Cooperating with Timor-Leste

Features

- Sustainable development and the East Timorese economy
- Reconstruction, civil rights and development in a post-conflict society
- Governance, civil society and social development
- Perspectives on agricultural development
- Addressing health and population issues
- The state of the legal system and judiciary
- Education and human resource development
- Communication infrastructure and transport

Publications on Timor-Leste

Resources and materials

Organisations cooperating with Timor-Leste

Editors: Pamela Thomas and Helen Hill
The Development Studies Network provides information and discussion on social and economic development issues. It publishes a quarterly journal, Development Bulletin, runs regular seminars on development policy and annual conferences on international development. Members of the Network are encouraged to contribute information and papers to the Development Bulletin.

Subscription to the Development Bulletin includes membership of the Network. This allows you to publicise in the Development Bulletin information about new development-related books, papers, journals, courses or conferences. Being a member of the Network allows you special discounts to Network seminars and conferences.

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Correspondence

Development Bulletin
Development Studies Network
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia
Tel: 61 2 6125 2466, 61 2 6125 8257
Fax: 61 2 6125 9785
E-mail: devnetwork@anu.edu.au
Website: http://devnet.anu.edu.au

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The Development Studies Network
Cooperating with Timor-Leste:
Options for good development practice
Contents

Household food security and subsistence production in Dili
Kyna Peake
Reconstructing the coffee republic: Development and colonialism in Timor-Leste
Damian Grenfell

Health, the family and population
Fertility and reproductive health of women in Timor-Leste: Results from the 2003 Demographic and Health Survey
Issu Dwisteyani Utomo
Health: Family issues in Timor-Leste
Beverley Snell et al
Strengthening health systems in Timor-Leste
Beverley Snell et al
Cross-sectoral responses to health for all in Timor-Leste
Beverley Snell et al

Education and human resource development
The contribution of education to development: Some issues for Timor-Leste
Helen Hill
Popular education and peace building in Timor-Leste
Deborah Durnan
Teachers' work in Timor-Leste: Some issues
Marie Quinn
The ecology of language planning in Timor-Leste
Kerry Taylor-Leech
Children's peace education in post-conflict Timor-Leste
Danielle Ujvari
Young people and change in Timor-Leste
Ann Wiglesworth

Information and communication
Working with libraries in Timor-Leste
Lyle French
Wrestling the crocodile: Information technology development in Timor-Leste
Lea Lafayette
Rural communications development in Timor-Leste:
Connect East Timor campaign
Alan Taylor
Renewable energy in Timor-Leste
Kevin Bain
Ethical funds for developing nations: Investing in business in Timor-Leste
Graham Scott

Workshop reports and recommendations
146

Publications
New books
AETA book list
153

Resources
Films on Timor-Leste
Organisations in Timor-Leste
Organisations in Australia
160
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABITL</td>
<td>Asosiasiun Biblioteka no Informasaun Timor-Leste (Timor-Leste Library and Information Association)</td>
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<td>AETA</td>
<td>Australia-East Timor Association</td>
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<td>APHEDA</td>
<td>Australian People for Health, Education, and Development Abroad</td>
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<td>ASPI</td>
<td>Australian Strategic Policy Institute</td>
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<td>CAVR</td>
<td>Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Cooperativa Café Timor</td>
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<td>CEP</td>
<td>Community Empowerment Programme</td>
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<td>CET</td>
<td>Connect East Timor</td>
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<td>CMCII</td>
<td>Community Integrated Management of Childhood Illness</td>
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<td>CNRT</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (National Council of Timorese Resistance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPD-RDTL</td>
<td>Committee for the Popular Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>CRP</td>
<td>Community Reconciliation Process</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commission for Truth and Friendship</td>
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<td>DETYA</td>
<td>Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Demographic and Health Survey</td>
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<td>DIT</td>
<td>Dili Institute of Technology</td>
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<td>EPI</td>
<td>Expanded Programme on Immunisation</td>
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<td>ETAN</td>
<td>East Timor Action Network</td>
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<td>ETPWG</td>
<td>East Timorese Health Professionals Working Group</td>
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<td>ETSA</td>
<td>East Timor Student Association</td>
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<td>ETSSC</td>
<td>East Timor Student Solidarity Council</td>
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<td>ETTA</td>
<td>East Timor Transitional Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Falinitil</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>Falintil Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (Falintil East Timor Defence Force)</td>
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<td>FLO</td>
<td>Fair Trade Labelling Organisations</td>
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<td>Fokupers</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Perempuan Timor Lorosaiti (East Timor Women’s Communication Forum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor)</td>
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<td>FUNTLL</td>
<td>Friends of the UNTL Library</td>
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<td>HMIS</td>
<td>Health Management and Information Systems</td>
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<td>ICIET</td>
<td>International Commission of Inquiry on Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>IHA</td>
<td>Interim Health Authority</td>
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<td>IMCI</td>
<td>Integrated Management of Childhood Illness</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
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<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunications Union</td>
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<td>MECYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
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<td>NCBA</td>
<td>National Cooperative Business Association of the USA</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NIACE</td>
<td>National Institute for Adult and Community Education (UK)</td>
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<td>OJT</td>
<td>Organisation for Timorese Youth</td>
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<td>OJETIL</td>
<td>Organisation for Timorese Youth and Students</td>
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<td>OPMT</td>
<td>Organización Puertorriqueña de la Mujer Trabajadora (Popular Women’s Organisation of East Timor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>National Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDTL</td>
<td>República Democrática de Timor-Leste (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rede Feto</td>
<td>East Timorese Women’s Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENETIL</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor Leste (National Resistance of East Timorese Students)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCU</td>
<td>Serious Crimes Unit</td>
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<td>SCIU</td>
<td>Serious Crimes Investigation Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIP</td>
<td>Sector Investment Programme</td>
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<td>SPSC</td>
<td>Special Panels for Serious Crimes</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENETIL</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor-Leste (National Resistance of East Timorese Students)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TERADP</td>
<td>Timor Economic Rehabilitation and Development Project</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMISTEKT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTIM</td>
<td>Universitas Timor Timur (University of East Timor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTL</td>
<td>Universidade Nacional de Timor-Leste (National University of East Timor)</td>
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We are proud to publish this special issue of Development Bulletin. We hope it will answer many of the questions you might have about collaboration between Timor-Leste and Australia and provide you with a valuable resource whether your interest is primarily Timor-Leste or in the wider field of development cooperation. This issue covers a number of fundamental questions — how do East Timorese view the future of their country? What are Timor-Leste's development priorities? What economic policies are most appropriate? How best can Timor-Leste protect and use its oil revenue to provide sustainable development? What kind of agriculture policies are appropriate in a post conflict society that suffers food shortages and malnutrition? What is the role of civil society in a newly independent country with a history of violence? How can cooperation between Timor-Leste and Australia be more effective? How can Australian aid agencies, unions, churches, service clubs, educators and local groups work more collaboratively and effectively with their counterparts in Timor-Leste?

These issues, and many more, were thoroughly explored in the conference Cooperating with Timor-Leste: Options for good development practice, held in Melbourne, in June 2005, and convened by the Australia-East Timor Association, Victoria University and the Development Studies Network at the Australian National University. The Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, the Minister for Agriculture, and Secretary of State (now Minister) for Labor and Solidarity, and the Vice Rector of the University of Timor-Leste provided papers and participated in discussion.

In this issue you will find a range of papers which reflect upon governance, civil society and social development, the economy, livelihoods and trade, the legal system, judiciary and justice, formal and non formal education, agriculture, environmental protection and communication infrastructure and health. You will also find discussion from sectoral workshops and recommendations from the different 'friendship' organisations and NGOs working with or in Timor-Leste.

We hope you find these papers, discussion and the information on books, organisations, web sites and films useful and that they provide you with in-depth information about Timor-Leste and its relationship with Australia.

