case that we perceive the
means first. The goal comes first and then the means.

I hope this conference will encourage the belief that each of us has a mission to carry
out in this country, without first having the resources. Our mission and goals become more
ambitious and more visionary when they are not restricted to our present knowledge base.
This is a characteristic that distinguishes high-performance nations from average nations.
Be aware that when we set the positive vision many people will recognise danger signs and
threats, and anticipate blocks or barriers to our positive objectives. We need to see these as
early warning signs, not the crash. Anybody can recognise a crash; great leaders see the early
warning signs and so avoid the crash.

In pursuing the vision, we must be accountable and aware. Even though the vision is
desired, if no one feels accountable for its achievement, people will shut down their
awareness of the cooperation that is essential to achieving the vision and not make the
significant choices that are required. I believe choice, not chance, decides one's destiny.

How do we build accountability in the greatest number of people within PNG so that
they will 'stay awake' and help us to achieve the goals that will come from this conference?
When we will use information coming out of this forum? We are not looking for surprise-free solutions; this forum must ensure that the solutions we get are good ones.

Another important factor in establishing the quality of PNG’s future vision is the self-esteem of the individuals in our country. Self-confidence, or the true sense of one’s inner power and God-given ability to make things happen the right way, will have a direct relationship to what we choose to pursue in the future. Low self-esteem restricts us to little tasks, little goals, no risk, an assured future and a bland and stagnant vision. High self-esteem and high self-regard bring with them a search for tasks, challenges, problems, missions and objectives worthy of the individual’s time and effort. Big goals, big challenges, big problems bring on excitement and a sense of fulfillment and adventure that makes life worthwhile. Let this be a challenge for you during this forum.

People with high self-esteem aren’t necessarily braver than others; they just don’t perceive challenges as possessing the same degree of risk and danger as do low self-esteem individuals. They know they can handle it. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that self-esteem with Christian values be nourished and cultivated in every school, every department and every individual in Papua New Guinea if we wish to see PNG celebrating 100 year of independence in happiness and prosperity.

Positive self-talk, the process of thought which consists of words-pictures-feelings, is the key factor, not only in establishing high self-esteem, but also in building the positive belief system of every individual in this country. There is a direct relationship between positive and uplifting constructive self-talk and success. People move toward and become like that which they think about. It is essential, therefore, that we think about our future to be in a positive and constructive manner. It is also important to observe and influence the positive self-talk of ourselves as Papua New Guineans.

If people are in the habit of thinking and talking about the bad things, you can rest assured that they will go back to the way things were in the past or keep them the way they are now. To create a positive future, which is different from the past or present, we must think and talk differently in the present. Effective people and nations accurately observe the ways things are in the current reality and continually focus on the way things will be in the future.

All Papua New Guineans dream, but not equally. There are those that dream at night, who don’t know to which port they are sailing and who do not have favourable wind. But the truly courageous men and women of this land are those that dream in the positive way about PNG, during the day with their eyes wide open. They can make their dreams come true as they know to which port they are sailing and they have favourable wind. Having a positive vision of the future is perhaps the most forceful motivator for change you and I possess. Thus I wish us all that this conference will equip us with such vision.
Introduction

There is no doubt that Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a country beset by difficult and growing problems. Increasingly, the conventional wisdom, especially in the donor community, but also among some Papua New Guineans, is that the country is in severe crisis, with most trends negative. A large part of the problem is seen to relate to the very weak capacity of the state in PNG, and that the weakness of the state is reinforced by the weakness of the nation. Large-scale technical assistance programs are therefore required to strengthen both the state and the nation. Such perspectives underlie the December 2004 strategy paper, Strengthening Our Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Papua New Guinea (ASP) 2004), produced by the influential Australian government-established Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).1 The strategy paper also influenced development of Australia’s 2003 policy initiative, the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP).

It may seem strange to introduce a collection of development success stories in PNG with a paper about the debate about the weakness of the state. There are, however, three main reasons why these issues need to be considered as part of a discussion about success stories. The first, and most obvious, relates to the fact that a major reason for holding a workshop on case studies of success stories is a view that the negative image of PNG is not the full picture, and should be corrected. If, however, our examination of local success stories is to provide a counterbalance to that negative image, then there is a need to understand, and, where necessary, criticise and respond to it and the prescriptions associated with it. In so doing, we should be better equipped to argue the possible wider significance of the case studies.

A second set of reasons relate to the fact that many of the case studies examined here involve projects or developments that can be regarded as having occurred in response to the growing weakness of the state. If so, then the studies may indirectly reinforce the perception of growing problems. There is, however, an alternative view that should be explored — that the case studies may provide support for a view of an increasingly vibrant society, in which ever-wider linkages are being made between groups in society, and where, slowly but increasingly, society is beginning to apply pressure to the state to perform in ways that the society demands.

A third set of reasons concerns the main proposals for action by donors emerging from the debate about state weakness, most of which involve massive increases in technical assistance to the state. No serious attention is being given to how developments in society (including those of the kind being examined at this workshop) might be contributing to development of both the nation and the capacity of the state (through pressure from society on the state to perform according to the expectations of the people). If such contributions are being made, then it may be necessary to consider again the arguments about weakness of the state, and, more especially, the main prescriptions being proposed to deal with such weakness.

Strengthening the weak state and nation: ECP and ASPI

The ASPI paper argues that while the state in PNG has not collapsed, it has become extremely weak. Poor and declining standards in the delivery of basic services to the people are seen as one of the key measures of weakness. Others include corruption, increasing levels of violence, and a worsening law and order situation. The weakness is so profound that:

PNG has now reached the point at which its institutions are too weak themselves to undertake and sustain the kind of major reforms needed to turn the country around. If PNG is going to be strengthened, it is going to need much more help — and different kinds of help — than it has received over the past three decades. If Australia does not take the lead in offering that help, no one else will (ASPI 2004:11).

One of the key factors contributing to the weakness of the state is said to be the relationship between state and society: 'the weakness of the state — the institutions of government — is in large measure the result of the weakness of the nation — the community of people bounded by some sense of shared identity and interest and commitment to their country' (ASPI 2004:34).

A range of factors combine to ensure that there is little pressure from the society for the state to perform better. These include a dysfunctional political system, characterised by poor links between voters and elected politicians, political parties and governments, and ministers and public servants. Not only is
there immense cultural and linguistic diversity (described as 'a major inhibition to economic development, complicating its service delivery and infrastructure development'), but the wantok system is seen as a major impediment to 'obligations to wantoks' evidently impose real and often debilitating stresses on Papua New Guineans with authority or resources at all levels of society' (ASPI 2004:33). The weak sense of nation is seen as the key:

[It is] the foundation of many of PNG's problems. A weak government can deliver little to its people, so there is no reason for the people to offer it commitment. Officeholders, working for a government that has little popular standing, have little motivation to put the interests of the state and the nation above their own or those of their family. The resulting poor performance by the government further erodes service delivery, and reduces the standing of government in the eyes of the people (ASPI 2004:33).

The prescriptions offered by ASPI involve an indicative program of four elements directed to strengthening the bilateral relationship, the state, the economy and the nation, all at a cost of about A$500 million per year. Recognising the difficulties involved in solutions imposed from outside, the paper proposes that the details of any such program would need to be developed through a 'senior, multi-level discussion' between the two countries (ASPI 2004:49).

The main costs of the program would probably arise in relation to the broad proposals to strengthen the state and the nation. In relation to strengthening the state they involve:

- increased support to existing projects directed at:
  - strengthening central coordinating agencies;
  - supporting reforms directed to achieving increased accountability;
  - building public service administrative skills;
  - overhauling the provincial government system, and
- expanded direct support for delivery of critical services in relation to such sectors education, health (HIV/AIDS) and infrastructure, all of which largely involve more of what the existing AusAID programs are doing already. It is also suggested that Australia might take direct control of some PNG government activities, the examples given involving 'functions in PNG which are a high priority for Australian interests, including customs, immigration and transport security'. Further, that some institutions might be shared between the two countries in order to 'avoid duplication, save money, and provide a better service to PNG' (ASPI 2004:45).

On the basis of the analysis of the problem of state weakness in the first half of the strategy paper, it appears to be assumed that improved performance from a strengthened state would result in a stronger nation. But ASPI would not rely on state performance alone, and proposes programs for strengthening the nation, including improving national mass media, development of radio and television dramas portraying the affairs of ordinary Papua New Guineans ('a kind of Blue Hill and Neighbours for PNG' (ASPI 2004:45)), development of sport (including possible participation of a PNG team in the Australian National Rugby League competition), strengthening the electoral system, supporting constitutional reform, and supporting civil society, especially through support for women's groups. Virtually all proposals for state strengthening, as well as significant components of the nation and economy strengthening programs, would clearly involve substantial injections of technical assistance for state capacity building.

In summary, what is being proposed involves the state and donors cooperating so that donor-funded capacity building improves service delivery, which, together with measures intended to 'engineer' increased national unity, should strengthen the nation, which in turn should contribute to improved performance by the state.

Some critical perspectives on the ASPI/ECP view

The analysis in the ASPI strategy paper assumes that the emergence of an effective state and a strong and unified nation in PNG can be achieved largely through donor-funded technical assistance. It is part of the responsibility of a strong and effective state such as Australia to assist in the strengthening of states in its region, and especially the weak states of the Pacific.

Various criticisms can be made of ASPI's analysis of the problems in PNG and the prescriptions it offers. To start with, putting so much down to the weakness of the state and of the nation is to simplify an immensely complex set of issues. It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, to undertake a comprehensive critique of ASPI's analysis. Accordingly, other than making some brief comments on the analysis, the focus of this critique is on the proposed prescriptions for dealing with weakness of state and nation.

The modern state and nation emerged in Europe, not as a result of technical assistance and the engineering of national identities, but rather from social, economic and political forces emerging from, among other things, hundreds of years of chaos and violence. In some ways, such chaos had positive aspects — particularly in the sense that the rule of law, protection of human rights, modern democracy, and the measures that we now regard as the fundamentals of good governance all emerged to a large degree as part of processes of reaction to, and efforts to limit, chaos and violence. Among other things, groups in the society sought to establish norms that limited action by the state (and also by groups in society).
States emerged together with nations, slowly and imperfectly. Later, states and nations were transplanted, relatively effectively, to the European settler colonies of the Americas and Australasia. The transplantation process has faced much more difficulty in most other places, and especially in the former European colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.

Even in Europe and the European settler states, however, the processes of developing nations and states have had their problems. For example, in terms of weakness of the state, Ron May points not only to experience of an Australian ambassador in Italy in the 1980s, stopped by the Italian government from travelling to a part of Italy where the government could not guarantee his safety, but also to the fact that government authority is tenuous in large parts of many big cities in the United States (May 2003:39). In terms of the strength of the nation, there continue to be secessionist ethnic movements in many parts of Europe. May suggests that state weakness and failure should not be seen as phenomena limited to Third World countries. Rather, we should think in terms of a continuum of state effectiveness stretching from, for example, Somalia, where state collapse has been dramatic ... through varying degrees of state weakness, to countries in which the state is well-entrenched with a virtual monopoly over coercion, and effective (if perhaps sometimes misguided) in its ability to exercise authority and deliver services' (May 2003:40).

The relationship of the state and the society in the emergence of a strong and unified nation is a complex one. Nations did not just emerge through action by, and increasing effectiveness of, the state. Broader political and economic developments contributed to the emergence of strong nations, for example, through increased linkages between diverse localised social groups (thereby contributing to creation of new and broader identities), and between such groups and the state. Society had important roles in shaping the state — core features of modern states (including the rule of law) emerged because of dissatisfaction with the state on the part of groups in society.

While state and nation developed over hundreds of years in Europe, the real concern with state weakness in PNG is that a strong state has not emerged after less than 100 years of weak colonial rule and just under three decades of independence. Yet the obstacles to rapid development of state and nation in PNG are significant. While some of these have been mentioned by ASPI, on the one hand the paper fails to acknowledge the full extent of the difficulties posed by the circumstances of PNG, and on the other seems to minimise them by indicating that it is essentially increased technical assistance that can overcome the difficulties.

In relation to the development of a strong nation, existing social groupings in PNG are probably smaller and more diverse (culturally and linguistically) than they were in Europe when modern states and nations began to emerge, and hence the problems involved in unifying this immense diversity are of a scale not experienced perhaps anywhere else in the world. There are limited (though increasing) linkages between the small social groups. Further, localised societies tend to see the state as something to be used, and even to be plundered — political leaders who can deliver state resources to their people gain support. Hence, while poor performance by the state does not help the emergence of a strong nation, it is not necessarily the main factor in the limited development of national identity. In the circumstances of PNG it is remarkable that a sense of national identity has developed as much as it has.

The continued existence of numerous small societies and the limited existence of cross-cutting linkages between them certainly does have negative aspects in addition to the possible inhibitory impact on economic development noted by ASPI (above). These include contributing to conflict and violence, as well as to oppression of women. But it also has positives. It means that there has been no ethnic group in PNG big enough to threaten to take control of the state. It has also contributed to continuity in a high degree of self-reliance among Papua New Guineans — to an ability to manage despite difficult circumstances. It is certain that the extent of the weakness of the state would have been far more evident and far more of a problem but for the resilience of customary communities.

There are also many obstacles to the emergence of a strong state. The first experience of the state in PNG was the colonial state, imposed from outside, often with use of force, and with limited regular impact on life for most people in rural areas. While the effectiveness of the colonial state increased after World War II, not only was it relatively effective for only a brief period of 20 years or so, but it was largely dependent on white men. Force continued to be used to impose the will of the colonial state, mainly through the police. Relative effectiveness does not mean that there was ever anything like a strong state delivering multiple services to all of its people, and with a complete monopoly on coercion. Nostalgia for the effective colonial state is to a large degree romanticisation of the situation that existed then. Rather, by independence, most Papua New Guineans still had little regular contact with the state and even less understanding of it. In terms of the capacity of Papua New Guineans to administer the state, until the 1960s, ten to 15 years before independence, very limited effort was expended on its development. In the lead up to independence, the focus was on the development of appropriate political institutions, and not on building the capacity of the new state to deliver services to its people through Papua New Guinean personnel.

All of this was a very poor foundation for development of a strong state, and makes it no surprise that capacity has weakened since independence, with the sudden withdrawal of the white
men that mostly ran it until then, and the limited capacity that a weak new state had to develop its own capacity. The lack of capacity to undertake and sustain major reforms noted by ASPI (above) is not a new phenomenon — merely one that has grown more acute in recent years. Australian aid, at about A$330 million per year in 2003–2004 (prior to the ECP beginning), has not made a huge impact. But is that a surprise, or merely an indication of the extent of the growing problems that Australian left behind at independence? As ASPI (2004:35) points out, A$330 million is not much more than the annual cost of running one of Canberra’s major hospitals, one of several providing just some of the health needs of less than 500,000 people. By contrast, the expectations of that A$330 million in aid is that it should have appreciably lifted the capacity of a state serving almost six million people.

In terms of the proposals to increase technical assistance directed at building state capacity, first, there have already been significant injections of technical assistance in PNG. While that has been far from wasted in terms of supporting performance of the state, it has not had dramatic impacts on building state capacity. In all of the circumstances as outlined, it should not have been expected to have done so. Further, there is little evidence of success in state and nation building that has been achieved mainly through provision of technical assistance from elsewhere in the world. Perhaps the best examples would come from post-war reconstruction of Japan and Germany, where the outcomes occurred in dramatically different circumstances from those existing in PNG. All over the world, the experience of technical assistance has been one of quite limited effectiveness (for example, see Morgan 2002).

That is not to say that technical assistance does not have an important role to play — only that it is most unlikely to achieve the outcomes that seem to be expected of it by the ASPI/ECP analysis. More importantly, there may be alternative analyses which indicate that the burden will not need to be borne by technical assistance alone.

Finally, it also needs to be noted that the ASPI/ECP analysis (together with their prescriptions) is not widely accepted in PNG. There are political leaders that support it, at least publicly, mainly because of the resources that it brings — resources which they see as reducing pressures on a resource-poor government. But it is an analysis that tends to be deeply resented, especially among senior bureaucrats and people with higher levels of formal education. They see it as failing to understand the complexity and difficulty and failing to recognise positive aspects of the situation, as well as likely to restore a high degree of control to Australia and Australians.

The ECP in particular is seen as having been imposed on PNG. Some of the Australian officials involved in negotiations of key aspects of the arrangements and their implementation are seen as having behaved with great insensitivity. Part of the problem here may be that much of the responsibility for negotiation and implementation rested with a Canberra-based inter-departmental committee, most of whose members had seldom set foot in Port Moresby, let alone had long and extensive contact with Papua New Guineans and with wide areas of the country. There seems to have been little understanding of the complex webs of interpersonal relations that play such an important part in the policy making and other decision-making processes of a country such as PNG with its small elite.

The ASPI paper pays more attention to the need for decisions on the content of new measures to assist PNG being made jointly with PNG. It talks of the need for both ‘local momentum’ and ‘home-grown solutions’ (ASPI 2004:42). But the analysis of the nature of the problem and of the broad parameters of the program seems to have been set already by ASPI. The consultation required, according to ASPI, is about how such a program ‘might be pursued’ (ASPI 2004:49). Further, the need for a high degree of Australian leadership of the program seems to be emphasised elsewhere in the paper. For example, in discussing the need for ‘local momentum’ in support of reform, the paper argues that many Papua New Guineans are fatalistic about the country’s problems, feeling that nothing can be done about state weakness, and so to build commitment to state and nation building, people need help to see what it might involve and where it might lead:

The prospect of a broad-based program of assistance, backed by Australia, might help provide clearer hope that things could improve. The psychological impact of a high-profile Australian commitment to a long-term, generational program of engagement in strengthening PNG’s government could start the ball rolling (ASPI 2004:41).

These and other passages in the paper are likely to raise considerable concern in Port Moresby that the problems experienced with the ECP will be just the beginning of a reassertion of Australian control of PNG. There must be a serious risk that the ASPI proposals will be misunderstood by many in PNG.

Outline of an alternative analysis and modified prescription

Both before the colonial era began, and ever since, the people of PNG have exhibited a great deal of capacity and inventiveness in dealing with problems of social organisation and survival. There have always been many clever people finding their own solutions to the difficult problems that confront them.2 In pre-colonial times, Papua New Guineans developed complex agricultural and social systems, including effective ways of managing conflict in the absence of state structures. In response to the problems currently being experienced, many clever people are finding new solutions, as the success stories outlined in this volume illustrate.

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It tends to be assumed that the problems being experienced by PNG have no positive side to them, that all is gloom. But experience shows us that conflict and chaos can bring opportunities as well as problems, can contribute to positive developments, and may even be needed to achieve positive change. The development in Europe of the rule of law and protection of human rights, already mentioned, provide examples.

It can be argued that that what we are witnessing in PNG is in fact part of a long historical process of development of a state appropriate to the circumstances of the country, replacing the largely inherited and little understood colonial state, which is gradually weakening and decaying. At the same time, the authority and coherence of the many small-scale traditional societies has been gradually eroding. Churches, schools, local governments, plantation work, squatter settlements, taskol gangs, and many other developments have all been contributing to the development of linkages between members of localised social groupings for decades, and the processes involved are accelerating. These ongoing developments are part of organic processes contributing to the emergence of new groupings and identities beyond traditional local ones. They include a slowly developing sense of national identity.

At the same time there is evidence of reaction by various groups to the problems being experienced by Papua New Guineans. In particular, quite apart from the efforts of various NGOs, such as the PNG chapter of Transparency International, there is evidence of the beginnings of diverse pressures from society on the state to perform according to the expectations of the people. There is some evidence of such developments in, for example, the localised efforts in both rural areas and squatter settlements to develop new approaches to law and justice. Through such a process, communities are not only developing links with state structures on their own terms, but are also applying pressure to the state to get its institutions to perform in ways that meet local needs. There are illustrations of such situations in the case studies presented here. These pressures from the people are part of the impetus for development of new law and justice policies by the national government.

Another example involves Bougainville, where the experience of the nine years of conflict, (1988-1997), has contributed to development of strong consensus amongst leaders in most — if not all — communities that violence is no longer an acceptable means of resolving conflict, especially between communities. The same experience has also contributed to widely held views about the need for the state, especially the police, to avoid the use of violence in its dealings with communities. That is not to say that violence no longer occurs in Bougainville, but rather that when it does a wide range of pressures emerge from within communities to stop it.

In addition, as Bougainville moves to develop an autonomous government with extensive powers in accordance with the Bougainville Peace Agreement, there is extensive discussion of the need to develop police, courts and penal systems with marked differences from those operating in the rest of PNG. For example, section 148(2) of the Constitution for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, adopted by the Bougainville Constituent Assembly in November: 2004, provides for a Bougainville Police Service, not a police force — the term 'force' in relation to police was rejected quite explicitly. The constitution also calls for the Bougainville police to 'develop rehabilitatory and reconciliatory concepts of policing', and to 'work in harmony with communities and encourage community participation in its activities', and 'support and work with traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders to resolve disputes and maintain law and order in communities'. Such concepts are in large part the outcome of rejection of the model of policing previously experienced in Bougainville, one which is seen as having contributed to considerable violence being used against Bougainvilleans by police mobile squads in the first months of the conflict, something that was a major factor in escalation of the conflict at a time when otherwise it might well have been manageable. So out of the experience of conflict is emerging the development by Bougainvilleans of widely acceptable and applicable norms about the use of violence by both groups in society and by the state.

It seems arguable that what we are seeing is the beginning of development of a Papua New Guinean notion of the rule of law, one that is emerging out of the people's own experiences and concern, and one that has the potential to gradually contribute to wider pressures from the society on the state.

Such an analysis gives rise to at least three potentially important perspectives that may need to be taken into account when considering the ASPI/ECP prescriptions for PNG. First, the processes of developing a PNG state appropriate to the particular needs of the circumstances of Melanesia are in fact already in existence. The key dynamics are internally generated. There are significant advantages in such processes, as opposed to externally developed and led solutions. People can better understand and can take ownership of what is developed by them, on the basis of their own experiences and needs.

Second, development of an effective state and strong nation are certain to be long-term, slow and gradual processes, and locally generated. While the ASPI paper is certainly conscious of the need for a long-term commitment, at the same time the impression given by proposals for very large technical assistance programs is that a 'quick fix' is possible. It also tends to assume that the best 'fix' is external. It tends to demean internal efforts. Again, this is not to say there is no role for technical assistance — rather, that there should not be unrealistic expectations created, even unintentionally, about it being a panacea.
Third, many of the case studies presented here indicate there are dynamic efforts by Papua New Guineans to find solutions to difficult problems, a willingness to contribute to the common good, and strong views about the way the state should be operating. A number of them also indicate interesting and creative roles being played by particular state institutions, and by donor-funded projects.

All of this could suggest alternative approaches and strategies to that involved in the ASPI paper and the ECP. In summary, this might involve a less exclusive focus on the role of technical assistance to strengthen the state. It might also involve more efforts to support and encourage community and other local-level initiatives of many kinds. ASPI talks of the need for its proposed program to ‘put a top priority on measures which help sustain and build demand for effective government and strong institutions among PNG’s people’ (ASPI 2004:41). However, in terms of the specifics of its proposed program, the only mention of such initiatives is a brief mention of possibly supporting civil society, and in particular women’s groups (ASPI 2004:48). It is suggested that it would be worth considering much more emphasis in this area.

Of course, it would not be wise to head too far down such a path without first undertaking careful research and evaluation concerning existing initiatives and their impacts — but the same caveat should apply in relation to all of the proposals being made by ASPI. Further, the greatest care would need to be taken in distribution of funds and support to local communities, for, as experience in Bougainville and elsewhere has shown, donor funding to communities can create its own problems. However, it is likely that many such initiatives can be encouraged with minimal funding support.

In summary, what is being proposed would be that in addition to the state and donors cooperating on capacity-building measures to improve state service delivery, the state and donors should work with communities to encourage community initiatives which build links both between communities, and between communities and the state, thereby strengthening the nation and building pressures for improved performance by the state.

More generally, however, there is a serious issue about the processes required to develop agreed programs of action. Any sense in PNG that decisions on programs are being made outside and largely imposed on PNG is likely to be counterproductive. If Australia is serious about assisting PNG to strengthen state and nation through the provision of significant additional funding, it should not begin by engaging with PNG about how best to pursue the four-part program proposed by ASPI. Rather, and ideally, Australia should begin discussions with a clean sheet, committed to developing joint proposals.

Summarising some perspectives

1. While there are many and perhaps deepening problems facing PNG, all is not failing, and indeed, there continues to be much that works in PNG.
2. While it is true that conflict and chaos will not usually be universally welcomed, at the same time they can contribute to positive developments.
3. What is strength or weakness, success or failure, problem or solution, in terms of development of the state and nation, will often not be readily judged in the short term. What is seen as a failure or weakness now may in 10, 20 or 50 years be seen as an important contributor to positive development.
4. Many individuals and groups are working to find their own solutions to problems in PNG, and in the process are developing the beginnings of new linkages between groups in society, and between such groups and the state, that are creating increasing pressure for development of a less ‘colonial’ and more ‘Melanesianised’ state to perform in accordance with peoples’ expectations.
5. Too great a focus on large-scale technical assistance and capacity building programs may well undermine locally generated pressures for change. Technical assistance is unlikely to be the only, or the best, way of state and national building.
6. There are no obviously applicable models for successful rapid engineering of state building or nation building.
7. Some possible implications for donors that arise from these perspectives include:
   - a need for much more detailed research about what is happening in state and society and for evaluation of the results being achieved by institutions, in PNG;
   - to better understand the complex situation in countries such as PNG, there is a need for policy-making bodies and aid agencies in Australia to have more staff with specialised knowledge of the countries that they are dealing with;
   - a need for personnel in policy-making bodies and aid agencies to build closer personal relationships in countries such as PNG, not only so that trends and developments can be better understood, but also so that potential misunderstandings about donor policies are minimised;
that processes directed at achieving change are much more likely to be successful if they are locally generated and driven than if imposed from outside; and
involvement of donors in locally generated processes for change, for which there is ample room, including through the use of conditionalities.

Relating the 'success stories' to wider developments

It may be helpful to relate the 'success stories' being examined in this volume to some of the wider issues just touched upon about the way that the state and society are developing in PNG. This might be done by asking what particular cases tell us about:

• the building of links between groups in society;
• whether groups are being encouraged to accept limits on their actions, especially limits on the use of violence in conflict and dispute resolution;
• whether activities of groups are contributing to building links between state and society, and creating pressures on the state to perform in particular ways, and/or to accept limits on the ways its institutions operate;
• whether groups are encouraging donors to operate as partners and supporters of locally initiated processes;
• what parts of the state are not only operating effectively, but are also contributing to building links with groups in society, and between such groups; and
• what experiences are there of donor programs working in partnership and in support of locally initiated processes that contribute to building links between groups in society, and between such groups and the state.

Notes

1. The ASPI strategy paper was available in draft form during the workshop where this presentation was made, and was referred to in that presentation. It was published soon after the November 2004 workshop, and so comment in this paper relates to the published version.

2. This description of Papua New Guineans originates in comments made by Mel Togolo at a workshop on land policy held at the Divine Word University. I am grateful to Father Pat Gersch for repeating the description to me.

References


Agriculture in Papua New Guinea: More good news than bad

R Michael Bourke, Department of Human Geography, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University

Introduction

One could be forgiveness for believing that agricultural production in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is in steep decline or, at best, is not performing well. Consider these three statements, the first from an official document of the PNG Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL); the second from a paper by a senior planner in DAL; the third from a group of strident Australian-based critics of PNG:

From 1980 to 1990, the agriculture sector grew by an average of 1.7% per year while the population growth was 2.3% per year, which led to a decline of almost 20% in per capita income in rural areas (DAL 2000).

the population growth rate of 2.3% a year during the 1980s exceeds the sector’s growth rate, which averaged less than 2% a year during the 1980s, causing a fall in real output per capita … Food production, at present, is growing at a rate of 1% per year, which is 1.3% slower than the population growth rate (Gwaiseuk 2001:31).

None of these statements accurately summarises the state of PNG agricultural production. In reality, food production has increased faster than population growth since 1998 and production of all of the export tree crops, except copra, has increased since 1980. The history of agricultural production in recent years has been a positive one. There are problems, there have been setbacks and there are still many challenges to be overcome, however, the overall story is much more positive than many commentators would have us believe.

There are five papers in this publication on aspects of agriculture in PNG that illustrate some of the success stories, without overlooking the problems. The first, written from the heart by Steven Pupune, tells the story of one farming family without overlooking the problems. The first, written from the heart by Steven Pupune, tells the story of one farming family in Papua New Guinea: More good news than bad... for the Port Moresby market over 25 years ago, and then of how their company grew to become the largest middlemen involved in fresh food marketing in PNG.

Two national-level papers from me complete this group. The first gives an overview of one of the biggest successes of PNG agriculture over the past 30 years, that of fresh food marketed within PNG. The second relays how ordinary PNG rural villagers overcame and survived the severe drought and frosts that affected much of PNG in 1997 and early 1998, emphasising that it was the villagers themselves and their urban-based kin who got most of them through that potential tragedy, not aid from overseas as is commonly believed.

To set the scene for the five papers that follow, I will give a brief overview of trends in agricultural production in PNG in recent decades. Agriculture in PNG may conveniently be considered as a number of sub-sectors — subsistence food production, domestically marketed food, non-food items sold on the domestic market, export tree crops, other export crops, and livestock mostly sold in the domestic market.

Trends in PNG agriculture

The most important sub-sector for PNG agriculture is subsistence food production. This provides most of the food that is grown in PNG (despite the myth that PNG is being overwhelmed by the urban staples of imported rice and flour-based foods). A 1996 study showed that 80 per cent of the food energy consumed in PNG was grown in the country (Gibson 2001:42). The proportion was even higher for rural villagers (84 per cent), as much of the imported food is consumed by urban people who obtain half their food energy from imported foods.

The proportion of food energy gained from locally grown food has almost certainly increased in the past decade. This is because imports of grains are static, and consumption of imported grain per person is falling. This is a result of the rapid rise in the urban market, induced by the decline of the PNG currency against the US dollar. In a recent study, Bourke and Vlassak (2004) estimated that 4.5 million tonnes of energy (stable) foods are grown in PNG each year, that is, a little more than one tonne every year for every rural village. They valued this production at K2850 million in 2004. Much of the increased production was from two crops that were introduced into PNG...
comparatively recently: sweet potato, which arrived 300–350 years ago, and cassava, which was introduced 130–200 years ago.

A large number of systems produce this food. A national-level field study conducted from 1990 to 1995 recorded almost 300 discrete "agricultural systems" (Bourke et al. 1998). The common characteristic of these systems is that they have been created by people who are innovative and who work within the constraints that the environment and their access to resources places on them.

Three components of the agricultural scene have performed exceptionally well in recent years. These are food grown and sold within PNG (domestically marketed food), the production and export of palm oil, and the spice vanilla. The first is addressed in three of the papers that follow: the overview of this sub-sector at a national level; the story of the fresh-food marketing company, Alele Fresh Farm Produce; and the tale of the Blue Corner farm, where the family’s main production is poultry meat. Many more success stories could be told about selling fresh food in PNG — most of the almost one million rural households in PNG sell fresh food.

During my November 2004 visit to Madang, I spent an afternoon in the Madang town market, charting with vendors and recording some of their stories (and explaining my interest in their marketing ventures when asked). I was struck by their innovativeness as they struggled to earn cash incomes for themselves and their families. Also impressive was the number of highlanders who had brought produce in significant quantities in their marketing ventures when asked. I was struck by their innovativeness as they struggled to earn cash incomes for themselves and their families. Also impressive was the number of highlanders who had brought produce in significant quantities from the highlands — a big change in Madang market over the past 20 years.

Vanilla production has been through a boom and bust over the past six years. The story is not told in this collection, but may be briefly summarised as follows. Only minor amounts of vanilla were grown in PNG until the late 1990s, when production was less than 500 kg per year. By 2003, production had exploded to about 200 tonnes, which represented some 10 per cent of world production, and PNG has become a major contributor to the world market (McGregor 2004). In 2004, vanilla exports declined rapidly, mostly because of quality issues. It is likely that production will stabilise at about 20–30 tonnes per year, much less than at the height of the boom of a few years ago, but still considerably more than production in the late 1990s. Vanilla is still a useful source of income for many rural villagers in the main growing areas, particularly in East Sepik Province. There is potential to increase exports of other spices, especially if niche and ‘organic’ markets are targeted, as the paper by Theresa Arek shows.

The export tree crops have generated significant cash income for many rural villagers over many decades. For each of the main commodities, the pattern has been one of slow initial growth, followed by rapid growth in production, then slower growth or, in the case of copra, stagnation. The standout success in this group over the past 30 years has been oil palm, which has grown from an infant industry in the early 1970s to the largest generator of export income in the agricultural sector from 2000 onwards. This is apparent in the growth rate for the 20-year period 1980–2000, where exports increased by over 500 per cent (Table 1). Oil palm has become the main economic driver in West New Britain and Oro provinces, and an important contributor in Milne Bay and New Ireland provinces. There is still potential for expansion of the area under oil palm, but suitable growing areas are not unlimited.

The growth rate for production of coffee (49 per cent), cocoa (39 per cent) and copra oil (24 per cent) has been good, if not spectacular, over this period. Production of the minor crops of rubber and tea has been low, but positive. Copra production has been static over this period (Table 1), although some copra has been redirected from exports to make copra oil which is exported. Aside from oil palm, the growth rates for all export crops have been less than the national population growth rate, which increased by 72 per cent between the 1980 census and the 2000 census.1

What these gross national figures hide is the difference between the smallholder (village) and plantation (estate) sectors. This distinction is important as the majority of PNG villagers live in households that are involved in production of export tree crops. The plantation sector has been in decline for all export tree crops over the past 25 years, apart from oil palm and the minor crop of tea. In contrast, the smallholder sector has been expanding for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Production (tonnes)</th>
<th>Growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>43,407</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>47,606</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>27,219</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra oil</td>
<td>33,283</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>3,812</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>7,061</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>140,883</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
1. The production data presented are means for five years, centred on 1980 and 2000. The 1980 figure is a mean for the five-year period 1978–1982; likewise the 2000 figure is a mean for the period 1998–2002. For copra, the second figure is for 2000 only.
2. The data used depends on its availability and are either production figures from industry sources (coffee and copra) or official export figures (other commodities).
Table 2  Growth rates of smallholder and plantation sectors for oil palm, coffee, cocoa and copra, 1980–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Growth rates (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smallholder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil palm</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The 1980 figure is a mean for the five-year period 1978–1982, likewise the 2000 figure is a mean for the period 1998–2002. The period for oil palm is 1985–1987 to 2001–2003 as disaggregated data were not available for the longer period.
2. Growth rates are derived from production figures, except for the combined figure for cocoa, which is for export quantities because of discrepancies between data sets. For oil palm, data are for fresh fruit bunch, not palm oil (as used in Table 1). The difference was dictated by data availability.

Concluding remarks
One issue that emerged strongly from the presentations on Alele Fresh Farm Produce and Pacific Spices is that certain private sector companies in PNG are contributing to the growth of village agriculture, but this is receiving little recognition or support from the PNG government or donors. These two companies are involved in helping villagers to grow and market their products, with Alele having an outreach division. There are other companies doing similar work, for example, Kongo Coffee Ltd in the Chuave area in Simbu Province. This lack of recognition and lack of support is a deficiency that needs to be addressed. The reality is that most agricultural outreach has collapsed in PNG and the private sector groups that are involved with this deserve some support.

The story of agriculture is mixed in recent decades. Some commodities are doing poorly, especially copra, while domestically marketed fresh food, oil palm and vanilla have performed spectacularly well. But overall, the men and women involved at every stage of these industries have done well. This is not to deny the many challenges that face Papua New Guinean rural villagers as they grow and market their crops and animals. For example, there are severe limitations imposed by poor environmental conditions to continuing expansion of the area devoted to cash crops. Much of PNG is characterised by steep topography, very high rainfall and inundation. Future growth in production and income will have to come from greater production from existing land under crops and from higher quality products — challenges that are common to agriculture in most of the world. There are possibilities for exporting produce into niche markets, for example through fair trade schemes and as organic produce.

There is a proportion of the population who are disadvantaged or very poor and who are engaged in subsistence food production, but have little access to markets and hence very low cash incomes. The locations of these people have been documented in detail and they constitute about 18 per cent of the rural population (Hanson et al. 2001:300). Continuing expansion of cash crop production, both food and export cash crops, is unlikely to assist many of the most disadvantaged people in PNG. Finally, the importance of good management of the national economy should be stressed. National policies do affect rural villagers, both positively and negatively, as the changes in the value of the PNG currency relative to the US dollar clearly illustrate.

The producers, processors and exporters involved in PNG agriculture have shown themselves to be innovative and adaptive and one can anticipate that this will continue to characterise agricultural production in PNG. That is a very different story from what one might imagine from the quotes given at the start of this article. I trust that you enjoy the five articles that follow and admire the women and men of rural PNG who are involved in agricultural production.

Acknowledgments
I am grateful to colleagues in the Land Management Group at the ANU for various assistance. In particular, Tracy Harwood did an editorial check on the six papers in this section; Bryant Allen commented on two of my papers; and Matthew Allen generated the data used in the tables of this paper.
Note
1. The actual population growth rate is probably somewhat less than the official figures indicate because of problems in the 2000 census, especially in parts of the highlands region.

References
Blue Corner Farm Business Group: 
A successful model of community development

Steven Pupune, Blue Corner Farm Business Group Inc

Introduction
My parents were simple subsistence farmers and they fostered my connection with the agriculture concept from an early age. They did not rely on money to sustain their family. Every day they worked in their food garden and involved us in this activity. This not only connected me to the land, but also taught me the importance of cultivating it for life’s sustenance. I still recall my father telling me: ‘If you don’t work the land and raise pigs, grow coffee, plant trees, then you are nothing. You will be a vagabond or a drifter with no roots. You will be a beggar and your children (if you are lucky to have a wife at all) will become beggars, rascals and bring you poverty and much disgrace.’ But how does that relate to PNG today?

Later, when I attended high school, we were encouraged to grow food to supplement school meals. The school had a tractor and Casper from Bogia ploughed up several hectares of land around the school property. The students were involved in tilling, planting, weeding, harvesting, cooking, and, of course, eating the produce. We also were allocated blocks of land, which were available for any individual who wanted to plant their own garden. These were called the garden haus. I had 2 garden haus and cultivated my own garden. During the weekends I worked in my garden, cooked my own food and rested in my own garden haus. Agricultural activities were also part of the school curriculum. In hindsight, I believe these two aspects of my upbringing firmly entrenched my connection to the land.

Decision to become self employed
My parents were getting old and were unable to work the land as they used to. I noticed that a substantial area of their garden land was going to bush. During a three-week recreational break around 1978, I went to the agriculture office to search for some things to do. I decided to purchase some egg-laying hens with my leave pay. I built a small bush material house and raised the chickens in this. This started as a hobby and when these chickens (36) began to lay eggs, I boiled them and sold them to the staff where I worked. Eventually I ordered more chickens, initially 100 and than 200. I increased the size of the bush house and stocked 400 and later 800 chickens.

The income generated was much more than the fortnightly wage that I was getting. So I handed in my resignation in December 1980. Initially, I started with my immediate family and later employed some labourers. I have never looked back. It is now 24 years since I made the decision to live off the land. It has been a long road. I have now on my land a very beautiful home and around this home are the farm activities, including poultry, a piggery, cattle, vegetables, fish ponds and vanilla. I also have a reservoir of A-grade mineral water, which is pumped from a well drilled in my backyard. This has been tested at the National Laboratory at Unitech, Lae. This water is currently used to water the farm, but I am hoping to develop this further into a water bottling business.

My success on the land has also impacted my own village and community. My extended family began to copy my way of life. They built permanent homes and decorated these with lawns and flowers. Surrounding villagers began looking at my home, my farm and lifestyle and started to copy this and they too have been successful. I have also branched into other income-generating activities. School children come on excursions to see some of the farm activities. Poultry (meat birds) is still our main activity. The egg-laying aspect ceased in 1997 because of the collapse of the PNG kina and the consequent high cost of stock feed. Currently, we are producing 500 meat birds every three weeks.

I have never had assistance from government or other people, except for some bank loans for non-agricultural activities. For this I am glad because I now fully appreciate and enjoy all my achievements. Right now there are about 12 people employed on the farm. I am certainly not a millionaire in the cash sense. However, with a beautiful home and family and with everything growing on the land for sustenance and being at peace with the Creator and the creations around, I feel I am a true millionaire.

I personally believe that every Papua New Guinean has the potential to become a millionaire when we begin to give due respect to the land and allow the land to look after us. For she is our mother — we all came out of her, we are sustained by her on our short journey and we will finally go back to Mother Earth.

Conclusion
I have tried to tell my story in the context of my success in agriculture. During the past two years, I have tried to take
agriculture to the next level. This is in the area of value adding. We have tried to grow our own rice and then mill it for consumption with the idea of packaging and selling it. We are currently growing peanut to make peanut butter with the view to selling this. We are also growing corn and cassava and milling these to make stock feed for our livestock and for our consumption as well. This requires many innovative ideas and some appropriate technology in the processing stage. These ideas are slowly being implemented on my farm. I hope I can get some experts as well as financial partners to assist with some of these ideas. I am also trying other import replacement activities to help solve some of our nation’s unemployment and economic problems.

True success does not come easy. It must start with a dream and being committed to that dream come what may. One must learn to walk through the valley before climbing to the top of the hill. There are never short cuts. But when you hit the top, you are less likely to fall because you are sitting on a huge boulder. When one’s success is built on short cuts and when there is an earthquake or a hurricane, there is nothing to shield or hold one up.

**Note**

* Steve Pupune completed high school at Divine Word High School (now the Divine Word University Campus) in Madang from 1971 to 1974. He then studied for matriculation at UPNG in 1975 before quitting studies in mid-1976 to work as public servant with the Department of Finance until 1980. He holds a current private pilot’s licence and served as Lord Mayor of Goroka Town from 1991 to 1996.
Development of Pacific Spices: A small producer, buyer and exporter spice venture

Theresa Arek, Managing Director, Pacific Spices

Introduction

Pacific Spices, based at Vunakanau near Rabaul in East New Britain, comprises growers, buyers, processors and exporters of herbs, spices and essential oils. The main emphasis of the company is to develop through on-site 'value addition' and to work closely with farmers and farming communities. This paper gives an overview of the development of Pacific Spices, the key factors in the company's development so far and its future direction, as well as highlighting the main areas that will need to be addressed and how, with some assistance, these areas can be further developed.

In 1997, there was a need to change the direction of my life, which meant a change in career. In making the change, I wanted to build on my existing skills, developed over 15 years in the forest industry. With my experience and agricultural background, combined with the experience of Ian Sexton, we decided to research the rehabilitation of the spice industry.

A key part of the research was to visit other spice-producing Pacific countries so as to get first-hand experience of spice operations. On our return, we realised that the potential in PNG was equal to or better than we had seen overseas. This convinced us to establish Pacific Spices with a clear goal to produce a diverse range of quality spices, and to develop a working relationship with the local farmers of East New Britain.

The first challenge was to create a cash flow. At that time the only spice commodity in any quantity in East New Britain was cardamom, which was grown in the Baining Mountains. Because of lack of markets, farmers had abandoned their plots which meant that the quantity available for sale was limited. There had been some ten years of no activity in the spice industry in the province. We then started the long and difficult road of sourcing markets which would accept limited quantities. Having found markets in Germany and New Zealand, we proceeded to develop and strengthen these relationships, finding out about market requirements and trends.

First five-year plan

By using research and market information, we were able to draw up a five-year plan. We kept in mind the need to build farmers' confidence by addressing some of the most frequently asked questions: What commodities do you buy and at what price? What can I plant that has a market? And, where can I get planting material from? The five-year plan outlined is based around three fundamental requirements: consistent purchasing at farmer level; quality control; and continued development. Some of the outcomes that arose during the implementation of the first five-year plan are presented in Table 1.

By 2000, the Vunakanau Nucleus Spice Farm was fully operational and Pacific Spices was exporting a range of spices on a regular basis. Production levels had risen from 4 tonnes to

Table 1 First five-year plan: Requirements and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i)</th>
<th>ii)</th>
<th>iii)</th>
<th>iv)</th>
<th>v)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Set up purchasing, processing and export of cardamom</td>
<td>Increase awareness and farmer confidence</td>
<td>Establish central facilities</td>
<td>Make available quality planting material</td>
<td>Further market research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain a spice operator licence</td>
<td>Set purchasing days</td>
<td>Establish a nucleus spice nursery</td>
<td>Encourage diversification and intercropping</td>
<td>Export chilli, nutmeg and turmeric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ and train staff</td>
<td>Set prices to enable continuous purchasing</td>
<td>Establish commercial demonstration blocks</td>
<td>Demonstrate a visible and working example</td>
<td>Become a consistent exporter of a range of quality spices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn processing and packaging procedures</td>
<td>Provide additional services to growers</td>
<td>Develop a centralised processing facility</td>
<td>Make available ready markets for farmer produce</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn export policies and import policies</td>
<td>Survey plots and forecast productivity</td>
<td>Make available a point of contact for farmers to obtain market information</td>
<td>Make available quality planting material</td>
<td>Set up satellite nurseries</td>
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<td>Learn documentation requirements and procedures</td>
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April 2005
Whilst developing a centralised processing and value addition plan to target a number of issues. These are listed in Table 2.

The Komgi case study

Whilst developing a centralised processing and value addition site, Pacific Spices continued to work closely with the cardamom farmers that we had initially dealt with. The remote village of Komgi in the Baining Mountains is situated some six hours walk from the nearest access road. Villagers there had demonstrated loyalty to the company and had shown a strong desire to develop further as a community. For this reason, Pacific Spices assisted Komgi villagers with setting up cardamom drying units, satellite nurseries and organic certification as an outreach grower group.