**Organisation of the journal and resources**

This issue of Development Bulletin is much larger than usual, reflecting the extent of interest in Timor-Leste. It begins with the conference keynote address by the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, Dr Mari Alkatiri. This is followed by 33 papers organised by sector. At the end of the papers we have included key points from the discussion in the sectoral workshops and recommendations from the friendship groups.

In the publications section we have included short summaries of recent books on Timor-Leste and lists of books available from the Australian East Timor Association. In the resources section we include a full list of films, videos and DVDs available on Timor-Leste beginning with the 1943 film *Men of Timor* and a full list of government, non government and civil society organisations in Timor-Leste together with a listing of some Australian-based organisations working with Timor-Leste.

There are so many Australian-based friendship groups and friendship city groups that due to space considerations we were unable to include them all. Both Victoria University and the Development Studies Network have posted this listing on their websites. The web sites are: [http://devnet.anu.edu.au/bulletin.php](http://devnet.anu.edu.au/bulletin.php) and [http://www.vu.edu.au](http://www.vu.edu.au).
Collaboration and support
The conference was supported by a number of organisations, many of whom supported delegates from Timor-Leste to attend the conference. These included Illawara Technical Corporation at Wollongong University, the Departments of Primary Industry in NSW and Victoria, Macfarlane Burnet Institute, National Tertiary Education Union, YWCA, Electrical Trades Union, Friends of Suai, Friends of Baucau, Oxfam Australia, and Victoria University. A large number of friendship groups participated in the conference.

AusAID provided support towards publication of this issue of Development Bulletin, including an additional 200 copies for distribution in Timor-Leste.

We would like to thank all those people who kindly provided background information, recorded the discussion from the workshops and wrote up recommendations and the lists of organisations. It was a huge job — thank you.

Staff at the Network
We have two staff changes at the Network. Both Annabel Pengilley and Michael McIvor very successfully completed their law degrees and have moved to positions where they can make full use of their new qualifications. Annabel was a wonderfully efficient and innovative assistant who was able to solve all problems — as well as being an excellent editor. Michael quietly got on with what had to be done without us ever seeing him! We wish them both every success — they deserve to do well.

We are very happy to introduce our two new staff members — Michele Legge and Aparna Nair. Michele has spent time working in Cambodia and has returned to ANU to do a part time masters in applied anthropology and participatory development. Aparna is a global citizen having lived in many countries. She has an MSc from the London School of Economics and is doing a PhD in demography at ANU.

Next issues
Our next issue will provide insights into the disastrous relationship between illicit drugs and development. We will then turn our attention to Pacific Island economies. If you have papers you would like to contribute please contact us.

Meanwhile, all of us here at the Network wish you very informative reading and ask you, when you have finished reading, to please pass this journal on to someone else whom you think would find it useful.

Pamela Thomas
Managing Editor
Cooperating with Timor-Leste

The Hon. Dr Mari Alkatiri, Prime Minister of Timor-Leste

First of all I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to address you at the opening of this conference organised by Victoria University, the Australia-East Timor Association and the Development Studies Network on the theme ‘Cooperating with Timor-Leste: Ideas for good development practice’.

Talking on the development of Timor-Leste we have a look back to 1999, immediately after the referendum, where almost 90 per cent of our infrastructure was destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people had to be forced to go to West Timor. It meant that we started a new life in Timor-Leste from scratch. At that time people and organisations of all kinds decided to come to Timor-Leste to assist us to overcome this emergency situation where not a single Timorese institution was in place, neither public nor private institutions. It meant that Timorese people at that time were looking for help and assistance without having the capacity to manage any type of assistance.

During the emergency time many initiatives of aid and other kinds of support from many countries, organisations and individuals, came to Timor-Leste. While we very much appreciated this initiative we did not have a holistic approach during this phase. As there was no single Timorese institution in place, the aid and assistance given to the Timorese came through very different channels. The main channel was the UN itself, other international NGOs, the Red Cross and others, and through CNRT, the Council of National Resistance. There was no national plan that could manage aid and assistance. This meant there was no condition to sustain the same assistance. Neither was there a plan for previewing the consequences of this kind of assistance coming from different corners of the world, with different kinds of approaches, bringing some hope to our people but without a systematic and planned approach.

This system brought with it the risk that it could create dependency for our people in the years to come. So-called ‘white elephants’ could be created around the country, creating a situation of unsustainability.

This is why, after the restoration of independence, the first priority for the government was to build institutions, particularly state institutions. Having a President elected, a Parliament also elected and an elected government does not mean you have a State. The State means institutions of all kinds that can really manage the whole public administration, and above all, embark on a process of development that is sustainable and efficient.

We decided, as I said, to build state institutions, starting from building the administration itself. We inherited from UNTAET very fragmented services, without an integrated way of doing things. Of course the UN did leave behind something for us, but still it was our duty to create the institutions of the administration as a whole. Having institutions is important, but the most important thing is to have a clear plan to develop the country.

National Development Plan

Months before the restoration of independence we began the broadest consultation up to now to design our National Development Plan that is now in place. The National Development Plan was elaborated with the participation of almost 36,000 people around
the country. It is not a political party plan, it is really a national plan that was adopted by my government as a national plan. Coming from the emergency situation and going through rehabilitation, these are two different phases of the whole process of development. The emergency situation ran from 1999 to 2001. After this began the rehabilitation of the whole economy and infrastructure.

Now that we have institutions in place and the basic legal framework is in force it is time to starting thinking about development in a different way. Besides having the institutions in place, we have also been working on implementing the National Development Plan through the design of a road map and later, the Sectoral Investment Programmes (SIPs). As I said, assistance came from every corner of the world, bringing to Timor-Leste different kinds of institutions and people. It was very anarchic with no coordination at all. Sometimes there were a lot of overlapping projects that really spent resources over resources without good results for our people.

**Developing new partnerships and programmes**

Now with the SIPs our objective is clear — to try to define a new partnership between the Timor-Leste Government and our development partners, countries, institutions and NGOs. This means that what we are looking for, from now on, is for all the friends and partners that are willing to assist Timor-Leste to identify in the SIPs a project, and through this project try to assist the country. During the last three years the mechanism that we used to coordinate with the development partners was called the Transitional Support Programme (TSP). It's a mechanism that was established between Timor-Leste and development partners and was jointly coordinated with the World Bank. Through this mechanism all the assistance to the government and the budget was coordinated. And this mechanism itself regularly comes in to monitor the implementation of all assistance. It means that the mechanism is one of strengthening institutions and building capacity. It has helped the whole administration to build its capacity. Recently however, because we realised that the time of rehabilitation and transition is over, we decided to create a new mechanism, the Consolidation Support Programme.

**Timor Sea revenues**

It is not just a changing of names — from TSP to Consolidation Support Programme. With the revenues now coming in from the Timor Sea we are in a really healthy situation financially but we still need this kind of mechanism because having financial capacity has obliged us to be very responsible in managing these resources. That is why we managed to convince our development partners to keep going with this mechanism as a way to strengthen our institutions and above all to build our capacity to manage our resources.

With the SIPs we estimate that Timor-Leste must spend about US$250 million per year to achieve the goals of the National Development Plan. It will mean a reduction of poverty and sustainable economic growth. Next year, government expenditure will rise by more than 40 per cent to around US$120 million, or more than 40 per cent of total needs. If current oil prices remain where they are now, expenditure could increase within four years to over US$150 million per year, or over 60 per cent of total needs. Still, there will be a gap.

All these activities of the government and the development partners have been carried out according to the National Development Plan with the aim of achieving poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. The Annual Programme of the government is a tool for integrated implementation of the plan.

Other institutions that can guarantee justice such as courts have been improved and given the capacity to better serve the people. The justice system and the judiciary are the weakest part of our state institutions. Recently we had to evaluate our judges and prosecutors — none of them passed the test. That is why we are working with expatriates, judges, prosecutors and public defenders, but we have a clear programme of training our judges and to build their capacity aiming that in three to five years from now we will have our own judges.

**Transparency, the Petroleum Fund and managing the economy**

On the transparency of the administration, the *Provedor* (Ombudsman) was elected and sworn in on 14 June 2005. A Petroleum Fund to manage and invest our petroleum revenue will be established on 1 July. The General Inspector was appointed in 2002 and he has investigated many cases of allegations of corruption and the misuse of government facilities and assets. Because of the resources of the Timor Sea, the creation of the Petroleum Fund, and the whole legal framework of oil and gas, Timor-Leste is already emerging as one of the best-managed developing economies in the Asia Pacific. We have been congratulated by a lot of friends. International agencies have praised our approach to economic management. Development partners want to do more in Timor-Leste because they want to reward success.

But still dear friends we are working in between two big expectations. One is the expectation of our people — always looking to have everything yesterday and not tomorrow, and second, the expectation of the international community that is always considering Timor-Leste a success story. It is not easy governing a country having these two expectations.
But inflation is running at just 2.4 per cent. We are increasing government spending greatly next fiscal year, but we are doing so in a way that will address poverty and increase national capacity, while also saving for the future. Under our Petroleum Fund we will effectively have a budget surplus of 21.9 per cent of GDP. Starting the Fund with a budget surplus of 21.9 per cent of GDP would be the envy of any Western nation. It is a surplus that will be saved. This policy recognises the fact that we must save a significant share of the revenue for future generations. The Fund is designed to generate a perpetual stream of interest earnings that will continue to support our budget after the resources have been depleted. This is the policy. The Fund is a way to convert the resources into financial assets and to maintain the value of the resources.

Under the Petroleum Fund our budget expenditure is based on the estimate of our sustainable income over the medium term from petroleum resources. This is the amount we can spend now without prejudicing future generations. An inherent part of this policy is the noble goal of intergenerational equity because we are aware that the resources are not renewable and we are working for the future. We cannot deplete all the resources for us and leave the future generations with nothing. Timor-Leste does not want to return to aid dependency in two to three decades when our resources are depleted. People and organisations that have been assisting us have been assisting other countries for years — not always with good results. We are trying to avoid this kind of situation.

We have adopted a highly transparent model which involves all petroleum revenue going into the Fund, and the government is required to obtain parliamentary approval to withdraw from it. We call our model the 'Norway Plus' model. The entire regime will have oversight from a Consultative Council made up of eminent persons. This is the 'plus' compared with the Norwegian Fund.

Already we have secured significant foreign investment with the US$1.8 billion investment in the upstream phase of Bayu-Undan. Timor-Leste shares 90 per cent of the revenue, it was really a very hard battle on the negotiations, but now finally we succeeded to have 90 per cent of the revenue, and there is potential for further significant investment under a new licensing round for onshore and offshore areas that will commence later this year. We are planning to have a roadshow in four different capitals around the world to make public the results of a seismic survey in our exclusive jurisdictional waters that are very promising.

The parliament recently passed the Foreign Direct Investment Law in response to the situation where many potential projects want to take advantage of Timor-Leste's low cost base, its friendly, stable and secure business environment, and as well the tax credits for local employment

Diplomatic relationships

I would like to talk about Timor-Leste's relationship with other countries. We are really carefully designing our diplomatic words to be proactive in building good relations with other countries.

As everybody knows Timor-Leste is the newest member country of the United Nations, having become a member on 27 September 2002. Under the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations, adopted in May of this year, a new mission was created in Timor-Leste: the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). After UNAMET, UNTAET and UNMIST, UNOTIL is the last mission in Timor-Leste. We hope that being the last mission doesn't mean the end of our relations with the United Nations. It will stay until May of 2006. It differs from the former missions in that it is a reduced mission without a peacekeeping force. Its main mission is to support the government to consolidate what has been achieved so far by the two former missions, UNTAET and UNMIST, and the Government of Timor-Leste.

As with other countries, an essential element in nation building and economic development is relationships with the international community and our neighbours, despite what we have suffered in the recent past. Nation building also involves bringing about reconciliation within Timor-Leste. I think that Timor-Leste is a success story because of the successful way of making reconciliation.

Timor-Leste has established diplomatic relations with more than 90 member countries of the United Nations. Very soon we will open new embassies in Bangkok and Tokyo and we are thinking of having an embassy in the Vatican.

Two weeks ago I paid official visits to some countries in Europe: Norway, Finland and Portugal. In Brussels I met the President, Commissioner and other senior officials of the European Commission. It was a successful visit. Timor-Leste continues to have the support and confidence of many countries. I would prefer to say of all countries.

Timor-Leste is a member of African, Caribbean and Pacific/European Unions, International Labor Organization, World Health Organization and World Food Programme and will soon be a member of the Asian Regional Forum where it will have the status of observer in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Pacific Islands Forum. It is also member of the Community of the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

Timor-Leste's relationship with Indonesia

Timor-Leste has very good relations with its neighbours, Indonesia and Australia. Immediately after the restoration of
independence Timor-Leste established diplomatic relations with Indonesia, the only country with which we share a land border. There are many Indonesian businessmen in Timor-Leste and Indonesia is Timor-Leste's biggest trading partner. Many Timorese are studying in Indonesia.

In April the Indonesian President, Mr Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, officially visited Timor-Leste. He had a friendly reception by the Timorese people who are aware of the importance of having good relations between the two countries. Timor-Leste and Indonesia still have some outstanding issues to be resolved. However, these issues will be overcome because both countries respect each other and are discussing these issues with good faith, responsibility and are determined to establish long and lasting relations based on the friendship and the interest of the two countries and people.

Ninety six per cent of the land border has already been settled in record time. The remaining four per cent will be solved soon. Under an agreement between both countries some Timorese policemen went to Indonesia to be trained in the traffic system. Imagine some years ago it would have been completely impossible to think about have Timorese being trained by Indonesian police. There is a joint commission composed by both countries that deals with all the issues relating to the important areas of cooperation.

A Commission of Truth and Friendship was also created in order to deal with the crimes committed in the past and to strengthen the relationship between the two countries. Our objective is to deal with the crimes but without a judicial mandate or political powers — just to bring the truth. This cooperation can only be possible because the Timorese people are mature enough to separate the past from the present and are able to look to the future.

Timor-Leste's relationship with Australia

Relations between Timor-Leste and Australia have been good. Australia and Timor-Leste cooperate in many areas such as capacity building for the Timorese police and army and assisting our budget and in different areas of our public administration. Although we have this pending issue of maritime boundaries we have been capable of isolating this issue from others and keep developing and improving relations in all other sectors. The Governments of Timor-Leste and Australia have different positions concerning the boundary. However there have been negotiations and many obstacles have been removed without prejudicing the positions of each country concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary.

Many countries around their world have taken decades to settle similar maritime disputes, or they have remained unresolved. Much of this progress is due to the overwhelming support of the Australian people, many of whom have supported our right to an international boundary. This progress is a mark of the goodwill and friendship between our two countries.

In the former missions of the United Nations, Australia has contributed with a considerable number of peacekeeping forces, and to the UN police and civilian positions as well. In the new mission of the UN it will continue to have military and civilian advisors.

The Victorian Government has provided support in areas such as health, development of civil society, education and infrastructure. Many Victorians have for many years taken part in programmes to assist Timor-Leste, including those involved in the various 'Friendship Cities'. We now have a Timorese-Australian adviser in Dili who is coordinating this assistance.

To be a peaceful country Timor-Leste needs to have good relations with the whole world. Good relations with its neighbours are fundamental for the stability and development of the country. Whatever difficulties Timor-Leste may face it has to establish good relations with its neighbours and the whole world. Good development practice requires these conditions and coordination with the policy of the government and the priorities established in the National Development Plan and the Millennium Development Goals.

Building human capital

Timor-Leste has in recent years become almost synonymous with oil and gas. In fact, we want to avoid becoming an oil dependent country and we think our greatest resource of all is not our oil — it is our people. Indeed, the real role for development assistance is not filling a financial shortfall. What is really lacking in Timor-Leste is not financial capital but human capital.