Market strategy

Pacific Spices has endeavoured to add more value to its products through new market strategies which are based on the positive characteristics of the company and its products. The following points have come from direct market feedback and are in line with the growing demands of existing and potential new high-end market outlets:

- fresh product;
- range of quality products;
- organic certification based on international standards;
- traceability to individual farmers;
- use environmental and sustainable farming methods; and
- target high-end market requirements.

Conclusions

The rehabilitation of the spice industry throughout PNG offers smallholder rural communities the opportunity to diversify and increase their overall net returns. The ability to generate consistent income, particularly in areas of high population concentration and land shortage, cannot be ignored. The production of spices and essential oils will directly improve the position of isolated communities, where accessibility precludes the production and sale of heavy bulky crops.

The challenge is to become a recognised long-term producer of quality spices and essential oils, which in turn requires three main areas to be addressed:

- the relatively low levels of spice production;
- the lack of processing facilities that meet world market standards; and
- the definition of a clear national strategy for the development of the spice industry to ensure a uniform quality standard across the country.

However, for a small private company such as Pacific Spices to maintain the level of development it has achieved to date and so maximise the return to smallholder farmers, it must bridge the growing gap between market standards and the reality at farmer level. To keep pace with the increasing quality demand of such markets, there is a need for significant investment in new

Table 2  Second five-year plan: Issues to be addressed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address the issues of small quantities through the sale of packaged</td>
<td>high-quality spices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market our products in PNG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take advantage of the increasing demand for traceable and</td>
<td>environmentally friendly products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connect the farmer to the higher-end market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist with the introduction of new marketable herb and spice crops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the local value addition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversify the income base for smallholder farmers, for example,</td>
<td>through production of essential oils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable isolated communities to value-add their agricultural</td>
<td>products, reducing the problems of poor roads and accessibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the value of natural tree products, so making them more</td>
<td>sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the marketability of certain agricultural products</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market products with organic certification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add further value through retail-ready packin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist with the marketing of additional agricultural crops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve value of organically grown crops by encouraging sustainable</td>
<td>and environmentally friendly farming methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain internationally recognised certification and hence demonstrate</td>
<td>potential markets the levels of management and standards of quality control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address the quality issues set out in the first five-year plan, we</td>
<td>attained by the company.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having accomplished many of the goals set out in the first five-year plan, we then re-evaluated the overall position and direction of the company. We now realise that the company is at a point where a second five-year plan can be put in place and implemented. The emphasis of the new five-year plan will be on 'on-site value addition'. The increase in net gain from value addition and quality awareness will broaden the farmers' economic base at a time when economic return from agriculture is under increasing pressure. In the coming five years (2005-2009), we plan to target a number of issues. These are listed in Table 2.

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technology. This in itself is a huge hurdle for most small private companies, as commercial banks are becoming more reluctant to fund agricultural-based development projects, particularly when they are pioneer ventures such as the production of essential oils. Assistance with the purchase of a K50,000 dryer can in fact change the entire marketing and supply potential of a company.

The need for private companies to receive assistance from donor organisations in the form of new technology and equipment is becoming more apparent. We constantly see consultants passing through PNG, funded by various donor organisations with papers being written on what should be done.

Yet, there is little opportunity for private companies to find the finance to implement such recommendations. Given that the market should be the first and last link in any development program, it is imperative that PNG remains in contact with the market through the ability to produce and deliver a quality product constantly.

We ask for the opportunity to discuss with donor organisations the requirements of the private sector. This is because the private sector is the driving force behind development and provides the sole connection between farmers such as those at Komgi and the international market.
Marketed fresh food: A successful part of the Papua New Guinea economy

R Michael Bourke, Department of Human Geography, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University

Introduction

Fresh food grown and sold within Papua New Guinea (PNG), or domestically marketed food, is one of the big success stories in the PNG economy. This is not widely recognised as there are few statistics on the subsector. You will not find data on this part of the economy in the Quarterly Economic Bulletin published regularly by the Bank of Papua New Guinea. Most arms-length commentators who use the bulletin as their source of information on the PNG economy do not acknowledge the magnitude of the fresh food subsector. Even when fresh food marketing is mentioned, it is mostly the introduced vegetables which are considered — items such as potato, broccoli, carrot, tomato and capsicum. These vegetables are only a small part of this success story. Many types of fresh foods, both indigenous and introduced, are marketed within PNG, and the energy food crops such as sweet potato, banana, sago, taro and yam are a major part of this subsector.

History of marketed fresh food in PNG

Prior to the colonial period, food was bartered in parts of what is now PNG. This was particularly marked where ecological contrasts were strongest, that is, where people who lived reasonably close to each other had access to very different environments, because of differences in inundation (flood), rainfall and altitude. For example, many people in the Sepik River region exchanged fish for sago. Elsewhere, coastal folk commonly traded coconut, betel nut and marine foods, including fish, with people living in nearby inland locations who provided taro, yam, banana, green vegetables and other garden produce. For example, this was common on the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain and the north coast of the Huon Peninsula. Similarly, people from very small islands often provided marine foods to those on nearby larger islands, who gave their garden produce in return. These patterns of trade continue in modern PNG. People commonly use currency for the transactions nowadays, but some barter markets still persist, for example, between villagers on the small islands west of Buka Island and those on Buka.

These pre-contact markets have greatly expanded in modern times. Markets can now be found throughout PNG. The largest are in the bigger cities and towns, but food markets exist in urban centres, logging camps, and at institutions such as church missions, hospitals and government stations. Village and roadside markets are also common. Trade is particularly vigorous where people have access to different resources, for example, between people living on settlement blocks and their neighbours who have access to marine foods and tree crops such as coconut and betel nut. Villagers started to sell fresh food to government officials, church workers and other outsiders, both expatriate and PNG New Guinean, as soon as the outsiders arrived. More formal town markets followed. For example, there was a marketplace in Rabaul by 1920, and probably earlier, and marketplaces were established in the main highland centres in the 1950s.

As well as these urban and rural food markets, a lot of fresh food is sold through supermarkets, in other stores, to high schools and directly to other consumers, including to hotels and hostels. Until the early 1970s, there was little locally grown fresh food sold in supermarkets in the towns or even served in the hotels. This started to change with the establishment of a government-run Fresh Food Project (FFP) in 1973.1 The FFP established buying depots in Port Moresby, Lae, Wau, Kainantu, Goroka and Mount Hagen, which ran until late 1981 when the FFP ceased to operate. Numerous other provincial-based buying depots have been established over the past 25 years, most of which functioned for some years before being abandoned. Another policy decision that led to an acceleration of marketed vegetables was a partial ban on importation of certain vegetables, which the PNG government put in place in 1983. This was extended in 1986 and that gave the industry a further promotion.2

A change that continues to occur is the growth of intermediate traders or middlemen. Up to the late 1960s, the people selling fresh food had grown it themselves. As Epstein (1982:12) put it, 'there is a striking absence of any wholesale transactions; practically all vendors sell what they themselves produce to buyers who are the ultimate consumers'. This situation started to change from about the late 1960s, when some people started to buy from the producers and sell food to consumers. This trend is continuing. There are many people who make significant income from acting as middlemen. They might operate at a local level, for example, buying in the main town market and selling the food or betel nut within the same town. But many people take food and other produce long distances, for example, to mining sites and to Port Moresby. This growth in the number of middlemen is a sign of a maturing economy and this trend indicates increasing efficiency in the marketing chain.
A falling PNG currency and new opportunities

Another policy decision which had a positive impact on marketed food, particularly energy foods, was the devaluation of the PNG currency in 1994. The currency dropped from being at parity with the US dollar in the early 1990s to about US$0.85 in 1994 (Bank of Papua New Guinea 2001). This made locally grown foods, such as sweet potato, more competitive with imported rice and flour-based foods. This trend was accelerated by a large decline in the value of the PNG kina in 1997. The currency was worth about US$0.70 in 1997 and has declined to a range of US$0.20–$0.30 since then. So, over the past eight years, the PNG currency has lost about two-thirds of its buying power against the US dollar. The result has been a threefold increase in the price of imported foods, including rice and wheat, from currency movement alone.

In recent years, the weak PNG currency has made life tough for many urban people as the price of the urban staples of rice and flour-based products has risen rapidly. But this weakness has provided opportunities for rural food producers. They have responded to the increased demand for locally grown food from both urban and rural dwellers by producing more food for sale. The trend is particularly marked in the highlands, where the returns received by coffee producers are low because the global price for coffee has fallen. This drop in the spending power of highland villagers can be illustrated by comparing the selling price of coffee with the buying price of rice. In 1999, if a villager sold a kilogram of parchment coffee in Goroka, they could buy three kilograms of imported rice at a store. By 2004, sale of one kilo of coffee would not yield enough money to buy even one kilo of rice.

It is noticeable how the size of food markets has increased in recent years, as has the volume of produce passing through them. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, long-term and intensive short-term studies were conducted on a number of markets in Eastern Highlands and Southern Highlands provinces (Bourke 1986; Bourke et al. 2004). When I have visited these markets in recent years, I have been struck by how much more produce is passing through them compared with 25 years ago. Similarly, there are more marketplaces in most larger urban areas now. These range from the main formal marketplace to numerous small roadside markets.

Size of the fresh food subsector

There are limited statistics on the volume and value of marketed fresh food in PNG. But there is enough data to indicate that this part of the economy is large and there are some statistical indications of the recent growth. We know that most food that is consumed in PNG is actually grown in PNG. In 1996, 80 per cent of the food energy consumed came from locally grown food (Gibson 2001). However, this proportion has almost certainly increased since then because imports of grain per person have fallen in recent years. Since 2000, rice imports per person have fallen at about 4 per cent per year and wheat imports at about 1 per cent per year. There is no indication that people are eating less food in PNG. The shortfall of imported food is being met by increased subsistence food production and more sales of fresh food, particularly the energy foods including the root crops, banana and sago.

Production of the staple foods alone is estimated as 4.5 million tonnes in 2000 (Bourke and Vlassak 2004). There were 4.3 million rural villagers in PNG in mid 2000. On average, each rural village produces a little over a tonne per year of the staple foods (1050 kg), of which almost two-thirds (64 per cent or 670 kg) is sweet potato. Other important staple foods are banana, cassava, yam, Chinese taro, true taro, coconut and sago. We do not know the proportion of food that is sold, although we do know that a lot of sweet potato moves from the highlands to urban lowland centres, including to Port Moresby (Benediktsson 2002). If only 1 per cent of that quantity was marketed, that would be 45,000 tonnes of the energy foods alone. However, as casual observation shows, the energy foods are only a small proportion of the foods that are sold daily in fresh food markets in PNG. Hence the total volume moving through markets each year is much greater than this figure.

We do have a reasonably good estimate of the total cash income that is provided from sale of fresh food. This comes from a nationwide survey of village agriculture conducted between 1990 and 1995, known as the Mapping Agricultural Systems in PNG project (MASP). The estimated value in 1996 was K40 million per year. That was second only to the value of Arabica coffee (K60 million) and more than cocoa, betel nut/betel pepper, copra, oil palm and fish (Allen et al. 2001:543). The figure for cash income is now much greater, although we do not have a current estimate of the value of domestically marketed food in PNG. It is greater, firstly, because the prices of fresh foods have risen in local markets, although these prices have not risen as much as the prices of imported foods (we know this from data gathered for the Consumer Price Index at five towns). Secondly, food imports are falling and villagers are responding by growing and selling more food. While the magnitude of these increases has not been documented, there is much anecdotal evidence for this. Even casual roadside conversations with villagers show the changing pattern, and, again, this is most noticeable in the coffee-growing areas of the highlands.

The MASP data showed that the number of rural people living in households where fresh food was sold was also significant (Allen et al. 2001:543). Almost 80 per cent of rural villagers live in a household where income is derived from selling fresh food. The next most important economic activity for rural
villagers is selling coffee. That is done by just under half of rural households (38 per cent sold Arabica coffee and 9 per cent sold Robusta coffee). Other important economic activities in terms of number of people involved were sale of betel nut and betel pepper (31 per cent of people), firewood (26 per cent), cocoa (20 per cent), tobacco (17 per cent) and copra, fresh fish and cattle (each 14 per cent). The striking thing about the data on both the income from various agricultural sources and the number of people involved is that the informal part of the economy is so significant. This side of the PNG economy is rarely mentioned by commentators and its magnitude is greatly underestimated. Of the nine commodity groups discussed above, three are export crops (coffee, cocoa, copra) and appear in official statistics. The other six commodities or commodity groups are sold on the domestic market and are generally neglected by official sources.3

The future

Despite the impressive gains that have been made with marketed fresh food in PNG over the past 30 years, there is potential for still further expansion. There is unsatisfied demand for more energy (staple) foods, sweet fruit, edible nuts and vegetables. Highlanders have a great appetite for sweet fruit, as most locally grown fruit in the highlands is not sweet.6 Well-presented sweet fruit, including mangoes from the seasonally dry lowlands and mandarins from the intermediate altitude zone (600-1200 m altitude) can be readily sold in the highlands in large quantities. Other fruit with potential for expansion in sales include rambutan and mangosteen. As the PNG economy continues to mature and become more integrated, the cost of transporting and selling fresh produce is likely to fall relative to imported food. This will provide further opportunities for expanded production of locally grown staples.

A number of factors are inhibiting expansion of the fresh food industry in PNG. These include: transport problems associated with poorly maintained roads and bridges; inadequate security for traders; poor handling of produce; post-harvest diseases, particularly fungal rots; inadequate linkages between producers, traders and retailers; and poor linkages between producers, researchers, other public sector development staff and those in the agricultural service business sector, for example, those selling agricultural inputs.

Many of the obstacles to development have been partially addressed in recent years, but much remains to be done. Those who are most closely involved in this dynamic subsector often appear to be overwhelmed by the numerous problems that fresh food marketing faces. However, when one looks at the huge gains that have been made over the past 30 years, the current problems seem less daunting, and more gains are likely in the future.

Notes

1. See McKillop (1981) for the policy background and a description of the demonstrations by women in Port Moresby in 1974 that led to an acceleration of that project, and Gorogo (1976) for an early review of the project in Central District.
2. See the paper by Graeme Ross in this issue for a similar perspective on this. These import bans were lifted in the 1990s.
3. The value against the US dollar is quoted here, as that is the currency in which imports and exports are denominated.
4. Rice production in PNG was estimated by Bourke and Vlassak (2004) at 400 tonnes per year. There has been an increase in the quantity of rice grown in parts of the highlands and Momase regions since these surveys were conducted, but total production is unlikely to exceed 1000 tonnes and certainly not more than 2000 tonnes, despite some recent assertions that 10,000 tonnes of rice is now grown in PNG annually.
5. Oil palm provided direct income for only 3 per cent of people for this period, but the significance in the national economy is much greater than this as it is the main economic driver in West New Britain, Oro and Milne Bay Province and is important in New Ireland also. Oil palm production has increased rapidly over the 10 years since these data were recorded.
6. The main exception is a type of passionfruit (Passiflora ligularis) known locally as sugar fruit. This was a minor crop in the late 1970s, but production has expanded greatly over the past 25 years.

References


Marketing fresh food in Papua New Guinea: The Alele story

Graeme Ross, General Manager, Alele Farm Fresh Produce Ltd

Introduction
I would like to share some of our development programs which began in 1978. The first issue that needed to be addressed was, ‘who are we and what are we going to do?’. Our company, Alele Farm Fresh Produce Ltd, is directed by five women from a Milne Bay family — Taima, my wife, and her sisters Labini, Gari, Rita and Cynthia. Our objective was to supply fresh vegetables to Port Moresby. At that time, imported fruit and vegetables dominated the supply chain and little PNG produce was in display cabinets. Few linkages from grower to the stores were in place for locally grown fresh food and the general feeling was that one could not grow or supply quality produce for the supermarkets.

I realised the huge market potential and did my sums. The predictions, based on known yields and type of produce looked great on paper, enough to make a bank manager smile and hopefully keep us busy. Little did I realise the long hard road that the PNG fruit and vegetable industry would have to travel to be what it is today. With only K5000 in our bank account and a strong objective to be a farmer, the new enterprise began. I stress here that our objective has always been to grow and distribute PNG fruit and vegetables, and this is still our driving force. We are farmers and have experienced what farmers need, their expectations, pride in national development, and their disappointment when their hard work of growing perfect produce is casually rewarded by being told to ‘come back next week — I don’t need it now’.

Building the business
And so our venture began in January 1978. Our great plans began on a leased plantation in Central Province. This was three hours drive from Port Moresby and the future home for Alele. This is still our registered head office and is situated on the lower part of the Kemp Welsh River. It consists of 2000 acres of mainly undeveloped river flats and broken down machines. I well remember our very first sale of 20 kg of snake beans and some capsicum delivered to the Gateway Hotel. This was success for us and our lifestyle began. It is hard to give a sequence of events of nearly 27 years of development and I will only highlight some of our experiences.

Our small car had to be replaced with a second hand utility for K900. The utility had an engine heating problem, so next came our new Mazda truck nine months later, financed with a loan. A bank loan was used to purchase the plantation and many production materials, including a large glasshouse where we could grow four tonnes of tomatoes a week. We used a grafting method to overcome bacterial wilt. One night, just as our juicy tomatoes were ready for sale, a huge electrical storm blew the roof off and ruined nearly all the tomatoes. They were insured for storm damage and replacement but we could not claim as the entire crop was not destroyed. I felt like giving up, but my wife took a positive attitude and we began again. Then came many events — flood, fire, workers’ strikes, rejection by retailers, bogged trucks, new vehicles, tractors, irrigation equipment, special orders for our produce for a visit by Queen Elizabeth, and three trips a week with produce cartons on our shoulder in search of sales in government offices.

Eight years later we gave up our dream to be vegetable farmers and turned our attention to grain production for Ilimo farm near Port Moresby. Just after our financial arrangements for grain production came through, a new government policy to ban vegetable imports came into being in 1986. I was asked to advise the Department of Agriculture and Livestock, under the ministry of Dennis Young. This strong policy was the real beginning of our PNG fruit and vegetable industry. An advisory board was put in place to advise the minister and farmers all over the country responded by producing fresh food for sale.

A fresh start
Alele was active again. Our development started to broaden and we opened our Port Moresby branch. The focus moved from being producers to being middlemen. We received training in tax incentives for exporting overseas, and there were even partial bans on imported rice to assist the local sweet potato industry. The 1980s were the real beginning of our realisation of industry success. But everyone forgot the need to maintain the quality of fresh produce. Studies were done on how best to transport vegetables from the highlands to other centres. However, there was no proper finance and donor aid was not given to the people directly working in the industry. Other challenges the producers faced were the reduction in protection from imported produce and a major increase in the cost of airfreight.

At this stage, Alele had to provide a full transport service, including semitrailers and cooler containers, if we were going to move the fresh food quickly and in peak condition from the
producers to the retailers. This was financially challenging and interest rates were as high as 26 per cent per year, but we went ahead. Our peak distribution has been 106 tonnes of fresh food in one week with over 65 types of food. PNG can be proud of this achievement. Alele now has five major transport depots throughout PNG, facilitating vegetable distribution.

One of the major reasons for success is consultation and exchanging information. Alele has been very active in promoting our products. Show displays have been made at the Port Moresby Agricultural Show, and in Enga, Goroka and Morobe where we take time to listen and talk with farmers. They are a very talented people with courage to take on challenges. Alele has mounted displays in the Gold Coast and Sydney international food and beverage shows. PNG coconuts are sought after and we have conducted successful trial shipments. You have to teach Aussies how to correctly crack a coconut with a straight line, but they love the fresh taste of coconuts from a close neighbour.

Aside from the vegetables, some of our new products include Pati rice from our own plantation and vegetable compost made from waste vegetables. The latter is sold as three lines — seed raising mix, vegetable compost and Quick Grow. Alele has continued to provide advice to farmers and has set up an extension and development division. This began just before potato late blight destroyed 95 per cent of potato production in PNG. Helping the industry recover has been a successful story and I want to discuss how the private sector reacted to help bring about regeneration of an industry worth approximately K110 million to the PNG national economy.

Potato late blight
The fungal disease potato late blight was first sighted in the Sirunki area of Enga Province in the highlands in January 2003. Within weeks, the disease had spread through the highlands and devastated the PNG potato industry. Links between growers, the business sector and public sector institutions are weak. The Fresh Produce Development Company advised growers not to save seed from infected plants and not to retain seed of the currently used Sequoia variety.

A potato late blight working group was formed by representatives of the private sector in mid-February. The committee had membership drawn from the following groups: Chemica Ltd, Farmset Ltd, Kelta Potatoes, Alele Farm Fresh Produce and the Rural Development Bank. Fungicide trials were conducted by this committee. Fungicides tested were Bordeaux mixture (copper sulphate and quicklime), Bravo (chlorothalonil), Kocide (cupric hydroxide), copper oxychloride and Copper Nordox (cuprous oxide). The trials established that application of fungicides could control the disease.

Training programs for potato growers were conducted in Eastern Highlands, Western Highlands and Enga provinces. A total of 886 farmers received training on potato production. Aspects covered were management, safety, spray technology, recommended fungicides and field practice. The four companies involved in the program spent over K200,000 on farmer training and sponsorship programs. The latter includes provision of seed, chemicals, safety equipment, fertilisers and knapsack sprayers.

As a result of the training, farmers can produce 19 bags of potatoes from each bag planted. This is a better return than what was being achieved prior to the disease outbreak and can be attributed to better all-round plant husbandry. As a result of these interventions by the working committee, the potato industry has made a partial recovery from potato late blight. By late 2004, potato production had recovered to about 20 per cent of levels prior to the blight.

Conclusion
The management of Alele as farmers wholesaler, retailer, extension transporter, specialised distributor and developer of new products is committed to pioneer in new directions for the PNG fruit and vegetable industry and proud of the competitive results the company has achieved. This industry has a great future ahead.
Introduction
In 1997, a major drought and series of frosts seriously affected people in Papua New Guinea (PNG), and many people in the western Pacific and eastern Indonesia. This was one of the three worst droughts to affect PNG over the past century. The other big droughts occurred in 1914 and 1941, with the 1997 event arguably the severest of the three. The drought, and the repeated frosts at high altitude, had a major impact on many aspects of villagers' lives in much of PNG, particularly on their food supply. Crop yields were reduced and, in many places, crop production failed completely. Other outcomes included a reduction in the quantity and quality of drinking water and an increase in the incidence of human disease. By the end of 1997, comprehensive field assessments indicated that 1.2 million villagers (almost 40 per cent of the rural population) were suffering severe food shortages, which were life-threatening in some cases.

This paper summarises how the affected people responded and how most survived this crisis. The paper draws on a number of published papers by the author and colleagues, including Allen (2000), Allen and Bourke (2001), Bourke (1999), Bourke (2000), and a series of 17 papers published in the Proceedings of the PNG Food and Nutrition 2000 Conference (Bourke, Allen and Salisbury 2001).

Increase in the death rate in remote places
Between August and December 1997, a number of teams conducted impact assessments for the PNG and Australian governments throughout almost all PNG. There were credible reports of increased death rates in a number of locations, for example, in remote parts of inland Gulf Province and in the relatively isolated Kandep and Marient basins in Enga Province. These reports were confirmed by four studies which showed that death rates during and after the drought and frosts were considerably greater than the long-term average in certain remote locations. The studies were conducted in inland Gulf Province (Lemonnier 2001), the Hewa-speaking area in the north-west corner of Southern Highlands Province (Haley 2001), the Lake Kioigo area of Southern Highlands (Robinson 2001) and an area north of Nomad in Western Province (Dwyer and Minnegal 2000). The rates in some isolated areas were recorded as high as 25 deaths per 1000 people (Haley 2001) and 70 deaths per 1000 people (Lemonnier 2001). These death rates are much higher than the mean crude death rate for all PNG of 12 deaths per 1000 persons per year.

The common characteristic of the locations where the death rate increased is poverty. Poverty is defined broadly and includes: people who have very low cash incomes; low levels of secondary and post-secondary education; little or no road access; many children malnourished; and limited access to health, education, other services and information. In addition, people live in physical environments not favourable for agricultural production. People in all the locations noted above were classed as suffering from 'moderate or severe disadvantage' in a nationwide study of disadvantage or poverty. That study found that 18 per cent of the rural population live in locations classed as moderately disadvantaged (15 per cent) or severely disadvantaged (3 per cent) (Hanson et al. 2001:300).

Survival
Most PNG villagers affected by the drought and frosts survived, despite the partial and complete failure of garden production, illness, inconvenience and water supply problems. They did this through their own ingenuity. The remainder of this paper focuses on how people survived what was, for most of them, an unprecedented crisis. People responded in a number of ways, and the combination of responses depended on where people lived and their circumstances. Different combinations of responses were used, even by closely located communities, including:

- eating food that would normally be fed to pigs and other livestock;
- eating greater quantities of food that would normally be eaten in smaller amounts, for example, coconut, sago, green pawpaw, small green bananas, various leafy greens, including fig leaves (Ficus copiosa and F. dammaropsis), cassava tubers from abandoned food gardens, mango fruit, and nuts of the sea almond (Terminalia catappa);
- eating emergency foods, including the basal part of banana plants, self-sown pueraria tubers (Pueraria lobata) and wild yam tubers;
- buying imported rice and wheat-based foods; and
• migrating to other rural locations or to urban centres (it is not known how many people migrated, but in some locations, such as the Kandep Basin in Enga Province, it was reported that up to half the population had moved to lower altitude or urban locations).

People found many ways to obtain cash with which to buy rice and flour. These included drawing down their savings; diverting cash income from 'luxuries' such as frozen chicken and travel to buy carbohydrate foods; selling stored coffee and other cash crops; making and selling copra; selling live pigs and killing pigs to sell the meat; and making and selling string bags, carvings and other manufactured items. There were reports of increased crime in some urban and highland locations, for example, in Chimbu Province (Kiza and Kin 2001:215) and some truckloads of food were looted on the Highlands Highway.

Imports of rice increased by 61,000 tonnes (or 36 per cent) for the year ending 31 March 1998 compared with the corresponding period a year earlier. Most of the additional rice (82 per cent) was purchased by rural villagers or their urban relatives who gave it to them. The remainder was bought by the PNG government (10 per cent), the Australian government (4 per cent), provincial governments (3 per cent) and various NGOs, churches and politicians (1 per cent).1

It is widely believed by many people in PNG and in Australia that the actions of the Australian government saved the bulk of the PNG rural population from starvation. The Australian government, through AusAID and the Australian Defence Force, made a valuable contribution to the relief effort in a number of ways, including financing the impact assessments, buying rice, flour and cooking oil, and transporting the relief food to remote communities which did not have road access (Sudradjat 2001). There can be little doubt that, without the efforts of the Australian government, the death rate in some of these remote locations would have been even higher. However, the bulk of the affected rural PNG population saved themselves using their own ingenuity — 'clever people solving difficult problems' (to quote the title of an opening paper in this collection).

Over the period 1950 to 1975 (and later), Australia helped the development of PNG. Because the infrastructure and cash cropping was in place, villagers were able to help themselves when the 1997 crisis affected them. An examination of the large impact of the same drought on the people of the Indonesian province of Papua (West New Guinea) (Ballard 2000) reveals how the lack of infrastructure and development there meant that villagers were much less able to solve the problems posed by the unprecedented drought and frosts. Returning to PNG, it needs to be acknowledged that most rural villagers survived this crisis through their own efforts and the support of their urban kin. As Allen and Bourke (2001:162) wrote:

The ability of people to cope with extremely difficult conditions should be recognised and publicised. The people of PNG should be proud of their own efforts during 1997 and should not be left thinking that they were rescued from disaster by another country.

Some lessons learnt

There were many things learnt from the exceptional drought and frosts in 1997, and some of those lessons are discussed in the series of papers in the Proceedings of the Papua New Guinea Food and Nutrition 2000 Conference (Bourke et al. 2001). One of the most important lessons was that those people living in the poorest communities, and the poorest people in all communities, suffered the most. This can be illustrated by examining the impact in coastal and inland Central and Gulf provinces. As a meteorological event, the drought was particularly severe and prolonged on the coastal parts of Central Province and parts of Gulf Province. However, villagers in the coastal areas have many relatives working in Port Moresby. While inconvenienced, they were able to access cash and imported food in the city and escaped the effects with only inconvenience. In marked contrast, people living in isolated inland locations in those two provinces suffered badly, with a documented increased death rate in parts of inland Gulf Province.

It was the isolated inland locations on the mainland of New Guinea where the drought had the worst impact on villagers. My estimate is that the same order of additional deaths occurred as a result of the 1997 drought and frosts as happened with the spectacular 1998 tsunami in the Sissano Lagoon area of Sandaun Province. I suggest that there were an additional 2000–3000 deaths in PNG in late 1997 and early 1998 that can be directly attributed to the drought and frosts.

These isolated places are located between the lowlands and the highlands (in the highlands fringe) where cash incomes are low, there are few or no roads, there is minimal access to health and education services and people do not have access to coconuts and marine foods. Some people in remote highland locations also suffered greatly. The contrast between the situation in the high altitude Tambul Basin in the Western Highlands and the Kandep/Marient basins in Enga Province illustrates the importance of development. Villagers in both locations lost most of their sweet potato and other crops to the repeated frosts. Round cabbages were one of the few crops to survive in both locations. In the former area, people could make the trip to Mount Hagen town and sell sufficient cabbages to buy enough rice to survive, but in the more remote high altitude basins in Enga, the distance and the state of the roads precluded this option and people's suffering was much greater. The other environment where the impact was particularly severe was on small and isolated islands, especially on raised coral atolls in Milne Bay Province, where people did not have access to shallow lagoons and the fish that they contain.
Some other important lessons learnt from the events of 1997 may be summarised as follows:

- Subsistence food production is an important, often overlooked, part of the PNG economy. It took a partial failure of subsistence food production in 1997 to remind everyone what an important part of the national economy that this represents. However, villagers do need help to maintain and strengthen subsistence food production in the face of continuing rapid population growth, climate change, an HIV/AIDS epidemic and other challenges facing PNG.

- Cash income is very important for rural villagers. It allows them to improve the quality of their lives, including educating their children beyond primary level and accessing health services in urban areas. When subsistence food production fails, for whatever reason, cash allows people to "buy their way out of trouble" by purchasing locally grown or imported food.

- Maintenance of roads, bridges and other transport infrastructure is important for the welfare of rural people, as this facilitates earning cash and accessing services based in urban centres.

- The very low levels of services to rural villagers, especially in remote locations, exposed by the 1997 food shortages and increased levels in human disease, should not be forgotten.

- The fall in the value of the PNG currency, while welcome for those growing export cash crops, is not beneficial for those with no export cash crops. The rapid increase in the price of imported rice since the drought ended, caused by the fall in the value of the PNG kina, means that another failure of subsistence food production would result in greater hardship for many people.

For most rural villagers, it was development and the associated cash income that helped them get through the impacts of the 1997 drought and frosts. Development does matter. The bulk of the PNG population demonstrated how they used the benefits from development to survive one of the most widespread and severe natural disasters that they have experienced in the past century. This was not a trivial achievement.

**Note**

1. The Japanese government also donated a further 8000 tonnes of rice, but that was not distributed until the worst impact of the drought and frosts was over in early to mid 1998 and that has not been included in the figures here.

**References**


Models for successful rural development

Hartmut Holzknecht, School of Resources, Environment and Society, and Visiting Fellow, Resource Management in Asia Pacific, Australian National University

Introduction

The three presentations in the rural development session of the conference focused on 'good news' stories. Two of the three focus on developments in two separate rural areas of Morobe Province; the third discusses in a more general sense one possible mechanism for helping to drive such 'rural development' in the present and future, that of incorporated land groups. This paper draws attention to some of the common features between the presentations in the rural development session.

For the presenters on the Burum and Lower Waria valleys, 'rural development' means for people in communities to engage in a very proactive, bottom-up, people-focused and participatory kind of development through a process, or, better, a series of processes, that they themselves control. Over a long period of time, people in both areas have experienced the kind of official neglect that is part and parcel of living in a remote part of Papua New Guinea (PNG). In both Burum and Lower Waria, the people, under determined leadership, reacted to the lack of development by undertaking their own development programs.

Mechanisms for successful rural development

The stories from the Burum and Lower Waria valleys make little of the difficulties encountered in trying to bring progress to these communities — dealing with bureaucracies at every level, dealing with processes that are basically political in the PNG context and at the same time establishing and maintaining community interest, focus and involvement in order to achieve results over a long period of time. In addition, remote rural areas usually suffer from a complete lack of access to information, while communication channels are either very basic or non-existent. These are all separate but interconnected elements that need to be managed and controlled so that rural development — in the broadest sense — will work to the benefit of rural communities.

We know that rural development in any context in many countries is a complex business. If it is only top-down development — as all government and donor aid projects tend by their nature to be — it is generally less than satisfactory because such programs or projects are usually managed from above, usually from a distance and usually with only a low level of local input and active engagement. Opportunities for the recipient individuals and/or their communities to adopt and internalise any of the new or adapted methods, knowledge or processes is limited. Moreover, these programs or projects survive only for as long as outside funding continues.

A bottom-up approach, where communities themselves undertake activities in line with their own priorities, also presents difficulties. Such an approach depends on good local leadership, on access to financial resources, on a consistency of approach and on being able to negotiate a productive way through levels of bureaucracy, where political games are often being played, as well as keeping up the home communities' energies, focus and application over long periods before real results emerge.

A third strategy necessarily emerges, the development of productive link-ups between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches. Rural communities, unless their efforts are very well organised, do not have access to sufficient funding to enable them to put in place their own projects, while PNG authorities seem reluctant to move in this direction, even though it is the logical consequence of the decentralisation and devolution approach the national government has been working towards since 1995–1996.

Development management processes

Rural development, then, is a complex business, but how can such complexity be properly managed? The following two case studies show quite clearly that any program manager or coordinator can never take action with just one objective in mind. This means that most problems or challenging situations have to be approached, considered and planned for with multiple objectives in mind, that is, in an integrated manner. There are many factors that are common to or characterise rural development. Those that consistently emerge are:

- managing through adaptive processes;
- managing with the community in mutually acceptable processes;
- managing bureaucratic processes at a number of levels;
- managing up through a number of political levels and processes; and
- managing based on good access to information and communications.
For a clearer understanding of some of the processes that these two case studies present, think of a juggler who is trying to keep a number of balls in the air. The processes set out above can be thought of as five balls that any effective manager or communities seeking to harness the complexity of rural development must juggle simultaneously and keep juggling to get positive results. It can be quite easy to drop one or more balls, affecting the successful outcome of a community's plans. For a juggler, there are many distractions that threaten his balance, difficulties caused by standing on unstable ground, changing priorities or loss of support. In addition, he/she has to keep an eye out for changing conditions and be able to adapt to them. Each of these processes are commented on below.

**Adaptive processes**

Adaptive processes and being able to keep multiple objectives in play underlie all successful rural development activities — adaptation, innovation, lateral thinking, a leader going out on a limb if they know they have the whole community's support. All these make a difference. What becomes clear is that it is not just the different factors and their details that are important, but the actual dynamics of an evolving situation that are the key to maintaining direction and achieving sought-after outcomes. Leaders and managers need consistent goals and directions for their activities, but must be prepared to adapt to ever-changing situations and contexts on the way to achieving results. In this 'game' of rural development, the failures are as important to learn from as the successes.

**Community processes**

Of all the elements in rural development, the behaviour of human beings, whether in organisations or not, is probably the most complex and most difficult to predict. Melanesian societies have a sociopolitical framework for the decision making needed in rural development in this region. The kinship relationships that underlie clans and sub-clans and the alliances and friendships between such groups are strong and enduring, forming the basis of this framework.

Locally based rural development, as both the Burum and Lower Waria stories quite clearly set out, cannot succeed unless everyone in a community is involved, committed and works together towards achieving particular goals. But, these days, communities cannot exist or succeed by themselves. They are integral parts of local level government wards or of church circuits, these being parts of government or church districts and so on up to national level, and some beyond to the international level. One of the important tasks for both leaders and community processes is to maintain people's enthusiasm and involvement, to keep people up-to-date by facilitating access to information and good communication systems. Without this, mistrust, rumour and jealousy emerge and are difficult to eradicate.

**Bureaucratic processes**

The sometimes stultifying and channelling actions of bureaucracies have limited rural development in PNG, as well as elsewhere in the world. At various levels, bureaucracies may be controlled or influenced by local elites so that other groups quickly become disadvantaged and unable to receive equal benefits. Nevertheless, bureaucracies can and do have significant roles to play in supporting rural development. If bureaucrats are involved in the planning of rural development in a particular area with the communities from that area, it is more likely that they will want to see the results of their involvement, much like communities themselves.

More usually, however, communities see themselves as battling against the unbendable timetables and limitations set down by departments and by district, provincial and national bureaucracies. The Lower Waria case is particularly interesting, with its process for refocusing the energy and activities of local level government and the public servants who manage them through the Morobe Bris Kanda program. The outcomes of this will be watched with great interest.

**Political levels and processes**

Politics in some form or other underlies much of Melanesian society and action, from local traditional political activity, largely representing a lineage, sub-clan or clan, to running for national parliament and representing the people of a particular electorate. The importance of leadership is very striking in the two areas presented. In one, an experienced teacher returned home and led the self-help program from then to the present — a staggering 30 years' worth of effort, activity and positive results, though not without its own upheavals and disappointments. A consistency of approach and determination to achieve results, in addition to the local leadership living and working in the area, have been hallmarks of Burum. Why have so few other areas in PNG not heard of the Burum example, nor learned the hard but significant lessons from it?

Entrepreneurs and other members of PNG's elite do both themselves and their clansmen a great disservice by isolating themselves from their relatives while exploiting for themselves what are essentially group 'goods', whether these are timber, or land or fisheries or other such activities. They need to find ways to return some of the value of these group 'goods' back to the group in ways that will benefit all group members. They often become members of the political elite, too, but then very rarely return home to their constituencies except at election time. There are some hard lessons to be learned here.

*April 2005*
Managing based on good access to information and communications

This is one element to which, besides lip-service, little attention has been paid in PNG. Yet it is a significant factor that provides not only critical information for decision making, but also an integrating function with some of the other processes mentioned above.

Without access to information and communications there emerges and remains what can best be called a 'poverty of opportunity'. This is a state of affairs in which individuals or communities do not know where or who to turn to find answers to their questions or information. Their preconceived ideas about what they can or cannot grow, for example, are never challenged. In other words, they find it difficult to find ways forward for their own and their community's development. 'Poverty of opportunity' here is a lack of knowledge about how to make the best of the many opportunities presented by a modern society overlain with the permutations and combinations that make up the multitude of PNG's customary societies.

Access to information should really be seen as a right that all citizens enjoy, allowing personal and human development to take place in the Melanesian context. Government should see it as a priority to ensure that every citizen can enjoy such access.

Incorporated land groups

Finally, the paper on incorporated land groups (ILGs) presents details of an adaptive response to managing customary-owned natural resources in ways that are acceptable under modern PNG law while being framed and grounded in the customary laws and practices that underlie each of PNG's customary societies and linguistic groups. An interesting aspect of ILGs is that for a particular purpose or activity a customary land group (usually a clan) can show its modern registered identity as an ILG, while for another purpose or activity the customary land group identity is sufficient. The people involved in both identities — and holding permanent rights under custom and membership in the associated ILG — are basically the same. Using the ILG approach can give customary groups an added and useful flexibility to use in the context of modern PNG. Contradicting the fears of many, the ILG approach cannot be used to sell customary land. In reality, an ILG can help provide greater security of a customary group's resource rights and provide a good and secure basis for a group to manage its own development.

Note

Nanak mutuk: Development through self-reliance in the Burum Valley

Tingneo Mandau, Burum Valley Development Programme, with Hartmut Holzknecht, School of Resources, Environment and Society, and Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University

Introduction
The Burum Valley is a mid-montane area on the southern slopes of the Finisterre Range of the Huon Peninsula — we have steep mountainsides, fast rivers, thick forests and a population of about 7600 people living in 27 villages. It takes three full days to walk to Finschhafen, the district headquarters, one day south to the coast, one day to Mindik and 1½ days to Pindiu, the nearest government station. We are truly one of those laskona (literally, ‘last corner’) places in Papua New Guinea. Despite this, we have grown coffee since World War II, upland rice since the late 1960s, and many exotic vegetables and fruit, as well as our own subsistence crops.

People in this valley were the last to be contacted in Finschhafen District, the last to be Christianised and the last to have colonial administration and agricultural extension. At independence in 1975 we knew that we would again be last if we waited for government handouts. This was unacceptable to us. Our area had virtually no infrastructure — no roads, airstrips only at Mindik and Pindiu, very few schools (basically only Lutheran Kotte language village schools) and no medical aid posts except at Pindiu.

Culture and changes under colonial administration
Before contact with the outside world, Burum communities were already moving to stop tribal warfare within their own language group. Clans stood together against neighbours speaking different languages. Many Burum values were like Christian values, and our ancestors had strong ideas, as we have now, about self-reliance. Our cultural identity remains a very high priority for us.

Lutheran missionaries from Europe first arrived in 1911 and learned our language and customs. But colonial administration, coming in after World War II, began to push out many of our traditional values in favour of administration plans for long-term developments in health, education and the economy. However, because of the remoteness of our area these plans were just talk. Many Burum luluais (chiefs) and nultuls (consuls) died telling our people about the administration’s long-term plans without them having ever seen any of it in their own villages.

Colonial administration brought about changes mainly around government stations and nearby communities. Anywhere more remote was forgotten and neglected — the Burum Valley has always belonged to this last group. We know about the unfairness of direct and indirect taxes being imposed on everyone without the benefits being shared equally by all. In particular, it was and still is the rural areas that are missing out. We decided to do something about this.

Burum developments
After a career in education, including being a school inspector, I chose to come back to my home area in 1975 to head Ogeramnang Primary School. Community leaders began to meet regularly and immediately we decided to complete the airstrip at Ogeramnang. The Pindiu local government council had begun to build the airstrip, but then declined to complete it because it said there were cargo cult activities in our area. With the airstrip approved and open we began to bring about other changes.

Though we had a primary school, the parents could not afford school fees. They had coffee to sell, but could not because of our remoteness. With the airstrip open we set up Memsimbing Bisnis Grup in 1977, with a minimum contribution of K50 from each village (some put in much more) and used these funds to buy and transport coffee to Lae for resale.

Though Burum people had been paying head tax to the Pindiu local government council for years, no projects ever took place in our area. So, in 1977, we decided to stop paying head tax. We needed funds for our own priority projects. From 1977 to 1979 we collected half the head tax for men and half for women in the Burum area and issued proper receipts. These funds were used to build a two-storey classroom and a community hall at the airstrip site. We had to walk 1½ days to Pindiu if anyone needed medical attention — just too far. In 1978, using some of the collected funds, we built a rural sub-health centre, also at the airstrip site and using our own mobile sawmill and our own timber.

The head tax issue had consequences: seven of the Burum community leaders were summoned by the Pindiu local government council for non-payment of taxes. We asked for...
the hearing to be held at our airstrip centre so that we could show all that had been achieved using the collected funds. The Pindiu council subsequently abandoned the case.

Using our own resources we have built five community schools in the Burum area (opening years 1975, 1978, 1979, 1989 and 1991). However, we continue to have problems with schools being supplied with teaching materials and with teachers remaining at their posts, both due to remoteness.

We asked the Summer Institute of Linguistics to send us a capable person to translate the Bible into our language. A translator from Finland lived with us regularly over a long period of time and completed this task.

Since the beginning we needed to find ways to raise money for our development program. Memsimbing still buys and sells coffee, but we needed other ways, too. So we built up trade stores and a number of PMVs (passenger motor vehicles) in our provincial capital, Lae. The profits went into Memsimbing for use back home. After some years we closed these urban-based operations.

Since our discussions and activities began, the idea of good road access to Lae has remained our first priority and main aim. Surplus funds were used to begin building roads radiating out from the airstrip, initially with picks and shovels. In 1983 we paid cash for a D3 bulldozer and had it airlifted, with a Suzuki vehicle, into Burum with an RAAF Chinoook helicopter. Expansion of the road network progressed more quickly. The D3 also began building the road from Burum Valley to the coast to connect up with the existing road to Lae, but it was small and progress was slow.

In November 1987 we acquired a D6 bulldozer, paying half in cash and half by bank loan guaranteed by the Morobe provincial government. We repaid the loan in seven years. The road to Bukaua was completed in 1996, and officially opened in 1997, but without major bridges. The road remained open to 1999, but then landslides and river damage closed it to vehicles. This road is now constantly used by foot traffic.

When provincial governments were established in 1980, the Burum people elected me as their representative and I remained the elected member until the provincial government system changed in 1995–1996. While in provincial government I was able, from 1988 on, to get regular, though not large, amounts of provincial government funding approved for our major road project to the coast.

We also invited technical specialists from the PNG University of Technology to assist us. A small hydroelectric plant was developed to bring power to the facilities we had been building up at the airstrip and school site. The plant was completed in 1985, though we found that the dam used to supply water to the plant was on limestone and could not hold water properly. We will eventually find a new dam site for this and get it going again.

The rural sub-health centre medical officer has now trained a group of village medical aides. Our development program funded their initial training and they now work in their home villages. Since its creation and establishment, the Burum-Kuat local-level government has been responsible for paying these village aides, though we have recently had problems in the supply of medicines from the Lae base hospital.

Finally, and quite recently, at our request and with the support of our Finnish Bible translator, we received aid support from the Finnish government. With this support and with our free labour we were able to achieve a number of things. We built a permanent bridge over the Burum River, officially opened in May 2004. The Burum community donated three substantial areas of land to the government and to the church to locate various services and facilities. Using this land and the Finnish aid, three teachers houses, classrooms, a parish office, a library and facilities for adult literacy and forestry extension have been built. At our request, the Finnish funds were managed by the Summer Institute of Languages. Burum communities supplied free labour. So, for example, we saved K60,000 in helicopter hire costs by using our labour to carry and push the bridge beams onto the pylons across the river.

**Memsimbing Bisnis Grup**

As already mentioned, we created Memsimbing to carry our work program forwards. It was first established, and continues today, to buy coffee from the growers in Burum to transport to Lae for resale. It was also the vehicle for some years for operating trade stores and PMVs in Lae town to raise funds for development at home. However, we received wrong advice about what we could do through Memsimbing and this led to problems with the tax department. This has now been resolved. Currently, Memsimbing is working at a low level.

At present we are trying to get funding for our major road connection to the coast, especially to build the required permanent bridges. We would welcome any genuine support to assist us to complete this major infrastructure, since for all of us at a subsistence level this is a huge financial undertaking. Once the infrastructure is in place many other things can follow—we will manage the road ourselves and can then initiate many new activities. When this major road link is completed and fully in use, we will then restructure the institutional basis of what we are doing and how we will do it in future.

**Working to a development plan**

Our goals, plans, priorities and methods are always by agreement among Burum community leaders and people. With no support from the state, even if it is our own national government, we have developed our own vision of how our valley communities can move forward. From this beginning in 1975 we have carried
our own plans forward and implemented our own development program. Consultation and agreement/approval processes are ongoing and critical processes for us; without them we would not have gotten as far as we have, nor achieved what we have achieved so far.

We have been able to have a high level of continuity partly because I have been the coordinator of the strategy and its implementation since my return to Burum. However, our group of community leaders over the years has always worked at a high level of consultation so that I, as coordinator, was able to continue taking the initiative and implementing developments to satisfactory conclusions with the regular assurance of everyone’s support.

We have always had as our first priority the road connection to the coastal road and on to Lae, our provincial capital. Without this infrastructure and assured access to and from our home valley, much else would not be possible and our whole population will continue to be the poorer for it. Because of the lack of not only state support but also very low prioritisation of Burum in planning and funding terms in Finschhafen District, we have had to develop innovative ways around the major challenge of finding sufficient funding to continue our activities at home. Sometimes these ways have had to be direct and proactive, as was the case with our stance on the Pindiu council’s head taxes.

My election to provincial government was no doubt a very useful link to have over the 15 years I represented my people at that level. I want to stress that in reality Burum did not receive unusually high levels of road funding. We were just able to make much better use of these funds because we owned our own machinery and we had our own trained and very experienced operators. Finally, one important characteristic of what we do and how we do it has been that Burum development and its leaders are based at home, not in town.

The future
To date we have achieved most of our early and current aims and objectives, or are on the way to achieving them, including:

• registered and active Memsimbing Bismis Grup;
• operational airstrip;
• operational rural sub-health centre, community school and community hall;
• five community schools built and operating since 1975;
• translation of the Bible into our language;
• road building in Burum Valley to connect villages to the airstrip;
• initial road construction to Bulcaua coast road;
• hydroelectricity installation at airstrip complex;
• own earthmoving equipment, compressor, vehicle, mobile sawmill, rice-hulling mill and trained and experienced operators;
• trained village medical aides in Burum Valley communities; and
• Yangpela Didiman (young farmer) trainer currently training over 40 students in Burum.

The major road link south to the coast and from there to Lae continues to be our first priority. Once this is in place it will allow a number of other activities to get underway to improve our standard of living, increase work opportunities and ensure much better access to a number of things. For example, we expect that the educational standard of our primary schools will improve significantly once teachers are happier at their postings. They need the road to quickly and safely get to the city for their pay cheques and supplies and get back to their schools within a short period of time.

So far we do not have a completed road to the coast, though the aid support from Finland this year has provided a most welcome boost. We need this road to be completed and traversable in the near future because it is the catalyst for other activities. For example, the very high cost of air transport and current low prices being paid for coffee have brought this industry to a virtual stop in our area. The industry needs to be revived in association with more affordable transportation.

In Burum we grow plentiful fresh vegetables and fruit; we need to find appropriate and productive ways to wholesale and retail this produce in urban areas. Again, with the road in place and with the assistance of other organisations, we will explore village tourism and other such activities as ways to generate job creation, for generating village-level income and for finding good ways to add value to our rural products (high-value crops include vanilla, timber, coffee and rice).

We will also demarcate our clan land boundaries so that Burum communities have land security. We are not afraid of other people coming into our area, but we are aware young people no longer move around our landscape with fathers and uncles and so are not learning what they need to know about their clan’s land boundaries and the stories that support them. Such lack of customary knowledge could be a problem in the future.

The road will also assist communications. Everyone in Papua New Guinea, including Burum people, needs improved communications and access to information. How else can we, individuals or communities, make better-informed decisions? This has to be a right for all citizens.

As the road, bridges and other activities are completed we will hold meetings and discussions so that we can together develop the next stages of our strategy, and the associated development planning and implementation processes.

Conclusion
Since our expectations at the end of colonial administration about what our government could or would do for us were not
fulfilled, our constant motto has been ‘nanak mutuk’, meaning ‘self-reliance’. Burum’s development program achievements are a significant testament to the Burum people, to their leaders and to their combined determination to achieve results of benefit to all Burum people. Our whole development program reflects the vision, determination, commitment and energy of the Burum people, standing and working together. We, their leaders, genuinely represent them. We are not rich, we don’t have expensive houses in town or Port Moresby, we don’t drive flashy cars and we all live and work at home in Burum. What has been achieved so far has been for and with the people because our commitment has always been to improve living conditions and opportunities in our Burum Valley communities.

The way that national and provincial bureaucracies seem to work has meant that infrastructure such as schools or medical centres cannot be built or staffed except at a time predetermined by someone else’s timetable or program. This was not acceptable to us. We are another example of how rural areas generally have consistently been neglected and placed very low in the priorities set at national, provincial and district levels. We found ways to jump over the hurdles and problems and are achieving real results at home in Burum where it really matters to improve people’s lives.

The Burum example has shown that all blockages can be overcome with enough will and determination, inclusive planning and long-term local support. There are no instant results — only the implementation over a long period of time of our initial vision with total commitment and involvement, sweat and determination to do things our way — no one else would or can do it for us. The road we have travelled has certainly not been nor does it continue to be an easy one, but it has made us stronger in many other ways.
Sustainable rural development: Lower Waria shows the way

Hon. Sasa Zihe Kokino, MP; Huon Gulf District, Morobe Province

Introduction
This paper is in two parts. The first gives an overview of development in Papua New Guinea (PNG), and explores the problems and limitations that are often encountered in efforts to achieve effective development, especially in a rural setting. The second part looks at a successful model of rural development, the Village Development Trust, established in the Lower Waria Valley in the Huon Gulf District, Morobe Province.

Development trends
At independence in 1975, the PNG people had high expectations of their own elected government to deliver goods and services to all four corners of the nation. The government took on the authority to control forest resources, while customary land control and management remained with the customary resource-owning groups. Some years after independence, there was increasing disappointment that these expectations had not been met. In response, in the late 1980s there was an upsurge in activity by civil society organisations. A number of people set up development NGOs, such as the Village Development Trust (VDT), to complement government efforts to deliver goods and services in specific sectors and particular areas. However, at least some sectors of government saw this as a direct threat to their efforts to bring development to the people.

In the last 25 years Papua New Guineans have been exposed to a vast array of technologies from the modern world. The colonial government put in place an economic model supported by modern technology similar to that being employed in Australia; in some cases PNG was actually ahead of Australia. Unfortunately, the economic base in PNG to support such a technical infrastructure was insufficient and poor management and poor maintenance of national assets has led to a rundown of just about everything in the country. Today, our main highways are nightmares to drive and rural roads have all but disappeared back into the bush.

Our education system has exclusively trained people for the modern sector; a major question to ask is whether education is for employment or to learn the basic principles of life skills? The economy has not grown to meet the demand for jobs, so tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of people are disillusioned, semi-educated and feeling under-valued in an economic and a human sense, living in rural villages or camping in urban squatter settlements with wantoks (relatives). A simple calculation of the number of school leavers and university graduates will show that there are no jobs for them. About 2000 students graduated from our universities and tertiary colleges at the end of 2000, yet did even 10 per cent of them get jobs?

What is the alternative to this situation? Clearly it must be to make our people much more productive by strengthening and diversifying their village economies and by trying to bring employment and income-generating activities to the villages. A very wide range of relatively cheap appropriate technology is available for village people to adopt and implement.

One of the dilemmas facing PNG today is that the level of development in our rural villages has been stagnant for decades; this in itself must lead to many questions. Is this because people are inherently satisfied with a so-called 'laid-back Melanesian lifestyle' and have no need of cash? Or are they too lazy to earn cash? Have the opportunities for earning cash been too limited in scope and often seen as too little return for the hard work required? Has the failure of all extension services in the country, due to the national government starving provincial governments of funds, been a critical handicap to village producers? Is it because efforts to produce items for sale in the village come to naught because of the high transport costs due to disappearing roads and rising fuel costs? The answer has to be that it is a combination of all the above factors. In fact, some 87 per cent of PNG's people live and work in the rural areas on their own customary land and this is the basis for their survival. That is, in fact, a major strength to PNG and we need to capitalise on this. The way forward is to support and encourage a basic economic drive in the rural areas, building upon the societal strengths and institutions that are already there. We cannot be Australians, nor should we try to be; we are all Papua New Guineans and need, once again, to be proud of it.

Economic focus, 2005–2015
The PNG government's major strategy in the next five years, as highlighted in the 2005–2010 Medium Term Development Strategies (MTDS), is to target 'quality economic growth'. This is a major public policy instrument that sets out the pathways for PNG's medium-term development. In association with this, it is clear that now is also the time to drive quality economic growth into our districts and rural areas. By complementing the MTDS, but focusing on developing and implementing
strategies that will bring the creation of employment and income-generating activities into the rural areas, the aim is generate development that will be of lasting benefit — locally, as well as nationally.

Since 2002, the people of Huon Gulf District in Morobe Province have prepared themselves to take the MTDS by the horns in a way that is focused on their home communities. While developing this strategy, we have also set the foundations and guidelines for the District Service Grant budgets. The Huon Gulf District has set out its targets and strategies for the next ten years. These are aimed at fostering sustainable improvement in the quality of lives for everyone in our three local-level governments (LLGs), and are based on promoting achievable and locally important economic growth.

We know that past strategies of both national and provincial governments were aimed at addressing deterioration in economic management, but much of this has failed for a number of reasons, including political instability and poor fiscal performance plus external factors.

The Huon Gulf District's focus for economic growth in 2005-2015 is based firmly on the government's recovery and development program and its objectives of good governance, export-driven economic growth and rural infrastructure development, poverty reduction and empowerment 'through human resource development'. This plan sets out measures to address major constraints that have blocked effective growth and development in the past, including poor infrastructure and governance.

The Huon Gulf District firmly believes that we can no longer ignore the dysfunctional system of service delivery that has arisen since independence and following the 1995 reforms aimed at decentralisation. People and administrative staff in our district have spent much time and resources to institutionalise the system. We have developed the Public Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement as the development arm for the respective LLGs in Huon District and this arrangement will allow the more effective delivery of economic growth services.

The district government will also continue to strengthen a number of its key strategic partnerships in order to ensure that implementation and ownership of MTDS is strengthened and its objectives are achieved. Other stakeholders in the PPP arrangements, besides national, provincial and local level governments, include village people and their communities, elites and entrepreneurs, civil society (churches and NGOs), private enterprise and donors.

An example is the Bris Kanda' program, initiated by the elected MP as a public investment program and established to promote and facilitate economic development in the rural areas of Huon District. Bris Kanda was supported by the Huon District administration, the three Morobe LLGs and had initial funding and support from the government of New Zealand to set up public-private partnerships with a number of stakeholders. The Morobe Bris Kanda program plays a facilitating role, bringing together different stakeholders in the planning, development, and implementation of economic and development initiatives.

PNG's future rests on the nation's robust economic performance. The national government's MTDS will provide the strategic framework for mobilising PNG's natural resources and labour. The resulting industrial and export growth will provide the economic gains to underpin our national, provincial and local progress in every sphere. It is clear, however, that these recent developments are built years of earlier activity and experience.

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**Box 1 Village Development Trust**

**Mission**
- Educate, empower, and facilitate rural communities in their development
- Encourage men and women to manage their resources in ways that promote community development through self-reliance and which are environmentally, economically and socially sustainable in communities across PNG.

**Objectives**
- Work with people to increase their understanding and appreciation of their own environment, their understanding impending threats to their environment and what they can actively do to protect it
- Work with local-level partner organisations to define and promote practices for good stewardship of the environment which are relevant to the target communities
- Work with communities to better organise and manage themselves to promote and participate in sustainable development and to ensure an equitable distribution of benefits between men and women
- Work with communities to undertake successful sustainable development initiatives that provide them with economic and other social benefits.
Village Development Trust

The Lower Waria Valley lies towards the southern end of Morobe Province and has a population of about 3800 living in 14 villages. This, in turn, is part of the far-fung Huon Gulf District that takes in the coastal and adjacent hinterland mountain areas from the border north, skirting Lae (the provincial capital) and taking in the lower Markham Valley. The population of this district is 59,523.

The Waria Valley people formed an organisation based on their existing tribal system, the Bui clan system, an institution that had survived the colonial period. The purpose of the organisation was to increase people's awareness about the use and exploitation of their natural resources. Village Development Trust (VDT) (Box 1) was formed in Lae in 1988 and later registered as an NGO in 1992. VDT's four programs — Eco-Forestry, Eco-Enterprise, Social and Gender Issues, and Conservation and Research — actually complemented much work already begun by the people of Waria Valley. VDT's overall focus at this time was 'community development through empowerment of rural communities for sustainable resource management'. VDT has since become a leading national NGOs. VDT has since become a leading national NGO, becoming well known mainly through its Waria Valley activities. The success of VDT's programs depended on the people's positive attitude towards development initiatives and the commitment needed following realisation of the need to be as self-reliant as possible.

Philosophy

Papua New Guineans' ancestors inherited this land more than 50,000 years ago and currently more than 80 per cent of the population still live a subsistence way of life. Drawing from the rich tropical biodiversity, culture and traditions, development should move in an organised way towards sustainable management of these natural resources so that development efforts are directed towards the rural population who still control more than 97 per cent of land in PNG under customary law.

If quality of life in rural communities is improved to meet more of the people's expectations then they themselves will have time to properly consider the conservation of natural resources and sustainable development. What is needed is to reduce pressure on forest resources, make better land and resources decisions; appreciate our environment and cultural values and protect them from large-scale unsustainable development practices.

Historical background

I co-founded VDT in 1988 and it was registered as an incorporated association in 1992. As noted, the organisation is involved in community development work directed towards promoting conservation and sustainable community development. Its initial and early objective was to promote small sawmill operations. Today, VDT is a much bigger organisation with four different but interrelated conservation and development programs. VDT has a total of 15 dedicated staff members who work both in the field and the office, and management support services staff running a small office in Lae. VDT has become an innovative organisation, which has pioneered and carried through a number of programs and activities, and over the years has impacted on some 30,000 people, mainly in Morobe Province and many in the Waria Valley.

VDT restructuring

In 2003–2004 VDT underwent an organisational redeveloping and restructuring process in which its board and staff worked on refocusing, reflecting and learning from VDT's past 15 years of experience in working with and in communities. This process included internal and external evaluations, case studies and organisational and program reviews in a strategic planning process that took all of 2003. The new project proposal being funded from 2005 will now focus in particular the following areas.

Eco-forestry

The development of eco-forestry and timber production in communities begins with awareness-raising, setting up land-use plans, small-scale forestry, reforestation and construction of eco-homes, and supporting the establishment of projects involving the downstream processing of timber. All these initiatives depend on and are based on sustainable forest use, and sustainable forest management plans.

Eco-tourism and non-timber forest products

Women and youth are actively involved in eco-tourism and non-timber forest products as a means of generating income. This, too, begins with basic awareness raising, special skills training and capacity building, the establishment of projects that are ecologically sound and being developed to marketable standard for both local and international visitors. The focus is on special interest markets while also developing a common identity in terms of people, communities and products, and then integrating the production and marketing of non-timber forest products as complementary to eco-tourism.

Lobby for policies to strengthen and support sustainability

One role is to raise the awareness of the Huon Gulf District and other local-level governments (LLGs) and provincial administration on issues of unsustainable timber exploitation practices and the importance of sustainability of natural resources.
Box 2  Programs and activities

- VDT began with the concept of working in own backyard first, combating logging threat at Sowara; campaigning against unsustainable logging practices by Yema Timbers
- Establishment of the Kamiali wildlife management area (WMA)
- Building and running of the Kamiali Training Centre and Guesthouse
- Exploration of alternative development options leading to establishment of community-based eco-tourism and guesthouses in the Huon Gulf (four locations, including Bau and Kamiali)
- Development of a *wokabaut somil* (mobile sawmill) program and associated training programs (including sustainable forestry) with introduction of *wokabaut* sawmills into resource-owner communities
- Development of the Eco-Homes concept (in association with Habitat for Humanity)
- Operationalisation of the Integrated Conservation and Development model (ICAD) of development
- International monitoring program for leatherback turtles, based at Kamiali and run by a local para-biologist (in association with US donor)
- Involvement in NGO campaigning and lobbying
- Initiated establishment of the Ecoforestry Forum in PNG
- Facilitating agriculture and micro-enterprise, such as non-timber forest products projects through business and technical training programs (for example, Kamiali furniture workshop)
- Initiating as revolving loan scheme
- Large increase in rice production in the Lower Waria Valley and milling locally
- Multiplier effects of many of these activities, particularly in Lower Waria Valley, including: development of eco-tourism niche market with Japan through the Niigata PNG association; eco-adventure groups visiting Huon coast regularly; Adventure building (four homes and teacher's house sponsored by Niigata PNG Association); Habitat for Humanity and VDT Eco-homes; international cultural exchanges between Japan and PNG (Waria Valley); women's economic projects (including Bau Guest House); Waria Valley Children's Programme; Waria Valley School Fee Trust Fund; school supplies donated by children in Japan; and, Waria Valley Children's Programme receives first sawmill for erection of school buildings from the Ayoshi Lions Club, Japan.

resources as a whole. The LLGs will appreciate the sustainability concept and practices and their importance by incorporating land-use policies and plans into resource management legislation. A major emphasis has to be on awareness, training and building the capacity of the local people to do things for themselves using workshops and *in situ* training. Our initiatives in these areas have been supported by donors.

**Overall objectives**

We see that the overall aim of this awareness campaign is to help us to see ourselves as real agents of change in our own communities, people who can make a difference and make our world a better place. Our specific objectives have to be to change the thinking capacities of people from dependency to self-reliance. This would show that we ourselves are able to achieve real development (social, spiritual, mental and environmental).

We are using development workshops as a forum to build up awareness and to help people become aware of how they can move away from poverty and dependency. Such a program can only be useful to people who take it seriously and have really thought about making changes to improve their lives.

Another important achievement is the understanding that development is a process — there are step to follow in trying to achieve the goals each individual or clan or community has set. Every community, group, individual should have a vision, a dream of what one tries to be or tries to achieve. Without a vision, a person has no idea where he or she is heading. The same also applies to our national government. Real development has to be planned systematically and carried out step by step. Having lots of money without planning what to do with it is not development. That by itself will not achieve the aims or goals of rural communities.

Finally, we cannot always match the world in technology and modern luxury, but we will always win with our environment and our culture!

**Note**

1. *Bris kanda* — a rattan bridge, a sturdy swinging traditional construction by which people cross over a creek or river.
**Incorporated land groups: A step towards rural development?**

*Lorna Brew*

**Introduction**

In light of all the negative publicity around incorporated land groups (ILGs) in Papua New Guinea (PNG), this is a brief presentation on ILGs in the hope of identifying the 'real' issues facing them. The *Land Groups Incorporation Act* (LGIA) came into being in 1974 as a result of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (CILM) in 1973. The CILM was tasked to look at the reform of land registration in PNG prior to independence. This paper focuses on what ILGs are under the LGIA, the features of an ILG, and responds to some of the criticisms of ILGs.

**ILGs under the LGIA**

The preamble of the LGIA states that it is an Act '(a) to recognize the corporate nature of customary groups; and (b) to allow them to hold, manage and deal with land in their customary names'. The LGIA sets out the process of applying for and incorporating a land group, including the minimum of what the ILG constitution should contain, the effect and powers of registration, and the mechanisms for dispute settlement.

The constitution of the ILG must contain the following:
- Name of the group;
- Qualifications for land disqualifications (if any) for group membership;
- Title, composition, membership and manner of appointment of the committee or other controlling body of the group;
- Manner in which the group is to act and manner in which that is evidenced;
- Any limitations or conditions of the exercise of powers conferred by the Act on the group;
- Name or means of identification of any custom;
- Proposed dispute settlement authority;
- Address for service;
- Rules applicable to the conduct of affairs for the group; and any other matters with the approval of the registrar.

Before a group applies to incorporate itself as an ILG, the group members must be of like mind and agree to go through this process. They need to get together and work out the various details as listed above. They then apply to the registrar of ILGs enclosing their constitution. The application is advertised in the area where the group lives and checks are carried out on the group's suitability for incorporation. After the registrar considers any comments and objections that have been sent in, the registrar will issue a certificate of recognition and the group is then incorporated. The registrar of titles will then publish in the *National Gazette* the 'Notice of Intention on Incorporation' and these notices are forwarded to the relevant provincial authorities for publication. The group then has the legal status of a corporation with perpetual succession and the capacity to sue and be sued and do other things that corporations do.

'The rights and liabilities of a customary group' means the rights and liabilities of the members of the group which they collectively held or were collectively liable for immediately before the group was recognised under the Act. These rights and liabilities become the rights and liabilities of the incorporated group in its corporate name under Section 12 of LGIA. The powers of an ILG relate only to land, its use and management, and associated matters regulated and exercised in accordance with and subject to its constitution and relevant custom. An incorporated group under Section 13 may:
- Acquire, hold and dispose of customary land and rights in or in respect of customary land, in the manner (if any) and to the extent (if any) allowed by custom;
- Acquire, hold and dispose of other land and rights in or in respect of other land;
- Use and manage the land, or enter into agreements for the use or management of it;
- Borrow money or accept property on credit for the previous purposes;
- Distribute any product of the land or any profits arising out of the use or management of it; and
- Has any other powers necessary or convenient for the exercise of those powers.

No right or interest in or in relation to any land that has been given by an ILG to a member of the group is registrable under any current law relating to the registration of land or interests in land.

The LGIA has provisions for an ILG to be wound up. This may take place after receiving a request from the management committee of the ILG itself or a report from the dispute settlement authority, or from the village court having jurisdiction over the group or some other court dealing with a dispute, that an ILG or the affairs of an ILG is or are in such a condition that its continued recognition is undesirable. If any of these possibilities does occur, then the registrar may order that the affairs of that particular ILG be wound up.

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The winding up provision further provides for the payments of the debts of the ILG, the liability of its members, distribution of surplus property and dissolution and vesting of customary land (owned by the group) whereby it reverts to the persons who would be the customary owners if the group had never been recognised under the LGIA.

Features of an ILG
Some of the features of ILGs as identified by Power (1999) are improved management of a clan's natural resources and fair payouts and distribution of benefits, for example, of mining royalties. Land groups are recognised by the laws of PNG and their decisions are recognised under modern PNG law. Decisions have the authority of the whole land group, decisions are binding on all group members and an added benefit is that youth and elders work together.

The correct permanent rights holders are identified through the process of genealogy studies. The land group system means the right decisions are made by the right owners/members of the ILG. Moreover, the creation of ILGs contributes to the strengthening and facilitating of land demarcation processes. Strong control over group finances is achieved, firstly, through a provision in the ILG constitution to cover financial management, and secondly, through ratification of any and all major decisions by all members of an ILG.

ILGs have the ability to enter into legal agreements with other parties and can hold shares in a landowner company (LANDCO). Benefits such as spin-off deals can arise. An example of this would be where preference is given to the registered LANDCO within a project area to provide catering services through partnership or security services, etc. Incorporation is a learning process of merging custom with modern management, it excludes non-permanent members, but does not touch or compromise arrangements with a range of authorised temporary users.

It is important to note here, however, that the purpose of ILGs is not solely for the distribution of royalty or equity payments. The original concept of ILGs was to utilise and formalise customary groups to facilitate dealings with their customary land and related issues as listed above. However, in some parts of PNG it has become the mechanism (particularly in the forestry and petroleum sectors) by which to distribute royalties and other such cash payments amongst customary groups and their members.

Criticisms of ILGs
A number of criticisms were highlighted by Samuel Koyama in a recent issue of the Pacific Economic Bulletin (Koyama 2004):

- ILG members are not receiving the benefits due to them, including through unfair royalty sharing
- ratio or disagreements over sharing ratio;
- would-be beneficiaries are missing out;
- leaders may misuse funds;
- leaders may lack of proper representation;
- members engage in leadership struggles;
- they can cause land disputes;
- lack of accountability and transparency;
- inability of ILGs to resolve internal disputes;
- lack of contact, communication and consultation between members and leaders;
- political alliances used as another means of facilitating rent seeking;
- bribery and corruption within ILGs; and
- engagement of ILGs in failed landowner enterprises.

Responses
Practices coming under the label of good governance will help to guarantee the better performance of ILGs, as they do in most other corporate structures. These include trained and competent management, accountability, and transparency of decision-making and financial transactions.

A fundamental issue that needs to be addressed occurs at the stage of ILG registration at the level of the Department of Lands. Here there is only one officer responsible for ILGs and this officer is receives and processes 10–15 ILG applications per day. This raises some serious questions, including as to whether these groups are being formed properly in the first instance and whether the basic checks on the received application material are actually being carried out.

As noted, there are a number of problems that ILGs and their LANDCOs seem to get embroiled in, often through mismanagement. These problems can manifest in the relationship between private companies and LANDCOs, especially in the area of royalty and dividend payments. The following is an example of what the private company Oil Search Ltd, through its Business Development Section, has done to encourage the positive performance of the LANDCOs it deals with. First, the LANDCOs are to adopt a constitution that has a dividend payment formula so that dividends are always paid according to profitability earnings. Second, contracts with LANDCOs include a requirement to produce monthly management accounts. These are used to monitor the performance of the LANDCO. Newly established LANDCOs will require assistance to ensure the above two steps actually do take place. The well-established LANDCOs do not require much assistance from the company's business development team.

At a national level, the Mineral Resource Development Corporation is now paying cash direct to the beneficiaries. This practice came about because of unfair distributions and also because there was no point depositing funds into an ILG account.
when there are no banking facilities out at the field and access to the funds was being handled by the few who could manage the trip to town or who already resided in town.

In assessing how ILGs operate, it is important to remember that while ILGs are based on Melanesian custom and forms of organisation, they do modify customary practice. This is an issue for anthropologists, who argue that ILGs are 'not customary'. However, ILGs are not meant to be entirely 'customary', rather they are based on custom that is then formalised and structured for modern uses.

ILGs do not solve all the problems of PNG land management, but this is a mechanism that is on the right track. The existing failures are a failure in managing the system and not a failure of the system itself. These are problems that can be addressed by better arrangements for royalty payments, investments, etc — they are not grounds for dispensing with the ILG concept in its entirety.

ILGs could serve a far more useful purpose as mechanism to encourage development. This an approach that many groups are already adopting informally, in that they follow customary land group practices. Using a formal ILG structure, however, gives a group extra legal protection. An ILG, through its constitution, provides boundaries of what can and can’t be done, identifies the rightful permanent members, and allows a group to go into partnership with other land groups and/or other companies while retaining the rights to that group’s natural resources.

**Conclusion**

ILGs have a valuable place in PNG rural development. ILGs can be used as the vehicle for the people to use their land without the fear of registering (and possibly losing) it. A customary group can come together as a structured unit with a representative committee and with duties and responsibilities set out under a constitution. This provides protection for the rest of the group should a representative overstep his role and not perform or exceed his duties. In this way, ILGs can become involved in and encourage economic activity at the rural level. The major benefit of having ILGs link up with rural development is the economic development that we all keep talking about.

**Note**

* Lorna Brew has a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Papua New Guinea.

**References**


Improving rural health and livelihoods: A case study from Tari

John Vail, Tari Family Health and Rural Improvement Program

Introduction
For community-based organisations to work successfully in rural areas, they must be well-integrated into the community and have good support structures. Long-term sustainability of development programs is the responsibility of the public and private sectors, as well as the community and local organisations. The Tari Family Health and Rural Improvement Program (FHRIP) commenced in 1995 and operated independently until 2000 and since then in partnership with Community Based Health Care (CBHC). FHRIP has helped many families to improve their standard of living through simple health and agricultural inputs.

The aim of the program was to apply low-cost technologies and simple techniques to improve health and living standards for rural families. Key areas targeted by the program were water supply, sanitation and nutritional gardens. Small livestock were also introduced. Due to the dispersed nature of settlement in Tari, the program worked with families. Though all shared, benefits were concentrated on women and children, especially where the husband lived in a separate house. Participation by the beneficiary was a prerequisite. Families were expected to contribute local materials and their labour in order to receive assistance from the program. A joining fee was also payable.

The program can be divided into two periods. Between 1995 and 2000, FHRIP functioned as a separate entity, backed by the PNG Institute of Medical Research, Porgera Joint Venture and a number of other donors. During these years, FHRIP was in a sense a pilot program, testing methods and items for their suitability in a rural environment. After 2000, FHRIP became a part of Community Based Health Care, and its program was one of implementing in CBHC communities the various activities that were tried and tested in the preceding five years.

FHRIP 1995–2000
The following sections summarise the experience of FHRIP during the first period, from 1995 to 2000.

Aims
The aim of FHRIP was to improve family health and livelihoods through the introduction of low-cost technologies and agricultural inputs. It was also to encourage participation in the process of development and to make communities more self-reliant, particularly in terms of meeting their preventive health needs. Integral to the success of FHRIP was the requirement to test the appropriateness of the designs and methods employed in the program and find those best suited to local conditions and culture.

Method
The program was divided into phases. New families entered in Phase 1, under which they had to construct a household water supply, improved pit latrine and make a nutritional garden. A health team visited each family and provided them with a basic medical kit so that they could treat sores and keep their amenities clean.

Those successfully completing this phase and maintaining their facilities were offered Phase 2 improvements, which included small livestock (Australorp chickens, rabbits, sheep and goats) and subsidised galvanised iron sheets to construct a permanent water catchment. Some payment was required, though the program subsidised the full cost to families.

To run the program, both male and female workers were trained, with emphasis placed upon the involvement of youth. Males were generally engaged in the construction of family amenities, while females assisted families to improve their health and plant gardens. Support stations, providing tools and materials to local workers, were constructed in each community so that they would have the capacity to sustain their own program in terms of amenities, seed, and livestock.

Sustainable agriculture
Koli farm was the resource base for FHRIP. At Koli a low-cost integrated crop/livestock regime was developed that was used as the model for the field extension of crops and small livestock to communities. The use of animal manures in the garden enabled a much more diverse range of crops to be grown than is otherwise possible on eroded volcanic ash soils. Garden fallow and surplus was in turn used to feed animals that provided meat, eggs, and cash. Koli farm supplied seed and livestock to most of the communities involved in FHRIP.

Appropriate technology
FHRIP developed and tested many items of appropriate technology (AT). The water catchment, 400 litre tank and toilet block were all designed, tested and disseminated by the program. Other innovations included a small cupboard for safe storage
of food and seed, and a broom head made using local cane. The program also adapted and tested AT items developed elsewhere, for example, a ferrocement water tank, drum oven and a kero drum cooker. A wide variety of water catchment and storage options were tested to find the most cost-effective and appropriate method for local households. These included demonstration versions of in-ground storage using plastic bag and cement/clay mix, accessed using a 'Rus' hand pump made from PVC pipes with valves of secondhand rubber innertube.

Results
As FHRIP was in a sense a pilot program during its first five years, progress was closely monitored and evaluated. The results of FHRIP experience between 1995 and 2000 have been reported elsewhere (Vail 2002). Key features were:

- Coverage of 10 per cent of the target families in Tari district.
- 263 families completed Phase 1. Over 70 upgraded their water catchments or acquired small livestock to supplement their projects. Nearly three quarters of 195 families assessed achieved good results.
- About 90 per cent of water supply units were found to be in good condition, and 75 per cent of pit latrines. Eighty-nine per cent of medical kits were being well kept. However, only 45 per cent of gardens were fully or almost fully planted. Twenty-eight per cent were keeping chickens in pens and 11 per cent were keeping rabbits in good quality housing.
- Sixty-four local people were trained to run community projects, 27 being female.
- Costs were roughly K200 per family per annum in administrative overheads.

FHRIP after 2000
In September 2000, FHRIP formally integrated with CBHC, a division of the Nazarene Health Ministries, which took over administrative responsibility for FHRIP from the PNG Institute of Medical Research.

Integration with CBHC
Between 1995 and 2000 FHRIP worked successfully with families, and to some extent with local groups, but had less impact on the wider community. In order for the program to meet broader needs, a more community-based approach was required, such as that developed by CBHC and introduced to the Pari community in Tari in 1999. CBHC assists communities to self-organise and prioritise their needs, and provides training for local volunteers to deliver medicine and antenatal care (Nazarene Health Ministries 2002). Likewise, CBHC recognised that the inputs FHRIP had developed were of value in assisting communities to attain their preventive health goals. Accordingly, FHRIP's role since 2000 has centred on CBHC communities, training local volunteers in water supply construction, seed propagation and small livestock management, and supplying the initial needs of communities in respect of these items from its resource farm.

However, a number of factors have prevented the partnership from realising its full potential. Firstly, the adverse operating conditions in the Southern Highlands Province have made it difficult to obtain materials or maintain communications with external support organisations. Secondly, and related to this, FHRIP has lacked the management capacity to organise its share of the program and to fully maintain its resource farm. Thirdly, and again in large part due to the uncertainties of the local situation, it has been difficult for CBHC/FHRIP to obtain core funding for its administrative, staff and field extension functions. Fourthly, there were some methodological differences between the organisations that have taken time to work through; in particular, whether interventions into the community should take place at the clan or the family level, the balance between voluntary and paid work, and the level and nature of incentives to be provided to community workers.

Expansion under the Melanesian Farmer First Network
The inaugural meeting of Melanesian Farmer First Network (MFFN) partners was held in Tari in April 2003. MFFN brings together five community organisations operating in different locations in Melanesia in the areas of food security and health, to provide mutual learning and training experiences. MFFN also assists the organisations through the provision of technical and financial support appropriate to their needs (Kastom Gaden Association 2002).

In Tari, MFFN is supporting training, communications, capacity building and exchanges, using the resources and expertise it has within the network. Positive outcomes so far include:

- financial support for the FHRIP team from a small grants facility funded via Oxfam/CAA;
- the establishment of an HF radio email station at Koli farm, providing a vital link for the program with MFFN and also communications for the public and private use;
- seed saver training — a FHRIP team member visited Kastom Garden Association and the Planting Material Network in Solomon Islands in 2003 to learn seed saving methods, which she is putting into practice to assist CBHC communities to improve their seed multiplication and storage methods;
• training in participatory rural appraisal methods for two FHRIP members in Bougainville in 2004, and put into practice on their return to Tari; and
• also in 2004, a visit by a financial manager from Kastom Garden Association in Solomon Islands to advise on financial management and best practice.

Future directions
As part of the MFFN funding in 2004, a new plan was introduced to make FHRIP support for CBHC more appropriate to a community-wide approach. Key features of this approach include:

• raising the awareness of the causes of illness and poor health in community, especially in respect of preventive health issues, with these activities taking the form of community awareness sessions and training of community volunteers;
• training and support for model adopters of amenities and lead farmers to upgrade their family projects to an enterprise that can meet the needs of other families in their community (these persons are identified by the community and operate within a local regulatory framework as set out by CBHC and community committees);
• establishment of participatory monitoring and evaluation systems that provide feedback both to CBHC management and local communities on strengths and weaknesses in their programs; and
• networking among communities to share good ideas and learn from mistakes.

FHRIP team members will also be encouraged to act in a more entrepreneurial fashion, by, for example, independently (of CBHC) organising training sessions and charging participants a small fee. While FHRIP services will continue to be offered to communities, these communities may have to meet some of the costs (perhaps through donor assistance). Whether this new approach will work effectively remains to be seen, but the shortfall in funding for FHRIP since 2003 leaves few alternatives.

Discussion
FHRIP was a first step towards achieving the goal of a healthy rural household. In Tari the aim was to encourage families to use separate sleeping, cooking and washing facilities. Basic to this was the provision of clean water where it was needed, a need met by the construction of the household water supply unit. The water also enabled the toilet to be kept clean, and hands and faces to be washed before meals. Program workers attempted to build a personal rapport with each family so that health education messages would be tailored to their particular needs.

In the garden a gradual evolution was sought from systems dominated by sweet potato and pigs to a mixed crop/livestock garden system that provides a diverse diet and tradable surplus. The greater labour input required for more intensive production was also meant to engage youth who are underemployed in Tari (and rural communities in general). In addition, a more intensive agricultural system was seen as one way to encourage better environmental practices, so as to conserve soil and counteract the rapid degradation of forests and slopes experienced in many parts of the Tari basin.

Over the longer term, the goal was to assist and encourage families to make their improvements more permanent, through the introduction of durable materials and diverse farming systems. The partnership with CBHC represents a major step towards providing an environment in which improvements can be sustained. CBHC and FHRIP have also tried to encourage the participation of government health and agricultural workers at the community level, and, while results in Tari have so far been limited, there is potential for cooperation once conditions are more stable. However, there needs to be commitment on the part of government towards community-based development as a model for development. One positive sign in this regard is the training program established by CBHC in Western Highlands Province for government health workers.

The association of FHRIP and CBHC with the Melanesian Farmer First Network has opened new horizons for the program, overcoming geographical and cultural isolation and allowing a sharing of knowledge and practice among peer organisations. The establishment of an HF radio email station by MFFN has enabled reliable communications with the outside world for the first time in many years.

Conclusion
Despite the changes and development since its inception in 1995, FHRIP still sees self-reliance and self-sufficiency as the most important goal for families and communities in Tari. Erratic export prices, high prices for imported goods and unreliable transport systems over the past ten years have only increased the necessity of meeting needs from local resources before turning to the cash economy. There is also considerable scope for increasing district and regional wealth through trading community surpluses in local markets. The goal is not to deny global trends, but rather to ameliorate their negative impact through the maintenance of vibrant local economies and cultures.

There is a widespread perception among communities in Tari that FHRIP improved family health. Partly this reflects the practical nature of the program, and partly the fact that FHRIP worked together with people in their own homes and gardens. Other factors in the program's success include the simple and low-cost designs of inputs, and the regular backup and
monitoring carried out by the program team. Essential too was Koli resource farm, which provided the seed and livestock to establish many family and community programs.

For programs like FHRIP to be successful they must be grounded in long experience with the community in which they operate, and if they are to be sustained they must be owned and run by the community. However, sustainability is not the sole responsibility of the community. It is equally important that the public and private sectors work together with communities and community-based organisations, and not as separate and remote entities.

References
Farmer First: A Pacific Food Security Network of Melanesian Community Organizations.
Building a local response to HIV/AIDS: Lessons from local initiatives and partnerships

Elizabeth Cox, HELP Resources Inc

Introduction
In Papua New Guinea (PNG), the National AIDS Council Secretariat (NACS) endeavoured to implement its first mid-term strategy to combat HIV/AIDS in 1997–2002 and is now implementing a second mid-term strategy for 2004–2008. In this second term, NACS faces the continuing problem of grossly inadequate budgetary support from the PNG government. The AusAID-funded National HIV/AIDS Support Project (NHASP) has been providing counterpart technical assistance and substantial program funding to the tune of A$60 million over the past five years (2000–2005) and is preparing to roll over to a new five-year project cycle. Commencing in 1998, NACS, and later NHASP, actively prescribed a top-down model for the formation of provincial AIDS committees (PACs), which interpreted ‘multi sectoral’ as all divisions of government and token representation by churches and NGOs, with suggested quarterly meetings. There is a long history of committees of this kind not achieving much.

The East Sepik Province has fought for the right to take a different approach. A broad-based and community-owned provincial response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic has slowly and steadily been built upon the substantial and diverse body of competent local development NGOs and church health and welfare services. These organisations are capable of adding value to the local response because of their long field experience, their expertise and their ability to source additional resources and funds. They also have a track record of motivating and including all government departments in a collective response to local health and social development issues. Sexually transmitted infection (STI) and HIV/AIDS programs and actions in East Sepik do not result from jumping on bandwagons or creating activities merely because AusAID grant funding is available. They are based on collective concern and determination that has grown gradually since 1991.

Formation of the East Sepik PAC
Throughout 1999–2000, a small team of local HIV/AIDS activists from government, churches and NGOs worked persistently and tenaciously to ensure representative cross-sector participation on the formative East Sepik Provincial AIDS Committee (ESPAC). The founding ESPAC members met regularly and formed a taskforce of committed people cooperating across agencies and sectors. Committee members were prepared to meet weekly or even twice weekly as was necessary to work through the checklists and prerequisites for recognition by NACS and eligibility for PAC institutional support and provincial project funding.

This initial teamwork, advocacy and action created familiarity, mutual trust and respect for different viewpoints and comparative strengths among ESPAC members. ESPAC became a lively and cooperative committee. It built a coordinated provincial response and had the commitment and capacity to make progress whether NACS/NHASP grant-funding funding trickled down to the province or not. There is a continuing solidarity among the ESPAC team that has prevailed through the many delays and frustrations that have been experienced.

Today, ESPAC is a committee of provincial activists and dynamic local implementing agencies, rather than a body of bureaucrats. Members include the Adventist Health Services, Bata Baua Popular Education Troupe, Callan Services (for people living with a disability), Catholic Family Life (family counsellors and community educators), Catholic Health Services, Correctional Services (prison staff), Defence Force (soldiers), the Division of Community Development, Division of Education, Division of Health, the East Sepik Council of Women, HELP Resources, local youth organisations, such as Samaritan Youth, PNG Institute of Medical Research, Provincial Planning Office, RPNGC (community police) and Wewak General Hospital (represented by nursing staff in key positions).

All local agencies involved in the PAC collaborated to organise HIV/AIDS-related events and to implement activities and programs throughout this period. ESPAC has avoided the politics, project-funding dependence and inertia that has led to slumps and suspended activity of PACs in many other provinces over the past five years and has overcome problems associated with some initial inappropriate recruitment to the PAC secretariats of various provinces.

Current ESPAC activities
Throughout PNG very little has ‘trickled down’ to support the provincial response. ESPAC members, however, have been strong enough to overcome problems associated with poor HRC
selection, and a long period during which the PAC operated without an HRC on board. There have been six different people recruited into the post of centralised Momase Provincial Liaison Officer in Port Moresby and not one has made a substantive or significant contribution to the ESPAC.

NACS/NHASP HIV/AIDS activity grant funding to local organisations through ESPAC has been slow and sporadic. This led to some initial disappointment, but also a determination of the stronger local NGOs and church agencies to seek and acquire funding elsewhere. This meant overriding NACS initial directives to NGO and church national and international funding bodies not to fund local HIV/AIDS programs. Substantial support from several major NGO donors (Oxfam Australia, Bread for the World, UNICEF and some church agencies) has sustained the East Sepik provincial response during a two-year drought of NACS/NHASP small grants funding. This funding shortfall was the product of a cumbersome bureaucracy, repeated false starts and flawed strategies for creating a link between NACS and PACS.

ESPAC has not yet succeeded in mobilising provincial government support, whether political, administrative or financial. This is more a reflection of the East Sepik provincial government’s long history of minimal and inadequate support for social development initiatives, yet it also demonstrates the capacity of local civil society organisations to act and make progress, regardless.

NACS and NHASP seem to hold the belief that progress in the local response should be measured in terms of how much local government contributes (human resources, funds for maintaining a local office, etc). However, this fails to count and cost the enormous contribution of local churches, NGOs and CBOs. East Sepik has demonstrated that civil society can lead the response, can easily mobilise government workers, and can gradually involve government administrators and leaders to support the local response.

HELP Resources
HELP Resources is a local NGO, and one of several key contributors to the East Sepik local response to the HIV/AIDS problem. HELP Resources staff have been founding and faithful members of ESPAC since 1998. Working in solidarity with other pioneering local AIDS activists and agencies, a provincial AIDS committee has been established with direct participation and proportional representation of government, church and NGO agencies, all working to actively implement HIV/AIDS policies and programs.

During 1998–2005 HELP Resources has made its best effort to contribute to the local response and the formation of ESPAC, as well as sustained cooperation and coordination within the East Sepik provincial AIDS committee. HELP Resources’s comparative advantage is its staff of well-informed and experienced health and social development professionals and its capacity to develop curriculums and produce training materials. HELP’s secular, gender-sensitive, rights-based approach has been one of many factors resulting in the relative success of the East Sepik provincial response from 1998 to 2005.

Since HELP Resources’s inception, community sexual health education has been one of the organisation’s core activities, resulting from a strong organisational commitment to contribute to the local response to HIV/AIDS. HELP Resources has contributed substantially to training, capacity building, networking, facilitating local partnerships, and research and documentation in support of a collective and collaborative provincial response to HIV/AIDS.