This is where institutions such as Victoria University and others here tonight can play a strategic role to develop the skills and capacity of our people. Before developing the economy we need to develop the way of thinking of the people — to liberate the people from the oppression that they were suffering from, to liberate them to start thinking, to start studying, and to engage in dialogue and discussion.

There is a tremendous amount of work to be done. We lack skills, expertise and experience in every area of social services and administration. In the health service we are almost entirely reliant on foreign doctors. Many of the key jobs in the civil service are being held down by internationals. This has to change. It is unsustainable, and it means that the lives of too many of our young people are being wasted by their lack of ability to obtain employment or to assume higher responsibility.

In Timor-Leste we want to work in a cooperative way so that international volunteers, consultants and advisers can truly build capacity. We don't want internationals to come to Timor-
Leste just to build their CVs. We want them to work side by side with Timorese counterparts and then gradually pull back and allow nationals to assume responsibility.

We have been very lucky to have many people of high professional standing work in Timor-Leste. We will need many more in the years ahead, but hopefully we will not need them indefinitely, but they are always welcome to Timor-Leste.

Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the announcement made by the G8 countries on the debt relief for the poor and indebted countries. Fortunately Timor-Leste is not one of them. Thirty-eight countries are eligible for debt relief under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Eighteen of them will benefit immediately from it. It is a very positive attitude. It marks the beginning of a new and better relationship between the rich and poor countries of the world.

Timor-Leste doesn't have any debt so far. It is not that I am ideologically against it. It is a question of good governance, management and absorption capacity.
Introduction: Cooperating with Timor-Leste: Options for good development practice

Helen Hill, Victoria University, and Pamela Thomas, Australian National University

Background
When Timor-Leste came to independence it did so in a fashion quite unlike any of Australia’s other neighbouring countries. Following the UN administered ballot on 30 August 1999, the systematic violence unleashed by the Indonesian military and its militia allies in Timor stunned Australia. Many Australians believed our country had a debt to pay the Timorese — a debt incurred during World War II when many Australians owed their lives to Timorese.

Despite the original plan for the Australian army to do no more than evacuate Australians (Fernandes 2004), Australian Prime Minister John Howard responded to public pressure and took the lead in getting together a peacekeeping force, INTERFET.

Australian community support for Timor-Leste
As a result of the high level of Australian awareness of the situation in Timor, Australia’s relations with the subsequently independent Timor-Leste have also taken a markedly distinct turn from that with other countries in the region. Not only did people march in the streets against militia violence in Timor, unprecedented numbers rushed to help the reconstruction effort (see, for example, Thomson, Chaplin and Mazzella 2003; Taudevin and Lee 2000).

To some extent the traditional aid agencies, even the voluntary agencies, found themselves bypassed. People wanted to go to Timor to help or to send material aid (some of it actually unsuitable or irrelevant). At the professional level large numbers of Australians have now worked in Timor-Leste in a military, police or civilian capacity. Very few have lost their interest in the country and many continue to seek ways to renew their friendship with Timorese and assist the social and economic development, particularly in remote areas.

In 1999, during the emergency, Abel Guterres, now Timor-Leste’s Consul in Sydney, initiated the concept of Friendship Cities where, in order to prevent all outside assistance being directed to Dili, municipalities in Australia could form a relationship with districts in Timor and promote people-to-people relationships and, it was hoped, sustainable and transparent development assistance.

The diversity of Timor supporters is surprising. No other issue in recent Australian politics has brought together such a diverse range of citizens. Even the Freemasons and the Knights of the Southern Cross got together in Melbourne to collect second hand tools for East Timor. Many who had served in the army in Timor, on their return to civilian status, returned to Timor to set up support projects. The Royal College of Surgeons established a scheme for their members to do voluntary surgery in their holidays. Computer professionals, teachers, nurses and lawyers as well as the expected development consultants and NGO workers have all gone to Timor in large numbers.
There was however a problem. The fundamental principles of development assistance — how to avoid paternalism, cronyism, inappropriate technology, unsustainable development and other traps — were often not well understood by the new activists. Meanwhile the traditional solidarity groups were also looking for new roles now that Timor was independent. The member agencies of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (now Australian Council for International Development) who had done a great deal of advocacy work during the occupation, had to find a new way of engaging directly with this new group of Timor enthusiasts.

Background to the conference
The conference 'Cooperating with Timor-Leste: Ideas for good development practice' was convened to bring this rich resource of Australian experience together with some of the best minds from government, civil society, the professions and academia in Timor-Leste. The conference provided an environment for intensive dialogue between East Timorese and Australians putting the emphasis on ways to solve some of Timor-Leste's problems by looking at effective and ineffective development experiences in Timor-Leste and elsewhere. Participants were involved in two different groups - a sectoral stream and an interest group, in addition to the plenary sessions. Relevant papers were given in each and plenty of time allowed for discussion. The seven sectoral streams covered in this issue of Development Bulletin are agriculture, livestock, fisheries and environmental protection; communications infrastructure and transport; the economy, livelihoods, trade and tourism; health and population; governance, civil society and social development; the legal system and justice; and education and human resource development. The key points and recommendations from sectoral and interest group workshop discussions are included here following the sectoral papers. The 14 interest groups were friendship cities and their supporters, aid agencies, church members, unions, service clubs, Timorese in the diaspora, youth and tertiary students, academics and TAFE teachers, women and women's organisations, teachers and secondary students, librarians, health workers and business. The names and contact addresses for many of these groups, in Australia and Timor-Leste, are listed under organisations at the back of this publication and are also available on our website (see endnote). Every group had at least two Timorese members some of them students studying in Australia.

Governance, civil society and the economy
In his keynote address, the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, Dr Mari Alkatiri, emphasised the need for new thinking to address Timor's problems and for Timorese to be liberated from many of their old ways of thinking. In his paper he outlines his government's development planning process and the establishment of the Sector Investment Programmes (SIPs) as a means of coordinating development activities and development assistance. These plans detail some of the aspirations and priorities of Ministries and form a good basis for cooperation. He discusses the ways in which oil and gas revenues, through the establishment of the Petroleum Fund, based on the Norway Fund, would fund the government budget both for the present and well into the future. In his paper Dr Alkatiri stresses that 'the wealth of our country is not our oil and gas but our people, who must be developed, with knowledge and learning'.

Unlike most developing and post-conflict countries, Timor-Leste has no debts and plans to remain debt free. Dr Alkatiri recommends that any organisation or agency planning to assist in Timor-Leste should study the relevant SIP, become familiar with its policy framework, and plan assistance accordingly. Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund is fully explored by Jennifer Drysdale who provides insight into the extensive debate and planning which took place to ensure that Timor does not suffer the 'resource curse' — a fate of many other resource-rich countries who waste their resource incomes. Processes to ensure transparency, and safeguards covering withdrawal of funds, have been widely discussed within government and civil society, and are now formulated as law. The Petroleum Fund will contribute to the wise management of petroleum resources, for the benefit of both current and future generations by providing a source of revenue for government budget expenditure and at the same time saving revenue to build financial reserves for the future when petroleum resources are exhausted.

A common problem among newly independent countries is the retention of colonial institutions and structures and an accompanying lack of public participation in decision making — a problem that faces Timor-Leste. João Cancio Freitas discusses Timor-Leste's colonial past and the problems associated with inheriting an administrative structure that is unsuitable for a democratic state. This situation was exacerbated by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) relying on international staff to make decisions and only very much later involving a few East Timorese in a consultative role. Freitas argues for greater decentralisation, strengthening local governance capacity and enhancing the participation of citizens and civil society.

Janet Hunt outlines the very considerable role of East Timor's civil society during the Indonesian regime, in the resistance movement and during the emergency. While, Freitas suggests, there has been little opportunity for communities to be involved in national decision making, Hunt points out that many have been extremely active in organising and administering non-government activities including human rights, livelihoods,
popular education, sustainable agriculture, microfinance and women's rights.

National security is an important governance issue in any post conflict state, particularly when the former colonial power is just across the border and there are still high levels of internal security concerns such as a small core of former anti-independence militia leaders in West Timor, violence against women and children, and poverty and unemployment in towns. Cynthia Burton asks how capable the country is of managing its own security given this situation. She suggests that the newly established Security and Justice SIPs, while incorporating many elements considered to be best practice by the international community, may not work well in the context of Timor-Leste.

Women in Timor-Leste
Several papers in this issue deal with the status and role of women in Timor-Leste — their role in governance and civil society, women's health issues, women in business and the problems of violence against women and the application of the law. Rosa de Sousa points out that while there was widespread awareness of the brutality of the Indonesian military towards men, there was very little information about the sexual abuse, rape, torture and murder of women and young girls. With independence, violence against women has continued and domestic violence is common, but hidden, as family pride and status are involved, the society is still patriarchal and there is inadequate legislation to protect women victims. The NGO Fokupers fights for women's rights and provides support to women who have experienced violence.

It is extremely difficult for East Timorese women to access or obtain justice in cases where their human rights have been abused. Maria Agnes Bere noted the cases of violence against women filed with the police and then monitored women-related cases before the Dili District court. In 2003, 361 cases involving violence against women were filed. Most never reached the courts and those that did were delayed or postponed. In the few cases where a judgement was handed down the sentences did not reflect the severity of the case, judges did not apply international standards in their decisions, were insensitive towards gender issues and lacked knowledge of the rights of minors.

Women's reproductive health, high levels of maternal mortality and very high fertility are discussed by Snell et al.

The legal system, the judiciary and justice
There are a number of difficulties facing the legal system and judiciary. Not least, the failure of all 22 East Timorese judges, as well as all the public defenders and prosecutors, to pass examinations (written in Portuguese language) and undertaken in May and September 2004. Justice Shane Marshall points out that this has resulted in a situation where no East Timorese judges or public defenders are able to work in the court system. These failures have raised serious concerns about the language used in both the examinations and in the courts. This gaping deficit in human resources is a major impediment to self sufficiency in the courts, the justice system in Timor-Leste and the progress of democracy.

The issue of serious crimes is also problematic. Tiago Sarmento outlines the role of the Ad Hoc Court established in 2000 to investigate and determine cases of serious violations of human rights including genocide that occurred between April and September 1999. He reports that of 18 persons indicted, 12 were acquitted and six convicted. All of those convicted appealed to the final courts of review in Indonesia where five convictions were overturned and the sixth person remains free. Sarmento also outlines problems with the Special Panels for Serious Crimes and its rather loose interpretation of its mandate.

Approximately one-quarter of the population of East Timor died in the years immediately after the Indonesian invasion in 1975 — a very grave case of genocide, followed by several large-scale massacres and the violence following the 1999 referendum. To try the perpetrators of these crimes and to bring about restorative justice was the role of the newly established Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). Spencer Zifcak discusses the role of the CAVR and examines how enquiries and restorative justice processes were implemented in communities across the country. The perspectives of individuals who attended community reconciliation processes are reviewed by Lia Kent who found that many victims felt very ambivalent about both the process and the results. Victims and community leaders raised the need for economic assistance for vulnerable groups, in particular widows and orphans. Kent points out that in the absence of reparations there is a prevailing sense among communities of being neglected by government.

Agricultural and sustainable development
Estatelau da Silva, Minister for Agriculture and Arsenio Bano, Secretary of State (now Minister) for Labor and Solidarity agree that the top down approach to government used in the reconstruction phase as a means to get things done quickly, was not effective and that unless in-depth consultation on development planning is undertaken with communities, civil society and those directly involved, a great deal of money would be wasted. More consultative processes are now in place.

The importance of achieving food security and self sufficiency in food rather than devoting all agricultural effort to export crops was an issue raised by the Minister for Agriculture — it is also discussed in this issue by Rob Wesley-Smith, Kyra Peake and Tim Anderson all of whom suggest that Timor-Leste's focus on food production for local use is, at this stage, more important than engaging in export crops. Anderson points out that export oriented, resource based development models have
been a failure in many developing countries as these countries cannot complete on the open market. They illustrate serious flaws in the implementation of open market policies. Anderson points out that Australia's success in agribusiness, for example, is highly subsidised in ways that are not available to Timor-Leste or other developing countries. He strongly supports Timor-Leste's food security policies. As the Snell et al. paper shows the nutritional status of many East Timorese and most children is low and improved food crops for household use are of considerable importance in improving overall health.

There is a small but growing international market for East Timor coffee but prices received by farmers in Timor-Leste remain low. The role of USAID and the CIA in the coffee industry is discussed by Damien Grenfell.

Within the conference there was lively discussion between the Minister for Agriculture and the East Timor-based NGO Hasatil about government agricultural policies, in particular the importation of chemical fertilisers and the emphasis on seeds bred outside the country rather than using local varieties which farmers have developed over the years.

The sustainability of dairy cows in remote areas of Timor-Leste was also discussed and it was suggested that other forms of milk production should be explored, such as goat, buffalo or even soy milk. Soya beans grow prolifically in Timor-Leste.

**Health, the family and population**

The results of a recent health and population survey are presented in papers by Snell et al. and Iwu Utomo. The population of Timor-Leste is currently around 924,642 and increasing rapidly. The survey indicates a high level of 'wasting' and 'stunting' among East Timorese children; high infant and child mortality at 80 infant deaths per 1,000 live births and 144 child deaths per 1,000 live births — evidence of poor diet and feeding practices, including very limited breast feeding and very high fertility resulting in large numbers of 'at risk' births. Less than 36 per cent of women follow the health department policy of exclusive breast feeding infants for the first six months.

The highest fertility rate in the world — a total fertility rate of 7.8 children per woman — also influences nutritional status of children, infant mortality and child and maternal health. Utomo discusses the impact of women's status and knowledge on fertility and infant health as well as the health impact of the conflict and violence experienced by the East Timorese people. Family planning is not well known in Timor-Leste and most women say they want to have large families.

Beverley Snell and colleagues outline the progress made by the Department of Health in rebuilding a health service that was non-existent in 2000 and discuss progress being made to coordinate and provide consistent standards to the work of a wide range of organisations each involved in the health sector.

The health service is still addressing the need for a greater skills base in its workforce and finding effective ways to provide services to rural populations that are difficult to reach and where TB, pneumonia, malaria and diarrhoea are still serious problems. With regard to HIV and AIDS, the Catholic Church is a powerful influence and has been involved in negotiations with the Ministry of Health to prevent HIV transmission. Although the Church cannot recommend the use of condoms to reduce fertility, the clergy are prepared to tell people how to use them to prevent HIV transmission.

**Education and human resource development**

At independence Timor-Leste had a population with very limited education and no education system. The illiteracy rate is 50-60 per cent and 46 per cent of the population has never attended school. As Marie Quinn discusses in her paper, almost two-thirds of the female population is illiterate. Ninety-five per cent of schools and many post-secondary education institutions were destroyed, school furniture looted and teaching materials burned. Little progress has been made in establishing new educational policies and practices, largely due to the difficulties of re-introducing Tetum and Portuguese into the curriculum for formal schooling and providing enough trained teachers. Many teachers today are volunteers.

Language is currently a matter for considerable discussion in Timor-Leste and as Kerry Taylor-Leech discusses, it is an integral part of a culture. The language of teaching literacy is not just important educationally but also in confirming identity.

Regardless of the difficulties, great progress has been made at pre-school level with learning to read in Tetum, and in changing the culture of the classroom from passive listening to participation. Helen Hill's paper stresses the importance of education as a key factor in overcoming poverty as exemplified by a number of East Asian countries. Although the World Bank has argued for many years that market policies underlie reductions in poverty, their own research now shows the importance of universal general education for poverty reduction and development.