In 1998, through a mass training effort organised by the East Sepik Women and Children’s Health Project, HELP Resources staff trained 24 sexual health trainers who then trained 400 village health volunteers (VHVs) to talk about sex, sexuality

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**Box 1 Overview of Help Resources Inc**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>After six years of operations, HELP Resources (HELP R) has 12 salaried staff, 18 youth volunteers and several networks of trained trainers to mobilise to address the pressing social development of the East Sepik Province. HELP R has two main program components.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gender, human rights and HIV/AIDS are cross-cutting and mainstreamed issues in these program components.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. A Community Multi-purpose Telecentre — This component aims to facilitate public access to multimedia information sources and communication options. HELP R’s print, video and CD-ROM libraries have more than 20,000 items, many of which are about community and sexual health and relationships and global and local best practice in HIV/AIDS responses. All local organisations can borrow HIV/AIDS-related videos for training and HELP Resources assists with the dissemination of centrally produced HIV/AIDS IEC materials, as well as producing local training manuals, training support materials, flyers and information sheets and in Tok Pisin in its own desktop publishing unit. Young people can discreetly access and read books and view videos about sexual health and HIV/AIDS in the library and reading room and during community video screenings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Community Education and Empowerment — HELP Resources has a team of three trainers/trainers of trainers who work to establish coordinated networks of trainers in sexual health, HIV/AIDS prevention, gender and human rights, community organisation and mobilisation, food security and active citizenship for good governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact HELP R on tel/fax: +675 856 1453 or email <a href="mailto:help_admin@globalnet.pg">help_admin@globalnet.pg</a></td>
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and sexual health in their home community, with an emphasis on STI and HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care (Cox and Hendrickson 2003).

HELP Resources has maintained a successful partnership for more than six years with SHine (Sexual Health Information, Networking and Education) South Australia. A Training of Trainers (ToT) for sexual health trainers benefited from this partnership through the input of two experienced nurse educators (one from Fiji and one from Australia) who provided a combined nine weeks of direct technical inputs in training content and method and support for local trainers to adapt and translate a core training manual from an existing Pacific sexual health program.

Since 1998 HELP Resources has further developed, tested and refined a sexual health training manual and supported trainers' kits for community-based education on sexuality and sexual health. In 2003, three linked ToT workshops were held over 12 months involving trainers from many other agencies. Such long-term and close collaboration with local organisations, such as Baua Baua Popular Education Troupe, has resulted in a network of sexual health trainers being established and extension programs of gender-sensitive sexual health information and education being integrated into many church-based and secular networks across the province.

HELP Resources has also initiated and supported many local HIV/AIDS activities in partnership with various local, national and international agencies including:

- With Callan Services, delivered a certificate program in HIV/AIDS community counselling and home-based care and established a network of community counsellors. Thirty counsellors have been trained through this program over the past four years.

- With the active participation of all relevant sectors in East Sepik, produced a substantial sexual health training kit, trained a new team of 26 sexual health trainers and supported the formation of a coordinated, collaborative, resourced and supervised network that places great emphasis on cross-sector cooperation, confronting gender, gender violence and role modelling by trainers themselves.

- With Save the Children in PNG and ESPAC, implemented a second mass training of 340 women VHVs in 2004, which has been documented on a comprehensive CD and in the video documentary Scaling Up.

- With technical support from SHine, the cooperation of the Division of Education and under the leadership of Catholic Family Life counsellors, a team of teachers and sexual health trainers have been trained and inspired to initiate a program of sex education in East Sepik schools. The approach empowers teachers and moves beyond a biological model of reproductive health found in the existing Life Skills curriculum.

- Conducted major research and prepared a situational analysis of child sexual abuse and commercial sexual exploitation of children in PNG for UNICER UNESCAP and ECPAT. In April 2003 launched a four-month behaviour change campaign to follow up on the research, aimed at informing, educating and enabling communities to confront and combat widespread sexual abuse and exploitation of children.

- In May 2005 will train ESPAC members in research skills and support them to research the social impact of the 2003-2004 'Sepik vanilla boom' and the large South Seas tuna factory and the impacts on sexual behaviours, risk and vulnerability, particularly of girls and young women.

- With Baua Baua, currently working on an adaptation of the famous Stepping Stones Commata gender-sensitive and rights-based approaches to HIV/AIDS education, using role play and other participatory methods. The program aims to enable communities to examine, understand and take control of gendered and age-based relationships of power and HIV/AIDS and the key factors of risk and vulnerability.

- With ESPAC members, and the support of Oxfam Australia, HELP Resources is currently documenting the East Sepik provincial response to HIV/AIDS and examples of good practice in local responses. This is being undertaken as an exercise for local reflection and evaluation, a guide to future planning and also as a contribution to current efforts to plan and design a strategy for the imminent second five-year AusAID-funded HIV/AIDS project in PNG. This will also enable ESPAC to showcase what has been achieved in the East Sepik and to inform other provincial responses.

As a member of ESPAC, HELP Resources has contributed in many ways:

- With the church health services and other NGOs who were among the ESPAC’s founding members, HELP Resources has challenged the initial, top-down NACS/NHASP blueprint and their prescriptive approach to the formation of PACs.
Among founding ESPAC members, cultivated a healthy scepticism regarding the imposition of centralised directives, including a blanket ‘model’ for and approach to the formation of PACs with membership dominated by government ‘big shots’, and merely token participation (one representative each) from the church and NGO sectors, even when these were clearly better informing themselves and doing the most local work on HIV/AIDS.

Worked with other local NGOs and faith-based organisations to demand fair representation of active NGOs and churches on the PAC from the outset and set about working with all of these agencies to implement a vibrant and multifaceted provincial response.

Provided support to local popular theatre, in particular working closely with Baua Baua for eight years on popular education and dissemination of information on HIV/AIDS information through drama and song. This included production of a cassette of songs and an accompanying songbook, and provision of back-up to a nine-month tour by Baua Baua of 60 villages along the Upper, Middle and Lower Sepik River and its tributaries. The tour provided three-day participatory workshops in each village to mobilise, encourage and link with community action and responsibility for malaria and HIV/AIDS prevention.

Provided ongoing facilitation and moral, technical and micro-project financial support (from Oxfam Australia) as seed funding for the community-based work of members of the network of sexual health trainers. The success of this seed funding in providing moral support to trained trainers who wanted to get out and get to work in communities and in sustaining the local response when financial support was not forthcoming from the national level, provides important lessons regarding the value of continuous follow-up and networking for trained trainers and the importance of making micro/seed funding available to community-based or ‘multiplier effect’ local HIV/AIDS activities.

**Lessons learned**

With six years of experience in contributing to the provincial HIV/AIDS response, HELP Resources has learned the following lessons about dealing with centralised peak bodies, about centralised and directive counterparting projects and of the limited support for people in provinces who work at their own pace (in this case ahead of the national response) with their own unique pools of cross-sector agencies, resource people, energy and creativity:

- a centrally promulgated blueprint for local committee membership, structures, schedules of meetings, provincial responses and national/provincial working relationships is never appropriate for all provinces;
- an expensive and prescriptive centre for the national and provincial response leads to limited and often poor returns on high expenditure on short-term sorties into the provinces, which rarely reach out in any sustained way to the districts or the community;
- various smaller donors working with local HIV/AIDS initiatives are vital and usually able to achieve *more with less*;
- in five years of NHASP funding, insufficient in-depth analytical work has been or is being done in the provinces by the people themselves — there has been no encouragement of local participation in research and documentation, except for the one-off national social mapping project;
- flashy and superficial approaches that involve spending a lot of money on T-shirts, bags, caps, launches, openings, marches, entertainment and other one-off or one day events are at best not strategic and at worst represent an alarming misapplication of government or donor funds — they are often not relevant to or do not reach people living in rural communities;
- a centralised response that is unable and/or unwilling to address gender issues or ensure integrity of its core staff will not produce a meaningful mainstreamed gender-sensitive approach in the national, provincial or local responses.
- slow, imperceptible trickle-down project funding is frustrating and can lead to local implementing agencies dropping out of a collective PAC response to do their own thing;
- occasional rushes to reach targets for grant-funding disbursement can cause a flurry of activity, yet too much remains merely sensational and superficial;
- the centralised large-project approach has serious limitations in enabling a viable and sustainable provincial response to HIV/AIDS. This must be compensated and overcome by a strengthened

April 2005
bottom-up approach as a matter of urgency before even more valuable time in the war against HIV/AIDS is lost;
• when they can access funding and their ability to be innovative and creative is encouraged, local NGOs and churches are capable of making many substantive and significant contributions to the local and national responses and of initiating best practice;
• learning from experience and identifying and replicating best practice should be experienced as a two-way street, and not just top-down.
• support and funding should be provided to enable successful local responses to be documented and shared; and
• large projects with highly paid personnel tend to overestimate their own importance and contribution to a national response, while underestimating and not acknowledging capacity for innovation and good practice in provinces that have well-experienced and knowledgeable government, church and NGO practitioners and substantive programs.

Conclusion
Over six years, the East Sepik Province has built a successful provincial AIDS committee and a collectively owned and collaboratively implemented a local response to HIV/AIDS, yet there has been little acknowledgment from NACS/NHASP of the importance of developing a range of models for local responses. An analysis of the ingredients of success is important if lessons are to be learned. A cost-benefit analysis that also counts local expertise, human and other resources and funds brought directly into the response through horizontal rather than hierarchical relationships and partnerships also needs to be undertaken. This will ensure that these issues are acknowledged and understood.

HELP Resources is one of several key organisations consciously building the local response by emphasising and facilitating cooperation across NGO, church and government agencies. HELP Resources calls regular meetings and puts many of its resources into networking. HELP Resources also shares the financial and technical assistance it receives from overseas partners with all agencies involved in the local response.

Provincial government support has been the missing ingredient in the East Sepik's local response. In the past, and again recently, staff of NACS have recommended disbanding ESPAC and replacing the current members with political and administrative leaders, largely from government, thereby reinstalling a top-down, formal and bureaucratic committee. This would spell disaster. Valuable lessons regarding the elements and processes of building an effective local response must not be lost if current progress in addressing HIV/AIDS in the East Sepik is to be maintained and advanced.

Reference
What we do in Saraga:
Building community peace and harmony

Issac Wai and Paul Maia, Saraga Peace, Good Order and Community Development Association*

Background
Saraga was once a Motu Koitabuan village, but as Papua New Guinea grew it became a squatter settlement. The first groups of people from Goilala arrived and settled in Saraga in 1949, with a verbal agreement with local landowners providing them with security protection and labour. Under the colonial administration, the government needed labourers for casual duties. They recruited labourers in other districts of Papua New Guinea and brought them in to Port Moresby where, away from their relatives, they worked and lived. Eventually, relatives followed their wantoks to Port Moresby and started to squat with them in Saraga. The population increased through urban drift from rural areas, new births, foreign marriages and the extension of the tambu relationship. Saraga settlement was established in this way, and, today, the community has third and fourth generations who recognise themselves as Saraga people. The Saraga Peace, Good Order and Community Development Association conducted and carried out a survey and community census in 1999, which indicated that there are 17,000 people from 34 ethnic groups residing in Saraga.

From 1970s to the 1990s, Saraga was known as one of the criminal breeding grounds in Port Moresby — a kind of Wild West cowboy country with lawless characters, murders, tribal fights, rapes, rascalism, car thefts, break and enters and armed hold-ups. The police and the general public feared going to Saraga at night. People did not care about Saraga.

Association formation
On 9 February 1998 a nine-year-old Rigo girl was shot dead along the Magi Highway in Saraga by young culprits. Prominent leaders from Central Province, the national government, Motu Koitabu landowners and the general public wanted an immediate removal of all settlers in Saraga and for them to be repatriated home. The atmosphere was very tense and people started to fear what would happen next.

Massive manpower was wasted in Saraga, as people became idle, loafing and roaming around aimlessly, committing violent acts against innocent people and destroying state property. An anti-crime campaign was run by the then Central and National Capital District Commander, Jeffrey Vaki, for the settlers at Saraga. People were told to stop the acts of terror or they would be evicted and repatriated.

Following the anti-crime campaign, Paul Maia arranged an urgent meeting with all community leaders to establish a mechanism that could become the mouthpiece of the community and set a vision for the community. At the meeting, the idea of establishing committees in each ethnic group to maintain law and order was conceived. Each ethnic group formed and established its own law and order committee. All of the 34 ethnic committee leaders proposed to form an association. The response was favourable and the Saraga Peace, Good Order and Community Development Association was established on 12 February 1998, with the aim of planning strategies to combat law and order problems.

The association's aims and objectives are:

- **Promotion of good governance** — help achieve good governance and the realisation of human rights and prevention of conflicts. Promote and establish a community coalition between government, business houses, communities and civil society to help restore law and order.

- **Promotion of human development** — help people achieve higher levels of education and help and widen opportunities for the disadvantaged.

- **Promote the status of women** — contribute to the removal of gender discrimination and encourage the greater participation of women in societies. Liaise, coordinate and network between all collaborating agencies to ensure violence against women is prevented.

- **Prevention of delinquency** — engage youth in lawful and socially useful activities. Foster a humanistic outlook on life so that young people do not develop criminal attitudes and children's personalities are respected. Implement the Juvenile Court Act in conjunction with United Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child requirement so that PNG criminal justice agencies make reforms to ensure that stated rights and the specific needs of juveniles are maintained.
the different ethnic groups together, where they socialised and created friendships. These relationships spread and extended to include other people.

**Law and order awareness**
The association conducted law and order awareness with the assistance of the British High Commission. The Commission provided the association with brochures containing legal information and the association explained the information to Saraga's 34 ethnic groups. The issues covered included wife-beating as a crime, laws about drinking alcohol, home brewing, marijuana, pack rape, changes of laws in the country, child abuse and the rights of a child.

**Restorative justice peace mediation**
Restorative justice peace mediation is a Melanesian cultural concept recognised as suitable for mediating conflicts by Saraga Peace Good Order and Community Development Association. The association adopted the concept based on the mediation skills taught by Peace Melanesia Foundation Ltd in 1996 and converted it into a locally owned concept. The concept was used to mediate six murder conflicts that arose between different ethnic groups in 1997–2004, and is still being used today. The association mediated and successfully addressed the harm caused to the victims and their families. They ensured that the victims accepted the offenders and their families back into the community and that the offenders restored relationships with innocent community members who had been affected by the conflicts.

The concept that the association uses ensures that conflicting parties become responsible for their attitudes and behaviours, which creates respect, peace and harmony. Upon completion of a successful conflict resolution process, Peace Declared Memorandum of Understanding forms, with specific conditions, are drawn up. Both parties agree upon these conditions and sign the forms, confirming that peace has been restored. The mediation panel also signs the document, which seals the peace agreement, and a police station commander witnesses the documents. Upon signing these peace agreements, the parties become solely responsible for repairing damages caused, according to the conditions set and agreed upon.

The concept is very useful and it is an alternative to imprisonment, which relieves pressure on the police, the court system and the prisons. The local police commander and his police members are associated with the Saraga group and they always work alongside one another, making sure that minor summary offences and juvenile cases are registered in the police occurrence book before the cases are referred back to the community for mediation. The association's mediation group resolves the conflict at hand and then reports back to the Six-Mile police, who close the incident reports at the police station.
Cases that have been mediated by the committee have included stealing, bag snatching, conflicts relating to alcohol consumption, tribal fighting, gossiping, wife beating, child abuse, false allegations, adultery, broken marriages, bride price, attempted rape, land disputes, non-repayment of credit and possession of cannabis.

**Major sponsors**

Government, non-government and private companies have all played an important role in the association's activities. The Community Justice Liaison Unit works to enhance, strengthen, develop and maintain partnerships between government agencies and to bridge the gap between the civil society groups like the Saraga Peace Good Order and Community Development Association. The Community Justice Liaison Unit recognised our establishment, came to our aid and have funded community sports to the value of K12,874. This has also provided opportunities for women and children to carry out small income-generating activities at the sporting events.

In the near future, the Community Justice Liaison Unit is planning to fund our multi-purpose community hall. All organisations operating and residing in Saraga will utilise this property together and operate under one roof with the aim of fighting crime and violence.

Downer Construction, a former construction company in Papua New Guinea, and Kuima Securities, now known as Pacific Corporate Security Company, have sponsored, supported and assisted with financial and logistical support throughout the association’s operation at Saraga. Pacific Corporate Securities is providing and assisting the equal distribution of security employment to all different ethnic communities residing around Saraga and the National Capital District. It has also created free fast and efficient communication system links with its radio network to assist fighting rascalism using the association’s committee network.

In March 2004, Downer Construction wound down its operations in Papua New Guinea and Omni Ltd purchased the Downer premises. Omni Ltd Management provides the Saraga Peace, Good Order and Community Development Association with logistic support in fighting law and order problems in the area.

**The future**

In 2005–2006 the Saraga Peace Good Order and Community Development Association plans include:

- building a multi-purpose community hall;
- installing electricity and streetlights in needed areas;
- installing and extend water supply to necessary areas and increase water pressure;
- building sewerage blocks to improve hygiene in the area;
- poverty alleviation schemes such as back yard gardening, poultry keeping, flower planting, and nurseries;
- improving the mobile clinic arrangements;
- skills training for youths, both boys and girls;
- maintaining the project to keep Saraga protected, green and clean and extending it to the National Capital District;
- promoting detailed awareness on family and sexual violence, alcohol and drugs through the use of brochures; and
- increasing sports participation with other settlement and villages.

The association members have created a foundation for community development and law and order. It would be a great help if government agencies could see and recognise the association’s existence and financially support its mechanisms to strengthen, develop and maintain strong partnerships that could keep law and order problems at a manageable level.

**Conclusion**

The law and order problem is not only the problem of the national government and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. The law and order problem is also the problem of normal and ordinary community members of Papua New Guinea. It is necessary for us all to build partnerships for change and to combat crime and build safer and stronger communities.

The strategies the association has implemented have created socialism, friendship, peace, love, joy and unity and its establishment model has been extended to other individual ethnic communities in Saraga. We brainstormed and made ground rules to govern and control people’s attitudes and behaviours. We invited and brought the different ethnic group leaders together during community leaders’ fortnightly meetings. We built the community by involving everyone in different activities and gradually everyone came to meet each other. Know each other, and share items among themselves to build a democratic community.

Even though Saraga is a multicultural community with different cultures, traditions, it is united in peace and harmony as one Saraga ethnic community group today.

**Note**

- Mr Issac Wai is the Deputy Chairman and Mr Paul Maia is Chairman of the Saraga Peace, Good Order and Community Development Association based at Six-Mile, in Port Moresby, NCD.
Proactive crime prevention in National Capital District, Port Moresby

Sergeant Patrina Dikin, Community Police Section, NCD, Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

Introduction

For years the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) has approached crime reactively, attending to crimes such as abduction, pack rape, robbery, murder, white-collar crime, indictable crimes and summary offences after they have occurred. Using this reactive process, on most occasions cases are discussed and then withdrawn due to insufficient evidence. Suspects go free and conviction rates are poor. We can all see the practical outcome that results — law and order issues.

Recently, the RPNGC has moved towards a proactive approach. Both reactive and proactive will run side-by-side in a long-term approach to crime prevention and control. Policemen and women will need to be capable of using both reactive and proactive approaches. Training workshops are being conducted for members of all ranks in the constabulary, but there also has to be changes in operational methods, changes in characters and total changes to both the police and the PNG community.

Community policing

Community policing empowers people in house lines, villages, settlements, organisations, youth groups, women's groups and church groups to participate in the fight against crime and to contribute collectively to securing a safer community. It is a service to be provided free by the community — a service of love, respect, consent, change of attitude, obedience, commitment and dedication. Communities, government agencies and NGOs have to network and share knowledge, experience and resources to secure a safer community. Bottom-up planning and transparency are necessary before we can have a real democracy in PNG.

One of the main roles of the community police is to prevent crime through public awareness raising. Some of the issues that have been addressed by the RPNGC include the causes of crime, such as payback killing, child sexual abuse, state property theft, rape, homebrew manufacturing, graffiti, domestic violence, compensation, firearms and drugs. Awareness sessions run by community police officers have targeted children, youths at schools, community groups, and women and young girls, and print materials have been distributed widely in a variety of languages.

An important recent activity launched by the Community Police Section in Port Moresby's National Capital District (NCD) is the victims desk, which is coordinated by regular members of the police force. The victims desk was established to deal with victims of crime (mainly women and children) by advising victims on the process of laying police complaints and court proceedings so that they can use the law to their advantage. The desk also runs workshops and training on domestic violence for community women and police personnel. Morata 4 city is one of the victims desk pilot projects (see below).

The Community Police Section is in the process of establishing eight victims desks, one in each of the eight substations in NCD. It is hoped that the idea will spread to the other 19 provinces in PNG. Evaluation reports on these activities compliment the RPNGC for introducing the victims desk and support the notion of using the concept in all 19 provinces. This may be seen as a start in addressing family abuse and all forms of discrimination against victims, especially women and children, but it still requires networking, community participation, transparency, commitment and cooperation — all of which will take time.

Pilot Project: Morata 4 safe room and children's centre

The Morata 4 safe room provides traditional and Western counselling, prayer, accommodation for mothers and children, meals and clothes and maintains records of every incident experienced by people using its services. People involved in running the safe room assist police awareness and training on domestic violence and network closely with the police victims desk. The safe room is owned by community women and provides a safe place to protect children and women in the community who are victims of discrimination, sexual related offences and HIV/AIDS. The services are provided and sustained by women from the community, youths and community leaders. Husbands and the general community are supporting the activities undertaken by the women and appreciate what the women of Morata 4 are doing to complement the work of the RPNGC. All activities and services are undertaken in close consultation with the victims desk.
In addition to the safe room, a children's centre has been started by the women of Morata 4 city so that their children have a safe environment. They believe that this will help children avoid becoming the victims of sexual and other crimes and it will prepare children at an early stage to become good citizens. This involves monitoring and controlling children in the community to avoid abuse of time and involvement in criminal activities. Services offered by the centre are creative, articulating Western and Melanesian styles of doing things. The centre is supervised by women in the community who work in close consultation with the police victims desk.

To prevent crime in their community and to create a safe and happy environment, the people of Morata 4 are undertaking a variety of activities, including beautification, building and creating a classroom and area for the children's centre, making the community responsible for participating in crime prevention activities, sustaining crime prevention activities by providing resources, collective opinion, labour and time, and participating in services that are offered to the community.

**Issues of critical concern**

Despite the hard work that the RPNGC and community members are doing to prevent and control crime, there are a number of ongoing issues of critical concern. These include:

- monitoring the movement of people from villages, settlements, house lines and provinces at the national level;
- the intellectual capacity of police personnel;
- the limited rehabilitation programs at Bomana correctional institution;
- the lack of provincial government interest in children and women's issues;
- the poor and corrupt justice system; and
- the attitude problems of Papua New Guineans who refuse to change.

The RPNGC, with its limited resources, is now turning back to the community and appealing to the community to join hands together to secure a safer community. It's our responsibility — we all must work together.
Keeping the covenant: Seventy years of peace for the Moge Nambka Melimp and its leaders

Paul Petrus*

Introduction

There is a Melpa proverb that goes, 'Nde omba pumrem, nor i morem, nu omba purem kep e tete'. It translates as, 'Where a tree was previously cut down, the stump still remains for a long time, and where a river has previously run, it leaves behind its banks'. As an example, the proverb is applied to describe how on the death of the father, his qualities and character, can still be seen in his children. The history of a place leaves its mark on the present and future society. Historic events remind the people of their past and give them a sense of identity and often pride. This is the case for my clan, the Moge Nambka Melimp, which has a population of approximately 3500 people and is located on the north-west periphery of what today is the city of Mount Hagen. The 'good news' story is that my clan upholds a 70-year-old covenant of keeping the peace and living in harmony. This covenant has had a significant impact on the present socioeconomic conditions in Mount Hagen and the whole Western Highlands.

History

In pre-colonial times, as occurred in the rest of the highlands, the Moge Nambka Melimp clan had occasional fights with neighbouring clans, mainly over land, pigs and women. These material concerns represented much deeper issues, such as identity and security. Men were on the alert wherever they went. They had to live fearlessly and look aggressive so that their land, villages and other properties were not threatened by other clans. This enabled the clan to live in security and a kind of peace, as ‘for centuries these people ... depended on their fighting strength for survival and any new comers were seen as a threat’ (Mennis 1982:41).

The hostile lifestyle of the Moge Nambka Melimp began to change when the Europeans arrived, especially the first missionaries in 1934, Father Ross and his party from Madang. The head men of the clan adopted a different attitude toward the Europeans. One of the most notable head men of this period was Ninji Kama, who accepted the missionaries onto his land, which they needed badly. Unlike leaders from other places in the highlands, he did not regard the missionaries as the ghosts of the ancestors, or strangers to be hated and feared. Ninji Kama put aside these fears, confronted the white men face to face, and asked them who they were. Ninji approached Father Ross suspiciously and searched his body, especially his genitals, to feel if he was really a man. This encounter is still remembered today in the village.

The clan leaders were also surprised at the attitude of the missionaries, who were humble and peaceful. This led Ninji to accept the missionaries into his land. In return, Father Ross recognised Ninji as a very intelligent man (Mennis 1982:52, 63). The missionaries regarded the Moge Nambka clan as the chosen clan, and they decided to settle on their land. More importantly, filled with wisdom and knowledge, Ninji could see the future. He was fascinated by the Europeans’ material goods and dreamed of owning them. He organised his people to become friendly and helpful in order to benefit from European goods and materials. He was truly a very unique, wise and intelligent leader of the Moge Nambka Melimp clan.

From then on, Ninji and his clan were helpful to the missionaries. They built the first airstrip in Mount Hagen on Ninji’s land in 1934. They also helped to build the mission station and the first school in Mount Hagen, which opened on 10 January 1935 (Mennis 1982:64). Many graduates of this school have been and still are active in the social life of the province and the country. In return, the missionaries cared for the sick people and taught the young boys and people to become Christians. They established a good relationship that continues today.

The 1936 promise for peace and harmony

In around 1936 one of the most significant events in the history of the clan took place. A decision was made under the influence of the Christian principles preached by the missionaries. Ninji and other leaders of the clan promised to live in peace and harmony and forget about tribal fighting. Mennis gives a description of how the peace ceremony was conducted. With the missionaries present as witnesses of God, the men burnt their shields, spears, and bows and arrows. Big feasts were arranged and pigs and valuables were exchanged with their enemies, their neighbouring brother clans, the Akilkas and the Komonkas and other tribes such as the Elti Penambi (Mennis 1982:81–83). This promise for peace has been kept to the present day. The pact has been strained on some occasions, with
small fights occurring between old enemy clans, but these ceased quickly and peace was restored, with new feasts held to strengthen and renew the promise.

With the coming of patrol officers, the promise to live in peace and harmony was reinforced. Most fights after this peace ceremony were brought to the attention of the patrol officer or the missionaries and were solved peacefully and the culprits sent to jail. The clan also played an important role in the establishment of the government, providing building materials for the establishment of the government station at Mount Hagen.

Ninji became the paramount *luluai* (chief) and represented a strong link between the government and the people of Western Highlands. When he died he was shown great respect by the government and mission because they had lost a very vital link to the people. He died a happy and proud man because of his contribution towards the development of his clan and the province. Today, he is still remembered by his people as a hero.

Ninji’s footsteps were then followed by Wamp Wan. Working with the government, he was the *tulul* (consul), later becoming councillor of the clan and finally council president. He kept the promise of his elders and did not encourage tribal fighting, but rather encouraged his people to follow the Christian way of life. Sir Wamp is now very old and housebound, and his memory is failing, but he remembers the ‘old days’ and has no regrets about his own role in keeping the covenant.

The present
The promise to live in peace and harmony made by our forefathers is still evident today. It is safer to walk around the clan area than many other clan areas. My forefathers’ approach has allowed the Moge Nambka Melimp clan to have access to government and church services, such as schools, health clinics, roads and electricity. Currently, the two councillors, business people and other highly respected and well-educated individuals carry on the tradition of living in peace and harmony, with clan leaders still boasting today about the foresight of their leaders:

> My forefathers were the first to see and accept the missionaries. Therefore, God is always with my people no matter what and we know the law better than others.
> 
> Councillor Yak Wandaki

There are frequent media reports of tribal fights in many parts of the highlands region. Police, with their limited resources, cannot stop the fights, which involve powerful firearms and can last for months. Sometimes, as in the case of the tribal fight in the Nebilyer valley, it can take years to settle such fights. Most clans around Western Highlands believe that they have to extract payback through injury or death, with little thought to solving their conflicts by the traditional methods (compensation) or the Western justice system.

By contrast I have discovered my ordinary clan members do not have any guns. Only business people in the clan own guns for their own protection. When the youths ask to access these guns to take revenge in cases of conflict, the business people respond negatively. They allow the traditional and modern justice systems to solve their conflicts and let Christian principles prevail. If, for example, a fight occurs in a local market involving a youth of Moge Nambka Melimp, leaders take action by solving the conflict the next day.

A bonus for the Moge Nambka Melimp leaders is that they are intelligent orators and are skillful in solving problems. When giving public speeches, leaders mention the peace promise by our forefathers and urge the young generation to carry on the tradition. The ordinary clan members’ respect for their leaders’ ability to solve their disputes and their acceptance of their decision also enables peace in the society.

Like other societies, the clan does experience family violence, drug-related problems, HIV/AIDS and petty crime. But the clan members are aware of these problems and address them peacefully, rather than letting them get worse. I witnessed a number of incidents this year that could have led to a tribal fight but didn’t. In one such incident, a woman from the Moge Nambka Melimp clan married to a neighbouring clan member was stabbed and chopped to pieces. Her husband had suspected, with no evidence, that she was having affairs with other men. The family members and the Moge Nambka Melimp clan, especially the young men, were angered but were cooled down by the leaders, who allowed the police to investigate. The councillor of the neighbouring clan was very angry with the husband and assisted the police in his arrest. He also arranged to pay compensation, which was shared among the Moge Nambka Melimp clan members. As a leader, he stated that he respected and admired the Moge Nambka Melimp clan for proclaiming peace.

In another case, a company driver under the influence of alcohol and driving dangerously, did not see two Moge Nambka Melimp men walking on the roadside and ran over one man, killing him instantly, and injured the other. A typical response from other clans would be to take revenge by destroying the company’s property before claiming compensation. But this did not occur. The driver was jailed and the company itself offered compensation which was shared among the clan members.

Sadly, Councillor Yak Wandaki MBE, the most recent leader to uphold the 70-year-old covenant, died a week ago. He had worked with the local-level government of Mount Hagen and the provincial government of Western Highlands to spread the example of peace in his own clan to other clans and tribes around the province. He was known as the ‘Man of Peace’. His death is a great loss to the clan and the province, but I believe in what...
one of the upcoming clan leaders, John Kama, said during the funeral service: 'The death of my father (Cr. Yak) is like we are planting a seed. When it grows it will bear more fruits.'

The message spreads

Other tribes and clans have their own ways set by their forefathers of contributing to the development of the province, such as the clans under the Jika tribe, who are good at politics. But the peace-making contribution of Moge Nambka Melimp clan provides a foundation that allows for the other contributions from the various tribes. Further, its brother clans, such as the Andaglimps, Komokas, Askillas and Okeptas, are following in the footsteps of the Moge Nambka Melimp clan. When these and other tribes discuss peace, their leaders usually refer to the Moge Nambka Melimp clan as an example. Our clan leaders have been involved in peace making in other tribal fights. Recently leaders of the clan supported the Catholics in Mt. Hagen in a peace march through the war zones of Rumdi and Nenga over the Gumans Coffee plantation (the largest in the Southern Hemisphere). Both tribes subsequently accepted peace and have ceased fighting.

Conclusion

This community approach to law and order has had a great impact on the development of the province. When there are more committed Christians and the society lives in peace and harmony there will be economic growth. Looking at the history of the Moge Nambka Melimp clan, I think that the leaders of each clan or tribe are the key to community peace and development. Following the good characteristics of leaders in the past, they should be wise and intelligent, as well as educated and able to look to the future, with a clear focus on developing the society.

In the highlands, especially the Western Highlands, a society will always live by the words and action of the leaders in terms of how to resolve conflict. I have noticed that leaders who resort to violence as payback in a conflict usually have society members who are violent and disturb the peacefulness of the community. The opposite is also true, as with my clan the Moge Nambka Melimp.

Lastly, I would also like to acknowledge that other societies in the province have their own ways of dealing with law and order problems. For instance, after the killing of an airline pilot in Mount Hagen in early 2004, church and government leaders pledged to condemn violence and keep peace among the Western Highlanders with a memorial built to symbolise this pledge.

Notes

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1. At the time of writing, in November 2004.

Reference

Introduction
The violent conflict in Bougainville caused many deaths and much trauma. Serious problems remain, but positives also emerged. The conflict was brought to an end in large part through the renewal and application of local customs. The resurrection of the Melanesian way brought the disputing parties together and provided a framework for peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Background
Bougainville is the most eastern province of Papua New Guinea (PNG) and is geographically a part of the Solomon Islands chain. It has a population of approximately 170,000. Many people have left the island and have created diasporas throughout PNG. Many will call themselves Bougainvillians for generations, yet have made their lives on the mainland and will not return to live on Bougainville. There are 19 different language groups and ethnicity is of significant importance. Of greater importance, though, is the matrilineal society of all the northern language tribes. In a matrilineal society, the husband moves to the wife's land and village. The society is still male dominated, so the links and relationships across the island through intermarriage are extraordinarily strong.

Bougainville has a long history of opposition to the PNG central government. The distance, the heavy pigmentation of Bougainvillians, the separation of Bougainville from the Solomon chain and the general neglect by the government have all been partial causes of the opposition.

There are two towns in Bougainville, Buka and Arawa. Until recently, Buka was a centre of administration and commerce with few people living there — after three in the afternoon when the public servants had returned to their villages it became a ghost town. Most of the people in Bougainville live in small hamlets consisting of less than ten houses, with up to 15 hamlets constituting a village. The two most important controls in the lives of the people are their land and their relationships with each other. The land owns the people as much as the people own the land and relationships based on reciprocal sharing are the basis of traditional power and government.

The mine and cultural collapse
In the early 1960s, the creation of the Panguna Copper Mine struck at the two deepest codes of belief — land and relationships. The people were told that the land belonged to the British monarchy and that their ownership rights related to the use of the surface only. The easy money of those who worked for the mining company destroyed the process of reciprocal gift giving, and consequently placed the whole culture at risk. The old traditions and sanctions of control fell apart to the extent that schools were closed because the children were no longer safe from the new temporarily wealthy youth for whom displays of materialism in the form of motorbikes, loud music and acceptance of free sex on demand became the norm.

Further stress was placed on the culture by the failure of the government and the mine to control the influx of thousands of mainlanders (redskins). Their aggressive approach to achieving what they claimed as their rights brought about the loss of traditional land to squatters and a loss of government power through corrupt voting practices. Crime grew. Criminal gangs, violence, robbery, fencing of stolen goods, and prostitution in the hands of redskins left the local population bewildered. Unused as they were to such a devastating threat to their way of life, the local people were confused and did not realise what their rights were or how to protect themselves.

The missionaries, who had been the friends of Bougainvillians and had provided support for the past 70 years, were equally helpless. The missions were resentful of the government, which had suddenly put them to one side as the providers of services. The missions took the opportunity to point out that in other countries, land did not belong to the Crown but to the landholders, and further informed the Bougainvillians that they were being robbed of a just share of the mine's wealth.

People at the mine site and along the Jaba River never had any idea of the extent of the overburden and tailings from the mine. In their shock they looked for ways to stop the mine. While people outside Bougainville could not see the danger of cultural extinction, they could see the environmental damage, and this became a major issue. Inside Bougainville, resentment grew. The young mine landowners claimed power, demanding that steps be taken to provide protection against redskin invaders and that they have a better share of the mine's profits. Their appeal was ignored by the government, which was milking the profits for itself. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) was formed to close the mine so as to bring the government to the negotiating table. The BRA was made up both of men who had the highest ideals of fair dealing and by raskols and criminals.
of the worst kind. The PNG government responded with brutality and human rights abuses against the people, the innocent as well as the guilty. War was created and it dragged on for three years until the army and police were finally withdrawn.

For six months the newly appointed rebel government attempted to rule, but were thwarted at every turn by Francis Ona’s Revolutionary Council. Frustrated in their attempt to govern they threatened to resign. The result was that the Panguna BRA and the raskols unleashed a reign of terror aimed at the PNG government, all who had in the past worked for it, and all who were seen as sympathisers. Suspects were summarily executed by BRA criminals and their followers. In many parts of the island, beginning with Buka, the people revolted against the BRA, called back the PNG army and formed the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF). This was the beginning of a genuine civil war.

The PNG army provided weapons for the BRF and youths of 17 and 18 became the spearhead of these armed forces. The army set up care centres to separate the BRA from the civilians. In theory all those outside the care centres were considered as BRA, but this was not so because most of the villagers, after years of cultural degradation, trusted no one and set up their own home guard. Care centres were controlled by the army and were places of shame and degradation. Women and children were the main victims and families were destroyed by shame and lack of respect and privacy. The army was in charge and there was no one to watch the watchers.

All groups — BRA, BRF, PNG Army and the home guard — committed atrocities, including murder, rape, torture and arson. Women and children were the worst sufferers. Infrastructure damage (of public buildings especially) was enormous and an estimated 15,000 people died. Police and the village and district courts failed. Many thousands of the best-educated and capable Bougainvillians fled to PNG. Thousands of youth, male and female, who bore the brunt of the fighting and the torture, were traumatised.

The Melanesian way
Before the coming of the white man, the people of Bougainville had, followed the Melanesian way of law and justice. It was a process based on the social contract, which forbade murder, theft, adultery and all behaviour that would threaten the quality of life or the security of the tribe against menacing outside forces. It also required that social obligations brought about through reciprocal gift giving be respected and that the power of the big men be respected. To deal with an offence, criminal or civil, the most urgent need was to mend the broken relationship. Experience had taught that any ongoing feud in a tribe weakened it and in its fragmented condition laid it open to external enemies. The essentials of the Melanesian way are community involvement, shame on the offender, apology to purge the offence, forgiveness, reconciliation and the return of the victim and offender to the community.

The Western system, imposed on PNG by the colonial power because it was not aware of the existence of the Melanesian way, came out of a different environment. The model was retributive and the purpose of law was to protect property, privilege and the status quo. Its instrument was a sophisticated court system to punish offenders with fines and jail.

During the years of the civil war on Bougainville, the Melanesian way was being resurrected, but was still in the redevelopment stage. The people returned to custom and found that it was successful because the mediator was neutral and the decision was made by an agreement between the disputing parties that could be accepted by BRA, BRF and home guard people (but not the PNG army). Where it was set in place the process was as follows:

- first there was a meeting of the victim and offender with families ‘in the eye of the community’;
- the family of the victim spoke about harm done, and the shame, loss, fear and trauma they experienced;
- the community talked about harm done to victims and the causes of crime in the community, such as drugs, home brew, prostitution;
- the offender was shamed when faced with his/her behaviour;
- the offender’s family spoke and apologised;
- families of the victim and offender and the community agreed on restitution;
- the victim’s family sometimes called for supervision of the offender;
- the offender was forgiven;
- reconciliation occurred, through a meal or feast;
- and
- in some cases of serious crime, the offenders could be expelled from the community for a designated time period.

Custom protecting civilians
During the civil war, the Melanesian way was used to deal with many crimes, even murder. The likelihood of ongoing feuds and further murders was reduced considerably. The Melanesian process allowed the offender to purge his guilt by apology and restitution. Similarly, the trauma of the victim was reduced by confrontation with the offender. Ongoing feelings of trauma and guilt were reduced, and both victims and offenders were in a better position to get on with their lives.
The return to custom prepared the way for the reconciliation processes that began during 1998. Many people (some trained by the PEACE Foundation and others following their own cultural processes) began conducting mediation for people in need. Where tribal fights had occurred, the leaders (chiefs or big men) were able to call on mediators to do the spadework to bring the warring BRA and BRF together. When the first reconciliation processes were successful, they were followed all over the island. With a gradual lessening of tension, it became possible to make a call to surrender the guns.

**A home-grown peace**

As the custom process was initiated by the people themselves, the return to peace is seen as a home-grown process. Reconciliation ceremonies began in 1998 and prepared the ground for the meetings attended by the BRA, BRF, the PNG army and the PNG Government in New Zealand, which finalised a peace deal, the 'Burnham Accord'.

The Bougainville crisis has had both negative and positive outcomes. On the negative side, Bougainville has lost its pre-war position as the best-governed and best-administered province in PNG. It has lost many of its best-educated and most capable people. There are still many hundreds of traumatised people. Its income from the mine has long disappeared and it has serious problems with an untrained public service. It has serious problems generating enough funds to manage. The problem of Francis Ona and his Me’ekamui Defence Forces remains.

On a positive note, in 2001 Bougainville signed a draft agreement of independence. This signing was the official ending of the civil war. Most of the guns have been handed in and Bougainville has written its constitution. The greatest asset of Bougainville is the quality of the people themselves, who are still able to call on cultural traditions to mend relationships. They have themselves put an end to a civil war, something almost unknown in today’s world. They know how to forgive one another.
Empowering local communities: The Kirapim Hauslain Foundation

Andre Kamane and Wayne Korarome, Kirapim Hauslain Foundation

Introduction
Kirapim Hauslain Foundation Incorporated (KHFI) is a non-government organisation that works with rural communities in the Eastern Highlands to assist them to develop themselves, rather than waiting for development to come to them. KHFI was started in 2003 by a small group of people mainly from the slums of Goroka township. At KHFI we saw that most development does not reach the rural communities. People in authority have not found time to sit down with rural people to plan the improvements and changes to their communities. What is evident instead is remote-control development by the bureaucrats and cargo development promoted by the politicians. KHFI believes in motivating people to start thinking positively about changes to their lives. Development has to build on what people already have within their capabilities and people have to be involved if real changes are to be made in PNG's rural communities.

In Tok Pisin, 'kirapim' means to resurrect something (such as an idea, a person, a process, or a community), which has died or is sleeping or dormant. 'Hauslain' means groups of people living in close proximity in communities or a village. At the core of the Hauslain system is the Hausman/meri, the forum for decision-making and planning. We believe that it makes more sense to base development work on existing knowledge and traditions rather than creating a new imported concept. KHFI's goal is:

- To empower the rural communities to be productive and self-reliant through the indigenous governance system (Hausman/meri system) for a positive mindset change and improved quality of life.

Issues for development
A number of particular issues affect the extent to which rural communities are able to develop themselves. Communities in the Eastern Highlands Province are not effectively organised, which affects their ability to accommodate development objectives and programs. Useful traditional values and knowledge systems are being undermined in the village societies due to competing Western influences and hegemony. The cargo cult and handout mentality is destroying communities, a situation complicated by self-serving politicians and people of influence from outside, and this must be avoided at all costs. In addition, inequality, discrimination and gender problems exist at the village level, which can lead to conflict and disadvantage certain members of the community. Thus, most communities in the village cannot afford to improve their living standards. HIV/AIDS, drugs and substance abuse, such as alcohol and marijuana, are very serious concerns in local communities. These are destroying young families and the youth of the villages. Communities do not have access to basic health care that is affordable and close to their homes. People, and especially children and mothers, are dying from preventable diseases, such as malaria, dysentery and typhoid. Most communities lack proper water supply and sanitation systems, although they have fresh clean water sources. As populations grow, there is more pressure on food production, land utilisation and on natural forests, which are being cut down for agriculture, fuel and timber. As a result, the villages suffer the effects of soil erosion and deforestation and their capacity to produce food is reduced.

To help counter these problems, KHFI's objectives are to:
- empower people to be productive and self-reliant;
- facilitate and strengthen indigenous community organisation and governance systems;
- improve the livelihood and living standards of the community and individuals;
- change the mindsets and attitudes of people to be responsible and valuable members of the community;
- assess and develop cultural and natural resources;
- facilitate basic education and skills training at the village level to generate lessons and values through the development process.

Process
The first step is the building of the Hausman/meri, which symbolises the spirit of cooperation, identity and respect for fellow members of the community, and empowers the leaders to lead the community towards wellbeing. In the Hausman/meri people can set up forums and dialogue on common issues and problems they face as individuals and as a community.

The second step is to instil control and establish a justice system for the communities. Through the Hausman/meri forum, which uses traditional laws and regulations that are
appropriate to the particular community, government laws and regulations can, where appropriate, be applied at the village level. Elected members of parliament can also play important roles through enactment of village laws as stipulated under the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government (section 42).

Then the ground is ready to plant the seeds of development, with the third step being discussion and planning of activities. KHFI facilitates the discussions and planning processes, including mapping of resources and communities so people understand the resources that are useful and how these can be utilised.

The fourth step is for KHFI to create a working relationship with the communities and begin on an agreed method of delivery. KHFI also aims to tap into the network of resources and entities that can provide funding, technical expertise and other resources. The communities supply the labour and material resources and formally organise themselves.

The KHFI team, comprised of the board and staff, work with eight voluntary district coordinators who are appointed to coordinate the activities of the Hauslaisn in each constituency. A representative from the Hausman/meri becomes the link with the KHFI, with the people supporting and cooperating with the Hausman/meri coordinator. KHFI also sees itself as helping to link communities with government and donors. KHFI works at the level of wards within the local-level government structure of each district, as stipulated under the Organic Law. The idea is that the people's ward councillors will put forward their concerns or projects, which then come to the attention of the district level and to the provincial headquarters. Each project will attract funding and technical expertise from churches, other NGOs, local-level, provincial and national government, and international donors and agencies.

Achievements
A start has been made. Over the period November 2003 to March 2004, the KHFI visited 60 communities. Since then, the villages have been evaluated and advised about the KHFI programs. Each village has constructed a Hausman/meri and has created their own bylaws to govern their communities.

The KHFI program has revived the 'community-day work scheme', where each village appoints a certain day during the week to carry out community services. Basic health and hygiene practices are followed and people now experience huge differences in their lives. KHFI encourages people to build and maintain basic infrastructure developments, such as roads, bridges and water supply systems using their own resources.

The people of the villages involved in the program to date are happy that they can organise themselves and utilise their own resources to achieve a meaningful quality of life. The mindset of the people is beginning to change from a 'handout mentality' to a more self-reliant approach. KHFI strongly prohibits the practice of free handouts in monetary terms, because this only destroys and weakens the community idea of self-reliance. KHFI emphasises strengthening the organisation of traditional communities and making use of available resources with little or no funding.