Deborah Durrnan and Danielle Ujvari point to the importance of peace building as an educational strategy. Ujvari shows that 78 per cent of households in Timor-Leste experienced loss and/or violence prior during the Indonesian regime and after the vote. The result has been high levels of trauma among adults and children, continued violence against women and an acceptance among children of violence as a way of life. Ujvari explains the use of art and storytelling in peace education for children. Durrnan considers popular education for adults and the need to build communities where people can learn to take collective action, an activity
discouraged during the Indonesian regime. Ann Wigglesworth points out that a large proportion of young people in Timor-Leste have no, or very little, education — a direct result of the conflict and Indonesian policy. Many were involved in the independence struggle but now have no role and no employment. Young people have high expectations of the new leadership as well as the potential to challenge national leadership. It is therefore important that government provides opportunities for young people to positively contribute skills and enthusiasm to national development.

Information and communication

Information and communication and the establishment of a free media play a vital role in good governance and development. Libraries have an important information role in the redevelopment of Timor-Leste. As with many other institutions all libraries were completely destroyed during the conflict. Lyle French's paper shows that there has been excellent progress in rebuilding libraries in Timor-Leste and that several different types of libraries are now playing a role in the development of the country. Although there is still no unified library policy and no plan for a national library there is a public library, small school libraries, post secondary libraries and special libraries.

The extension of computers as a means of communication in Timor-Leste is held back by the lack of reliable electricity everywhere but Dili and the lack of computing skills. While many East Timorese are learning how to use computers, few are studying the electronics and computer science needed to keep them going. Lev Lafayette and Alan Taylor discuss the possibilities for using information technologies for extending communication in the country.

Ways of overcoming very limited energy resources are discussed by Kevin Bain who quotes a multi agency report claiming the provision of electricity to all households would reduce poverty by 26 per cent. There is little doubt that electricity would encourage social well-being and economic activity through improved education, better communications, and improved health status through better storage of vaccines, improved sterilisation measures and reducing respiratory problems caused by open cooking fires. Better communication between national government and rural communities is a vital issue in the establishment of a truly democratic state. Bain outlines a number of renewable sources of energy that would be appropriate to Timor-Leste including the establishment of minihydro installations which could provide sufficient renewal power for communities and small solar power generating installations. He calls for assistance from Australian organisations to help support the establishment of these sources of power for rural communities.

Conclusions and the way ahead

During the emergency period the East Timorese could not make many decisions about their own future, they had to accept what the donors did as their own society was in chaos. As reconstruction proceeded they gained more power over making their own decisions but lack of East Timorese institutions and a regulatory framework often meant they lacked direction. Now the East Timorese are ready to explore the issues which will determine how they develop their country. Full information must be made available and be readily accessible. Discussion and dialogue about how to achieve what has been outlined in the SIPs must now begin. The conference and this issue of Development Bulletin are only the first step along such a way. It is hoped that readers of this Bulletin who live in Timor-Leste and those who visit from Australia or other countries will be helped in their thinking about good development practice. The papers here provide a variety of viewpoints and reflect the participants in the conference. They came from different backgrounds, different disciplines, different work experience, had different interests and different levels of knowledge about Timor-Leste. But all had a deep interest in helping build an equitable, just and democratic nation.

A recommendation from the conference was for another to be held in Dili in two years time to be hosted by the National University of Timor-Leste, with the assistance of Victoria University and the Development Studies Network at the Australian National University. This would be allow wide-ranging dialogue and include government, civil society, academic, business, and all those, including visitors from other Pacific and Asian countries, who can contribute to Timor-Leste's future thinking about development.

Notes

1. A full list of Friendship City organisations is available on http://devnet.anu.edu.au/bulletin and www.vu.edu.au/ICEPA/Timor-Leste, see VLGA 2003 for some discussion of the scope of these bodies.
2. All of the SIPs are available at www.vu.edu.au/ICEPA/Timor-Leste, under the headings of the sectoral streams of the conference.

References

Managing petroleum revenue in Timor-Leste: A brief explanation

Jennifer Drysdale, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National University

Introduction and summary

There are many examples of countries that exploit their natural resources (minerals, petroleum, forests, and so on) with the expectation the revenue will bring economic growth. Unfortunately, in many cases, in developing countries in particular, the opposite happens; they experience a decline in economic growth. This phenomenon is known as the resource curse (Auty 1993). Familiar examples of countries that have been cursed are Nigeria and Nauru (Martin and Subramanian 2003; World Bank 2003). The resource curse can present itself in the form of economic or financial mismanagement, corruption, and/or civil conflict. The capacity of government and civil society institutions to develop good systems of governance and to monitor and manage finance is crucial to avoiding or mitigating the resource curse.

The Government of Timor-Leste is currently dependent on revenue from exploitation of petroleum resources. In the 2005-2006 financial year, petroleum revenue will fund 57 per cent of the government’s budget expenditure. The challenge for decision makers in the government is to learn from ‘cursed’ countries and establish an effective model of petroleum and natural resource revenue management. In response to this challenge, the government will establish a Petroleum Fund. Civil society faces a challenge in understanding the systems the government has established so they may monitor the management of petroleum revenue and hold the government to account. The success of the Petroleum Fund and other institutional arrangements in preventing the resource curse will be vital to the future of Timor-Leste.

This paper explains how the Petroleum Fund works and, in particular, how it is integrated with the state budget. It will also explain the estimated sustainable income (ESI) — the amount of money that can be withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund each year such that the Petroleum Fund will always provide a source of income for government budget expenditure. The Parliament decides how much revenue should be withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund each year and they are provided with a calculation of ESI when making such decisions.

Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund law

Timor Leste’s petroleum fund model is based on the ‘Norway’ model which was what the International Monetary Fund suggested when the government asked for their advice in late 2002. Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund law includes measures to address transparency and accountability that Norway does not, so it is known as the ‘Norway Plus’ model.

Between October 2004 and May 2005 the government and civil society engaged in a process of consultation to develop the Petroleum Fund law that was submitted to Parliament and passed unanimously (unprecedented in Timor-Leste) on 27 June 2005. The law was then promulgated by the President. The Petroleum Fund is a ‘Tool that can contribute to the wise management of petroleum resources, for the benefit of both current and future generations’ (RDTL 2005a). The Petroleum Fund does this by providing a source of revenue to fund government budget expenditure while, at the same time, saving revenue to be spent by future generations when the petroleum resources are exhausted.

The Petroleum Fund law is not just a mechanism for petroleum revenue transfers to the budget. The law also describes how petroleum revenue should be invested, penalties associated with mismanagement of petroleum revenue, details of the establishment of a Consultative Council and a mechanism to guide the Parliament in deciding how much to withdraw (ESI). This ESI mechanism will be explained later but first it is necessary to understand how the Petroleum Fund and the budget are integrated.

The integration of petroleum revenue and Timor-Leste’s 2005-2006 budget

Petroleum revenue is essential to the East Timorese economy. The government currently receives revenue from the exploitation of Elang-Kakatua and Bayu-Undari petroleum fields which are both located within the Joint Petroleum Development Area of the Timor Sea. In the future Timor-Leste may receive additional revenue from the exploitation of Greater Sunrise or other petroleum fields both on and offshore but the General Budget of the State 2005-06 (RDTL 2005b) includes only potential revenue from currently exploited fields.

Government expenditure in 2005-2006 is budgeted at US$132 million. In this financial year, the government expects to raise taxes, fees and charges (domestic revenue) of US$36.4 million and autonomous (self-funded) agencies such as aviation,
Revenue from petroleum exploitation

Petroleum Fund

Domestic Revenue

Autonomous Agencies

Development Partners

Government of Timor-Leste Budget Total US$132 million

Education

Health

Agriculture

Public Works

Interior (Police, etc.)

Defence

Justice

Etc.

ports and electricity will contribute US$10.3 million. Development partners (or donors) have also committed to direct budget contributions of US$10 million. This leaves a 'budget gap' of US$75.3 million (57 per cent) which is why the management of petroleum revenue is crucial to Timor-Leste's economy. Petroleum revenue in 2005-2006 is expected to be US$153 million (excluding interest) or 41.6 per cent of GDP (RDTL 2005b).