All this has been achieved through the Hausman/meri system, which guides and provides the overall operations of the communities' wellbeing. In Melanesian society, a decision made in a Hausman is a law and well respected. Thus, harmony can prevail in the community. The Hausman/meri form a key part of the community law and justice approach the PNG Government is trying to promote. The success of the program to date is due to a number of factors — the program operates on environmentally sound principles, it is based on appropriate technology and skills, it does not need high capital and inputs from outside, as much as possible the program utilises existing community resources, and, finally, ownership is by the people and the program can be easily managed by them.

There are, however, some constraints, the major ones being lack of transportation, funding, manpower and office resources. For example, lack of transportation has meant we have been unable to coordinate the program on a regular basis. Some villages have given up hope and resorted to illegal activities. The Eastern Highlands provincial government has offered some assistance, but other than that we have received no monetary support from government and donors. People are ready to cooperate as is evident from our experiences. However, support for this infant initiative is required.

Conclusion: Lessons from the project
First, most people in rural communities have taken on the belief that development comes from handouts given by the government bureaucracy and politicians. This has set a dangerous precedent, resulted in corruption at government offices, and led to certain communities being disadvantaged and missing out on development. The outcome is that people's living standards, creativity, potential and values have been degraded to well below pre-Western contact periods. The KHFI process is designed to change mindsets and attitudes, to encourage development through sets of processes, rather than seeing development as a product that is handed out.

Second, traditional communities were designed to be very cooperative, disciplined, self-reliant and productive. Entrepreneurship was encouraged through the different customs, practices and way of life. Why can't the development agencies work with the established system of organisation, thought and with existing resources instead of trying to create competing ideas,
resources and concepts of development? It makes a lot more sense to complement what the people already know and to channel support through these means to achieve development targets.

Third, it is well known in PNG that the government service delivery mechanisms are an inefficient way of implementing national government objectives. The result is that the bureaucracy has become a stumbling block in the development process. Although there may be well-meaning politicians and leaders at the helm, the service-delivery mechanism in the Eastern Highlands Province, and the country as a whole, has become too expensive and less in touch with the realities of people's lives. There needs to be an effective and direct delivery system through collaboration and networking amongst communities and stakeholders.

Finally, decisions and planning processes are usually made without the direct participation of the people who will be most affected by these processes. KHFI aims to create a paradigm shift by bringing these resources directly to the people through community forums and village organisations. If the government can focus on the bulk of the people (80 per cent or 4 million) who are living in villages, then it can find answers to some of the major socioeconomic problems that are facing PNG. Everyone will be a winner.

Note
Andrew Kamane, Program Manager for Kirapim Hauslain Foundation, was born in Goroka. He has a Diploma in Community Development (Melanesian Ethics) from the Capuchin Postulant Seminary in Mendi in the Southern Highlands. He has worked in various capacities for the Governor of the Eastern Highlands Province, including a period as Principal Electoral Officer and Executive Officer. Wayne Korarome is responsible for data and research at Kirapim Hauslain Foundation. He has a Bachelor in Communication Engineering from the PNG University of Technology, Lae. Wayne has worked as data analyst in the Electoral Office of the Governor of the Eastern Highlands Province and also as a computer assistant in the Eastern Highlands Provincial Assembly.
Promoting Papua New Guinea enterprise: The Tanorama experience

Nora Vagi Brash, Tanorama Ltd*

Introduction
This paper focuses on the success story of Tanorama Limited. It shares the company's experiences in selling PNG's intellectual ability and management capacity, both inside PNG and internationally. The paper describes some of the lessons the organisation has learned in its 10-year history and highlights key aspects of the Tanorama model that could be considered by other entrepreneurs or organisations.

Tanorama Limited is a family-owned PNG consulting firm, with offices in Port Moresby and Cairns, Australia. Its area of expertise is in identifying project opportunities and tendering for projects, as well as designing, reviewing and implementing projects. Tanorama's main business comes from development projects covering a wide range of areas and funded by donor agencies, NGOs and the private sector. Tanorama's PNG management ability is supplemented by a network of consultant contacts throughout the country who collaborate with the head office on a needs basis.

Tanorama's vision is to promote PNG expertise through the delivery of high quality consulting and project management and services to its clients. In ten years the company has grown from a family company to encompass non-family members in management positions, who may soon become part-owners. Like all its stakeholders, Tanorama strives for sustainable development.

How Tanorama does business
The head office in Port Moresby is the hub for sales, management and information for project managers and the network of consultants. Port Moresby handles all PNG work, while the Australian office in Cairns handles regional opportunities. Tanorama's significant asset is the databank of PNG and international experts from different fields and disciplines who work together to provide exceptional service to clients. When working in collaboration with international firms, Tanorama ensures that different styles of partnerships and/or contracts of engagement with consultants are appropriate to the PNG context.

The company has a staff of 10 permanent employees and the financial resources to mobilise and implement small and medium-sized projects. In addition, there are more than 10 external consultants who can be brought on for different assignments. Like the permanent employees, their activities are directed by the company's vision and policies.

Lessons from the Tanorama experience
The company struggled with debt and lack of capacity for a couple of years, but this has changed in the last four years in terms of staff, experience and income. A lot can be gained from PNG's intellectual ability and management capacity. The enabling environment is progressing, providing further potential for viable business in this area. Different groups have specialised in sectors such as human resources, education and health and are targeting the development/donor sector. There is a good and active marketplace and the demand is high. For instance, PNG consultants have the potential to increase their market share of the A$320 million in AusAID funds if they can maintain quality and results.

Businesses need to learn from their ups and downs and take on a disciplined approach to cost minimisation, savings and investment and careful marketing. They also need to dedicate time and commit resources to achieve high quality outcomes. The benefits of individual consultants working for a reputable management/broker firm are that the pipeline for opportunities through the firm is very high. With a contracting and management platform in place, more services can be offered and the risks are spread. Other challenges and opportunities include the cost involved in managing the database, developing contracts and managing projects, developing a business acumen and a sense of calm and discipline, financial sustainability, continuous learning and innovation, and a sense of responsibility towards supporting community initiatives.

Considerations for donors and government
Participatory development approaches are considered the best. The buzzword that goes around is 'partnership', however, few organisations operate with the trust, integrity and sharing that a good partnership needs. Project success often relies on strategic, hardworking and honest attitudes by participating agencies and consultants. This can be difficult to find and/or foster and takes a considerable amount of time to accomplish. A good course of action is to link government systems and projects to achieve synergies amongst the various projects that operate. To achieve savings and enhance project success rates, an ongoing public sector reform and a strengthened coordinated approach is needed. One strategy is to involve more entrepreneurs in

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government-organised overseas tours in place of public servants, politicians and their spouses. Such an emphasis on more trade-based initiatives has the potential for increased national returns and investment and offers a better return on tax payer-funded overseas trips.

The PNG consulting sector needs additional resources and support for individual professional development and organisational growth. There is also scope for the government and donors to study and provide further support to the 'learning community in the development sector'.

**Key aspects of the Tanorama model**

Tanorama is a local company that started off as a small family-owned business, but it has built on its potential and has a system in place to expand beyond this. It is guided by its clear vision and policy statements and the contracts and organisational structures by which it operates. The company was able to identify and capitalise on a niche (specialist) area of service provision with a viable product, which is the 'PNG People'. The owners risked their own money, with no bank loans, and committed a lot of time to establishing the company. The employees receive decent wages and conditions.

The company is largely PNG-run and maintains a degree of stability as a result of this. The company focuses on building relationships and contacts and has a system and a budget to support this. It recognises that there is scope for improving contracting and management systems within Tanorama and within other development-focused organisations in PNG. It has learnt business lessons from its ups and downs and considers itself part of a learning community, which shares ideas on project and organisational success and failure, as well as sharing information on national policy and enabling environmental issues.

**Conclusion**

Human resources are PNG's most valuable commodity. The PNG organisations that provide human resources services are growing in experience and ability. The government and donors can take advantage of this growth and local knowledge to the benefit of PNG. The private sector would welcome consultation on this with the government, provided that such talks are backed-up by genuine follow through and true partnership.

**Note**

* Nora Vagi Brash is an executive director of Tanorama Ltd. More information on Tanorama can be obtained from: <http://www.tanorama.com>.
Social impact studies by Papua New Guineans

Nancy Sullivan, Joseph Rainbubu and Nancy Warkia, Nancy Sullivan and Associates Ltd

Introduction

Nancy Sullivan and Associates Ltd is a small consulting firm established in 1997 to emphasise the importance of ethnographic insights in the research component of development projects in Papua New Guinea. The company comprises a core group of students and graduates from the Papua New Guinea Studies Department at the Divine Word University in Madang and Dr Nancy Sullivan (an anthropologist), who conduct research into all phases of development projects, including the detailed community baseline studies required by conservation organisations.

A recent switch in donor expectations, following a change in emphasis by the World Bank, means that most agencies operating in PNG now require Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs) and/or Rapid Rural Appraisals (RRAs) to analyse and assess the efficacy of their work. However, because PRA/RRA procedures are intended to produce generalisable data, they are usually devoid of cultural particulars and almost purely sociological in their research methods, incorporating the charts, diagrams and graphs of any social study, regardless of its actual location.

There is a critical need to adapt these methods and tools to the PNG context, and find approaches that are more sensitive to the requirements of specific projects and the communities involved. This is not to say that generalisable data cannot be found, but we remain extremely wary of charts that present information for an international audience that are devoid of ethnographic context and detail. We argue that it is no more appropriate to apply a research perspective developed in Romania to Thailand than it is to follow the prescriptions of a formulaic PRA/RRA in both Popondetta, Oro Province, and Vanimo, West Sepik.

PNG research processes

The Department of Papua New Guinea Studies at the Divine Word University is the only school at a locally based tertiary education institution dedicated to providing two and four-year all providing an important opportunity to create a national 'think programs that focus on a broad range of issues from Melanesian law and literature to history, development, international relations and cultural studies, all providing an important opportunity to create a national 'think tank'. It is essential that graduates also gain as much practical experience as possible in conducting research and preparing reports in PNG, with all its unique challenges and rewards. As opportunities arise, Nancy Sullivan and Associates Ltd seeks to provide this role (a list of the studies completed since 2000 and the researchers involved is provided at the end of this paper).

Development projects require high quality information, particularly as by definition such interventions are about changing people's lives. They often target communities at the margins of society who are especially vulnerable to external influences. If projects base their actions on insufficient or faulty data then the result (at best) could be a misplaced intervention that fails to correspond with the needs of the target population or could end up being ignored and so a waste of donor resources. At worst, such projects may have a negative effect on communities by undermining traditional practices or causing local people to invest their scarce resources in wasteful activities. Vulnerable populations may become more destitute as a result of poorly informed interventions. In short-term studies, Papua New Guineans are best placed to recognise the subtle nuances that may compromise a project. One of the most important functions of development anthropology is also the identification and deconstruction of development power relations. This is not always easy, though, as researchers are vulnerable to being subsumed by the assumptions and terms of donor agencies; liable to reproduce existing power relations in an effort to continue benefiting from them.

There are several methodological changes necessary to minimise the impact of such issues. The first is to be wary of sociological tools. We specifically choose to avoid any diagrams, flow charts, graphs or questionnaires which presume that all social institutions are essentially similar or to assume that features such as a 'modern' family, bank, hospital or wedding operate in PNG in the same way as they do in Europe, or that they are even comparable to their European (or African or Caribbean) counterparts. We try to resist the urge to 'smooth the curve' and 'screen out the static' of unexpected results, notwithstanding the insistence by most donors that they have colorful inserts in their reports. There are reasons for some of these (such as matrices), but Venn diagrams that look like 'bad wallpaper', the endless charting of material that should be described rather than converted to statistics, and the impulse to suppress variation in order to draw generalisable conclusions are all major taboos for us. In fact, we like raw data. We like to use the original stories and the informants' own charts and drawings in both the body and appendices of our reports. The more we record, the happier we are; we tend to gather information around the report objective rather than pursue a single line of inquiry. This is not to say that we get it right all the time, but having a pool of Papua New Guinean researchers from all over the country, most of whom have Papua New Guinea Studies degrees, makes a big difference
in analysing data. For example, the obligations of a mother's brother that seem unlikely to one ethnographer will make absolute sense to another, once we discuss the data. Such an approach tends to 'normalise' unusual material rather than suppress it.

There is a basic anthropological emphasis on cultural relativism in our work. This means that we prefer not to impose models from overseas, or from one cultural group to another. The idea is to remain open to patterns on the ground and not 'bully' the material into a donor's argument. A lot of sociological reportage is directed by biological, economic, psychological and social theory that originates from Europe and which presumes the universality of its principles. As a result, consultants often look for 'materialist' explanations of informal economies, corruption, failed development and so forth. Alternatively, we may take for granted Freudian or functional causes for behaviour merely because that is what we were taught in school (in PNG as well as overseas). But the lessons of anthropology are all about resisting those models when we recognise them in ourselves. For example, unless you know something about indigenous ideas of biology and pollution (not to mention nutrition and 'wellness') in a health project, much of what gets imposed will never be reproduced. You may be a Papuan doctor, but you will never get your male Highlands colleagues to eat food a woman has stepped over, nor will they understand your need to bury or burn hair and fingernail clippings. There are also deeply held beliefs associated with issues of domestic violence and pack rape that we must understand before we attempt to change or suppress behaviours in this age of HIV/AIDS.

In our experience, case studies, social mapping and unstructured interviews have all proved to be effective tools, while charts, diagrams and 'social indicators' are insufficient. For example, a chart showing a low incidence of women in Madang with HIV could mean that AIDS is not a problem, or that few women get tested, or that the tests themselves are inaccurate. At least blood tests constitute material evidence. In many other instances, field data may have little value because it is devoid of 'framing' evidence, such as who asked whom the question, why the person told you that information, and whether the discussion was held in private or in public.

Conclusion
A final and important point regarding social impact studies in PNG is the need for longer term data sets. Investigations are generally based on what people tell you during a particular week, or at best a month. Apart from the obvious question of whether they have a grudge to bear or a contravening motive that we may never know about, there is an inherent element of unreliability associated with short-term research. If growing conditions are good, people may (or may not) have a positive view of a proposed spice project, but conditions can always change.

One of the best aspects about research in PNG is the range and volume of long-term data sets that are available, and the fact that something has been written about virtually every district in the country. Agriculturalists, anthropologists, geographers, government officers, linguists and religious ministers (amongst others) have recorded and published their findings over more than 100 years. This work represents literally millions of research hours and should not go to waste; much of it can be readily accessed via the internet, or through collections that are held locally or overseas.

Kenelm Burridge's work from the 1960s, Bill Mitchell's from the 1970s, and reports by countless other social scientists since the 1980s have proven particularly useful resources for us. Some of this data has been available through the Divine Word University library, while other material has been sourced from the internet or the National Archives in Port Moresby. In this way we have found that the Wape people in the Torricelli Mountains in 2003 were still unique for the characteristics Bill Mitchell identified in 1977; that the men were unusually involved in rearing babies and infants, and can still be seen carrying children in slings across their chests. Elsewhere, Lapita pots shown to us by villagers have indicated that previous assumptions about migration patterns were wrong. Dances found in one location, but borrowed from another, have provided further information about socio-cultural links, while origin stories (combined with the wealth of material already recorded in the literature) have enabled us to speculate about the movement and history of certain peoples, and may provide important data for future land tenure debates.

Reports
The following is a list of reports completed since 2000 by Nancy Sullivan and Associates Ltd.

'The Wape after the Devil Fish: Culture and conservation of the Scott's Tree-kangaroo (dendrolagouse Scottae), an ethnographic survey of the 13 villages that constitute the Tenkile Conservation Alliance Project area', for The Tenkile Conservation Alliance, West Sepik Province (139pp).

‘An ethnographic survey of the Kenge, Araka, Yagovat and Ivorab people within the Nature Conservancy's project zone of the Almani Local Level Government, Bogia District, Madang Province', for The Nature Conservancy (343pp).

'Socioeconomic impact study of the proposed Biliau-Ramu Sugar Road in the Rai Coast and Nahu-Rawa Census Divisions of Madang Province', for the Madang Provincial Government (92pp).

'Tinpis Maror: A social impact study of the proposed RD Tuna Cannery at Vidar Wharf, Madang', for the Kanamand landowners.

'European Union's Rural Coastal Fisheries Development Project Baseline Study: Follow-up RRA for Madang', for the European Union (176pp).

Data for these reports was collected by the following researchers: Francis Akuana, Nellie Allman, Moses Angasa, Christian Dominic, Rebecca Emoit, Jennifer Kanoko, Lawrence Mandeni, Joseph Rainbubu, Nancy Sullivan, Daniel Tira, James Topo, Thomas Warr, Yunus Wenda and Kutina Williams.
The TreeHouse Village EcoResort: A model for successful sustainable tourism

Alun Beck, TreeHouse Village EcoResort

Introduction
With the Bali bombings, the recent Fiji coup, internal wrangling in Solomon Islands, the fear of terrorist attacks and the low performance of PNG kina against the US dollar, it made sense to develop a tourism business that would earn foreign currency. A five-step conceptual framework was used to implement the project: concept (idea); assessing the project; developing the project, creating the image; and making it work. The result was the TreeHouse Village EcoResort, which features a giant tree house with amenities for guests and beachfront bungalows in the New Ireland Province of PNG. Activities include scuba diving, surfing and rainforest treks. The project actively promotes eco-tourism and shows how an individual can develop a tourism business concept and how to make it work.

Understanding the industry
It is not enough just to get up and create something. One has to have some understanding of the industry, and that is where experience counts. It has to be understood that there are two sides to this business, both 'tourism' and 'hospitality'. The hospitality sector comprises of accommodation, restaurants, bars and service quality. It centres on where the guests are going to stay and what and how they eat and drink. The tourism sector mainly corresponds to attractions, such as snorkelling, diving, bushwalking, mountain climbing, and so on. The more variety of activities there are for tourists, the better it is for business. When the tourist wakes up in the morning, there has to be something different to do, otherwise their stay is shortened and that money is lost forever. It is important that tourists get a good experience for their money so that they will spread positive word of mouth to encourage repeat business, otherwise the opposite can happen.

Developing the concept
The idea to start up a project can come from personal experience, from talking to people, through formal or informal discussions or from seeing an idea at work somewhere else. Kotler et al. (2003:320) state that the idea should be generated in a systematic rather than a haphazard manner. That means that the idea should be clear and workable, that is to say, the person should know how the idea can be implemented, its aims and the resources that are available.

Assessing the concept
In order to find out whether the concept will work, a person needs to consider things such as current skills and competencies, time and resources, goals and aims of the project, market projections, impacts, opinions of other people, motivation, and other important factors. Some of these factors may warrant separate studies and become projects within the main project. Once acceptable answers to the questions are identified, one can start the project.

Implementing the concept
A general rule is that the quicker one can do the above, the quicker one will know the result. This may reduce costs and enable the person, if the idea fails, to come up with a better option. It is good to establish a strong foundation and not depend too much on others. For example, one should ensure that legal contracts are formally in place. Additional elements that are critical at this stage are having the concept written on paper, identifying the activities, constructing the infrastructure and creating accessibility, training the human resources, promoting the business, delivering the product, reviewing the image and assessing the market, and reviewing the product to create more income.

When starting a tourism business, it is paramount to bring in tourists, keep them there for as long as they can enjoy the place, and to provide a different experience each day. A sign of success in the tourism and hospitality industry is repeat business and word of mouth plays a great role in this. Guests look for experience and that experience must be delivered to them successfully in order to generate repeat business.

Creating the image
This part is a little bit difficult as it can be perceived in different ways, but it can be managed to create the kind of image that the person wants. Image creation is the job of marketing and involves whatever the person does relating to the project, such as the materials and facilities used for the project, advertising, recruitment and training of staff and the level of service quality that is delivered. This image has to be worked on constantly and the kind of service associated with the chosen image should be delivered.
Making it work

It is important to remember that every traveller is an individual person and to treat that person as an individual. This means that service has to be personalised. For example, a physically disabled person who travels with a group will have his/her own particular needs and should be provided with the relevant services. Each tourist needs to be complimented, greeted, thanked, and so on in ways that they can relate to personally.

Identify your competitors, do what they do, but do it better, or find a niche market, target its needs and then meet them. Learn to read the signs and stay one step ahead of your competitors. Project operators need to like the project and feel motivated enough to keep up with the project. It gets easier to implement projects as experience is gained, or if one has previous experience to build on, it becomes easier to work through challenges. Being honest, assisting where it is possible and doing what one is supposed to be doing in business is very important and can go a long way to support the business.

Marketing

This is very significant yet some people forget to budget for it. It makes sense that if no one knows about the business no one will come and there is no need for the business. Some time and resources will need to be set aside for marketing purposes. One needs to spend in order to make money. Word of mouth has proved to be the best form of efficient and cost-effective marketing, followed by the use of internet, as in the case of the TreeHouse EcoResort. A lot of people may surf the net but not all will buy. The use of internet requires certain skills such as creating a business name that will automatically appear in the top five of the hit list when a powerful search engine is used. Other important considerations are effective security systems for electronic transactions, fast response times and being able to deliver exactly what has been promised (Imbal 2001). Websites also need to be maintained regularly.

Conclusion

Tourism is a business that requires sensitivity and responsiveness to the tourist, the product and the environment. Individuals have the choice to start up something they are familiar with or something completely new and face the challenges that that brings. There has to be commitment and motivation to harness opportunities and perform better so that ultimately it can become a sustainable project that Papua New Guineans can run.

Note

* The TreeHouse Village EcoResort was developed and is run by Alun Beck, who has a wide experience in the tourism and hospitality industry as an operator of a live-aboard dive charter catamaran and has served for three years as the president of the Travel Association of Papua New Guinea and for two years as a Director of the PNG Tourist Promotion Authority. Information on the TreeHouse Village EcoResort is available through the website: <http://www.treehouse.com.pg>; or by emailing: info@treehouse.com.pg

References


Introduction

This paper shares some of the good news on successful models of community development, entrepreneurship and governance, focusing particularly on community tourism in the Sepik River.

In November 2003 the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Pacific Ecoregions Center engaged the Tourism and Hospitality Management Department of Divine Word University (THM DWU) to conduct an inventory of community tourism in the Sepik River catchment area. This was aimed at promoting sustainable community tourism, to encourage wise use of resources and a sense of pride, and allow for friendly interactions and exchange of experiences.

The Sepik River people have a very rich and vibrant culture and history, and are renowned all over the world for their fine arts and craftsmanship. Compared to other provinces in Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Sepik River people have scarce economic resources and most basic health, communication and education services are lacking, but there is a great potential for tourism. However, the downturn in the PNG economy, together with unfavourable environmental conditions, such as flooding and drop in the water level of the Sepik River, has prevented regular income generation from tourism. The young, able and educated people leave the area for work and do not return. Many do not send money back to those living in the villages. This situation prompted WWF to sponsor two staff of THM and three diploma students of DWU on an eight-day visit to the communities of the Sepik River.

Sepik River culture and community organisation

Communities along the Sepik River live a simple life, similar to that in most rural communities of PNG. Communal support, sharing, adherence to traditional laws and the elders of the society, and knowledge and understanding of the environment are features of life on the Sepik River. The strong respect for the Haus Tambaran (traditional spirit house) and male initiations is still practiced in villages. The Haus Tambaran is where most of the decision-making relating to the welfare of the community is done and also training and education, particularly for the males of the society. Men, women, children and leaders are each expected to play their roles so the society can function. Their understanding of the environment and the conditions in which they live have helped the people to survive in what is considered by outsiders as a most difficult and challenging place to live. The churches play a big role in providing basic health, education and communication facilities in the region, and the people still take pride in their rich culture and mastery of art and craftsmanship.

The Sepik River people are producers of world-class arts and artefacts. They have a rich and vibrant culture that is unique in each village. For instance, the Jerakudime and Walijelang clans in the Middle Sepik River of about 400 people have different symbols representing pigs, sago, etc. The Aibom area in the Sepik is famous for its clay pots, providing opportunities for both locals and tourists. One of the biggest Haus Tambaran in the Sepik is in Kanganamun and initiation rites are strictly followed.

Tourism in the Sepik River

The Sepik River itself is one of the greatest river systems of the world. The Sepik is probably the largest uncontaminated freshwater wetland system in the Asia-Pacific region. Biologically, the region holds some of the most diverse and least described ecosystems on earth. Fresh waterfalls, forests and the tranquil Blackwater Lakes can be enjoyed at Govemas village. Beautifully situated beside the Murik Lakes, facing the green and gold mangrove forests and meeting the Bismarck Sea, is the village of Mendam and of Karau, where the current prime minister was born. The Ambunti Lodge provides modern comfortable accommodation in a traditional setting and has a local manager who arranges tours into the villages and along the Sepik River. Together, these attractions make a haven for tourism with the potential for sustainable community development.

Strengths

Tourism is a community-based project that requires a combined effort from the whole community to provide a quality experience to tourists. From their experience with the early Malay bird of paradise traders, German administrators (Sullivan 2004:173) and regular contacts with tourists, the locals are very familiar with the behaviour of tourists. Successful entrepreneurs, such as Alois Mateos, operator of Sepik Adventure Tours, and Cletus Maiban, an expert carver, self-taught architect/builder, artefacts buyer-assistant and a successful operator of Numungi
Guesthouse, combine local knowledge to provide a comfortable experience while considering the needs and expectations of tourists. This has been achieved through the commitment of much time and resources. These entrepreneurs are then able to support other locals through creation of employment, payment of school fees, funeral expenses, and so on.

The diverse culture, nature and the expertise of the local people in arts and crafts and the local knowledge they possess provide an advantage in sustainable tourism development. In addition, traditional methods of community organisation provide the platform for a combined effort to achieve this. With assistance from government and NGOs, sustainable tourism can be successfully developed.

Challenges
The local people have the local knowledge and can provide tourism resources and experiences, but need to be properly schooled and trained in the needs and expectations of tourists. For instance, those that try to operate guesthouses may only have open rooms with no basic facilities for comfort and hygiene. Specific industry skills, such as tour guiding, product development, customer service, communication, establishing business contacts and marketing, are seen to be lacking in most entrepreneurs. People may have the local knowledge and resources but they are unable to sell effectively. To counter this, assistance in these areas is offered by expatriates. Environmental factors also pose challenges. For example, there are two cruise boats serving the needs of tourists on the Sepik River, but occasional floods and the changing level of the Sepik River mean it is difficult to maintain visits to all stops along the river and people are not able to earn regular income.

The local people need to be empowered. They need to be shown the way to do proper business and assisted so that quality and customer satisfaction can be maintained. What is also needed is partnership. A case that demonstrates this is the Korogo Haus Tambaran, which is supposed to come under the care of the National Cultural Commission (NCC). Unfortunately, this Haus Tambaran is disintegrating because the partnership is not working. A true partnership between the local people, donor agencies, NGOs, private sector and the government will ensure that Papua New Guineans can truly be responsible to themselves and successful — so that they also can become donors instead of being mere recipients.

Conclusion
Engaging in community tourism business has the potential to promote sustainable community development, responsible entrepreneurship and good governance. The people own the tourism resources and possess the local knowledge. Their operations involve the local people and have an immediate impact on their lives. If they can practice obedience and communal support as done by their great forefathers and apply that appropriately to the needs of modern business, they can become successful. This can be achieved with the input from others in the spirit of true partnership. Give a man a fish and he will come back; give him a hook and a string, teach him how to fish and he will fish for life.

Reference
Promoting urban micro-enterprise:  
Ginigoada Bisnis Development Foundation

Gabriel Iso, Foundation Manager, Ginigoada Bisnis Development Foundation Incorporated

Introduction
This paper reports on the work of the Ginigoada Bisnis Development Foundation Incorporated (GBDFI) in Port Moresby’s National Capital District (NCD). The foundation’s aim is to provide income-generating opportunities for disadvantaged families and individuals through the provision of urban micro-enterprise training and development. Here the work of the foundation is reviewed, and future limitations and opportunities are canvassed.

Institutional background and mission
Ginigoada Bisnis Development Foundation Incorporated is a not-for-profit community development organisation providing micro-enterprise skills development and training programs to disadvantaged people in the NCD. It was incorporated as an association in October 2001, commenced operations during March 2002, and is governed by an honorary board of directors representing the broader community. An initiative of the local MP for Moresby South electorate, Lady Carol Kidu, GBDFI was designed to empower vulnerable people with appropriate income-generating knowledge and skills to improve their living conditions. The foundation was initially funded by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) as a pilot project which concluded in June 2003.

The design document for the GBDFI pilot phase included a microfinance component that sought to ensure effective and efficient delivery of seed capital to low-income people. A lack of microfinance opportunities in Port Moresby, however, has often hampered the efforts of GBDFI training course graduates to obtain capital to commence business activities. A recommendation has been made to establish a microfinance program using an existing Asian Development Bank/Papua New Guinea microfinance project, though no timetable currently exists for its implementation.

Aims and objectives
The goal of GBDFI is to improve income-generating opportunities for disadvantaged families and individuals in the NCD (that is, people without formal regular income sources) through establishing an appropriately targeted and efficiently delivered urban micro-enterprise training and development program for men, women and youths. Future sustainability through reduced donor dependency is also a key objective.

Programs
As a micro-enterprise training and development organisation, GBDFI offers two programs: Basic Business Training (BBT) courses; and short-term vocational skills training courses. The BBT courses comprise five modules which cover basic and practical business concepts, business principles, and entrepreneurial and management skills. They are structured to address the specific needs of different target groups and include basic business awareness, costing, pricing, basic record keeping, and family income management. The first module covers general business awareness (in particular, what it takes to successfully operate an income-generating activity), the identification of opportunities and skills training needs, trading in a Melanesian context and the shift from a subsistence mindset to a commercial one, setting goals and priorities and how to attain them, and issues of self-reliance and making do with limited resources. Later modules familiarise participants with a range of other fundamental business concepts.

The short-term vocational skills training courses include various demand-driven modules ranging from food processing, tailoring/screen printing and sign writing, vegetable growing and animal husbandry, marine products, carpentry/plumbing and mechanics to crafts and artefact making. To enhance the learning experience through immediate practical application, BBT modules (except for basic business awareness) and vocational skills training courses are run concurrently.

Current performance
From April 2002 to December 2003, a total of 19 Start Your Business (SYB) courses and 17 vocational trade skills courses were conducted, with 272 and 235 participants graduating respectively. SYB courses were followed by skills courses, with some participants attending more than one skills course. From January to June 2004, we conducted 13 Basic Business Awareness (BBA) and nine Basic Business Training (BBT) and Skills Training courses, graduating 259 and 118 participants respectively. It is estimated that more than 20 per cent of GBDFI graduates are currently involved in some form of income-generating activity as a result of their course, though participants from Taurama (retrenched soldiers) and Port Moresby City Mission were specifically acquiring skills for later application when they returned to their home provinces. This result
services is the provision of well-coordinated basic business and
subsidised rates and mostly a self-employment focus). While
the estimated population of NCD is approximately 150,000. 
During its pilot phase, the target market of GBDFI was 
restricted to the Moresby South electorate, which comprises 
the largest combination of squatter camps (settlers from all 
over Papua New Guinea) and semi-urban villages (inhabited 
by the traditional Motu Koitabuans) in the NCD. Of the 
estimated population of 150,000, 80 per cent are dependent 
on the informal sector for their livelihood. Enquiries show 
there is a clear need to expand our services across the entire 
NCD. Unlike Moresby South, however, Moresby North East 
and West are predominantly inhabited by Highlanders and 
Momase people, and, with an abundance of land, the number 
of new settlers is continuing to grow rapidly. According to the 
2000 census figures, the population of NCD is approximately 
250,000.

Training methodology prior to December 2003
Participants were previously required to undertake a business 
training course (SYB) followed by a skills course of their choice. 
SYB is a business awareness and planning course designed to 
assess the participant’s entrepreneurial skills, experiences and 
attitudes, and then identify appropriate local business 
opportunities. This was followed by the preparation of a detailed 
business plan to assess commercial viability and make decisions 
about proceeding further. Following discussions with graduates, 
we found that the business training course was too complex 
given the type of businesses participants were planning to 
commence.

Training methodology since January 2004
SYB has now been replaced by a simplified Basic Business 
Training (BBT) course to better meet the needs of the target 
group served. BBT training materials were prepared by the Asian 
Development Bank's Skills Training Resource Unit, under the 
Employment Oriented Skills Development Training Program. 
This simplified business course has now been incorporated into 
the skills course and is conducted by trainers accredited by the 
Small Business Development Corporation.

Potential for further development
During its pilot phase, the target market of GBDFI was 
restricted to the Moresby South electorate, which comprises 
the largest combination of squatter camps (settlers from all 
over Papua New Guinea) and semi-urban villages (inhabited 
by the traditional Motu Koitabuans) in the NCD. Of the 
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Momase people, and, with an abundance of land, the number 
of new settlers is continuing to grow rapidly. According to the 
2000 census figures, the population of NCD is approximately 
250,000.

The training industry in NCD includes formal organisations 
(offering courses at commercial rates that are employment 
oriented) and vocational training centres, non-government 
organisations, churches and community-based trainers (offering 
subsidised rates and mostly a self-employment focus). While 
GBDFI falls under the latter category, a unique feature of our 
services is the provision of well-coordinated basic business and 
skills training courses across the NCD, concentrating on income-
generating activities. Other groups, by contrast, offer more 
specific and geographically limited training functions that 
complement their broader social programs or merely run 
particular business or skills courses. 

Another distinctive feature of GBDFI is the shorter time 
period of our courses and the regular follow-up of graduates to 
assess their performance. With many of the same type of training 
courses being conducted, the challenge now is to offer new 
courses that are market-driven and use appropriate technology, 
skills and resources that are within the reach of participants to 
maximise the potential for successful outcomes. The provision 
of other complementary services, such as ongoing business 
development advice and links to microfinance providers for start-
up capital, are all necessary to help graduates establish themselves.

Demand for services
The current tough economic times and the high cost of living 
experienced by ordinary Papua New Guineans present an 
important opportunity for GBDFI. The ever-increasing price 
of goods has made the average consumer very price sensitive, 
enabling entrepreneurs to offer local communities cheaper 
alternative products, such as homemade buns and scones (made 
in drum ovens) rather than commercially produced biscuits and 
bread. Difficulties in recognising and taking advantage of such 
opportunities generally reflect a combination of inadequate skills 
and a subsistence-oriented approach to life. In the absence of a 
strong and capable alternative provider of business and skills 
training courses, the need for GBDFI’s services remains high, 
particularly in the electorates of Moresby North East and 
Moresby North West.

We have continuously endeavoured to develop and improve 
the delivery of our demand-driven micro-enterprise training 
programs to all communities in NCD through well-established 
community contacts and training providers. All activities and 
outputs stipulated in our project design document have been 
achieved expect for the microfinance component (currently 
being organised through a separate arrangement). As a new 
organisation, we are still evolving and learning, with a desire to 
continuously improve our products, processes and systems to 
ensure our organisational objectives are realised.

In addition to carefully chosen personnel, our success reflects 
a desire to regularly seek feedback from clients on the 
appropriateness of training materials and programs to ensure 
that courses address the needs of target groups. In this way, the 
business training component was redeveloped from a modified 
entrepreneurial training course sourced through the Small 
Business Development Corporation to a more simplified and 
appropriate program (the BBT).
GBDFI is supported by a network of well-established community contacts, graduates and community-based organisations throughout the Moresby South electorate, and, since 2004, in major parts of Moresby North East and Moresby North West electorates. We also work with the churches, using their extensive links, influence and general goodwill to further our own objectives. We are particularly proud of our close working relationships with women’s fellowship groups, youth groups, women’s incorporated organisations and other community-based groups in both the settlements and in Motu Koitabun villages.

GBDFI is also closely aligned with well-established training providers such as Badili, Kokmi, Limana and Morata vocational training centres. This relationship reflects the Department of Education’s policy of supporting short-term skills training courses at vocational school level for the informal sector. We believe the vocational training centres are best equipped in terms of facilities, equipment, personnel and resources to conduct skills training courses for our clients.

The support received from the Department of Community Development under the ministerial guidance of Lady Carol Kidu has been extremely complementary to our work. GBDFI seeks to promote sustainable families and communities, which is also the department’s objective as mandated by the government. We view the department as a major development partner, and GBDFI as an important delivery mechanism supporting their charter.

The make-up and commitment of our board of directors has also been highly beneficial. The guidance and leadership provided, and the contacts and spheres of influence involved have been vital to our early development and will only enhance our future prospects.

From April 2002 to June 2004, GBDFI trained more than 800 participants across the NCD in BBT and a range of vocational skills training courses, with more than 20 per cent of graduates currently engaged in various income-generating activities.

The future

A business plan was finalised in July 2004 to determine the level of financial support required by GBDFI to sustain its training activities in the future. The plan identified ways to diversify our funding base, increase internally generated revenue, reduce operating costs, and, accordingly, reduce reliance on external funding. It also focused on current training functions given that returns from any possible involvement in microfinancing businesses would probably take a number of years to be realised.

GBDFI now runs an awareness module of the BBT to allow staff and trainers to identify the skills, training needs and opportunities available in communities, and to properly screen participants to ensure that only those who demonstrate the necessary aptitude and commitment are accepted to receive further training. It is hoped that this process will increase the chances of having more successful income-generating activities developed by participants. Five awareness workshops will be conducted every month, which will see 100 participants graduate, from which the best 20 will be accepted to continue to the other BBT modules and a skills course of their choice. Clients will be encouraged to start income-generating activities as individuals or in groups.

Post-graduation support services will include individual and group meetings on a monthly basis, and quarterly meetings with community contacts to provide and receive feedback. Other types of trainers are still required to diversify the existing narrow skills base and avoid market saturation, while also providing new and exciting opportunities.

The staffing structure will consist of a maximum eight part-time development officers, located in various settlements and semi-urban villages, supported by a three-person administration team (foundation manager, administration officer and an office assistant/driver). Given that development officers will be part-time and based in their own communities, improved planning, monitoring and evaluation systems have been developed to ensure that outputs will still be achieved. The possibility of relocating the head office to another site that includes multiple-use conference facilities is also being investigated.

The original project design envisaged GBDFI linking-up with established microfinance providers to allow successful course participants to access capital with which to commence income-generating activities. Unfortunately, the only microfinance provider subsequently ceased operations (in 2002), and until the launch of Kina Dinau in June 2004 funding sources had not been available. GBDFI will seek to work closely with Kina Dinau, and any other microfinance providers as they emerge.

Given the target group served, GBDFI is not able to generate sufficient revenue from training activities alone to sustain its operations. Over time, however, we envisage building relationships with a variety of projects and organisations whose functions include the provision of funding for training purposes as a method of spreading our income sources and reducing our dependence on AusAID. While further work is still required to identify other donors with which to establish partnerships, the Asian Development Bank, Skills Development Trust Fund (SDTF), AusAID’s Community Development Scheme (CDS), PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd, JICA, the British High Commission and Horizon 3000 have been identified as potential sources.

April 2005
Conclusion
GBDFI focuses on providing support to the informal sector, which itself is crucial to the livelihoods of most Papua New Guineans. Our BBT and vocational skills training courses emphasise principles of capacity building, empowerment and self-reliance. We encourage people (particularly the disadvantaged) to be productive and participate in community and nation-building activities, through developing a sense of pride and worth in themselves and their families. Our efforts are supported by influential individuals, groups and organisations who share the same vision.

At GBDFI, we support the government's determination to skill the nation's workforce in a sector where everyone has a reasonable opportunity to prosper (given its less restrictive nature). We see our role as laying and consolidating the foundation for micro-enterprise development and growth with the opportunity of later graduating into small and medium enterprises, and of contributing to the nation's development goals of promoting growth through a vibrant informal sector and the expansion of private enterprises.
The Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea: A governance apparatus working successfully

Ila Geno, Chief Ombudsman, Papua New Guinea

Introduction

The Ombudsman Commission is a constitutional institution that has been established to guard and enforce the principles of good governance and good leadership. It is the main enforcer of Papua New Guinea’s ethical standards. These standards are derived from the country’s constitution and all the other laws. The Ombudsman Commission is a guardian of the constitution, an anti-discrimination commission, and a de facto human rights commission and anti-corruption commission. These are the key factors that determine the practices and policies of the Ombudsman Commission in the management and administrative framework of its operations—and the perception out there is that it is a government apparatus working successfully.

What are the motivating factors for the Ombudsman Commission? What keeps the members of the commission and officers in the service of the Ombudsman Commission so committed to their work? The answers can be found in the present staff strength of the Ombudsman Commission, in the Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, which provides the ideals for setting up of the Ombudsman Commission, in the preamble to the PNG constitution, and in the ethical standards that the Ombudsman Commission enforces. These are the things that motivate the members of the commission and the officers in the service of the commission.

Finally, it would only be proper to inform readers of the reforms that have taken place over the years. By going through these steps, I hope to show how and why the Ombudsman Commission is considered a successful organisation.

The Ombudsman Commission

The Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea is a small organisation. In 1999, the staff ceiling was less than 100. Today we have an approved staff establishment of 123. There are 100 positions in the head office in Port Moresby. This means 23 officers man our regional offices in Mt Hagen, Lae and Kokopo. With this number of officers, we look after more than 5000 leaders in this country. That is about one officer to 41 leaders. This is in addition to handling more than 5000 complaints each year. As well as supervising the constitutionally enshrined Leadership Code and the traditional ombudsman function, the Ombudsman Commission also performs functions in the following areas:

- anti-discrimination;
- human rights commission;
- anti-corruption;
- enforcement of the Integrity Law;
- guardian of the constitution; and
- advisory jurisdiction.

The reasons why 123 officers are able to deal with this insurmountable workload and why enforcement of these functions is working when other oversight agencies are not as successful are explored below.

Special features of the Ombudsman Commission

There are two special features of the Ombudsman Commission that set it apart from equivalent institutions in other countries. The first is its diversity of functions. The Ombudsman Commission performs a range of different functions, which, in other countries, are dealt with by different institutions. The second is constitutional independence. The commission’s independence is guaranteed by the constitution, in a number of different ways. In accordance with law, it is not subject to direction or control by any person or authority. In most other countries, ombudsman institutions do not have this special status.

The people of PNG clearly decided that an Ombudsman Commission was necessary to meet their changing needs. The Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) fully supported the views of the people. The CPC stated in its Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee:

The modern control system has become very complex, and many men and women who are trained to administer those controls, cannot be adequately supervised. The decisions of these men and women in the public service and in semi-government institutions affect a great number of people. Sometimes, even the most diligent public servant makes errors. Because of the size of the public service, careful superintendence of all government officials is difficult. Some public servants take advantage of this, and their negligence, or wilful abuse of administrative power, can result in hardship or injustice being caused to many.

In a number of industrialised countries, the office of the Ombudsman has been established to fill the gaps in the scope of the court system, and to strengthen the integrity of the public service. The ‘Ombudsman’ is an independent
government official who receives complaints about government agencies mainly from people who feel they have been unfairly or unreasonably dealt with by officials. This work involves the Ombudsman in investigating these complaints (and sometimes initiating investigations himself) and, if he finds evidence of, for example, administrative injustice or unreasonable delay in taking action, he makes recommendations to remedy the situation.

Papua New Guinea's ombudsman should be available to assist ordinary people throughout the country who feel aggrieved by actions or omissions of the bureaucracy or of any institution of government. We consider that our ombudsman should also have the important responsibility of supervising and enforcing the Leadership Code, to ensure that our leaders do not compromise national, provincial or local interests for personal and selfish ends. Our ombudsman should have the necessary powers to investigate charges of corruption or other types of abuse of public office, and to ensure that appropriate action is taken against those who break the provisions of the Code.

Another function we consider the Commission is well suited to carrying out is that of enforcing legislation prohibiting discriminatory practices. To date no legal action has been brought in any court for an offence against the Discriminatory Practices Ordinance, yet it is common knowledge that discrimination against Papua New Guineans on racial grounds is still common.

Here lies the core focus of every member and officer that has served the Ombudsman Commission since independence. Whoever becomes a part of the Ombudsman Commission must be aware of what the organisation was meant to achieve. The CPC goes on to give many good reasons on establishing an Ombudsman Commission for PNG. Clearly, the members and officers of the Ombudsman Commission appointed to serve in that highly honourable institution must be of higher moral standards and exemplary character. Persons of lesser standards could only cause moral decay and bring apathy and corruption into the organisation.

To protect the Ombudsman Commission, the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission provides strict guidelines for the appointment of persons to the position of ombudsman. The Chief Ombudsman and the other two ombudsmen are appointed by the Ombudsman Appointments Committee comprising the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Chief Justice, Chairman of the Public Services Commission and the Chairman of the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Appointments. The Ombudsman Commission, in accordance with stringent screening measures, appoints officers for the service of the commission.

Applying good governance ideals
The ethical standards of good corporate governance are already enshrined in the constitution. The preamble to the constitution provides us with the vision and the mission, which Papua New Guinea has to follow:

WE, THE PEOPLE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA —

- united in one nation
- pay homage to the memory of our ancestors — the source of our strength and origin of our combined heritage
- acknowledge the worthy customs and traditional wisdoms of our people — which have come down to us from generation to generation
- pledge ourselves to guard and pass on to those who come after us our noble traditions and the Christian principles that are ours now.

By authority of our inherent right as ancient, free and independent peoples

WE, THE PEOPLE, do now establish this sovereign nation and declare ourselves, under the guiding hand of God, to be the Independent State of Papua New Guinea.

AND WE ASSERT, by virtue of that authority

- that all power belongs to the people — acting through their duly elected representatives
- that respect for the dignity of the individual and community interdependence are basic principles of our society
- that we guard with our lives our national identity, integrity and self respect
- that we reject violence and seek consensus as a means of solving our common problems
- that our national wealth, won by honest, hard work be equitably shared by all

This should be the national pledge and children at schools throughout Papua New Guinea should recite these words every morning at their assembly. I also consider the national goals and directive principles, which form part of the preamble to the constitution, as the mission for the people of Papua New Guinea. These too form part of the mission for the Ombudsman Commission. There are five goals:

1. Integral human development.
We declare our first goal to be for every person to be dynamically involved in the process of freeing himself or herself from every form of domination or oppression so that each man or woman will have the opportunity to develop as a whole person in relationship with others ...

2. Equality and participation.
We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have an equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the development of our country ...

We declare our third goal to be for Papua New Guinea to be politically and economically independent, and our economy basically self-reliant ...

4. Natural resources and environment.
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's natural resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, and be replenished for the benefit of future generations ...
The attitudes and actions of members of the Ombudsman Commission and its officers are governed by these timeless ethical principles. Once you have people with these core ethical and motivating principles working in your organisation, then obviously your organisation is likely to become a success.

Here also are some fundamental principles and ethics of good governance that leaders of this country and all of us are required to adhere to:

- avoid conflicts of interests;
- do not demean your office or position;
- do not allow your official or personal integrity to be called into question;
- do not endanger respect for and confidence in the integrity of government;
- do not use your office for personal gain;
- do not do anything that might be expected to give rise to doubt in the public mind as to whether you are carrying out your duties as a leader;
- ensure that your spouse and children and any other person you are responsible for conduct themselves properly;
- publicly disassociate yourself from any activity or enterprise of your associates if they conduct themselves improperly;
- you must not ask for or receive any benefits that are not authorised by law. You cannot ask for or accept a bribe; and
- when you deal with any official matter in which you or your associates have an interest, you must reveal that interest.

All these are important and critical ideals of good ethical conduct, but how is the Ombudsman Commission compatible and capable of living up with the times?

Institutional Strengthening Project

The Ombudsman Commission Institutional Strengthening Project was one of a wider series of projects aimed at strengthening the justice institutions in PNG. These were developed following a pre-feasibility study or assistance to the legal and judicial institutions of PNG conducted in 1996. Early in 1997, AusAID called for capability statements from organisations interested in providing consultancy services for the design and implementation of a project to be known as the Papua New Guinea Ombudsman Commission Institutional Strengthening Project.

Consequently AusAID contracted Educo Pty Ltd to design and implement the project. The Educo design team, led by Sir John Robertson, commenced work in PNG in November 1997 to assist the Ombudsman Commission in preparing a five-year strategic plan, and a project design document (PDD) for...
submission to AusAID. A strategic plan was prepared and submitted to the Ombudsman Commission in January 1998. The plan was approved on 20 February 1998. The vision of the project was 'to develop the Commission into a disciplined, responsive and competent organisation'.

The term of the Institutional Strengthening Project (ISP) expired in July 2002. To prepare for the handover, the Ombudsman Commission was required to put in place a process to consolidate the changes and achievements attained under the project; to design and develop strategies and plans to assume ownership of completed projects; to adhere to timely completion of existing projects and sustain performance of ongoing activities; and to identify and submit to AusAID functions and activities that require strengthening and ongoing assistance.

There is pride and satisfaction in the Ombudsman Commission with respect to the progress that has been achieved. It is our view that the prospect for the ISP achieving and probably exceeding its objectives remains strong. If the current levels of performance and productivity were to be maintained, indications were that the ISP would deliver a 50 per cent increase in productivity by the end of the life of the project. Hence the positive results are not just a reflection of the quality of programs delivered, but the ability of the Ombudsman Commission to take initiatives and ownership of completed projects and ongoing activities.

Under the ISP we have raised productivity in our core functions. In our forecast for 2001, we estimated we would receive 3000 complaints. By 31 July 2001, we had received 2124 complaints, which was 21 per cent more than our estimate. The Ombudsman Commission expected to receive 3500 complaints in 2002. We reduced the turnaround time in responding to complaints from 10 to 5 days, resulting in a 50 per cent improvement on previous levels.

In 2000, we commenced work on 56 leadership cases. By 31 July 2001, 104 leadership cases had been commenced. The commission planned to investigate 76 leadership cases in 2002. In 2000, five leadership cases were referred to the public prosecutor. By 31 October 2001, seven leadership cases had been referred to the public prosecutor.

The Ombudsman Commission had emerged from its structural adjustments and its institutional strengthening into a performing organisation. Our vision for 2001–2005 to promote good governance, good leadership and good leaders signifies a shift in focus from being inward looking to being more performance and results oriented.

Sustainability of our internal reforms, projects and programs is crucial to our future performance and productivity. Strategies and plans to sustain the operations of the Ombudsman Commission are mentioned. The desire to be more performance-oriented does not imply that internal management reforms are no longer required. There will be some new initiatives that we will be proposing to AusAID. The Ombudsman Commission will continue to aspire to be disciplined, competent and relevant in terms of its jurisdictional roles and functions and its management and administration of the organisation. Sustaining and aspiring to higher levels of efficiency and productivity is our goal beyond July 2002.

**Status and progress of the ISP**

Following are the five functional areas, which became known as components, that were reviewed for upgrading and improvements under the ISP. The components formed the basis of the 1998 project design documents and the revised project design document approved in 2000. The report on the status and progress of the project has been assessed according to each component.

### 1. Organisational structure

The objective of this component was to improve the work practices of the Ombudsman Commission and the organisational vehicle that carries them to enable the commission to effectively discharge its role and functions. New organisational structures and broad-banded salary structures were developed during 1991–2001 and these formed the milestones for the period.

The first objective of the ISP had been to put in place a structure that would achieve the new vision. A review of the organisational structure was conducted in 1998. The review recommended changes to the structure and functions of the Ombudsman Commission. Functions and positions that were not needed were made redundant and abolished. New functions and positions that were needed were created. A new corporate services division was created to provide administrative support to the Ombudsman Commission, to enable it to concentrate on its core functions. Officers who became unattached as a consequence were retrenched. Recruitment to employ suitable officers with the right qualifications, experience and skills was completed in 1999. A new broad-banded salary structure, which remunerates officers according to performance, was designed and approved.

Management and operations committees were established to improve internal communications. A media unit was created to develop and implement the External Relations Program. After consultation with the Public Services Commission, and the Department of Personnel Management, the new organisational structure was approved in 1999. The structure was amended in 2000 and further amended to accommodate new responsibilities the Ombudsman Commission would take on in 2002.

### 2. Staff development

The objective of this component was to enhance staff capabilities to enable the Ombudsman Commission to effectively discharge...
its role, functions and responsibilities. These are defined in the constitution, the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission (OLOC) and the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leaders (OLDRL). The functions entail undertaking investigations, compiling reports, drafting right-to-be-heard letters and statements of reasons, making referrals and appearing in courts or tribunals. To perform these roles effectively, officers are required to possess the right skills, qualifications, experience and competency.

The review of the capability of the Ombudsman Commission highlighted the need to develop and offer its officers skills, knowledge, expertise and experience relevant to their functions. Accordingly, it was agreed that the capacity and competency of officers needed to be upgraded and sustained. This objective had been partially achieved and what has been achieved needs to be sustained. The ISP has developed and formulated both a short and long-term staff development program. This program is being administered and implemented by the human resource unit. All officers received training in information technology. The members of the Ombudsman Commission and senior management undertook training on how to handle the media. Selected officers were nominated to do report writing courses. All investigators had undergone investigative training. One obvious reason for the success is that the training courses were tailor-made to meet the needs and objectives of the Ombudsman Commission.

3. Planning and reporting
The objective of this component was to establish regular planning, monitoring and reporting systems that enhanced the overall performance of the organisation. Milestones completed under this component include strategic plans for 1998-2002 and 2001-2005, yearly 'Ombudsplans', annual reports, divisional work plans, and development of an internal communications policy.

While communication in the Ombudsman Commission has improved and communication policies have been developed, there is still a need for further improvement. Communication practices are variable as managers continue to implement communication strategies involving management meetings, staff meetings and regular feedback to staff about performance. Communications between Port Moresby and the regional offices has improved since the installation of the IT network and subsequent use of the email system.

The Ombudsman Commission has established a concise planning framework that is well understood at senior management level. It has attained, through this project, the competency, skill and expertise to prepare and produce its strategic plans, annual Ombudsplans and annual reports. Lower level plans (work plans and individual work plans) have only recently been produced and the implementation and regular use of these plans is still incomplete. Staff at middle and lower levels have limited understanding of this planning framework and more effort is required to integrate these levels of planning into mainstream operations.

4. IT network
The objective of this component was to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Ombudsman Commission through the introduction of a new IT network for case management, management of staff, finances, information, and for reporting of performance under the Ombudsplan.

Milestones completed for this component include the IT strategic plan, IT training, operational procedures manual, computer hardware installation, network software platform, and a stand-alone computer library. The IT network was installed after some delay at Deloitte Tower when the Ombudsman Commission relocated its head office. The network has brought international work standards to the Ombudsman Commission. Officers are working smarter and faster. Equipment has been standardised. Information assets are more secure. New work processes improve and reduce response time. Communication between head office and regional offices has improved. Memos and minute pads have given way to email. When fully installed, the CMS and the CHRIS (personnel) systems will improve the rate of completion of reports and accessibility of personnel records.

Training to handle PCs at various skill levels has been delivered to every member and officer of the Ombudsman Commission. Intensive Microsoft NT training for our IT officers had been completed. There is general satisfaction with the competency of our IT staff. The long-term administration and sustainability of the network will be a critical test for them. This is not an insurmountable problem. Updating of knowledge of the state of the art is required on a regular basis. Basing the new work practices on IT infrastructure means that the work practices are now vulnerable to any breakdowns in those systems. Formalisation of the maintenance contract and retention and ongoing training of our IT staff is of crucial importance. It was clear that external IT technical advice and assistance would be needed for sometime after the expiry date of the project.

5. External Relations Program
The objective of this component was to generate a clear understanding of and support for the purposes and functions of the Ombudsman Commission among leaders, government, constitutional bodies and the PNG people. Milestones completed under component five include an External Relations Program five-year plan, practice guidelines for governmental bodies and a strategy for developing linkages with anti-corruption and other bodies.
The Ombudsman Commission had developed and established the annual External Relations Program. Public awareness exercises had been conducted in a number of provinces. A leadership workshop was conducted in Rabaul for leaders in the New Guinea Islands region. The External Relations Program implementation continues to be successful overall. In addition, the Ombudsman Commission had produced a sound strategy document on the development of linkages with external oversight and enforcement agencies to help facilitate the Ombudsman Commission’s investigations functions. A model for complaint handling systems in the PNG public sector was being developed through the cooperation between the Ombudsman Commission, the Royal PNG Constabulary, Correctional Services, the Department of Education, and the Teaching Services Commission. Under the project, pamphlets, booklets and brochures providing information about the Ombudsman Commission were produced and distributed. A media guide to assist media persons in their reporting about the Ombudsman Commission and its operations was published and distributed to the media. A newsletter providing information about the Ombudsman Commission’s activities is published monthly and distributed internally and externally.

When the ISP concluded in July 2002, the Australian government and the government of PNG continued to assist the Ombudsman Commission, particularly as it related to sustainability of the projects initiated at the ISP stage. The Ombudsman Commission has continued to receive assistance from this program over the years and we are indeed thankful to the Australian government and our government for the assistance which is being provided.

**Conclusion**

It has been necessary for the Ombudsman Commission to go out to the public in a major way to educate them on their rights, duties and obligations. To achieve that, a media unit was created to run public relations and drive other external relations initiatives. With these efforts, the Ombudsman Commission continues to fight corruption, maladministration and discrimination. Its goal is to help improve the work of other governmental bodies so that they too can become governance apparatus working successfully.
Keys to success: An overview of progress at the Ombudsman Commission

Stephen P Mekis, Secretary, Ombudsman Commission

Introduction
The Chief Ombudsman has outlined the complex roles and responsibilities that the Ombudsman Commission performs. I am here to share with you our successes within a complex and demanding work environment. The Ombudsman Commission is required to guard, enforce and promote good governance, good leadership and high ethical standards. It would not be incorrect to say that the Ombudsman Commission exists to regulate human behaviour, administer human conduct and promote good governance. That makes the role for which the Ombudsman Commission has been established a very noble one. Accordingly, our endeavours to achieve such noble goals are not measured by profit margins, they are measured by justice and their improvement to quality of life. These are usually difficult to measure.

The Ombudsman Commission is required to lift the overall standard of public administration in Papua New Guinea. It does not exist simply to assist individual citizens. It has a much broader constitutional mandate. This complex organisation must have an equally high level of discipline in its management, proportionate to the requirements of its constitutional responsibilities. Simply put, if on-line managers are not providing performance management, the Ombudsman Commission will not effective. This paper provides an overview of the key policies and practices that were and are integral to the success of the Ombudsman Commission.

Mechanisms and processes for reform
Change within the Ombudsman Commission was inevitable. Not a change to have more manpower or more funds, but change to build a new work culture, a new work attitude and new work processes. In 1997 we received AusAID assistance and brought in wholesale reforms under the Institutional Strengthening Program (ISP).

Flexible structure
We restructured the organisation. We put in place a lean, flexible and dynamic structure. We restructured the functions from five to down to three functional divisions. We retrenched officers who were not performing and recruited the best officers. Our structure remains lean, flexible and dynamic to this day. It can be further restructured when changes are required.

Manpower: The most important resource
The Ombudsman Commission recruits officers who are second to none in their fields of expertise. The complexity of our constitutional functions requires that we employ highly skilled, competent and motivated people. Our recruitment is deliberately selective. Only officers with strong work experience, good academic qualifications and who are of outstanding character are recruited. We empower our officers. Everybody is treated as an officer whether they are serving tea, cleaning the floor or driving vehicles. We did away with demeaning titles such as tea boys, cleaners, drivers, receptionist and clerks. Gender equality is a deliberate policy of the Ombudsman Commission and today we have more female lawyers than male lawyers.

Corporate culture and values
We changed the work culture. We did away with the Public Service mentality of working from 8 to 4. We encourage our officers to look beyond their pay packets and see their work as a service. The objectives to build honest leadership and improve governance lift their zeal and purpose to serve. Officers are appointed on the basis of their performance, high moral standards and exemplary character. Lesser standards are seen as potential risks that can compromise the integrity and values of the organisation. Corporate values to us are not just statements on paper, they have become part of our lives and culture.

Exemplary leadership
We reasserted the importance of exemplary leadership. Leaders in the Ombudsman Commission are regarded as role models, persons with great integrity and high ethical standards. Employees will not trust leaders who won't tell them their values. We expect our leaders to have the capacity to drive our vision and give us a sense of direction. Inspiring vision and dreams lead to inspired performances. We believe that a leader who displays no passion for a cause has no right to expect their workers to have a passion to work. The ability to provide inspiring leadership is the inner quality of spirit, it requires people who live from a great depth of being.

Performance driven by planning
Planning is crucial to performance. A good planning process incorporates three types of plans: a long-range plan, which
maps out agency direction for 5–10 years; a strategic plan, which maps out agency plans for 3–5 years; and an annual plan or corporate plan, which maps out agency direction for one year. We have two types of plans. Our strategic plan maps out our agency plans for 5–10 years. It defines our values, our vision and our mission statement. Our annual plan is called the Ombudsplan. It maps out our agency direction for the year and defines our annual targets and the timelines to achieve those targets.

**Monitoring and evaluation**

Our performance is monitored stringently. Most importantly, it is evaluated every two months through performance summary reviews. Divisional heads and managers report to the Ombudsman Commission and the management committee on whether they are achieving their targets. Managers who do not achieve their targets are required to explain why. If the reasons are to do with lack of resources, officers are given the opportunity to improve their performance upon availability of resources. If failures are related to performance, officers are relocated to appointments where they will be able improve their performance. Rarely are officers terminated on poor performance alone. They are empowered to do better.

**Communication**

Communication in the Ombudsman Commission has two purposes. First, it has a public relations function — defining the Commission’s image and disseminating good news stories to its external stakeholders. Good public relations are proactive, defining the stories the agency wants key stakeholders to hear. Good public relations practice requires someone dedicated to working on how the agency is viewed by the public and other key stakeholders. We established a media unit to be responsible for this. Our External Relations Program has become an effective vehicle for our awareness exercise.

The second aspect of our communication is internal. Our officers are constantly updated about the operations and administration of the organisation. We hold a compulsory staff meeting every month. This forum is convened for staff to raise matters ranging from the terms and conditions of their employment to the operation of the organisation. The management committee meets fortnightly and divisions meet weekly. The Ombudsman Commission meets three times per week. One meeting is dedicated to administrative matters, the other two weekly meetings are dedicated to constitutional matters. The weekly in-house **OC News** is published and emailed to all officers. The monthly **OC Newsletter** is published and distributed internally and externally to all our stakeholders.

**IT network**

We modernised our work by establishing an IT network. The network has brought international work standards. Officers are working smarter and faster. Equipment has been standardised. Information assets are more secure. New work processes have improved and reduced response times. Communications between the Ombudsman Commission, its regional offices and internationally have improved. Memos and minute pads have given way to emails.

**Measuring success**

Our success to date can be demonstrated through some comparative analysis. Between 1975 and 1997, a period of 22 years, 37 leaders were referred for prosecutions. Between 1999 and 2004, a period of six years, 34 leaders were referred for prosecutions. Again between 1975 and 1997, the Ombudsman Commission did not seek any court rulings or interpretations on constitutional issues. By contrast, between 1999 and 2004 it instituted 13 constitutional references. Similarly, up until 1997, the Ombudsman Commission did not request any Section 27(4) constitutional directions, whereas, between 1999 and 2004, 23 Section 27(4) constitutional directions were requested. Finally, but not least, we have reduced our response time from 10 days to five days.

**Conclusion**

Organisations need not die or fade away. They can be revived and rejuvenated to new levels of performance. For that to happen, organisations must instil enthusiasm, inspiration, discipline and commitment in the workplace. But enthusiasm must be girded with discipline and inspiration must be driven by commitment. This has been the story in the Ombudsman Commission. It is a good story. It is a success story. It is a story about turning an average performing organisation into high performing institution.

Let me close by quoting former US President Theodore Roosevelt, who once said:

> There are two kinds of success. One is the very rare kind that comes to the man who has the power to do what no one else has the power to do. That is called genius. But the average man who wins what we call success is not a genius. He is a man who has merely the ordinary qualities that he shares with his fellow workers, but who has developed those ordinary qualities to more than an ordinary degree.

Officers of the Ombudsman Commission are not geniuses. They are men and women who have merely ordinary qualities, but who have developed those ordinary qualities to a more than ordinary degree. Success can belong to anyone.
The Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council process

Barbara Tomi and Nick Menzies, Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council

The CIMC provides the opportunity for the government to have a real open engagement with the private sector and civil society. This creates the opportunity for the government to explain its policies, and also, most importantly, for people to tell the Government what policies are needed for development and why. The consultative process therefore aids good governance by providing a direct channel for the people to hold the Government to account.

Hon. Sir Moi Avei, Minister for Planning, at CIMC's 2004 National Development Forum

Introduction
The Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC) was established in 1998 by a decision of the National Executive Council. CIMC is an independent organisation that brings together civil society, private sector and government partners to develop policy and directly influence government decision making for the long term development of Papua New Guinea. Our role is to ensure dialogue is sustained between civil society, government and the private sector and that recommendations arising from this dialogue are implemented.

CIMC is a governance organisation. We promote good governance in Papua New Guinea, as well as contributing to community development and entrepreneurship. In this paper, we outline how CIMC promotes good governance and then give two examples of CIMC programs - one which contributes to community development, the Family and Sexual Violence Action Committee, and another which promotes entrepreneurship, the Informal Sector Committee. We will then conclude by identifying why we think CIMC has been successful (and thus qualifies as 'good news').

Table 1 CIMC good governance processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of good governance</th>
<th>How CIMC promotes these indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation of men and women in the process of decision making.</td>
<td>Regional and national development forums and sectoral committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency in government.</td>
<td>Informing whole of PNG about government decisions through provincial visits and regional forums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability of decision makers to the people.</td>
<td>Monitoring the performance of the government (and others), for example, monitoring the Enhanced Cooperation Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability through ensuring that rules are set and decision makers follow the rules.</td>
<td>Lobbying for the drafting and passage of many laws, including the Security (Protection) Industry Act 2004.</td>
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April 2005
In 2005, CIMC will implement an initiative through its regional and national development forums to make the national budget process more transparent. We have become aware that the general public does not have the basic information about the budget cycle, the terms used or the amount of money concerned to enable them to make considered input in the budget. In 2005 we will be bringing departmental heads and officers from the departments of treasury and national planning to the provinces so that more people can better understand how the national budget is formulated. This is an important step in a process, known as participatory budgeting, which is growing worldwide.

Accountability
An important part of what CIMC does is to monitor the government's performance. Independent monitoring is critical to ensure that the government does what it says it is going to do and that any negative consequences in implementing government policies are addressed.

An important new initiative that CIMC is undertaking is to monitor the impact of the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP). The ECP is a joint program between the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea, which is bringing over 200 police and government department staff from Australia to PNG. CIMC is concerned at the lack of community input into the design and monitoring of the ECP. CIMC will facilitate a monitoring strategy to ensure that the community has the ability to say how the program is working and how it can be improved. This type of monitoring is essential if the government (including the Australian Government) is to be held accountable.

Predictability
An important part of good governance is that clear laws and policies exist (and that they are followed). An integral part of what CIMC does is to lobby and help draft new laws and policies. The most recent example of this to come to fruition is the Security (Protection) Industry Act 2004, which was passed by parliament this month with bipartisan support. Since 1998, CIMC's Law and Order Committee has been actively involved in the development and passage of this law. The law regulates an area that previously was largely unregulated — private security companies. Now, all security companies need to be licensed, all individuals who engage in security work must meet certain standards to obtain a work permit and a security industry authority will be formed to control the activities of the industry.

Community development
CIMC implements many projects that promote community development. One example is our Family and Sexual Violence Action Committee. This committee is made up of 80 government and non-government partners who work together to reduce the incidence of family and sexual violence in PNG. Provincial Family and Sexual Violence Action committees have been established in all but one province. Some of the activities that the committees undertake to promote community development include:

- sponsoring dispute resolution training in settlements;
- developing a family support centre at Port Moresby General Hospital to provide medical, counselling and legal services for survivors of family and sexual violence; and
- developing a training manual on family and sexual violence so that communities across the country can better understand the causes, their legal rights and methods of prevention.

Entrepreneurship
The Government has established a good working relationship with the private sector through the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council Private Sector Working Group. Through such dialogue, we will continue to create an environment that will have a good market return for the country.

Mel Togolo, PNG Business Council

Another means by which CIMC promotes entrepreneurship is via its support for the growth of informal sector businesses. With the formal sector unable to provide jobs for over 80 per cent of the population, the growth of the informal sector is vital to the country's future. Since 2000, CIMC has supported the development of the informal sector through sponsorship of a nationwide study into the informal sector, lobbying for the passage of the Informal Sector Development and Control Act 2004, and the development and execution of a plan to implement the Act, including employing a full-time program coordinator.

Why is CIMC good news?
What has made CIMC successful? This question was posed to the CIMC staff and the word that they think sums up our success is SMART:

- Small: We are small in staff size (8 people), which allows us to be dynamic and flexible.
- Measurable: We choose activities that have measurable results, which helps us to be focused and specific.
- Achievable: As a result of choosing specific goals, we often achieve outcomes and because of this people feel it is worthwhile volunteering their time to
participate in our activities. Volunteerism is central to our success — people contribute for the benefit of the nation, not for what they will personally gain.

**Realistic**

We are realistic about what can be achieved and we take a non-partisan approach. We try not to alienate people and avoid taking extremist or radical positions. As a result, when we push good ideas we get bipartisan support.

**Time**

We take the time and are committed to ensure our projects work — this often takes three, four or five years from an idea being formed to a tangible outcome.

**Conclusion**

We believe that we cannot demand good governance from the government without ensuring that we ourselves apply the same principles internally. At CIMC we try to be:

- **Participatory:** The staff are responsible for setting the policies for the organisation.
- **Transparent:** All staff are involved in setting the annual budget and all salaries are known.
- **Accountable:** The management is subject to performance appraisal by the staff.
- **Predictable:** We follow the policies that we develop.

We have greater control over our own performance than that of others. If we can follow the principles of good governance internally we start to develop a culture of good governance in PNG. We also learn first-hand the benefits of good governance and set an example for other organisations to follow. If other organisations follow our example then small islands will grow and join into a sea of good governance for PNG.

**Note**

Barbara Tomi is the Communications Officer at CIMIC and has been with the organisation since September 2004. Prior to joining CIMIC she was a sub editor for *Wantok Niuspepa*. Nick Menzies is Executive Officer at CMIC. Prior to joining CIMIC in January 2004, he served as the Legal Advisor, Community Legal Education Centre, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Introduction
The Community Development Scheme (CDS) is an initiative of the Australian and Papua New Guinea governments and funded by AusAID. The aim of the scheme is to support community development initiatives and build the capacity of civil society organisations (CSOs). The overall goal of the scheme is to contribute to poverty reduction by strengthening the capacity of CSOs. CDS has operated in two phases — Phase 1 from 1999 to 2001 and the Phase 2 from 2002 to 2006. Since its inception, CDS has made enormous improvements (through basic infrastructure development such as for water and classrooms) to the lives of many rural and remote populations who largely remain outside government-service delivery mechanisms.

This paper is a brief presentation of the achievements of CDS over its six-year existence. The scheme is implemented through three core programs — the Small Grants Program, the NGO Strengthening Program and the Specialist Partners Program, which are described below. An overview of the key features of the CDS process follows. The good news outcomes of CDS and its impacts are then assessed. Finally, there is an overview of the key lessons learned from the CDS experience.

Small Grants Program
The Small Grants Program (SGP) provides capacity building and resource support directly to communities with a track record of community mobilisation whilst at the same time addressing development needs. The rationale is to further enhance social capital of communities that already have a degree of leadership and are able to manage local actions towards improving their livelihood.

The SGP currently supports a wide array of community development projects in agriculture and rural development, education, enterprise development, environment and sustainability, gender equity, governance, health, infrastructure, law and justice. The SGP is facilitated through core groups and fieldworkers. The SGP in reality strengthens social capital at the community level, at the fieldworker level as fieldworkers gain knowledge and skills in community development, and at the core group level with regards to project design and management. It is envisaged that this enhanced capability will continue to benefit the communities in future development endeavours.

The SGP is primarily implemented through provincial or district-based core groups. Core groups are basically representative committees of key community development stakeholders whose responsibility is the management of the CDS process to ensure quality and efficiency in project delivery. The CDS has assisted with the development of core groups as a conduit to community-based organisations. The concept was implemented in the middle of CDS Phase 1 when it was realised that the original nodal agency model would not work. As core groups are based within a geographic location they can draw on their members' local knowledge to make informed decisions about project priorities and selection. The groups are made up of local NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs), and government and business representatives. As noted above, these groups in some cases have formed active networks within their locations, and the members are gaining skills in transparent management processes that they can replicate in their host organisation.

There are currently 27 core groups operating throughout PNG, with at least one in each province. All core group members are volunteers. The current role of core groups is as managerial, assessment and networking bodies. Core groups engage fieldworkers to carry out field-level activities. CDS provides the core groups with minimal operational funding, which includes an establishment grant, quarterly administration, fees for one coordinator, and a 2 per cent management fee on completed projects. CDS will propose to the advisory committee in April that the management fee be increased to 10 per cent in line with the fees paid to specialised partners. This will involve a phasing-out of all other payments.

CDS provides standardised training for core groups in processes for screening and selecting projects, project design and appraisal, strategic planning, developing work plans and budgets and recruitment processes for fieldworkers. This formal training is supported by ongoing mentoring by CDS bureau and regional staff.

In mid-2003, CDS carried out a competency-based assessment of all core groups to gauge strengths and weaknesses. In 2004, CDS developed a program monitoring tool (PMT) which assesses the efficiency of each core group on a quarterly basis. The PMT also provides information on weaknesses that need to be addressed.
NGO Strengthening Program

The NGO community is an important partner in the implementation of the CDS program. NGO program activities cover remote areas that are often difficult to access by government and donor programs. However, despite their good intentions, many NGOs have weak organisational capacities, which affects the efficiency and effectiveness of their programs. The purpose of the NGO Strengthening Program is to work in close partnership with PNG NGOs and assist them to build their organisational capacities so that they are better able to fulfil their mission and vision (as determined by their own membership) and in turn help CDS achieve its goal.

The NGO Strengthening Program is open to major indigenous NGOs and faith-based organisations. The focus is on building the human and organisational capacity of agencies, with some assistance also provided to help organisations implement community development activities. To be considered for the program, an NGO must be a registered, not-for-profit NGO in PNG, have a clear development philosophy and focus, have at least one full-time paid employee (or equivalent), have office space and basic office resources, a minimum three-year track record of project and/or program activities, not be in default of CDS funds, and have good financial records for the past three years.

Becoming a part of the NGO Strengthening Program is a three-stage process. The first stage involves submission of an agency profile consisting of basic organisational information. If, based on the information provided, CDS deems that an applicant organisation is a genuine NGO, the second stage involves conducting a joint organisational assessment of the NGO. This assessment is a collaborative exercise between CDS officers and key staff of the NGO concerned. It is intended to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the NGO. Key areas of focus in the assessment are governance, networks and partnerships, personnel management, administration, information management, financial management and project management. The assessment is also intended to identify and reach agreement on possible areas of capacity building to be provided by CDS. The third stage involves the NGO formulating a project plan for capacity building assistance from CDS.

Since the program’s inception in December 2004, ten major NGOs have so far received assistance to the value of K1.4 million for a variety of capacity building activities, including staff training, mentoring or coaching, short-term specialist assistance, bridging funds to cover short-term staffing and operational costs and provision of office equipment.

Specialised Partners Program

The Specialised Partner Program (SPP) is a partnership between CDS and organisations with specialist technical expertise in the delivery of the CDS program. A significant proportion of current CDS-funded project activities, such as gravity feed water systems, agriculture and income generating projects and institutional development, require technical expertise from specialised organisations. Several NGOs (such as ADRA, Living Waters and WorldVision) already have specialised expertise and the SPP program aims is to extend such expertise to other NGOs, CBOs and communities in the implementation of CDS-funded projects.

NGOs eligible under the SPP are those that are financially self-sufficient, have a track record of working with their own partners and networks (often within a specific sector), and are able to act as intermediaries between CDS and community-based organisations. Like core groups, specialised partners may have an ongoing relationship with CDS — acting as a link to the grassroots level.

CDS only funds the direct community development activities in the field. Thus, to be considered as an SPP, the NGO must be a registered organisation in PNG with a mandate for non-profit community-based activities, have a clear development philosophy and focus, at least three full-time paid employees (or equivalent), office space and basic office resources, and a minimum three-year track record of project and/or program activities. In addition, a potential SPP must not be in default of CDS funds. SPPs must also have two years of audited accounts, existing outreach or partnership programs in a specific geographic and/or sectoral area, a transparent process in place for how they select community partners and the capacity to meet their own recurrent costs in terms of staffing, office space, etc.

A process of organisational assessment as undertaken under the NGO Strengthening Program is also undertaken under the SPP program, but focuses more on the technical capacity of the organisation. If assessed successfully, the organisation is then invited to submit a proposal for funding for a specific target community.

CDS-funded projects

Altogether CDS has funded about 1200 projects nationwide. At any one point in time around 400 projects are under active implementation. Table 1 shows by region projects funded under both phases and the total kina value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 CDS project funding, 1999–2004</th>
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<tr>
<td>Region</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Momase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highlands</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Projects</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Kina Value</strong></td>
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April 2005
Graph 1 shows the number of grants (projects) by sector per region. Clearly the sectors with highest number of grants funded are health, agriculture and education. The health sector includes projects such as water, sanitation, nutrition training for families and provision of childcare and community health facilities. Agriculture grants include a wide range of income-generating activities such as livestock farming, including poultry, piggery, goats, sheep and fisheries, vegetable farming, potato production, and citrus and spice farming, while education covers non-formal education such as literacy, training of women in basic skills and funding for elementary schools. Sectors with lowest number of grants are enterprise development, infrastructure and law and justice.

**Key features of the CDS process**

The CDS project cycle consists of the following seven elements:

1. expression of interest;
2. community project plan;
3. appraisal and approval;
4. project start-up;
5. implementation and monitoring;
6. completion; and
7. evaluation.

Key features of the process, their rationale and their effects, are highlighted below.

**Grants as the entry point for capacity building** — The overall aim of CDS is to build the capacity of NGOs and CBOs. CDS therefore views the grants as an entry point in a relationship that will lead to the strengthening of the capacity of the NGO or CBO. The grant is not an end in itself. This is attested by the constant contact and dialogue maintained between the communities and CDS during project implementation.

**Grant agreement signed** — A grant agreement is signed between CDS and the NGO/CBO or the recipient community for each project approved. The grant agreement clearly specifies the roles and responsibilities of each party and the consequences should the roles and responsibilities not be implemented as agreed. The grant agreements are legally enforceable and are essential to avoid the all too common occurrence where individuals misuse donor funds. The grant agreements have led to improved accountability and transparency by leaders of NGOs and CBOs.

**Fieldworkers and core groups interfacing with CSOs** — For each approved project, there is a minimum of three field monitoring visits (beginning of project, middle and end of project implementation) by the fieldworkers to provide assistance to the communities and to ensure project implementation is carried out according to plan. or, if changes are required, that the changes are consistent with project objectives. The monitoring and supervision by fieldworkers has been a key factor in the strengthening of skills at the community level and the successful completion of projects.

**Collaboration and partnership between government and CSOs** — Whilst practical implementation of CDS as a whole lies somewhat outside of the government machinery simply because
key partners are in the NGO sector, there has in fact been a high level of collaboration between government and the NGO sector, particularly through the provincial and district core groups where government rural development officers play a crucial role in the screening of projects, as well as the implementation of projects.

NGOs and CBOs creating their own space and vision — A rewarding feature of the process is that it allows NGOs and CBOs to pursue their own vision and goals without necessarily being subservient to CDS project goals. They are able to take the CDS process and apply it to their own organisational goals. This in turn indicates the relevance of CDS goals and processes to the development needs of PNG.

Good news outcomes
The good news emerging from this investment of time, energy and resources through CDS is outlined below.

Community livelihoods improved
Since its inception, CDS has funded projects through which community livelihoods have been improved either through direct infrastructure development or through skills training. Basic infrastructure development such as catchment and gravity-fed water supplies enable communities to access good clean water. Multi-purpose resource centres are used for livelihood skills training covering a wide range of topics. The provision of elementary classrooms improves the quality of preparatory education and enhances children’s quality of education. Footbridges connect tribal communities, while provision of fishing equipment for coastal communities leads to improved income generation. Development activities, such as health and nutrition, education, domestic skills, income-generation, and cultural and environment conservation, are also promoted through the CDS process.

NGOs strengthened
About 88 per cent of grant activities are with village groups or associations, thereby directly building social capital in the rural areas. Many of these groups are located in remote areas that are not serviced by government machinery. Through the grant activities, community-based organisations acquire organisational and leadership skills, business and financial skills training and technical skills. Eleven per cent of grant activities are with large civil society organisations such as the Research Foundation Conservation Foundation, Foundation for Rural Development, East Sepik Council of Women, Centre for Environmental Law and Citizenship Rights and WorldVision. The enhanced capacity of these organisations in turn is extended through their own internal networks and partnerships.

Cadre of fieldworkers trained
CDS currently has a network of about 200 fieldworkers throughout PNG whose primary responsibility is to facilitate a process of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) for communities to identify and assess development needs, problems and issues and to select key development priorities. Based on the PRA, fieldworkers assist the communities to write project proposals for possible CDS funding. Fieldworkers receive both formal training and on-the-job mentoring and coaching from CDS advisors and specialist trainers. At any one time, some 60 fieldworkers are actively engaged in dealing with community groups. By the end of the current phase of the CDS program in 2007, many new fieldworkers will have been trained, replacing those who move on to join other organisations. CDS is currently working on developing a three-tiered competency framework that will be formally registered and recognised through relevant national authorities and institutionalised through university-level courses. This will eventually lead to the production of a critical mass of community development workers for PNG.

Network of development agencies (the core groups)
Another good news outcome is the establishment and development of 28 provincial or district core groups responsible for coordinating CDS work. Core groups receive formal training and mentoring or coaching on the job by CDS advisors and specialists on organisational management, project management, financial management, networking and partnerships. With increased social and technical capacity, core groups have the potential to evolve into autonomous development organisations.

Cadre of development managers
CDS operates through four regional offices. These are managed by an indigenous team of 12 development managers, supported by procurement and financial management officers. Through extensive on-the-job training, team-building exercises and distance education studies, development managers have acquired a wide range of management skills that will benefit PNG well after the CDS program terminates.

Accountable processes
By far the most important good news coming out of the CDS experience concerns the 'transparent and accountable systems and processes' through which the grant activities are administered. Moreover, the processes are flexible enough to provide effective linkages between village, district/province and the CDS bureau. Contrary to experiences elsewhere, the checks and balances built into the CDS process have proven difficult to manipulate by unscrupulous persons. This effectiveness has cultivated a high level of trust between CDS and stakeholders.
— so much so that community groups throughout PNG commonly state that CDS is an organisation they can trust. The effectiveness of the processes in meeting donor accountability requirements whilst at the same time delivering tangible benefits, has also attracted attention from other donors who have expressed interest in using the CDS systems and processes in the delivery of their development aid.

Responsibility of administering and managing the CDS systems and procedures is largely vested with the regional offices, the core groups and the fieldworkers. The ease and efficiency with which Papua New Guineans are managing a scheme of this size shows that similar donor development programs can also be managed in a like manner and with minimal external expertise.

CDS impact
From September 2004, CDS began facilitating a process of participatory project evaluation, whereby beneficiary communities reflect on the changes brought about by the project and assess the impact of the projects. This is justified on the grounds that it is the communities that identified the development and designed the project intervention and it is the communities that experience the changes and any positive or negative impacts. It therefore makes sense for the communities to assess the impact themselves.

The participatory project evaluation assessment focuses on the following four parameters:

- **Goals** — these are development-oriented goals such as improved health, improved nutrition, improved income generation, poverty reduction and improved law and order.
- **Outputs** — these are activities geared towards eventually achieving the development goal. For example, 'construction of gravity-fed water systems' might be an output oriented towards improved health of the community. 'Training in vanilla production skills' is an output that would help achieve the goal of 'improved income generation'.
- **Leadership** — this refers to changes in leadership skills and behaviours that the beneficiary communities or groups have experienced as a result of the project.
- **Replication** — this refers to the ability and capacity of the group to undertake a similar enterprise on their own.

Using a 'before and after' time frame and a ranking score from 0 to 5, community members representing leaders, women and men are asked to answer the key questions of "What was the situation like before the project came into being?", and "What is it now like after the project?", and to rank their scores. These key questions were applied to all four parameters. Since many of the participating individuals were illiterate, scoring was done by using culturally appropriate measures such as stones, sticks, leaves and marbles, and after careful explanation. Results from all 24 evaluations carried out at the time of this conference (another 32 evaluations have since been done) indicate communities are experiencing clear changes on all four parameters.

The changes as indicted by the scores have to be understood within the social and economic context of rural and remote PNG, the majority of which have not benefited from any systematic government services or donor development aid for many decades because of accessibility and communication problems. Within such development-starved populations, any rare opportunity of development will make significant impact on the minds and lives of the people. On the whole, the impact assessments clearly show the CDS-funded projects are bringing about significant changes in the lives of the target beneficiaries.

Key lessons
A number of key lessons can be highlighted from the CDS experience:

1. First and foremost is the need to have an effective, transparent and accountable process of development aid delivery that accords adequate control yet allows flexibility at the operational level to respond to changing situations.
2. Second is the importance of community ownership and participation at all stages — from identification of development need, to assessment of possible solutions through to the project proposal and the implementation of the project. The CDS requirement of community equity (monetary or in kind) has also led to strong community identity and ownership of the projects.
3. The role played by the fieldworkers in providing regular monitoring and support has been crucial to the successful completion of projects. Delivering development aid should not simply be an exercise in financial disbursement, but one that guides communities through the systems and processes, especially when this is a new experience for the community.
4. Ninety per cent of current CDS project staff are Papua New Guineans. The success of the CDS projects attests to the ability and capability of Papua New Guineans in delivering development aid and shows that development aid can be delivered at low cost.
5. Finally, when dealing with communities whose
survival and livelihood is totally dependent on the toils of their labour, the doom and gloom about PNG that is consistently and ferociously being spread by certain interest groups seems very far removed. It is of little consequence to the ordinary villager who is the target client of CDS. At the grassroots level, the resilience and robustness of the people of Papua New Guinea that has seen them survive many thousands of years will continue to play a key role in their livelihood. Development aid needs to systematically tap into this natural ability if more good news is to be created in PNG.

Conclusion
One of the key themes discussed at this conference is governance. This paper has not directly discussed the subject. Governance is the complex art of decision making that is influenced by personal character, values and principles. These attributes have more or less been acquired by the time person becomes an adult. Good governance requires timely access, synthesis and application of information and knowledge. It is our belief that the capacity building of civil society organisations by CDS is laying foundation for effective governance at the community level.
Bougainville: The conflict and the peace process

Anthony J Regan, State, Society and Governance Melanesia Project, Australian National University

The combination of the conflict and the peace process in Bougainville may seem as an unusual one as the subject of a case study of a success story in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Nevertheless, it is arguable that despite its negative impacts, the conflict also contributed to positive outcomes. Subsequently, the resolution of that bitter and apparently intractable conflict through one of the most successful peace processes in the world in recent decades has had a number of positive impacts for Bougainville and PNG, and has brought considerable credit to Papua New Guinean and Bougainvillean leadership internationally.

What follows is an overview of the origins and development of the conflict and the peace process, the dynamics of the peace process, and key outcomes.

The Bougainville conflict and its impacts

Factors contributing to the conflict included a Bougainvillean sense of a distinct common identity; a sense of isolation from and neglect by the rest of the country, which contributed to feelings of grievance; and resentment about the imposition of the Panguna mine for the benefit of the rest of PNG, with little account taken of the social and environmental costs for Bougainville.

Violent conflict was precipitated in 1988 by localised disputes over impacts of the mine and the revenue share received by younger landowners. Destruction of mine property by landowners and mineworkers elicited widespread violence by police mobile squads, and conflict escalated quickly to also involve the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). That violence was the catalyst for mobilisation of a wider secessionist rebellion, led by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Most non-Bougainvilleans fled Bougainville in fear during 1989 and the early 1990s, in what was in some ways a form of ethnic cleansing.

After withdrawal of the security forces from Bougainville following a March 1990 ceasefire, Francis Ona, leader of the BRA, made a unilateral declaration independence (UDI) of Bougainville in May 1990. But the UDI gained no international recognition, and intra-Bougainville conflict that developed from 1990 made the BRA goals difficult to achieve. Internal conflict prompted leaders in many areas to seek protection from the security forces, which began returning to Bougainville from late 1990. From about 1992, diverse armed Bougainvillean elements opposing the BRA began combining into the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF). Both the secessionist conflict between the BRA and the PNG national government and the internal conflict between Bougainvilleans continued until ended by the peace process beginning in July 1997.

The conflict undoubtedly had terrible impacts for both Bougainville and for Papua New Guinea more generally. They included, in relation to Bougainville:

- causing or contributing to an unknown number of deaths — perhaps several thousand;
- terrible mental as well as physical trauma experienced by many people;
- deep divisions amongst Bougainvilleans;
- destruction of infrastructure and of private sector productive assets (including small-holder plantations);
- destruction of the capacity of the local state (then the North Solomons provincial government); and
- large scale dislocation of life for huge numbers — up to 160,000 of the total population of about 60,000 was living in 'care centres' (refugee camps) in 1996.

In relation to PNG, there were also several hundred deaths in combat, trauma for members of the security forces, loss of revenue from the single most important revenue source (the Panguna mine), divisions amongst Papua New Guineans, and so on.

There were also positive aspects connected with the conflict. For example, there was increased reliance by many communities on traditional authority and kastom, for instance, in resolution of disputes. A broad consensus emerged among most groups in Bougainville society that violence is no longer an acceptable means of resolving disputes, and, as a consequence, there is a view that both groups in society and the local state (now the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government and in due course the autonomous Bougainville government) should not make use of violence as a means of dealing with problems (as discussed earlier in this issue, 'Clever people solving difficult problems'). Finally, the conflict promoted widespread reliance on locally developed 'appropriate technology' (such as small-scale hydro-electricity schemes, modification of combustion engines to run on coconut oil, etc.) and 'bush medicine'.
Overview of the peace process

The peace process, generally regarded as beginning with the Burnham (New Zealand) talks in July 1997, built upon many previous peace efforts, going back to at least early 1989. While at the time these were regarded as failures (in not ending the conflict), in fact the talks all made important contributions to the ultimately successful peace process. They provided experience to negotiators, permitted exploration of options, excluded approaches that could not work, and so on.

The initial talks in July 1997 were between the divided Bougainvillean groups, who then agreed to cooperate in talks with the PNG national government that began in October 1997. Until June 1999, the primary focus was on building a process within which the parties could feel secure. Negotiations on the divisive political issues then began and continued for over two years, concluding with the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement in August 2001.

During 1998 and 1999, significant divisions occurred among the Bougainvillean groups supporting the peace process, but, from December 1999, most combined and negotiated on the basis of a united position. One significant group, however, remained outside the process, comprising those supporting Francis Ona, who believed Bougainville was already independent under the May 1990 UDI. In April 1998 he announced himself President of the Independent Republic of Me’ekamui, supported by the armed Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF). At the time of writing (January 2005) they remain outside the process, and refuse to disarm, though also indicating that they will not actively undermine the process.