Under the Petroleum Fund law, all petroleum revenue, which includes revenue received by the government or any person receiving revenue from direct or indirect participation in petroleum operations, must be deposited in the Petroleum Fund. Petroleum revenue includes First Tranche Petroleum (or royalties), tax revenue (for example, taxes earned from developing rigs) and profit oil. Petroleum revenue in the Petroleum Fund is invested overseas and earns interest. This interest remains in the Petroleum Fund. The Petroleum Fund is an earmarked receipt account held by the Central Bank. Other than management fees to be paid to the Central Bank the only transfers out of the Petroleum Fund must be approved by Parliament. Once approved by Parliament, transfers from the Petroleum Fund can only be spent via the government budget.

Distinguishing petroleum revenue income and budget expenditure

The relationship between petroleum revenue as income and budget expenditure requires clarification. There are two separate decision making processes undertaken by the Parliament; one is to decide how the budget should be allocated (which sectors take priority and what the budget total should be). For example, the General Budget of the State 2005-06 (RDTL 2005b) states that the recurrent expenditure for health and education (combined total) should be greater than 35 per cent of the total budget, greater than 4.5 per cent should be spent on agriculture and no more than 25 per cent should be spent on security (including police and defence). Health, education and agriculture have been targeted to ensure minimum expenditure levels but in the case of agriculture, that does not mean it is a priority in the sense that its expenditure exceeds other sectors.

As well as deciding the budget, Parliament also decides how much revenue should be withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund (while having regard to the ESI). The two decisions are connected but the idea that petroleum revenue will be spent on specific sectors (for example, health, education, and agriculture) is misleading. Figure 1 illustrates that budget income is derived from four separate areas. The budget then funds all of the sectors' expenditure. Petroleum revenue does not directly fund specific sectors but it can be used to increase the government's overall budget. If the Parliament chooses to increase the budget of a particular sector and in order to do that it increases the value of the withdrawal from the Petroleum Fund accordingly, then petroleum revenue effectively funds increases to that sector.
How much petroleum revenue?
At the end of the 2004-2005 financial year the Petroleum Fund was expected to total US$63 million. Anticipated income from exploitation of Bayu-Undan and Elang-Kakatua (the two petroleum fields currently being exploited by Timor-Leste) is shown in Figure 2. Elang-Kakatua will be exhausted in the next few years and revenue from the exploitation of Bayu-Undan is expected to cease around 2024. The current projected income from these fields between now and 2024 is US$4.9 billion in real terms or US$3.4 billion in nominal terms (discounted).

One of the difficulties for any country managing petroleum revenue is the lack of certainty of income projections. Many factors including changes in oil price, changes to production plans and the value of the US dollar, can all impact on income projections. This means it is difficult for decision makers and civil society to have a clear understanding of Timor-Leste's petroleum wealth. For example, the General Budget of the State 2004-05 (RDTL 2004) anticipated total income between July 2004 and June 2008 would be US$270 million. However, the General Budget of the State 2005-06 (RDTL 2005b) projects income for the same period to be US$749 million. In one year that is a difference of US$479 million. Petroleum revenue might end up being much greater or much lower than these projections but this depends on many factors that are beyond Timor-Leste's control. Establishing the Petroleum Fund is one way of managing that volatility and attempting to ensure there is always a source of revenue to fund budget expenditure.

Another way in which the government responds to this uncertainty is to use conservative estimates. A base case scenario is used when projecting income. The figure the government uses for oil prices is not only US$5 lower than the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) figures, but it is discounted further by 15 per cent in order to 'provide security for the planning of the annual government budget of the State' (RDTL 2005b).

This illustrates that the current government exhibits conservative and sound fiscal planning when it comes to management of their petroleum wealth. Figure 2 illustrates the relative significance of petroleum revenue to Timor-Leste and therefore the importance of good petroleum revenue management. Another mechanism that complements this sound fiscal planning by government is the calculation of the ESI.

Estimated sustainable income
The government of Timor-Leste faces a challenge: they expect US$4.9 billion from petroleum revenue exploitation over the next 20 years, how do they decide how much to spend each year and how can they make the best use of that expenditure?

One of the features of the Petroleum Fund law is that before the Parliament can approve a withdrawal they must be informed of the ESI. The ESI is revised each year and represents the maximum amount that can be withdrawn from the fund and leave enough revenue in the fund for an equal amount (that is, in real terms) to be withdrawn in all subsequent years.

The law includes a formula to show how the ESI figure is worked out. The General Budget of the State 2005-06 (RDTL 2005b) states the ESI this year is US$100 million. In the next four years (until 2008-2009) the government plans to spend less than ESI (or less than US$100 million) from the Petroleum Fund each year. For the purposes of illustrating how ESI works we shall assume that in the 2009-2010 financial year the government decides to spend the ESI or US$100 million from thereon. On this basis, Figure 3 shows the balance of the Petroleum Fund if US$100 million is withdrawn every year from 2009-2010 (in real terms). After 2024 (when Bayu-Undan is exhausted) the value of the Fund is maintained forever. That is to say, the interest earned on the fund is spent but the capital is preserved.
If less than ESI (less than US$100 million) is spent each year, the value of the Petroleum Fund will increase. One of the reasons the government plans to spend less than US$100 million over the next four years is because there have been difficulties with budget execution and some sectors' budgets have remained underspent in recent years (RDTL 2005b). Another reason may be that the economy cannot absorb expenditure at this level. If revenue is spent too soon, and there is no capacity to spend it wisely, it will be wasted.

If more than the value of ESI (greater than US$100 million) is spent the value of the Petroleum Fund will decline until eventually (sooner or later, depending on the extent of expenditure) there is no revenue left in the Petroleum Fund.

The value of ESI will vary from year to year because the Parliament is unlikely to approve withdrawal of exactly the ESI amount every year (they may withdraw more or less than ESI) and, further, revenue projections will vary (particularly if other petroleum fields are developed). Regardless, the ESI figure is the basis on which Parliament makes their decision. But what petroleum revenue is spent on is equally, if not more, important. For example, revenue could be spent on capital and infrastructure, human resource development (such as health and education) or consumable items (such as cars and computers). What revenue is spent on will have varying impact in terms of its sustainability and the creation of good development to benefit both current and future generations.

Conclusion

Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund law has now been promulgated by the President and mechanisms to ensure the wise management of petroleum revenue are being established. The mechanism of ESI will be useful for Parliament in deciding how much revenue to withdraw from the Petroleum Fund expenditure but it will be important that civil society understand these mechanisms well and be able to distinguish the different decision-making processes. The Petroleum Fund will go some way to assist Timor-Leste in avoiding the resource curse but civil society must also participate in the governance of petroleum revenue so that both current and future generations can benefit from its expenditure. Government and civil society will need to work together to ensure the wise management of Timor Leste's petroleum revenue.

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Decentralisation in Timor-Leste: Issues and challenges

João Camcio Freitas, Dili Institute of Technology

Introduction

Most Third World countries, on attaining independence from colonial rule, choose to retain, with little change, the inherited centralised colonial institution. This is generally a rule-driven, hierarchical administration with overbearing bureaucracy, often concerned more with compliance with rules and procedures than with results. Timor-Leste is no exception. The major problem with the old structures, in terms of local governance, was the lack of public participation in decision making, the emasculated local governments or administrations, and accountability that was more inward- and upward-looking to the political leadership but not to the public.

This paper addresses the issue of decentralisation in Timor-Leste for effective service provision and challenges ahead in terms of building up local representation and democracy at urban and rural levels to account for demographic and other social changes, as mandated by the Constitution. Timor-Leste gained its independence at the beginning of a new millennium and in an era of democratic governance at all levels. This appears to be an appropriate time to introduce change through decentralisation and citizen participation in the decision-making process.

Historical background

Timor-Leste was left with a heritage of colonial administrative practices that were unsuitable for a newly independent state. This new state had in the past experienced two kinds of colonisation — from Portugal and from Indonesia. Under Portuguese administration, an 'indirect rule' system was applied with government operating at provincial level under a governor, administering the whole territory, with district administrators who in turn coordinated sub-district administrations. The villages were left to the traditional authority, the liurai/detos and/or chefe de sucos (Oliveira 1952).

Under Indonesian administration (which was not recognised by the international community) a tight form of 'direct rule' prevailed, with a highly-centralised political system. Unlike the first form of colonialism, and in accordance with the need to pacify East Timor after the invasion of 1975, the management of each layer of administration was not only in the hands of a civilian administrator (the governor, the district administrator, bupati, the sub-district administrator, camas, and the village chief), but it also extended horizontally to embrace military and police commanders in order to keep the population under control. This made coordination even harder, as each of these components was accountable to their respective authority.

The creation of several tiers of local authority had implications for available fiscal and human resources including the problem of effective coordination. The end result of this bureaucratic and hierarchical mindset was the perpetuation of a system notorious for being self-serving, inefficient, ineffective and non-responsive to peoples' needs. As in all of Indonesia, corruption was the biggest problem during the Indonesian administration of East Timor. The cost of changing those practices is a burden Timor-Leste carries as it emerges from its colonial period.

During the crises that followed the 1999 UN-sponsored referendum, East Timor suffered a near total destruction of its public records and infrastructure, and more than 8,000 civil servants fled the territory. The transition to independence has been traumatic and costly in human and economic terms, in particular the rebuilding necessary following the total devastation of the institutions of government and of basic services.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), established in October 1999, had as one of its first tasks the establishment of the foundations of a government administration to run the independent country. UNTAET's structure and decision-making processes were managed by international staff, leaving just a consultative role at the highest level to the East Timorese leadership. In Afghanistan, and even more recently in Iraq, an Afghan and Iraqi Government were involved from the onset, with UN financial, technical and human resources assistance. However, in Timor-Leste, the UN opted to establish itself as the administrator, and slowly (too slowly for many East Timorese observers) co-opted East Timorese to work with it. Later, by its own experience and/or under pressure from the East Timorese and its leadership, this was changed to a Cabinet-style administration embracing East Timorese input, particularly at senior level (including Cabinet level). After independence in May 2002, the administration was handed over to the East Timorese leadership.

UNTAET's record in the area of local governance was not satisfactory (Centre for Applied Research and Policy Studies 2003). The administration failed to recognise the political realities and failed to capture the window of opportunity for reforming the old system. The system installed by UNTAET at national and sub-national level was heavily centralised and based on the 'agency governance' model. UNTAET could not avoid
overlapping functions, as a UN mission and as 'de facto' government. As a consequence, many important institutions have not been established at local level. The local governance and administration system under UNTAET experienced numerous problems including uncertain levels of authority, unclear responsibilities, language and communication difficulties, low motivation and human resource issues.

Although Timor-Leste's Constitution sets out a vision of decentralised government, this is yet to be established. Currently, the district administrations and public sector services such as health and education continue to be extensions of central government, providing services to the people with very limited resources, personnel and capacity. They also derive their limited budgets from the central ministries, to whom they are responsible.

**Decentralisation policy**

The first study on local government, funded by the Asian Development Bank, involved a think tank on local government. The study proposed the formation of a few regional administrations with de-concentrated powers for service delivery and less than 50 local or community governments at sub-district level for local representation and governance (Local Government Think Tank 2001). In 2003, a ministerial committee was established, with funding and external expertise from donors channelled through the United Nations Development Programme, to research, advise, and prepare policy on how decentralisation should proceed in Timor-Leste. Six options were presented at first and later revised to two. The Council of Ministers then approved one option on establishing the sub-districts as municipalities; this option confirmed the findings of the first study.

The option of establishing the sub-districts as municipalities involves the removal of the district as the immediate level of sub-national government below the central government. It sets up a small number of regional or provincial administrations for service delivery requirements. It was envisaged that the municipality would become a devolved local government body, responsible for managing its budget and its own staff and for providing the basic services under its control. Within this option there were to be distinctions between different types of municipalities based on their capacity. In terms of regional or provincial arrangements, each central ministry would organise itself regionally according to its own criteria and service delivery requirements.

This model presents a significant reform in local governance in order to strengthen local government, enhance citizen participation, mobilise civil society and distribute resources at the local level more equitably. In order to attain these goals, legislation needs to be initiated. As a first step, a local government act establishing a nationwide system of 65 municipal governments, each with elected mayors and councils, is needed. This will enable all of the country's citizens to be represented through municipal government structures. For a country whose rural population had in the past been excluded from the political process, this represents major change.

The advantage of this option is that it gives a significant presence for government at local level that will increase its visibility and credibility. In terms of service delivery, the option has some economies of scale. The provision of basic services such as primary education, primary health care, water supply and rural extension would be closer to the people. By decentralising the responsibility of service delivery to the municipalities, it would give more opportunity to the central ministries to concentrate on nationwide policy development and strategy, monitoring and overall supervision.

The benefits derived from this option must be balanced against other factors such as cost. A highly decentralised system would require a larger number of civil servants in each municipality, something that may not be possible, at least in the early years of Timor-Leste's nation building. Another issue is the local capacity to administer, coordinate and provide adequate services, since there is a visible scarcity of human and material resources. This would compromise the number and degree of functions to be decentralised to the 65 municipalities. As well, consideration would have to be given to the ease of coordination and integration between and among the national and local levels.

**Institutional arrangements**

A number of scholars argue that decentralisation improves governance and public service delivery through better matching of public services to local preferences, also known as allocative efficiency, and through productive efficiency, or by increased accountability of local governments to citizens, fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs (Kahkonen and Anthony 2001). The effectiveness of decentralised service delivery depends on the design of the particular decentralisation and on the institutional arrangements governing its implementation. Specifically, the argument that decentralisation promotes allocative and productive efficiency assumes that the devolution of functions occurs within an institutional environment that provides political, administrative, and financial authority to local governments, along with effective channels of local accountability and central oversight. These channels include:

- mechanisms for citizens to express their views to government bodies;
- central government laws, rules, budget constraints, and oversight over local government operations, and channels for local governments to influence central government decisions concerning them; and
- public sector management arrangements that promote accountability — such as merit-based
personnel policies and rules and arrangements promoting fiduciary accountability and constraining corruption.

Although the municipal model can provide significant opportunities for enhancing local participation in important areas of public life in Timor-Leste, it appears to be confronted with some key questions.

Firstly, what sort of local representational model will this municipality idea provide to local communities? Will the municipality approach provide an appropriate representational model for community groups, particularly in remote areas with their specific rural characteristics? These questions arise quite apart from the doubts over whether the municipalities will have sufficient technical capacity to manage public services.

Timor-Leste, as is the case in many other developing countries, is facing acute problems with rural to urban migration. For the educated rural migrant, this means looking for urban opportunities in labour or in business, while illiterate rural migrants may be seeking an escape from the toil of farm life. The brain drain from rural to urban locations severely affects the development of rural areas. Shortage of skilled personnel is identified as one of the principle challenges in bridging the rural-urban gap.

Secondly, should all the 65 existing sub-districts automatically become municipalities? Should municipalities be declared on the basis of fulfilment of specific criteria such as population density, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities and their economic importance? This issue needs to be clarified in any proposed local government act. By establishing a set of criteria, each of the developing urban areas in Timor-Leste would know whether or not it can meet the requirements needed to be deemed a municipality. Towns such as Maubisse, although not a district capital, could possibly obtain municipality status as a result of increased population, fiscal capacity, and/or the development of a non-agricultural sector. Specifying conditions could also strengthen transparency because the decision would not rest in the hands of administrators. In this way, it is hoped would-be municipalities could avoid having to pay a 'commission' to corrupt officials to gain the status of municipality, as has happened in other developing countries.

Service delivery

During the initial phase of decentralisation, there will be a critical lack of resources and skilled personnel. Delivery of basic services such as education and health will be provided from regional administrations, with the municipalities and rural community governments managing