The political settlement contains innovative solutions to the difficult problems that faced divided and distrustful parties at the start of the political talks. It comprises three main elements. First, a high degree of autonomy is provided to Bougainville under constitutionally guaranteed arrangements. Second, the most divisive issue, Bougainville's secession, is dealt with by a constitutionally guaranteed but deferred referendum for Bougainvilleans on independence, to be held 10–15 years after the establishment of the autonomous Bougainville government. Third, Bougainville is to be demilitarised, through both the withdrawal of the security forces (both PNGDF and police mobile squads), and a three-stage process of disposal of the weapons held by the BRA and the BRF.

The implementation of these arrangements is encouraged by their being linked to the passing by the PNG national parliament of the constitutional amendments implementing the agreement, the coming into operation of those amendments, and the holding of the elections for the autonomous Bougainville government.

Implementation has generally proceeded well (if sometimes more slowly than anticipated), beginning with passing of the necessary amendments to the PNG national constitution in March 2002 and the completion of withdrawal of the security forces from Bougainville about the same time. At that point, the implementation of the weapons disposal process began. Certification by the United Nations that the second stage of weapons disposal (secure containerisation of weapons) had occurred brought the constitutional amendments into operation in August 2003. Between September 2002 and November 2004, the constitution for the autonomous Bougainville government was developed in a process involving extensive popular consultation. The new constitution was endorsed by the PNG national government in December 2004, and elections for the autonomous Bougainville government are now expected in May 2005.

Adoption of that constitution and implementation of the autonomy arrangements more generally are resulting in choices of innovative government arrangements. Those in relation to policing have been outlined already in this volume ('Clever people solving difficult problems'). The constitution aims for a highly democratic and accountable government system, including provision for recall of members of the legislature; plebiscites for popular consultation on major issues; citizen-initiated legislation; a heavy emphasis on the importance of custom and of traditional authority in most aspects of government, including provision for a body of traditional leaders with an advisory role; a specialist human rights enforcement body; and ombudsman and leadership code arrangements much strengthened by comparison with those under the PNG national constitution.

The peace process has not been without its problems, some of which continue, and the process itself has caused problems in Bougainville. Of the ongoing problems, perhaps the most serious concern continuing divisions in Bougainville involving Francis Ona and the MDF. These have been made worse by an alliance Ona's has developed since about 2002 with Noah Musingku, the founder of the U Vistract pyramid fast-money scheme who claims to have developed a new world economic order that will make an independent Bougainville incredibly wealthy. Ona has thus been encouraged to believe that he does not need to reach an understanding with other Bougainville leaders, and has probably been able to expand his support base.

There will be a number of difficult choices ahead for Bougainville and the autonomous Bougainville government. Both government capacity in Bougainville and its economic base are weak. With limited revenue available, the capacity of the autonomous Bougainville government to meet the high expectations will be limited. An ongoing problem, contributed to by the peace process, concerns the impact of both aid and peace-process related expenditure. In a post-conflict situation, where people have limited access to income, such expenditure has created high and unsustainable expectations, which may result in some serious problems for the autonomous Bougainville government.

On the other hand, the post-conflict situation offers Bougainville the opportunity to focus on what patterns of
economic activity should be encouraged as the basis for future development. With creativity, this could involve encouragement of the kind of self-reliance that was so evident during the conflict.

**Dynamics of the peace process**

In mid 1997, when the peace process began, the Bougainville conflict appeared intractable, with divisions and the use of violence to achieve political ends becoming entrenched. Yet from mid 1997 to the present, the conflict has not been renewed, and the peace process has become widely regarded as one of the world's most successful, studied by participants in other peace processes. Some key factors involved in the transformation are now outlined.

The process was locally initiated. While there had always been individuals and groups on all sides committed to peaceful resolution of the conflict, in the early stages of the conflict their ability to encourage moderation was limited, for, as the conflict intensified and new strategies were attempted by the protagonists, each side had high hopes of outright victory. As the period of the conflict intensified, and the possibility of complete victory faded, the scope for the influence of moderates increased, and many took the opportunity to push for exploration of options for peace, often at considerable personal risk. In Bougainville, in particular, part of the impetus for peace was growing concern about the negative impact of the conflict on the sense of common identity among Bougainvilleans that had previously been developing amongst their diverse language and culture groups. Strong cultural traits in Bougainvillean societies about balanced reciprocity in relationships also tended to both limit conflict and encourage reconciliation, and supporters of peace from the community level upwards drew on these traits. The fact that societies in the rest of PNG share similar traits meant that at the national level both political leaders and senior bureaucrats were similarly open to reconciliation, a factor that contributed to building peace between Bougainville and the PNG national government.

Local initiatives received significant support from the international community, without which it would have been difficult for the hostile and distrustful parties to build a sustainable peace process. The most significant support included:

- facilitation of initial talks by the government of New Zealand;
- provision of funding and personnel by New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu for an initial unarmed Truce Monitoring Group (December 1997 to April 1998) and then for a Peace Monitoring Group (May 1998 to June 2003), a body which provided the secure 'space' for the parties needed for negotiating a settlement, and which also facilitated the peace process in many ways (supporting peace talks, helping to implement the weapons disposal process, etc.);
- provision of a small monitoring mission by the United Nations, from late 1998 to June 2005, which among other things played important roles in mediation and facilitation in the peace talks, and also supervised the weapons disposal process; and
- significant donor support facilitating the Bougainville peace process and supporting reconstruction.

Australia played a significant role in what has been, for the Pacific Islands region, a major international intervention. From April 1998, it took the lead role from New Zealand. It was, however, generally a role that Australia fulfilled in a moderate manner, compared, for example, to what might be described as its more 'robust' approach to leadership of the intervention in Solomon Islands. Despite some frustration at delays and costs involved, in general Australia acted in support of locally initiated and designed processes, rather than seeking to set agendas and timetables. In large part this moderation reflected Australian sensitivity about the suspicion that many Bougainvilleans had because of Australia's past roles in both development of the Panguna Mine and the provision of training and other support for the PNGDF in the early stages of the conflict. Ona and the MDF remaining outside the process underlined for Australia the need for local initiative to be paramount and the consequential requirement for moderation in its support role.

The high levels of international support made it possible for the process to be very inclusive, with representatives of a wide range of groups being directly involved in most phases of the process, including over 20 rounds of negotiation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. This inclusiveness contributed to support for and understanding of the peace process and its outcomes across groups in Bougainville.

**Conclusion: Some outcomes**

The conflict had some positive impacts, as outlined already. Further, the conflict demonstrates that the end of conflict can offer unusual opportunities for change in, and re-building of, the state. What is being attempted in Bougainville is being watched with interest elsewhere in Papua New Guinea.

The peace process has had a range of benefits, the most obvious being the ending of the bitter nine-year secessionist conflict. It has also largely united a deeply divided Bougainville, and provides a basis for what is at least a temporary accommodation between Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea, and could possibly provide a new basis for a long-term accommodation (depending on the outcome in the referendum). The process is also an example of constructive engagement between the international community (including donors), the state, and interests and groups at the local level. Their joint efforts have contributed not only to the success (to date, at least) of the process, but also to the development of innovative initiatives in development of local state structures.
Cases of successful alliance management for development

David Kavanamur, School of Business Administration, University of Papua New Guinea

Introduction

The importance of strategic alliances in development has been highlighted in an earlier volume of the Development Bulletin (Kavanamur 2002). Concepts such as cooperation, networking, competitive-cooperation, relationship, trust and synergy all underpin the concept of strategic alliance management. Here, an holistic definition of strategic alliance management is offered, one that reflects the dynamism of the concept rather than staticism:

Strategic alliance management is the process of strategically managing dynamic cooperative-competitive relationships between two or more partners involved in a simultaneous network of alliances, in order to capture synergy thereby enhancing the competitive position of each partner. This process assigns the task to an alliance manager who must regularly take cognisance of the influence of external factors on the alliance, namely the partners' culture, organisational and environmental contexts (Kavanamur 2003:28).

This paper presents research findings on two successful cases of alliance development and cooperation at the corporate level.

Case 1 — The Bougainville Micro finance Scheme (BMFS) represents a strategic alliance between AusAID, its Australian managing contractor (AMC), Australian Volunteers International (AVI), and the Bougainville Transitional Government through the Bougainville Division of Commerce (BDC). The alliance partners created a separate entity known as the Bougainville Haus Moni (BHM) as a way to achieve their main objective of financial intermediation on Bougainville.

Case 2 — NASFUND-AON represents a strategic alliance between the National Superannuation Fund (NASFUND) of PNG, formerly the National Provident Fund (NPF), and AON Consultancy (PNG) Ltd, a global corporation specialising in employee benefits administration. The alliance agreement was finalised on 2 May 2001 through an Administration Services Agreement (ASA), initially for five years. The alliance agreement stated that NASFUND would outsource its backroom operations to AON Consulting. This process left NASFUND with the key functions of compliance and client servicing.

Environmental context

Table 1 summarises the environmental influences on the two cases. It also shows how the alliance managers handled these factors.

Several themes and issues run across the two cases. First, all alliance managers, including those of alliances not presented in this paper, identified the effects of a prolonged economic downturn since 1994 on the performance of their alliances. At least two of the cases, not presented here, had to be terminated because macroeconomic instability had prevented a partner from honouring its financial commitment to the alliance (Kavanamur 2003). These partners were dependent on GoPNG budgetary support.

Second, two partners were compelled to enter into partnerships in order to have access to the technological competence of a partner. Of these, only NASFUND, the lead partner in the NASFUND-AON alliance, is seeking to retain a degree of technological competence in-house. This is a risk strategy against technological incapacity in the event the alliance is not renewed at the end of the current five-year agreement. Clause 13.3 of that agreement prevents the transfer to NASFUND of any software technology documentation.

Third, the cases noted the significant negative effects of the politico-legal environment, but the alliance cases developed effective strategies to mitigate these effects. NASFUND, the most politically influenced entity prior to alliance formation, built an effective firewall to prevent political interference through its adoption of good corporate governance principles and by instigating reforms in the superannuation industry. The reforms facilitated its eventual privatisation and allowed it to serve only stakeholder interests.

Finally, all cases identified the dangers posed by PNG's societal culture on alliance management. However, the parties in both successful cases developed strategies to cushion the negative effects of these factors. Firewalls developed through...
Table 1  Cross-case summary: Environmental context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance environmental context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NASFUND-AON</strong></td>
<td>• Alliance mainly concerned with negative effects of three consecutive years of economic downturn on partner earnings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Alliance benefit from state-of-the-art technology offered by AON; NASFUND deficient in this competency, but trying to build in-house competency.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Privatisation of NASFUND helped contain political interference.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Firewalls through good corporate governance minimise negative effects of broader cultural and social environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Law and order remains an issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Women employees preferred due to high productivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Macroeconomic instability has bearing on membership numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BMFS</strong></td>
<td>• A 10-year war from 1989 to 1999 left few locational amenities on the island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Financial vacuum generates high demand on BMFS services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cross-cultural alliance portrays strong political negotiations and networking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Absence of legal framework constrains outright deposit mobilisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evidence of emerging cultural fit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pressure for gender equality to reflect matrilineal society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Macroeconomic instability is a concern for local economy.</td>
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good corporate governance helped minimise the negative effects of the broader cultural and social environment. And, most importantly, women employees were preferred due to their high work productivity. In the BMFS case there was strong pressure for gender equality to reflect Bougainville's matrilineal society.

Overall, the alliance environment was dominated by concerns about the negative effects of government dominance and socio-cultural issues, a dominant component of which is wantokism. The two alliance cases could be identified as having developed effective strategies to cushion the effects of change management processes on alliance management. The primary reason for this can be attributed to the role alliance managers played, and the fact that both cases involve cross-cultural alliances, with significant exposure to international best practice. Both cases portrayed strong political negotiations and networking, as well as the possibility of achieving culture-fit.

Organisational context

Table 2 summarises the organisational context of the two cases and how this impacts on alliance management.

Several organisational themes and issues run across the two cases. First, all the cases have alliance agreements signed by each partner. In terms of formal governance structures, both success cases had a common structure from which alliance work was coordinated while others that failed (reviewed in Kavanamur 2003), merely had an agreements which were managed from a distance by alliance coordinators. Indeed, the cases with formal governance structures were relatively successful in alliance management, as partners interacted directly and interfaced with their clientele. Considering that PNG has a relationship-oriented culture, personal contact through governance structures appears to have enhanced the alliance management process. The presence of formal governance structures also facilitated satisfactory alliance control and reporting mechanisms in the two relatively satisfactory cases.

In terms of goals and values compatibility, the two cases with formal alliance governance structures scored well compared with those without the structures. Hence, for NASFUND-AON and BMFS, their respective alliance businesses were central to the partners' core businesses, and efforts were expended on realigning their values and cultures. It would seem that those cases with formal governance structures, and which enjoyed goals and values compatibility, are the ones most likely to continuously realign their strategic intents, establish and maintain structures, develop planning and control mechanisms, and foster a positive culture and environment.

Another important organisational component is human resources. The success cases were satisfied with the skills possessed by their personnel in alliance management while interacting with each other, and with their respective clientele. The cases that were not so satisfactory, there were complaints about lack of alliance management skills. They had junior
Table 2 Cross-case summary: Organisational context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance environmental context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NASFUND-AON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Governance structure embodied in agreement and Strategic Plan 2002–2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• AON is represented on NASFUND's board of directors and trustees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reporting clearly spelt out in agreement and thus far satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Constant realignment and monitoring of agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alliance central to core business of partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Early positive results have pleased partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human resource well trained and more than sufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• AON reemployed 24 of NASFUND's staff to manage NASFUND's portfolio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication reflected at strategic and operational levels and considered optimal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sharing of intranet facilitates smooth and open communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strong interpersonal relationships enhance conflict resolution.</td>
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</table>

| BMFS                          |
| • BMFS has a board and management structure. |
| • Capacity at board and management level promising. |
| • Vacuum in capacity building at district and regional level. |
| • Constant but slow realignment due to absence of legal framework for deposits. |
| • Concern about reporting accuracy by GMFs to BHM head office. |
| • Signs of compatibility between partners vis-a-vis rural financial intermediation goals and community service obligation. |
| • Alliance central to partners' core business. |
| • Budgetary constraints restrict capacity building to BHM. |
| • Differences of opinion on communication effectiveness. |

Source: Kavanamur 2003:222.

officers appointed as alliance liaison officers whose credentials did not meet those of their counterparts, who obviously were senior executives.

Communication can be measured in two ways: frequency (between alliance managers) and degree (depth of communication). Within the two success cases, the NASFUND-AON alliance recorded optimal communication at strategic and operational levels facilitated through partners sharing a common intranet facility, strong interpersonal relationships and informal ties amongst staff at the operational levels. All 22 personnel at AON working on the NASFUND portfolio were former NASFUND staffs who were reemployed by AON. Communication at BMFS was considered satisfactory.

In summary, it appears that formal alliance governance structures greatly enhance the work of alliance managers and the overall alliance management process. Only the cases considered in the broader study (including our success cases) that considered respective strategic alliances as strategic to their core businesses established formal governance structures. These cases also continuously realigned strategic intents to structure, plan, culture and environment.

Alliance management skills

Table 3 summarises the environmental influences on the two cases. The extent to which the alliance environment is managed, organisational components leveraged towards goal attainment, culture managed and alliance management process is developed directly depends on what the alliance manager does in the alliance's life cycle.

The findings of the study show several key themes. First, each of the success partners appointed senior executives as alliance managers with at least 10 years of experience and industry knowledge in their respective organisation. There was, therefore, continuity in the position of alliance managers which allowed for corporate, or institutional, memory and continuous learning. Seniority also enabled multiple and multilayer communication with partners, whereas in the less satisfactory cases the junior officers who were appointed did not match the skills and experience of their counterparts, who were often senior executives.

Second, in the satisfactory cases all alliance managers were involved at the negotiation stages of their respective alliances. The extant literature on strategic alliance management
Table 3 Cross-case summary: Alliance management skills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance environmental context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NASFUND-AON</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strong alliance management skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both alliance managers were senior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both involved from negotiation stage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presence of cross-cultural management skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BMFS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Satisfactory alliance management skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• AVI's alliance manager senior; BHM's alliance manager junior and under training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both involved from negotiation stage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cross-cultural tensions amongst alliance managers are manageable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Recommends that it is good alliance management practice to involve the potential alliance manager in the early alliance negotiation stages so that the person can become the alliance's ambassador (Yoshino and Rangan 1995; Lorange and Roos 1992; Cauley De La Sierra 1995).

Third, the presence of cross-cultural management skills is vital in cross-cultural and global alliances. There were cross-cultural management skills present in the most satisfactory alliance, NASFUND-AON, and the BMFS. It appears that cross-cultural skills are partly responsible for the success of the NASFUND-AON alliance and to an extent at the BMFS. This is the case despite the fact that in BMFS cross-cultural differences were beginning to emerge at the time of research in terms of management style and personality between the alliance managers.

Finally, AVI's alliance manager in the BMFS case pointed out that BHM's alliance manager suffers from an exaggerated view of hierarchy, possibly because of being a former public servant. Given that the weak alliances reviewed elsewhere entailed at least one public sector organisation as a partner, it would seem that public–private sector alliances present special challenges for overall alliance management. These challenges stem from the hierarchical Weberian management principles prevalent in public sector organisations that are opposed to the flexible and less hierarchical management principles necessary for alliance success. In this regard, partners that are exposed to international management best practice and cross-cultural management are better placed to manage alliances, but the problems pertaining to public–private sector alliances are not necessarily insurmountable.

**Alliance management culture**

Table 4 summarises the alliance management culture of the two success cases. The importance of alliance management to an organisation's culture is confirmed in the extant literature. Culture has significant impact on alliance implementation and performance, much more than on strategy formulation.

Key themes and issues of management culture run across the cases. Most involve the challenges alliances face in developing a culture-fit between the partners' organisations while taking into account the dominant societal cultures. A common theme that emerges is that all alliance management processes were affected by the negative influence of PNG's societal culture, including corruption, political interference and *wantokism*. These influences interfere with decision making, are apparent in slow decision making at management board level, and reflect a strong social rather than business culture, an emerging loan default culture and 'bigmanship' resulting in strong respect for hierarchy. It must be noted here that in relation to issues of corruption, it is not really the dangers of PNG's social culture per se that give rise to corruption. Rather it is corruption and lack of transparency that poses the gravest problem for alliance management because it is allowed under the guise of PNG's social culture as captured in the concepts of 'bigmanship' and 'wantokism' (Kavanamur et al. 2004; Okole and Kavanamur 2003; and see <www.transparency.org>).

Alliance managers who devised strategies to filter these influences or blend the positive aspects of societal culture with organisational culture were able to improve alliance performance. In the NASFUND-AON alliance, NASFUND, given its excellent alliance management skills, undertook a change management process that improved the organisational culture prior to entering into its alliance with AON, a global company. During the course of alliance implementation, firewalls were put in place to provide protection from the political interference that often gave rise to corruption. Thus, whilst the negative influences of societal culture were filtered out, the partners developed a strong cultural-fit that revolved around a strong service-oriented culture, with improvements in front-desk service and a strong corporate governance culture.
Table 4 Cross-case summary: Alliance management culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance environmental context</th>
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<tr>
<td>NASFUND-AON</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Change management programme introduced by NASFUND in 2000 has improved management culture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Strong service-oriented culture with improvements at front-desk service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strong corporate governance culture with emphasis on transparency through implementing firewalls against corruption and political interference.</td>
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| BMFS                          |
| - Alliance culture influenced by AVI's philosophy of building grassroots capacity, effective communication with stakeholders, sensitivity of local culture, local ownership of projects, and gender balance. |
| - Growing professional work culture within BHM. |
| - AMC concerned with inability of board to make fast decisions. |
| - BHM concerned with AVI's tendency to pressurise board in decision making reflecting differing cultural orientation. |
| - AMC feels BHM's alliance manager has an exaggerated sense of hierarchy being a former public servant. |


that emphasised transparency. The firewalls, built by NASFUND in its role as lead partner, entailed separation of board from management and the outsourcing of the following functions: Chairman of the Audit and Remuneration Committee to PW Coopers, Investment Fund Manager to Capital Brokers/ANZ joint venture, Chief Accountant to Deloittes, external auditors to KPMG and Fund Controller to AON Consulting.

To remove political interference, NASFUND became a private company after performing as a government statutory body since its inception in the 1980s. Conflicts of interest were minimised by having board members declare any such conflicts at the beginning of meetings. To promote transparency, board minutes were published on the NASFUND website (<www.nasfund.com.pg>). This website also posted the employment terms and conditions of staff, from CEO to desk officer.

In the BMFS alliance, the strong community-service orientation and grassroots culture of AVI seemed to have dominated the alliance. The partners used local societal structures, such as clans, and promoted the positive aspects of wantokism, such as sharing, to develop local trust and derive a sense of ownership of the GMFs that were multiplied at the local grassroots level. However, in terms of work culture and ethics, AVI continued to inculcate a professional work culture and networking skills at BHM.

A common thread can therefore be observed across all cases, revealing that cultural fit between partners could be reached where there are shared values. Thus, for the NASFUND-AON and BMFS, there were common goals that accelerated the process of building cultural fit. However, organisations that are poles apart in terms of values are less likely to achieve cultural fit. In this regard, public–private sector alliances present special problems and cross-cultural alliances add further challenges to the work of alliance managers. Moreover, when one adds the pressures of societal culture on alliance management, the task of alliance managers looks even more challenging and unenviable in a developing country environment.

Alliance management process

Table 5 summarises the alliance management process of the two cases. Organisation environment, organisation context, alliance skills, and management culture are all important to strategic alliance management. However, dynamic processes and the soft issues of relationship capital also need to be managed because alliance outcome — success or failure — is inseparable from the quality of process management.

Key themes run through the cases. First, all cases had persons appointed to perform the task of the alliance manager. In the two satisfactory cases, senior executives were appointed to perform this task, while in the weak cases reviewed elsewhere, some partners relegated this function to junior officers and often did not even perceive them as performing such roles.

Second, those cases that placed emphasis on relationship-building skills had more favourable alliance outcomes than those which did not. All cases recognised that PNG's relationship culture is characterised by personal contact and reciprocity, or exchange obligations. Partners in the NASFUND-AON and BMFS alliances derived benefits from
their investment in personal relationships, which were aided by geographic proximity of personnel on the ground. Moreover, all the satisfactory cases demonstrated that solid personal relationships at both the strategic and operational levels enabled alliances to be managed beyond the legal documents. Indeed, the existence of an alliance governance structure tended to facilitate such close interactions. Close personal ties tended to cause partners to overlook minor conflicts and enabled alliance managers to focus on the big picture or to undertake perspective taking while keeping track of operational issues. Personal ties also broke down barriers to communication, encouraging partners to deal with emerging conflicts early.

Finally, all cases had alliance agreements in place. The difference in performance arose, however, when such agreements were juxtaposed with the presence of alliance management skills. Those that did not inculcate alliance management skills at all levels only paid lip-service to such agreements and failed to manage beyond these documents. Such cases suffered from accusations and counter-accusations.

In addition to the common themes noted above, a number of issues emerged from the cross-case analysis table. The first is related to cross-cultural exposure. In the NASFUND-AON alliance it seemed that cross-cultural exposure enabled alliance managers to better understand managerial issues peculiar to PNG and they therefore designed strategies to overcome barriers. However, whilst cross-culture exposure enhanced the BMFS alliance, certain conflicts emerged arising from the difference in culture between the alliance managers.

A final issue is that a satisfactory alliance outcome does not necessarily depend on initial partner compatibility. Instead, what matters most is the actual management of the interaction process as postulated by network theory (Duyveters et al. 1999; Sharma 1998). Thus, in the case of the two weak cases (see Kavanamur 2003), their well-designed alliance agreements did not save them from failure because the alliance management process faltered as partners started defaulting on their commitments, such as paying out on default guarantees. However, if one reviewed the BMFS case, the alliance simply evolved over a period of five years until a formal agreement was signed much later. Even after the project design was approved, it was subsequently reviewed with the initial operating logic adjusted to accommodate budgetary constraints. Therefore, even though the alliance had not fully achieved its goals, these tensions had been adequately managed and there seemed to be a general perception that continuous realignment was a given rather than an option in such a volatile and information-void environment. This point underscored the critical role of alliance managers in the actual management process.

To summarise, the role alliance managers play in the alliance management process can never be undervalued. In volatile and information-void environments, such as that prevalent in PNG, the demands on their skills and patience are much more pronounced than for their developed country counterparts. As demonstrated by the two success cases, what matters most is not the nicely worded legal agreements and initial partner compatibility, but how interaction is actually managed. Continuous realignment in the strategy needs to be mandatory.

It is important for an alliance to demonstrate some early satisfactory results so as to keep partners on side. Generally, the cases show that alliances in volatile business environments should
have clear sunset clauses, which should be terminated once goal attainment is reached. They should also have shorter alliance agreements, preferably between three and five years, because of the imminent danger of strategic drift in volatile business environments.

Conclusion

I have presented the research findings of two relatively successful cases of alliance management in this paper. By presenting the data along the lines of five systems variables, namely environment, organisation, alliance skills, alliance culture and alliance processes, we were able to draw out common threads that ran across the cases. These threads could serve as lessons for those involved in building and managing alliances for development.

References


Introduction
In 2003, Nancy Sullivan and Associates Ltd was asked to conduct a social impact study of the RD Tuna Cannery in Madang. The aim was to assess the potential impact of the proposed relocation of its factory and fishing operations from Siar to Vidar Wharf.

The Kananam landowners of the Vidar area in Alexishafen, Seg, were anxious to have data on the effects of RD's ten-year operation amongst their neighbours in Siar for use in their legal battle to halt this development.

Impact of cannery operations

As Madang residents, RD was already well known to us and a major topic of interest. We all had friends and relatives who worked for the company and had read the spate of stories in the National and Post-Courier newspapers during late September and early October reporting on the conflicting claims about the broader economic benefits of RD's operations in the community, concerns regarding health and hygiene issues, and rumours of a burgeoning sex trade associated with the Filipino-owned cannery.

Several studies of the tuna cannery had already been conducted with widely differing findings. Firstly, there was a small environmental impact study conducted by RD itself prior to construction of the factory (in 1995), which essentially concluded there would be no detrimental impact on the environment. The authors of this report also cited an unidentified study conducted by an Australian in 1988 on the potential social effects of a cannery in Siar, which was optimistic about benefits for villagers, especially women, who would find cash employment for the first time. In contrast, the 2003 WWF Madang Lagoon Water Quality Monitoring Report indicated higher than permissible faecal coliform (from human waste) levels at points along the Madang Lagoon and their possible river sources, most notably those around the cannery at Siar. There was also a study by Aaron Jenkins in 2003 for the Madang Locally Managed Marine Area Network which revealed a significant drop in the numbers of food-source fish in those areas of the Madang Lagoon not protected by the network.

On the basis of these reports we concluded that there had been measurable environmental damage to Madang Lagoon. The fish people catch to eat and conduct trade; the water they wash in; the reefs and coral that support the marine ecosystem... have all suffered from the presence of RD Cannery and RD Fishing operations (Nancy Sullivan and Associates Ltd 2004:34).

We also discovered that much of the controversy surrounding RD concerned the way spin-off businesses had been established. These 'gifts' to the community, in the form of building, catering, maintenance, security, stevedoring and transport operations, were intended to be owned and operated by the landowner clans, but had become concentrated in the hands of a few privileged families. These people were also vigorously (sometimes violently, as we note in our report) confronting the growing tide of resistance amongst the majority of landowners who received few advantages.

Furthermore, we found that the structure of these businesses actually minimised the benefits enjoyed by their operators. All the equipment (building, vehicles) was owned by RD, who leased them to the landowners while paying very low rates for their services. For example, a second-hand minibus used to transport cannery workers was owned by RD, while the transport company who operated the vehicle were making leasehold payments on it that were effectively the same as the rate RD paid the company for transporting its workers. To make money, the company had to run the bus out of hours as a commercial public motor vehicle.

Company employees, meanwhile, were found to be working for as little as K60 per fortnight, though after paying for the rental of their safety equipment and uniforms, this figure was often reduced to K30. When the cost of late-night meals at the canteen was also deducted, some people took home virtually nothing; we talked to one worker who madeless than K5 (net) in a two-week period. Time away from subsistence fishing and gardening activities by key family members meant that the need for store-purchased food was increasing (despite the meagre quantities often involved), with inevitable consequences for people's health. It didn't take much to believe the stories of women prostituting themselves for fish to feed their families.

The attitude of RD towards community relations was exemplified by the fact that as of late 2003 the company had fulfilled none of its promises of support for local development...
activities or programs, except for one school that received a free carton of tuna as a donation.

We did not want to taint our report by merely speaking to critics of RD, and so data was also collected from the heads of clan businesses, community groups, church leaders, health workers, teachers and settlers in the area. The results were overwhelmingly disappointing, and while the canny was certainly not a 'good news' story, our study has been. This was by far the most controversial work we have done so far and our researchers conducted themselves with the utmost discretion. Nancy Sullivan (the 'white missus') stayed in the office while our Papua New Guinean staff lived in the communities, went out to interview night shift workers, took underwater photos of damaged reefs, entered the cannery, and convinced women to tell their more intimate stories. We didn't identify people who wished to remain anonymous, nor did we push for more material than was necessary. Informants generally approached us, happy to finally have someone interested in recording their stories.

Among the most controversial findings were eyewitness reports of RD workmen and village women engaged in group sex, often under the influence of Tanduay (80 per cent proof Filipino rum). Felix Siloi, a local stevedore, told us that the sex trade had started between 1997 and 2000. A woman told us:

When I was going to trade at the ships, I was there when lots of women would do this sort of thing. They go and the Filipinos tell them, 'we go and have sex first and then we give you fish'. Now I'm afraid for myself. I go there and all the women are doing this and coming away with bags of fish ... I've seen them with my own eyes when the Filipinos take three or four in one day and sleep with them. I see all this and so I no longer go and trade for fish.

In another instance, a ship's crewmen admitted that ship 829 poured ammonia gas into Seg Harbour during April 2003, killing marine life and affecting local people, primarily children swimming at Kananam.

These testimonies, amongst many others, were recorded on tape and included in our report (highlights from the executive summary are reproduced at the end of this paper). More importantly, though, is the fact that most of this data could only have been collected by Papua New Guinean researchers, and the report represents a success story by demonstrating the capacity and ability of Papua New Guineans to comprehensively investigate and expose a complex and controversial issue involving powerful commercial foreign interests operating in their own country.

A 'good news' postscript to this story ...

In December 2004, a PNG National Court judge backed the Kananam people of Madang and ordered that RD Tuna Canners and RD Fishing (PNG) pay costs to the landowners for a spurious lawsuit previously initiated by the company. RD Tuna had launched a defamation action during September 2003 against the Kananam landowners represented by the Idawad Association, their chairmen, vice chairman and the Sek/Kananam Ward Councillor James Sungai. Supporters of the landowners held that the company was attempting to silence mounting criticism of their operations, particularly amongst the Kananam, who claimed they had never agreed for RD to use their land, that their lagoon and reefs were being destroyed, that employment practices were sub-standard, and that social problems were escalating. Amongst the concerns raised by RD Tuna was that the defendants had created a website (<http://lorikeet-and.com.au/RD/rdtuna.htm>) which defamed the company. In addition to the court action, RD had obtained a restraining order against the landowners preventing them from any further public discussion of the issue.

Two months after initiating proceedings, the company was forced to agree that it had no legitimate claim against the landowners and discontinued the court action. The landowners were not satisfied. They felt that RD Tuna should be held responsible for their actions in trying to intimidate them and silence their concerns. They returned to the court to express these views and seek costs from the company.

National Court Judge Paul Mogish finally agreed with the landowners' arguments, ordered RD to pay all the landowners' costs and directed that no further proceedings be brought against them. While pleased with the decision, Frances Gem, chairman of the Idawad Association, noted that the concerns surrounding RD Tuna operations were real and still need to be addressed. RD Tuna Canners made no comment on the judgment.

The RD Tuna story is more than an obvious victory for local landowners over large foreign companies. It is also a validation of PNG and its court system. The country is often cast in a negative light with an endless stream of tales about law and order problems, and, more recently, claims that PNG is becoming a 'failed state'. There are many challenges in PNG, but when the judicial system can maintain its integrity and remind others in power that this is a nation of rural village communities who are the foundation of the country and must be treated equally under the law, then there is much hope for the future.

Foreign companies have been reminded that they are guests in PNG and must conduct their businesses fairly, while ensuring that any environmental impacts are minimised. The National Court, meanwhile, has sent a clear message that foreign companies are expected to follow the law, and that respect must be shown to people at all levels of society in Papua New Guinea.

April 2005
PNG is one of the places where social change is not always a threat to cultural integrity, and where it is not possible to simply shrug off cultural loss as an inevitable by-product of development. Indeed, despite the heavy-handedness and even violence of some of the first emissaries of western culture, Papua New Guineans remain enthusiastic about assimilating western developments to their own culture, and doing it on their own terms. It is understandable that the people of Siau, Nombob and Seg initially welcomed the presence of RD Tuna Canners and Fishing in their areas …

Because the communities had already lost their land and could not sustain themselves traditionally, they were in no position to negotiate terms. They were vulnerable: without the single most important natural resource, and the basis upon which all PNG cultures thrive, they had only their sea to provide for them. Were it actually possible to host a cannery and retain traditional fishing resources, the situation would be very different. For one, villagers would have a choice between working for a wage at the cannery and fishing for cash, food and trade. But once their fishing resources were forfeited to RD, the people from Kanamam, in particular, were without any options. They had exchanged their customary sustenance for wage labour with RD. But even this was an un-reciprocal exchange. Because RD’s operations have always been dedicated to a harboring of profits and a reduction of profit sharing at all levels, none of its workers actually make a living wage. The working conditions are deplorable, representing not the least investment on the part of the Company in their labor force. More importantly, none of the environmental responsibilities laid out in RD’s environmental reports has come to pass, and therefore the longer the Company stays, the greater the price is paid by all the landowners with their marine resources. In exchange, they receive sub-minimum wages for strenuous physical labour that puts them at health and, we have learned, frequent security risks (particularly for the women) traveling on Company transport.

The Kanamam, Nombob and Siau people are now locked in a cycle of dependency that is grinding away at the very fabric of their socio-cultural life. Without land, they must fish. With RD’s presence, they cannot fish as they once did. Without fish, they must labour for RD, which prevents them from working their gardens. Without sufficient pay, they cannot feed their families, or pay school fees or health expenses. They are left in a double-bind: no way to sustain themselves, and at constant risk of losing everything. Meanwhile, the Company has begun to turn the screws by opening up employment opportunities well beyond local landowners, attracting settlers from all over Madang. This puts greater pressure on the land, and on the cash-strapped landowner communities. Opportunity, a small number of women have created a niche market with RD Fishing employees, which presses traditional trade relations into a new form of prostitution. They are now able to feed their families, while crewmen find ‘comfort’ between their well-publicized Sunday worship and Wednesday Bible study classes …

Look closely at what RD has promised the landowners. Compare it with the conditions they have been given, and look again at what these landowners are requesting. They have been promised spin-off business ventures, and have been given secondhand vehicles carrying onerous bank loans, which can never be paid off by the rate of pay fixed by the Company. Landowners are asking for business ventures that do not serve the Company’s profit margin, but instead serve the community’s needs. Nevertheless, they are not asking for charity: they can service loans, as they have proven, but not at the rates fixed by RD. They will work for a living, but not at starvation wages. They will tolerate Filipino managers if they see skills transference down the line. They will also share their marine resources, if they can compete fairly with the fishing vessels’ sales to the cannery. But where there is no quid-pro-quo, where there is no prospect of a fair exchange, the landowners are bound to feel cheated in a moral as well as an economic sense. There is a [culture] of equivalencies, of both short and long term reciprocities. In the interviews collected here, there are a number of people who emphasize the long-term or bigger-picture rewards from RD’s presence: the revenues to the province and country, the importance of encouraging manufacturing in PNG, and so forth. But when such long term gains are also proven empty — now that it appears that RD will continue to enjoy tax exemptions, that their spin-off enterprises are structured to profit RD only, and that RD workers will never see Papua New Guineans as equals — the landowners can only feel morally, and culturally, affronted. Aggravate the situation with stories of rape, of crewmen urinating on village women, of seducing women on boardleg rum, and of community donations that consist of
one cartoon of canned fish, and there is bound to be anger. This is not "cargo thinking" but the overdue realizations of people who have been cheated.

As RD withdraws from its policy of preferential hiring of landowners, more settlers come into the area and provide competition at roadside markets. Husbands who have little time to see their families are taking on girlfriends and neglecting customary obligations. The old trade relationships are falling away for lack of time and the traditional goods to maintain them. Younger people are marrying across cultural, even provincial, boundaries. In Nobnob, the male initiations that used to be conducted as recently as 2001 can no longer be performed because elders fear the young men are neither as fit nor as pure as they need to be to endure its physical demands. In Seg, young women are selling themselves to get the fish they used to call their own. There is a general disrespect shown by the RD Filipino workers to their PNG counterparts, and most brazenly, to PNG women.

Economic Issues: In Kananam, as in Sir, by eliminating the one resource upon which rests the people's subsistence and customary trade practices (fish), RD has sent the community hurtling into the cash economy without lifelines. Rather than offering benefits, which would serve the autonomy and self-reliance of the community, and thus buffer the transition by preserving certain basic institutions, they have offered business spin-offs that serve to profit only the Company. The cannery and wharf wages are so low as to make survival on the cash economy impossible, thus locking the Sir, Nobnob and Kananam people into a dependency cycle that can only look to charitable relief rather than a self-reliant future. They have no more chance now of returning to a traditional economic base than they do of succeeding in the cash economy under RD's oppressive system.

Environment: The loss of fish is not simply due to overfishing by RD vessels, but a combination of pollution and overfishing... Lack of any suitable protocols for disposing of waste in both the cannery and wharf areas has led to horrible smells and suspected sicknesses of adults and children. Marine wildlife — in one case a dolphin — seem to have been poisoned by chemicals spilled in Seg Harbour, and an ammonia spill caused several people to become seriously ill. Not the least of peoples' worries is the level of noise coming from the ships in Seg Harbour, which has disrupted all aspects of community life and made it difficult to sleep at night in the village.

Employment: Conditions in the cannery are unhygienic and inhumane. Workers have no breaks, no clean or working toilets or showers; and劳动 under poor lighting and windless, hot conditions. Their sweat runs onto the fish in the production area, and the spilled fish scraps are retrieved from a crumbling cement floor only to be lightly washed and processed. There are no provisions for gloves, hairnets, masks or gumboots, although these are available; in one of the meanest of Company policies, use of these basic sanitation and safety items are deducted from the workers' pay. There have been documented cases of prostitution and gang rape of local women by Filipino nationals in both the cannery and wharf, as well as sales of illegally imported cigarettes and alcohol. No unions have been allowed until very recently, and then after pressure from the Idlawad Landowners Association. And this is because the latter finally broke with the implicit gag placed on SSD Members by being payrolled by the Company. The wages are well below minimum national wage, and the hours unmonitored: most workers say they are forced to work over eight hours daily without overtime pay. There are also dubious practices of deducting NPF monies and Company transport fees from workers' pay.

Recommendations: We recommend that RD Cannery Pty Ltd and RD Fishing (PNG) Pty Ltd cease operations to address the hygiene and safety conditions at both its plants; that it reduce the levels of fish caught in Seg Harbour and convert to practices that reduce the levels of by-catch fish; that it raise all wages to the legal minimum or above; that it monitor working hours and pay overtime rates; that it institute a fast-track training program for landowners; that preference in employment be given to landowners; that all spin-off businesses be restructured to the advantage of landowners, and that these contracts be offered to all members of the landowning clans; that health and safety inspectors monitor the work sites regularly; that assistance be given to aid posts, in particular donations of HIV blood test kits, in all landowner communities; that a clinic be established within cannery limits to serve emergency medical needs; that pay packet deductions be examined by independent accountants; that material contributions be made to the schools in the area, including lump donations to all students' fees; that local law enforcement be given unfettered access to all work sites for control of illegal activities on the part of RD employees; that a special social abuse office or task force be established within RD to accept and review complaints of abusive behavior between Company employees and local people, especially women.

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Papua New Guinea: Weak state, strong society

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Introduction

An understanding of the dynamics of political and socioeconomic change in such a diverse and complex country as Papua New Guinea (PNG) requires the application of multiple analytical lenses. The lenses most frequently applied in recent writing about PNG — those analysing political and economic instability and which frequently point to a country 'on the brink' of political and economic failure — offer important, if contentious, assessments. But, by themselves, they offer an incomplete picture of PNG's current condition. The application of 'social' and other lenses that look beyond the state to developments in society at large is necessary to provide a higher order of comprehension.

The 'Good News' workshop, conducted by PNG's Divine Word University and the Australian National University in Madang in November 2004, was intended to explore beyond these usual frames by sampling a range of successful initiatives in entrepreneurship, community development and governance and to hear the experiences of Papua New Guinean practitioners in these fields. The intention was to inform those involved in local-level development, as well as those involved in the broader processes of nation and state building, about possible ways forward. In other words, the workshop sought to examine some of the 'things that work' in PNG, particularly at the local community level. The aim was to determine what might be learned from these for policy makers, civil society and donors alike and generally to offer stimulus and encouragement to those engaged in local-level development.

The workshop heard some remarkable stories of self-reliant communities, of individual and community entrepreneurship and of civil society organisations in action. It also heard valuable descriptions and analyses of donor programs in community development, of processes that link, however tenuously, communities and civil society to government, and of the successful transformation of a governmental institution — the Ombudsman — that draws its legitimacy from public support.

The stories and cases ranged widely. Some dealt with remote communities that, through resource and initiative, opened up markets for their produce and developed income-generating opportunities unaided by government. Others described the ways in which urban and rural communities, racked by criminality and anomie behaviour, worked to bring about a degree of social order and cooperation with government authorities, including the police. There were accounts of entrepreneurs — individual and community-based — operating successfully in the agriculture and tertiary sectors and bringing benefit to the community at large. Prominent also were the experiences of non-government organisations working in partnership with local communities to improve the health and general wellbeing of those communities and more recently to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Successful processes of governance were explored, including the increasingly useful legal mechanism of incorporated land groups, which have the potential to drive rural development; a new tripartite consultative mechanism bringing government, the private sector and civil society organisations into high-level policy dialogue; and the process of peacemaking that ended the 10-year-long conflict in Bougainville. Donor-inspired initiatives (particularly the AusAID-funded Community Development Scheme), creating and strengthening civil society organisations, transferring skills and creating livelihood opportunities were also examined.

Themes and issues

Although by no means a comprehensive sampling of community-level activity, the workshop presentations demonstrated clearly the existence of vibrant and robust societies getting on mostly without (or regardless of) the state, coping with considerable adversity, 'charting their lives', acting collectively and finding local solutions in often difficult environments. Many themes emerged and with them lessons of various kinds for development policy makers and practitioners.

The initial failures or setbacks experienced by many groups and individuals — due in large part to inadequate information, planning and analysis about the venture and the absence of an extension service upon which to draw — were overcome by persistence and continued community support.

Leaders with vision and organisational skills (beyond that of the traditional 'big man') were regarded as crucial to a successful venture. These were people who could mobilise community support, defy government regulation if necessary, and resist pressures from wantoks/kinsman to prematurely distribute capital/resources. The qualities of leadership can be 'manufactured' only very rarely, but it is possible to transfer skills in management and administration. Leaders of community groups and entrepreneurs alike were willing to
share their expertise, thereby potentially enabling a demonstration effect for other communities (a practice familiar to private sectors in developed countries). A constant theme of discussion was how to help other communities emulate these initiatives in social order, in generating a sense of wellbeing, in the provision of basic services and in 'connectedness' to the state.

The successful mobilisation of people — both within clan units as well as within multi-ethnic settlements in support of 'law and order' and in opposition to continued criminality and disorder — demonstrated that communities have the will and capacity to act to restore social order and control even in the most difficult of circumstances. Appropriate strategies on the part of state agencies to link and relate to these community initiatives require further thought and articulation.

The dynamics of the agriculture sector and its performance over the past decade is particularly noteworthy. Not only have large populations found local solutions to cope with severe drought and frost in recent times, but the sector's ability to meet rising demand for domestic food production following the devaluation of the kina has been extraordinarily impressive. Domestic food production in PNG — often unrecorded in official economic statistics — is now growing at a rate faster than population growth.

Most storn of community-based initiatives indicate that, at some point, a connection with the government or an external NGO or a donor organisation has been of benefit to their success. Even the self-reliant Burum community discovered that the cost of maintaining the roads it had constructed were such that state support was necessary (even though they were not confident such support would be forthcoming!). This reinforces other points made in the workshop that facilitating future local-level development would be enhanced if partnerships and alliances between community groups and local government agencies are fostered.

Social capital and civil society
At a more general level, it can be argued that the workshop presentations and discussions illustrate the fact that the stock of social capital in PNG is growing rapidly. 'Transactions', interactions and emerging networks of a 'modern' economic and political nature (but often drawing on 'traditional' linkages) are expanding exponentially. Just how much this 'stock' or 'resource' assists local-level development and whether its growth might be generated by donors and development specialists is the subject of considerable debate. Enhanced communications and information flows — along with a vastly improved education system — would doubtless contribute to the further development of social capital. Research in other parts of the developing world suggests that the stock of social capital becomes effective when community organisations engage with government (and at times with the private sector) at the local level.

Civil society — that 'associational arena' or 'intermediate realm' — characterised by non-government and community-based organisations at the local and other levels would also appear to be expanding at a rapid rate in PNG. There is some evidence of a growing 'demand' on government for more effective services and better governance generally. There is clear evidence that NGOs in a number of areas are effectively delivering services, transferring skills, raising awareness of social and economic problems and enhancing livelihood opportunities. Assumptions are made in the literature on civil society about the many positive roles it is presumed to be able to play and of its importance to the achievement of participatory, democratic governance generally. But we should be careful about claiming too much for civil society, or attempting to measure its impact too quickly. Civil society should be seen as part of the process of political development; not as an instant panacea for a weak and unstable political system.

Research
The workshop pointed to a number of areas in which further research would benefit development practitioners. As Father Czuba noted in his introduction, many more such workshops are necessary to gauge the full extent of successful community initiatives (and of their conceptual underpinnings). Hence the need for extensive mapping of this phenomenon across all the provinces of PNG, paying particular attention to, for example, the occurrence of the types of community-based organisations in remote areas (for example, the lukaona (last corner) of Tingneo Mandan's storn) as against those occurring in areas of high-level economic activity (for example, around mine sites or intensive agricultural schemes). Given the potential for local-level development that seems to lie with community-based organisations, research into how they might be fostered would be useful.

If partnerships and alliances are one way forward for linking communities to the state (and private sector) more effectively, then research into how partnerships best operate is called for (along the lines of the contributions by Kavanamur, Rainbubu and Sullivan to the workshop). Research into the way in which the PNG state itself is being transformed ('decolonised' in the eyes of some writers, 'Melanesianised' in the eyes of others) and into the ways the apparatus of the state actually works would be of considerable benefit.

What is the real situation regarding the 'strength' or 'weakness' of PNG as a state or nation? There is very little research being undertaken on such areas, leaving some critics

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of the view that much donor policy on aid seems to be based on ‘moralising’ rather than on the basis of research and evaluation. And what of decentralisation? How best can the local-level system of government be improved?

**Top-down, bottom-up**

Finally, workshop participants were unanimous in that if external donors and domestic governments are to get their prescriptions right for supporting PNG’s effective development, it is imperative that the diagnosis is right. In their view — given the relatively poor progress experienced by top-down, state-centric approaches to better economic and political governance and, in light of the potential inherent in community-based action to transform a polity and economy — a more sustained and balanced focus by donors on, and support for, the role of society and community in PNG is warranted.

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A comment on democratic structures in Papua New Guinea

Terry Murphy, Consultant

The government and society of Papua New Guinea (PNG) seems to be in a state of rapid and serious decline. The national parliament does not function effectively. Violence prevails in Port Moresby and other major towns. The transportation and communication infrastructure, which, at independence in 1975 was relatively effective, is now falling apart. And the health of the people, on average, is worse than it was ten years ago, due to a continuing collapse of the national health system.

Why? The short answer, I think, is that the conceptual structure of traditional rural communities has been haphazardly hung on the framework of a modern parliamentary democracy. The same values which prevail in traditional village societies have come to dominate national political life, the difference being that the stakes are rather higher. This has led to a state of confusion which, fuelled by massive revenues from royalties, taxes and overseas aid, has resulted in a kind of legalised corruption that undermines the capacity of the state to provide for the common good.

Although there is an astonishing variety of ways in which traditional village communities have organised themselves, most PNG communities are highly democratic, or, perhaps more accurately, meritocratic. That is to say, with some minor exceptions, there is no tradition of a ruling class or an inherited elite status. Rather, men compete for leadership and status by mastering traditional symbols of power, whether these be success in battle or hunting, accumulation of valued goods such as shell money or pigs, in artistic endeavour, or as reservoirs of knowledge about the origin and significance of life in relation to the cosmos. Evidence of power is not just in accumulation, but in the capacity to distribute wealth amongst the community. Those who can accumulate and distribute wealth are recognised as 'big men'. Men seek parliamentary office because of the big man status it confers, as well as access to the wealth parliamentarians have awarded themselves. Unfortunately, what works at the village level does not necessarily suffice to keep the nation on track.

In the national parliament there are no requirements for election other than the ability to get elected. Evidence of superior intelligence, wisdom, technical skills or prior experience with governance is not required. In this, PNG is really no different than any other democracy. However, there is no tradition of national government, and too few parliamentarians have any sense of responsibility beyond their electorates, and more particularly beyond their traditional communities (given a 'first past the post' electoral system, members can be elected on a very small percentage of the total vote). The result is that parliamentarians who have become big men by winning the election have only one responsibility, which is to share the spoils of their position with their electors. This they have done in part by voting themselves hefty electoral allowances for 'development projects' in their own electorates. How much of this is siphoned off for private use is not known, but at best it leads to a series of minor projects which have very little impact. In fact, many projects are simply set up as ways of channelling funds to key supporters, or back to the member of parliament.
This is very difficult to control because of the peculiarities of the PNG electoral system resulting in a proliferation of small parties that sell their support to the prime ministerial candidate who is willing to share the wealth most generously. Even a high-minded candidate committed to reform will be unable to get up unless he is willing to share the wealth. Consequently, only a few members of parliament have any interest in national affairs, or much understanding of how good government can be made to work. Yet this is the peak of the pyramid of political power. It not only makes the law, it sets the tone for the nation.

There are a number of other factors that complicate the picture. Provincial governments are problematic. Prior to independence, PNG was governed as a unitary state, with some governmental functions devolved to regional structures. However, in 1977, the system of provincial governments was established, primarily to placate Bougainville, which wanted out of the system totally, in order that the vast royalties from the copper mine would continue to flow to Port Moresby. Each province has its own parliament or council, which has evolved as a replica in miniature of the national parliament in both style and levels of corruption.

The bureaucracy provides some stability, since within government departments there are many well educated and skilled administrators who, during the last 25 years, have managed to keep departments functioning and productive, up to a point. However, the administrative arm of government has never had the chance to evolve the distance from the elected government that would be required to keep it effective. And, finally, there is the question of social violence. Although not nearly as great a problem as the media might portray, nevertheless the major cities harbour an explosive combination of young, single, unemployed males, too often fuelled with alcohol. This is a dangerous mix in any society, but PNG supplies an amplifying ingredient — a tradition of violence between communities and against women in the community.

Why has the vast amount of development assistance poured into the country since independence failed to produce a stable and productive economy? Initially, most Australian aid went to budgetary support, in other words, simply using Australian taxpayers’ dollars to partially underwrite the cost of running the country. For about the last 15 years, the funding has focused on project support, which means that much of the money goes to contract consulting firms from Australia who provide technical assistance to the PNG government. The government gets the technical assistance, but the consulting firms get much of the cash.

In my opinion, the real problem lies in the fact that PNG was simply not ready for independence in 1975 and had not developed the capacity to absorb either financial grants or technical assistance. Some of the necessary physical infrastructure was in place — a national telephone system, a highway to the highlands, airports and harbours, an education system, banks and stores. But a modern economy within the construct of a democratic state must exist first and foremost in the minds of the people, and, in 1975, few Papua New Guineans had any experience beyond the village. Although in the interim many have acquired the education and skills to understand the needs of governance, they comprise a small elite which is subordinate to parliament. Those who may choose to speak out can be controlled by threats of violence from parliamentarians and their wantoks, who have developed close ties with raskol gangs in Port Moresby and elsewhere. Indeed, within the bureaucracy, real or threatened violence may be used to control relationships between peers or superiors and subordinates.

Papua New Guinea is a place of wondrous complexity and stunning beauty, but until the fundamental weaknesses of the parliamentary system are eliminated, it is unlikely that targeted aid projects and World Bank or ADB loans will have much impact on the current state of decline.
Violence, women and the state in Papua New Guinea: A case note

Abby McLeod, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University

Introduction
This paper examines the case of a Papua New Guinean refugee to Australia. Her case, heard in early 2004, embodies a number of key themes in contemporary Pacific studies, namely, violence against women and the gendered nature of the state. In examining her case, I aim to provide preliminary insights into a little-explored dimension of these themes within the context of Papua New Guinea (PNG). I offer these preliminary thoughts not from a legal perspective, but rather from the perspective of an anthropologist whose views on law and order in PNG have been sought for the purposes of expert testimony. It is hoped that the presentation of this case will draw attention to the ongoing problem of gender violence in PNG.

Background
Despite PNG's constitutional commitment to equal human rights, women in PNG enjoy neither freedom of movement nor equal protection by the law. Security of the person is denied to women, 70 per cent of whom experience domestic violence (PNG LRC 1992, Bradley and Kesno 2001) and many of whom fear basic tasks such as shopping, due to the prevalence of rape and physical assault. Gender equality is enshrined in the constitution and PNG is signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women (CEDAW). However, law enforcement agencies are dominated by men (McLeod 2003), many of whom possess culturally entrenched assumptions about male superiority and women's ensuing status. Consequently, women are disadvantaged at all levels of the legal system. Police persistently fail to act upon complaints of domestic and sexual violence (Bradley and Kesno 2001). Village courts demonstrate 'excess traditionalism' when dealing with cases of violence against women (Paliwala 1982; Garap 2000) and the feminine face of poverty renders the national court system financially inaccessible to female complainants.

While individual Papua New Guinean women exercise agency in a variety of ways, women in PNG frequently characterise themselves as 'second rate citizens'. The implications of this status are many and well documented, including ongoing subjugation to violence (physical, psychological and structural) (Bradley and Kesno 2001), under representation in decision-making positions (McLeod 2002), lack of equality before the law, and, ultimately, lack of integral human development. In recent times, this inequality has resulted in a relatively unexplored phenomenon, namely, Papua New Guinean women seeking asylum in Australia, to which we shall now turn.

Australian refugee law
To obtain refugee status in Australia, applicants must apply for a protection visa through the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). In the event that a protection visa is not granted, applicants have right of appeal to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) and to the higher courts.
Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the amending Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), to a person who:

owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it (UN 1951:Article 1(2)).

While gender-related claims are not explicitly provided for in the convention, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has recently called for gender-sensitive interpretation of the Convention (Hunter 2002:3), resulting in the development of guidelines by the UNHCR and individual states for the assessment of gender-related refugee claims (Hunter 2002:7; see DIMA 1996). In Australia, as in other jurisdictions, assessments of claims in which gender is the sole basis of persecution have focused primarily upon two issues. Firstly, the precise meaning of the term 'persecution', and, secondly, whether or not 'women' or certain groups of women constitute a 'particular social group' for the purposes of the convention.

In April 2002, on appeal from the Refugee Review Tribunal, the High Court of Australia, in MIMA v Khawar ([2002] HCA 14), ruled that the failure of the applicant's state to protect her from domestic violence rendered her a refugee, as defined by the convention. Ms Khawar, a citizen of Pakistan, alleged that both her husband and his family had repeatedly perpetrated violence against her. Moreover, she claimed that on four occasions, the police failed to enforce the law or offer her protection. This, she argued, constituted state toleration and sanctioning of violence against women, a single aspect of the state's systematic discrimination against women in Pakistan.

Gender-based claims are complicated by the clause that persecution must be 'for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion' because it can be readily held that a husband's violence against his wife is for personal rather than convention reasons. However, in MIMA v Khawar, the High Court concluded that:

Where persecution consists of two elements, the criminal conduct of private citizens, and the toleration or condonation of such conduct by the state or agents of the state, resulting in the withholding of protection which the victims are entitled to expect, then the requirement that the persecution be by reason of one of the Convention grounds may be satisfied by the motivation of either the criminals or the state (Gleeson CJ, para 31).

Simply put, the High Court accepted the formula presented in the English case of Shah ([1999] 2 AC 629), that 'Persecution = Serious Harm + The Failure of State Protection' (Kirby J, para 118).

In the case of Khawar, it was held that the state's failure to protect Ms Khawar was a result of her membership of a particular social group, namely 'women in Pakistan'. While many commentators contest the characterisation of 'women' as a social group on the basis that the sheer number of persons involved in such a group precludes cohesiveness, in MIMA v Khawar the High Court concluded that, 'women in any society are a distinct and recognisable group; and their distinctive attributes and characteristics exist independently of the manner in which they are treated, either by males or by governments' (Gleeson CJ, para 35).

Papua New Guinean refugees to Australia

Given the classified nature of DIMIA records and the limitations of available statistics, researching the prevalence and causes of refugee movement from PNG to Australia is difficult. Since 1993, 23 Papua New Guineans have appealed to the Refugee Review Tribunal against DIMIA decisions denying them protection visas. Of these appeals, only one was raised by a person in detention (RRT c2004), with all others being made by Papua New Guineans who had entered the Australian community via legitimate immigration processes. As the Refugee Review Tribunal publishes only 20 per cent of its decisions, it is not possible to obtain detailed information about non-published cases (including the gender of appellants), with only six cases since 1994 being publicly accessible. Of those six cases, four were women, one whose case details were not fully published in order to preserve her anonymity.

The claims of four of the five applicants whose hearings are published may be briefly described as follows (the fifth applicant's case will be described at length). Two of the applicants were Bougainvillean women (RRT 1994; RRT 1995), both of whom feared persecution in Bougainville and mainland PNG on the basis of their known support of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Both were granted protection visas on the grounds of membership of a particular social group (BRA supporters), with gender being a relevant factor in only one case. Specifically, it was determined that given the prevalence of violence against women in PNG, a single Bougainvillean woman would be unable to relocate to other areas of PNG on the basis that she had no 'male protector'.

Of the five fully detailed RRT cases, two involved male appellants. In September 1997 a man who had been raised in PNG sought refuge on the basis that he had received several death threats to which the police had failed to respond on the
basis of his foreign ethnicity. The RRT found no evidence to suggest that law enforcement agents treat foreigners differently and it was concluded that the threats were of a personal nature. Consequently, refugee status was not granted (RRT 1997). Two years later, in December 1999, a mixed-race male sought refuge on the basis that he and his mother had been bashed in Port Moresby because of their ethnicity. The RRT found that the bashing had been a criminal act rather than a racially motivated attack and concurred with the decision of DIMIA that the applicant was ineligible for a protection visa (RRT 1999).

The aforementioned cases were relatively uncomplicated. In the case of the Bougainvillean women, significant research was available to demonstrate the existence of persecution of various sectors of the Bougainville community, hence their eligibility for protection visas. Contrarily, in the cases of both male applicants, it was evident that the violence that they had suffered was for reasons of a personal or criminal nature, rather than for a convention reason, hence their ineligibility for protection visas. However, the 2004 case of a Papua New Guinean rape victim who was denied adequate protection by the state is rendered complicated by the fact that gender is the sole basis of her claim to persecution (RRT 2004). Her case is presented as follows.

The applicant, a single Papuan woman, lived in Port Moresby, where she had witnessed several incidents of violence since the late 1990s. On one occasion men with knives threatened her at the market, while, in an unrelated incident, men with knives teased her while travelling on a bus. Some months later, the applicant was travelling on a bus that was ambushed by men armed with knives and was subsequently raped by a number of men (alongside other female passengers). The applicant and the other women attended the Port Moresby hospital, however, while the other victims reported the rape to the police, the applicant did not do so and was never contacted by the police. The applicant was impregnated during the rape and visited a relative in Australia in order to receive appropriate care and support. The applicant’s mother and close female relatives were deceased and she received no support from her father and brothers, hence she did not tell them of her ordeal. The applicant claimed inability to return to PNG due to the lack of effective protection against crime towards women.

In reviewing the applicant’s case, as in MIMA v Khawar, the tribunal focused primarily upon the notion of ‘women’ as a social group and considered whether or not state failure to protect the members of such a group constituted persecution. The tribunal found that:

The Tribunal finds that ‘women in PNG’ are cognisable by both custom and practice. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a member of a particular social group ‘women in PNG’ and that she was gang raped and persecuted for the essential and significant reason of her membership of this particular social group (RRT 2004).

Furthermore, it was concluded that women are also vulnerable because their perpetrators know that effective state protection is denied to them (RRT 2004). On the basis of country reports and expert testimony, the tribunal accepted that the state’s tolerance of violence against the social group ‘women in PNG’ constituted persecution for convention purposes.

Conclusion

The High Court decision in MIMA v Khawar established a benchmark for women from countries in which women’s inequality is demonstrated via state toleration of violence against them. Moreover, in 2004, the aforementioned case established a precedent for the female victims of violence in PNG seeking refugee status in Australia. While not publicly recorded, migration agents attest that other Papua New Guinean women have sought refugee status in Australia on the basis of claims that similarly establish a nexus between being ‘women in PNG’ and state neglect, amounting to persecution.

The case in question, being the first of its kind, poses questions rather than answers. It is necessary to consider the ways in which this precedent will impact upon other Papua New Guinean women in similar situations. Given the broad parameters of the social group ‘women in PNG’, the recorded prevalence of violence against them and the documented failure of the police to address female victims’ concerns adequately, the 2004 case provides precedent for many Papua New Guinean women to seek refuge in Australia. However, as the opportunity to seek refuge in Australia may depend upon the applicant’s economic capacity to travel to Australia, such an outcome is highly unlikely. Australian protection visas may, however, become an option for wealthier Papua New Guinean women who have faced ongoing violence and who can show that the state has failed to protect them.

Ultimately, the case in question primarily demonstrates the severe state of contemporary gender relations in PNG. While one cannot ignore the multiple attempts of women to employ agency, many PNG women see themselves as second-class citizens. The state sees women as second-class citizens and the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal sees Papua New Guinean women as the victims of state persecution.

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The experiences of women political candidates in Vanuatu

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Introduction

The research described in this paper is the first in Vanuatu that specifically investigates the experiences of women candidates in the election process. Participants were chosen because they were candidates in either the 2001 municipal election or the 2002 national election. Twelve candidates and five campaign managers were interviewed.

Political parties were very reluctant to nominate women as candidates, so many of those that stood were independent candidates. The findings showed a need to work with and encourage political parties to nominate women. Lack of funds and other resources were major obstacles, particularly for independent candidates. The women often experienced a hostile reception from both men and women when they were campaigning. Early planning and training are essential to prepare women for candidacy.

In a previous Development Bulletin article, Donald, Strachan and Taleo (2002) documented the development of the Government of Vanuatu's Women in Government Policy by the Department of Women's Affairs and the experiences of Vanua'aku Party candidate Isabelle Donald in the 2002 general election. It was considered important to document the experiences of other women candidates to better understand how to prepare women for candidacy.

Methodology

The research set out to explore the following research questions:

1. What were the experiences of women who stood for election?
2. How can their experiences inform future planning to increase women's representation in government?

The methodology used was qualitative using interviews (in either Bislama, the lingua franca Vanuatu, or English) to gather information from the 17 participants (seven national election candidates, five municipal candidates and five campaign managers). Of the 12 candidates, seven were party candidates and five were independent candidates. The women came from Port Vila (on the island of Efate), Luganville (on the island of Santo) and the island of Epi. One candidate stood as a party candidate for the municipal elections in 2001 and as an independent candidate in the national election in 2002. However, she was only interviewed about her experiences as an independent candidate in the national election and so was counted only once.

Candidacy

Getting selected as a candidate by a political party was problematic for many of the women. Some of the women had been active within their parties for many years but when it came time for selection they were passed over. This was a pattern repeated in earlier elections when the political parties did not nominate any women. So it was often out of a sense of frustration that they decided to stand as independent candidates, particularly in the national election. Women were much more likely to get selected as a candidate for the municipal election than the national election.

Party candidacy

Only two women were selected as party candidates for the May 2002 national election and both their selections were problematic:

There was conflict within the party as to why I had to contest the general election. The idea of having a woman contest was still really unacceptable for a few men in the party.

However, it was not only men that were opposed and uncooperative. Sometimes women stood against other women. This lack of support of women for women was a recurring theme and is commented on more fully later in this article.

The Vanua'aku Party (VP) nominated the most women candidates, especially in the municipal elections. Of the seven women who were party candidates, six were VP candidates. The municipal candidates had to stand in the ward where they lived and were registered. In some cases, this meant that they had little chance of being elected as their wantok (extended family) lived in other wards, so their support base was very small. Some of these women experienced strong opposition from male candidates. A number of these men had been passed over as candidates so set themselves up as independent candidates in the same ward and in opposition to their own party's female candidate. This meant they split the vote so both had little chance of being elected.

All the women in the research thought that the party systems assisted women candidates. The parties provided support in organising the campaign, helped with funding, transport, publicity materials, access to communities and policies. Within the party, support came from both men and women, although this was not always the case.
At first I felt reluctant to participate in the elections, there were more men who were politically involved at the party level, so I was shy and frightened, but other women in the party were supportive.

A few women noted that political parties were largely a male arena. This provided men with a better chance of being chosen as a candidate, as the following quote illustrates:

I was the only lady working amongst men, and a lot of times we push for men to get in for elections, and so I viewed there would be a low chance to push women into Parliament.

Some women claimed to have experienced a negative attitude from both women and men, within their political party. Such circumstances forced some women to move out of the party. Some of those that stayed experienced opposition by other party supporters during the election campaigns. A few candidates deliberately contested against the women in order to divide the vote. They found this a very difficult and challenging situation. One candidate commented:

The difficulties went as far as the opposing members of my political party holding back the money sent for my campaign by the head office, and my posters were torn as a result of these conflicts. This is a result I received from people after being involved for 20 years (in the party).

**Independent candidacy**

The women who stood as independent candidates identified the autonomy they had as the main advantage. They also appreciated not being controlled by other people within a party. One national election independent candidate explained, 'Standing as an independent candidate allowed me to really say what I wanted'. However, all the candidates saw more disadvantages than advantages in being an independent candidate. In particular, they mentioned it would be difficult to implement their policies: 'Being an independent candidate, it is also a problem, because how would you enforce your policies when you do not have a party, and when you are alone?'

Another perceived disadvantage was that voters usually focused on a party rather than on a candidate. This was viewed by some of the women as a negative aspect that reduced their votes and therefore their chance of being elected. They thought this an unfair situation:

We have always believed in the party system, people have their minds set that the party is best. So people would vote for the party preferably as a choice over the candidate who may be better, but because she/he is an independent candidate, so we have to work extra hard.

Most independent candidates also faced funding difficulties. The difficulties experienced in fundraising were big disadvantages for independent candidates. The lack of funding caused other difficulties such as transport for the campaign (especially in the rural areas), campaign materials and the registration fee.

Another problem for the independent candidates was establishing contacts within communities. It was particularly difficult given that many of them had very little time to prepare their campaigns as the following quote illustrates:

You do not have ready contacts that are in place for you to go directly to once you start your campaign, you have to start from square one, whereas in the party the system is already there, and people (supporters) are there to help you.

The overwhelming opinion of the women was that if you could get selected it was much better to be a party candidate. However, because parties have been reluctant to nominate women as candidates women had had little choice but to stand as independent candidates.

**The campaign**

How each candidate conducted her election campaign depended largely on whether she was a party candidate or an independent candidate. It also depended upon whether she was standing as a candidate in the municipal or the national elections. For example, as a party candidate, campaign strategies, policies and a campaign team were all organised by the party for the candidate. So aspects such as policy development, funding and transport were not as problematic as they were for independent candidates. However, this did not mean that campaigning for the party candidates was all smooth sailing. Party candidates also experienced difficulties, some of which were similar to those experienced by the independent candidates.

Being well known in the community in which they were campaigning was a huge asset. Isabelle Donald commented that having lived and worked on Epi most of her life meant that her unofficial campaign had started well before she actually stood as a candidate, as she was already well known. Much of her hard campaigning work had already been done, particularly with youth and women (Donald, Strachan and Taleo 2002). Another candidate found that her previously high public profile was helpful as people already knew who she was and what she stood for.

**Organisation**

Having such a short period of time in which to organise and present their campaigns was problematic. Many women did not stand until the very last moment so the campaign organisation was often carried out as the campaign was underway. This meant that some communities did not get visited at all as there was not enough time. This was not just an issue for the independent candidates.

Some candidates chose to carry out a house-to-house campaign and others spoke to groups within each community. Others used a combination of both approaches. They all
commented on the need for good planning and how in the future they would be better prepared, but how the lack of time and funds severely limited the effectiveness of their campaigns.

Nearly all the candidates and campaign managers attended the training provided by the Department of Women’s Affairs. All found the training very helpful when organising their campaigns. Isabelle Donald received feedback from the communities on Epi on how well her campaign was organised and how disorganised the other male candidates were (Donald, Strachan and Talo 2002). Before her campaign started, Isabelle shared with her campaign team the training she had received and they carefully planned how they would carry out their campaign.

The campaign teams

There were a lot of women in the campaign teams and many had been involved in previous campaigns. However, some campaign teams also included men. The teams varied in size from just one or two people to up to 30 people. It was usual for those in the campaign teams to speak on behalf of the candidate. So, as they were representing the candidate, they also needed to have the respect of the communities and this was an important criterion when selecting people to be part of a campaign team. A candidate made the following comment:

they [the campaign team] were known for their honesty and it was linked with their personal life ... the people who showed up had good records of the past ... they were good at their jobs, good community people and good in their relationships.

The 'respectability' of campaign team members was another recurring theme as the personalities, personal life and qualities of a candidate and her campaigners were frequently attacked. Also, campaigning is hard work and so both the candidate and her campaign team needed to have the support of their families:

campaigning is very hard work ... you have to make sure this person has a stable home and the husband is supportive of women's issues and the issues she will be campaigning for.

There were times when a lack of planning was evident in the campaign, particularly in the consistency of the messages given. There were instances when the campaign team members spoke they contradicted one another and so confused the audience. Sometimes, though, it was not easy to find reliable and willing people to be part of the campaign team. Some of the political parties threatened party members with expulsion if they stood as an independent candidate, or if members helped with the campaign of independent candidates:

we decided to call a meeting and initially there were 20 women who were at our side, but every one of them were scared of the party, and one after another they withdrew until there were only five of us.

Accessing communities

All candidates, whether party or independent, needed to access communities for their campaign. This involved negotiating with chiefs and other community leaders such as pastors. Candidates could not just walk into a community and start campaigning, permission had to be granted by the community leader and a time for their visit negotiated. This was problematic in the rural electorates as telephoners were in many cases non-existent, roads were bad and transport expensive.

Many spoke of the need to expand their campaign to a wider group of communities within their electorate/ward. Once again the extent of their campaign was limited by a lack of both funding and time. One candidate commented:

I only concentrated on the communities where I live ... I need to expand that to getting involved with activities for other women in other parts of Port Vila.

Because the community leaders (for example pastors and chiefs) are almost always men who have a big influence in how their community members vote, some of the candidates actively worked at bringing the men in the communities 'on-side'. They did not want to be seen as undermining their authority:

So when we approached the communities we sat with the other women on the mats and left the seats to the men. I thought this was important because I felt that through this way the people could see we did not want to over-ride the men who were mostly community leaders.

Policies

The policies of the independent candidates reflected the reasons why they had decided to stand for election. Policies that focused on social issues predominated, for example, education, health, economic empowerment of women, especially rural women, women in decision making, encouraging investment, supporting the market women, and reducing violence against women. The welfare of women was at the centre of many of their policies and a number of the women stressed the importance of pushing the Family Protection Order Bill through parliament. They were very concerned that it had not yet been passed into law. An independent candidate explained:

My policies go mainly with community-based needs ... such as poverty, upgrading the standard of living for people through economic empowerment, issues such as health, education.

Another believed it was important not to focus only on women’s issues as this put some voters off. She considered it was important to focus on the big issues such as the economy and corruption, but to keep women’s issues in the back of her mind. Once she was elected, then she would voice women’s concerns.

April 2005
However, little detail was given by the independent candidates as to how these policies would be implemented. Policies were more an expression of concern rather than a detailed plan of action. The lack of time was at least partly responsible for poor policy development. This was a very real weakness in their campaigning and one that should be considered in any future training of women candidates.

**Campaign difficulties and challenges**

The women experienced a number of difficulties and challenges including lack of funding, transport difficulties, men threatening and bribing, and women not supporting women.

**Funding and transport**

Funding was frequently commented on by the independent candidates as being their biggest problem. Raising funds for the registration fee (50,000 vatu or approximately A$600), transport and publicity was very difficult. Raising funds was made even more difficult because many did not start their campaigns until very late. Some approached businesses for support, some individuals assisted, but most of the funding came from the women candidates and their families. Lack of funding restricted how extensive their campaigns could be.

One independent candidate used the radio to promote her candidacy, which she found to be very effective, but this was financially beyond the reach of the other candidates. Money was also in short supply to provide food for the campaign team, brochures, posters, T-shirts and other advertising materials. The strategies most often used were posters and talking to communities. A candidate explained how she differently she would campaign if she had sufficient funds:

> Suppose I had the finances what I would do differently is that I would have a proper plan when I am going around to do the campaign and to do the transportation. If you had the finances you would be able to deal with transportation and plan how it could assist you in taking you to places within the rural areas.

The problem with transport was commented on time and time again, particularly by the independent candidates. Transport was dependent upon funding and this was in very short supply. One woman who helped with the campaign of an independent candidate commented:

> I faced difficulty in finding transport, by the time I found transport the time had passed, and once I got to the area to do the campaign the community had dispersed because the time was up.

Also, some male taxi and truck drivers refused to transport the women candidates and their campaign teams because they belonged to a different political party to the one they supported.

**Men threatening and bribing**

Some male party members actively disrupted the women's campaigns. For example, in one campaign, male candidates who had not been selected by their own party decided to stand as independents and were abusive to the selected party candidate when she campaigned. They publicly questioned her ability as a woman to stand as a candidate. Although many men did support women candidates, including some chiefs, it was common for women to be verbally abused:

> There were a lot of threats that I received from members within my own party who opposed the idea of me standing in the election.

Some supporters of other candidates specifically asked questions to try and trap the women candidates. The women commented that they had handled this by focusing on the issues and the policies and refused to use the same abusive tactics. This was appreciated by the communities, some of which commented that they did not like it when candidates verbally attacked other candidates.

Bribery was also commented on. Some male candidates were bribing voters with money, food and alcohol, comments like the following were common, 'bribery and threats play a big part during the campaign' and 'They [the male candidates] were paying people ... parties were doing things against the law'. The women commented that they chose not to obtain votes by using bribery and threats. They did not want to stoop to the level of some of the male candidates.

**Women not supporting women**

There was a real concern amongst most of the research participants that some women were not supportive of other women. In some instances, women were actively working against other women, for example standing as a candidate in the same electorate. Many commented that this was very disappointing and a real hindrance to women's involvement in politics:

> The reason I mention women as a stumbling block to get into politics is because we women have this jealous attitude, when a woman wants to stand up women get together from the opposing side and oppose the contestant ... women are really bad at getting together to support a contestant.

> There were a lot of the women who did not support me, a lot of times, we women tend to blame men as the main obstacles to our progress, but I would stress that women are their own enemies.

The women offered some solutions but felt that until women were prepared to support other women it would be very hard for women to get elected. One candidate suggested:
Often women are watched by men and a lot of the times the internal conflicts we have among ourselves is seen as a weakness by the people, and so men continue to say we are not ready to work as a team and so they keep pushing us aside.

However, there is also dishuny among male candidates and members of parliament but this is not necessarily seen as an impediment to their ability to lead.

Another candidate suggested that the women should select only one or two candidates for Port Vila and all the women vote for them. This raises an issue about the quality of candidates. It is probable that the strategy mentioned above may get some women elected. But should a woman candidate be supported just because she is a woman? What if a voter does not like her policies? And, what if she does not have the background, experience and personal qualities voters consider necessary to be a good member of parliament. Is being a woman enough? The answer would have to be no.

Planning for the future
The women candidates need to be prepared early so once an election is called they can quickly swing into their campaigns. Fundraising and training must start early and women encouraged to build up their profile in their community and earn the respect of the voters. It could be that rural women have an advantage over their municipal sisters in terms of their community profiles. The training for women candidates needs to be offered around the country so rural women are not disadvantaged.

Political parties need to understand that women with party support, the right training and community background are very strong candidates and can help their party get elected to government. Well-trained women with a high positive community profile are assets not liabilities to political parties. We need to focus more on getting political parties to nominate women and for women to work inside the party machinery. It is very hard to run a campaign as an independent candidate. Campaigns are costly and without party support women struggle to put together an effective campaign.

Women need to work within their chosen political party, to work for change from the inside so women have an improved chance of selection as a candidate. Criteria for selecting candidates need examining and women must build their credibility in and their knowledge of the party system. There must also be greater transparency in the selection process. For years men have used the biased selection system to their advantage. Those systems need changing so the selection playing field favours women and men equally.

Training workshops for women candidates should be an ongoing process so that they are prepared if there is an early election. Very importantly, women must work more strategically and have clear and carefully planned policies. If women continue to stand against other women in the same election the vote is split, the result is women don't get elected. Sadly, this is what happened in these elections.

Epilogue
Since this research was completed Vanuatu had an early national election. It was scheduled for 2006. Instead, took place in July 2004. Isabelle Donald was re-elected as a Vanu’aku Member of Parliament. Leinavao Tasso, from the island of Epi, which is also Isabelle's island, was also elected, so Vanuatu now has two women MPs out of a total of 52. Unfortunately, because the election was called early there was no time to implement the training of women candidates. We were unprepared. This was a salutary lesson. We cannot assume that elections will happen as scheduled. Vanuatu has a history of early elections. We need to have an ongoing program that provides education and training each year.

Finally, by the end of 2004, and despite the Women and Government Policy being completed in 2002 and presented to the government for approval, approval had still not been received. The policy had stalled. It would appear that some of the recommended strategies within the policy proved too controversial, particularly the quota system and proportional representation. There has since been a change in government and with it a new minister of women's affairs (the prime minister). The policy is in the process of being updated and revised and will be presented again to government for approval.

Acknowledgement
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Notes
1. This article was originally presented at the Pacific Islands Political Studies Association Conference, 'Governance and Stability in the Pacific', Noumea, 3–5 December, 2004
2. Isabelle Donald was re-elected as the Vanu’aku Member of Parliament. Leinavao Tasso, from the island of Epi, which is also Isabelle’s island, was also elected, so Vanuatu now has two women MPs out of a total of 52. Unfortunately, because the election was called early there was no time to implement the training of women candidates. We were unprepared. This was a salutary lesson. We cannot assume that elections will happen as scheduled. Vanuatu has a history of early elections. We need to have an ongoing program that provides education and training each year.

Reference
This publication, prepared by a leading PNG newspaper, *The National*, features articles by a number of leading experts on various aspects of PNG state, society and industry. The *Papua New Guinea Yearbook 2005* includes a feature article on PNG fisheries and articles on compensation issues (Professor Lawrence Kalinoe of UPNG), global and PNG forestry policies (Dick McCarthy), political reform (Dr Henry Okole of UPNG) and planning for a brighter PNG future (Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare). The publication also contains information and statistics relating to mining, oil, education, agriculture, population, trade, economics, health, tourism and religion.

**State and Society in Papua New Guinea: The First Twenty-Five Years**


On the eve of Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975 there were many — both within the country and outside — who predicted political anarchy, with the possibility of an army coup or authoritarian single-party dominance, and economic collapse. Such fears appeared to have been justified when in 1975 both the North Solomons (Bougainville) and Papua unilaterally declared their independence. In fact, however, PNG achieved a smooth transition, and in its first decade as a new state enjoyed a high degree of political and economic progress. It remains one of the few postcolonial states that has maintained an unbroken record of democratic government.

Nevertheless, from around the mid-1980s a number of problems have become apparent, including: a decline in government capability; increasing problems of urban and rural lawlessness; poor economic management, with growing evidence of nepotism and corruption; environmental degradation associated with mining and logging, and increasing pressure on land; and, from 1988, a rebellion on Bougainville.

This volume brings together a number of papers written by the author between 1971 and 2001 which address issues of political and economic development and social change in Papua New Guinea.

**Building a Nation in Papua New Guinea: Views of the Post Independence Generation**


At the beginning of the new century, 25 years since independence, many changes have occurred in Papua New Guinea, from the Bougainville civil war and internal political crises, to the many challenges posed...
by globalisation and socio-political changes. This collection of essays, written by the post-independence generation of Papua New Guinea, articulates a vision for the future. It provides an overview of the history of the past 25 years, frankly assesses the state-of-the-nation and addresses its future development. The essays within this volume offer divergent perspectives on the nation-building process across a wide variety of areas. Common to all, however, is the theme of nation building. All contributors see themselves as being part of a process that will ultimately answer the question: 'where to from here?'

Estimates of Food Crop Production in Papua New Guinea


With their rich traditions of conflict resolution and peace-making, the Pacific Islands provide a fertile environment for developing new approaches to crime and conflict. Interactions between formal justice systems and informal methods of dispute resolution contain useful insights for policy makers and others interested in socially attuned resolutions to the problems of order that are found increasingly in the Pacific Islands as elsewhere. Contributors to this volume include Pacific Islanders from Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea including Bougainville, as well as outsiders with a longstanding interest in the region. They come from a variety of backgrounds and include criminal justice practitioners, scholars, traditional leaders and community activists. The chapters deal with conflict in a variety of contexts, from interpersonal disputes within communities to large-scale conflicts between communities.

This is a book not only of stories but also of practical models that combine different traditions in creative ways and that offer the prospect of building more sustainable resolutions to crime and conflict.

Anti-Corruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: The Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Fighting Corruption in Twenty-one Asian and Pacific Countries


This volume presents an overview of the main developments in the area of combating corruption in 21 Asian and Pacific countries and territories. The publication is based on information provided by the governments that have endorsed the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific through self-assessment reports and through publicly available information on the relevant institutions' official websites.

The report covers Australia; Bangladesh; Cambodia; Cook Islands; Fiji Islands; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Kazakhstan; Republic of Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia; Mongolia; Nepal; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; and Vanuatu.
Journals

Pacific Studies WWW Monitor


Established 12 April 2000, this pioneering journal — the only publication of its kind in the world — provides weekly abstracts and reviews of new/updated online resources of significance to research, teaching and communications dealing with Pacific Studies. The periodical forms a key element of the global, cooperative project Pacific Studies WWW Virtual Library. Weekly contents summaries and evaluations published in the web edition of the journal are disseminated also on the network via a mailing list.

Asian-Pacific Economic Literature

Ron Duncan (editor). ISSN: 0818 9935 (print), ISSN: 1467 8411 (online). Biannual. Institutional rate (print and online): £74.00; Personal rate (print and online): A$74.00. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 550 Swanston Street, Carlton South Victoria 3053. Tel: +61 2 8778 9999; Fax: +61 2 8778 9944; Email: bpa@tdistribution.com.au; Web: http://www.blackwellpublishingasia.com.au.

An essential resource for anyone interested in economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. With original articles on topical policy issues, literature surveys and abstracts, APEL makes it easy for you to keep ahead of the proliferating research on this dynamic and increasingly important region. APEL avoids technical jargon, and is the only journal devoted to one-stop, in-depth reporting of research on the development of Asia-Pacific economies.

Pacific Economic Bulletin

Ron Duncan and Maree Tait (editors). ISSN: 0187 8038, three issues per year. Subscription rate: A$60.00, single issues: A$20.00, individual articles: A$7.00 each. Published by Asia Pacific Press, subscriptions c/o Landmark School Supplies, PO Box 130, Drouin Victoria 3818. Tel: +61 3 5625 4298; Fax: 61 3 5625 3756; Email: book.distribution@elandmark.com.au; Web: http://peb.anu.edu.au/index.html.

This is an important resource for those interested in economic and policy developments in Papua New Guinea and Pacific Island countries. Each issue features economic surveys, articles, policy dialogues, comments, book reviews, and statistical annexes. The Pacific Economic Bulletin provides background analysis to those setting the policy agenda in regional matters, or those simply interested in keeping up with recent developments in the region. It is a fully refereed journal, with all published articles undergoing a double-blind review process. The Pacific Economic Bulletin is abstracted/indexed in the Journal of Economic Literature and Asian-Pacific Economic Literature.
This first National MDG Report for Papua New Guinea highlights progress being made by the country towards the attainment of the MDGs. It shows that the MDGs are part of the national development agenda through their alignment with Papua New Guinea’s National Medium Term Development Strategy and other sectoral plans and policies.

Papua New Guinea: The Health Sector Development Program Experience: Moving toward a Sectorwide Approach


This report analyses recent innovations brought to the health sector in Papua New Guinea by the Health Sector Development Program and is part of the ADB Pacific Studies series. Focusing on health service delivery, this program presented a fundamentally new approach to assistance in the health sector. Prepared and implemented in the context of the major Asian fiscal crisis in the mid-1990s, the Health Sector Development Program proved successful despite difficult circumstances. This work highlights lessons learned from that program, particularly the advantages of transparency and government reinforcement in low-income countries.


The Country Strategy and Program (CSP) is prepared in active consultation with developing member country stakeholders: the government, NGOs, civil society groups, the private sector and other development agencies. It is usually prepared once every five years. A CSP update is prepared every year to reflect any important country developments and adjustments to the program.

Papua New Guinea: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix


This report was prepared by a staff team of the International Monetary Fund as background documentation for the periodic consultation with the member country.

Saving a Staple Crop: Impact of Biological Control of the Banana Skipper on Poverty Reduction in Papua New Guinea


The ACIAR-supported Banana Skipper project led to the successful introduction of a biological control agent against the butterfly pest of bananas that was reducing the productivity of the banana crop. This study focuses on the impacts of the project on poverty reduction, specifically through an examination of incomes.

Country Profile: Papua New Guinea

Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, 2004. ISSN 1449-9452 pb 79 pp. Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, GPO Box 1571 Canberra ACT 2601. Tel: +612 6217 0500; Fax: +612 6217 0501; Email: comm@aciar.gov.au.

This publication contains short summaries of both bilateral and multilateral projects with Papua New Guinea that were active at 30 June 2004. At that time there were 27 active bilateral projects and two active multilateral projects, the latter being led by international agricultural research centres. There were another 10 projects under development, many of which are expected to start in 2004–05.
**Organisations and Programs**

**State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project (SSGM)**

Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200. Tel: +612 6125 8394; Fax: +612 6125 5525; Email: ssgm@anu.edu.au; http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia.

The State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project is the leading centre for research into contemporary issues of governance in Melanesia. Launched in 1996 the SSGM Project's key objectives are to encourage scholarship on governance and state-society relations; to generate dialogue throughout Melanesia and the Pacific Islands on these issues; and to assist in bridging policy and research.

The project's research and outreach focuses on Island Melanesia — Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji; on the culturally-related region to the west including Papua/Irian Jaya and Timor; and on the countries of the Pacific Islands region to the north and east.

**ATprojects Inc**

PO Box 660, Goroka, Eastern Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea. Tel: 675 732 3278; Fax: 675 732 1458; Email: atprojects@global.net.pg; Web: http://www.global.net.pg/atprojects/.

ATprojects is a Goroka based NGO which works with both district and provincial governments, churches, rural communities and other NGOs in the Eastern Highlands Province. Its aim is to enable rural people to use appropriate technologies which give them more control over their lives and which contribute to the sustainable development of their communities. ATprojects provides a number of project development services and is one of the few organisations in PNG offering practical technical support at a district level. ATprojects increasingly sees its role as a supporting organisation working with projects generated at district level by local government, church groups and rural communities.

ATprojects produces an excellent weekly email bulletin on development news and views in PNG.

**HELP Resources**

PO Box 1071, Wewak, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. Tel/Fax: 675 856 1453; Tel: 675 856 1615; Email: help_info@global.net.pg.

HELP Resources is a new NGO in the East Sepik Province of PNG. HELP Resources was established in October 1998. The name 'HELP' is an acronym for Health, Education, Livelihood and Participation. These are four of the main concerns in the National Goals and Directive Principles of the PNG Constitution. Good health, education, livelihood and participation for all (all women, men and children) will promote development in villages and communities and will promote the rights of all citizens to fulfill their potential.

HELP Resources exists to support these fundamental aspects of development in the East Sepik Province and, as requested, in other parts of Papua New Guinea. HELP Resources is based in Wewak town in the East Sepik Province of PNG. The main goal of HELP Resources is to support and strengthen community leaders, organisers, workers and response people in planning, implementing and evaluating their own sustainable development while managing conflict and problems. The Information Services has a library of print and AV materials on all aspects of social, political and economical development.
In Papua New Guinea, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad supports local partner organisations focusing on the impacts of mining, environmental issues, and HIV/AIDS.

Mining operations have significant detrimental impacts on communities, including loss of land and livelihoods, and environmental contamination. Social consequences include increased alcohol abuse and violence, decreasing health standards, and greater vulnerability to HIV/AIDS.

Another program theme is responding to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea currently accounts for 85 per cent of all reported cases of HIV/AIDS in the Pacific region. Elevated rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), prevalent gender-based violence and increasing impoverishment combine to ensure a high vulnerability to the virus.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations House, Deloitte Tower, Level 14, Douglas Street, Port Moresby, NCD, Papua New Guinea. Tel: +675 321 2877; Fax: +675 321 1224; Email: registry.pg@undp.org; Web: http://www.undp.org.pg.

Building upon UNDP’s corporate mandate, global experience and strategic focus areas, UNDP’s programme in Papua New Guinea is articulated in the Country Programme Outline for 2003–2007. The Country Programme Outline identifies Democratic Governance and Poverty Reduction as the overarching themes for UNDP support to PNG.

Web Resources

Pacific Studies WWW Virtual Library

Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200; Web: http://www.anu.edu.au/WWWVL-PacificStudies.html

The Pacific Studies WWW Virtual Library is the leading online Pacific Studies resource centre. It was established by the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, in 1994 to facilitate the worldwide exchange of scholarly and factual information dealing with the Pacific. This site is a part of the Asian Studies WWW Virtual Library and keeps track of leading information facilities in the field of Papua New Guinea studies.
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A minimum of references and/or footnotes is requested due to space constraints. All references referred to or cited in the text are to be included in the reference list. Book titles and journal names should be italicised or underlined; titles of journal articles and book chapters are in single inverted commas.

The Harvard style of referencing is preferred: author’s surname, forename and/or initials, date of publication, title of publication, publisher and place of publication. Journal references should include volume and issue number, date and page numbers.

Detailed guidelines on the Harvard style of referencing are available online at: http://www.uwe.ac.uk/library/resources/general/info_study_skills/harvard2.htm#book

Examples: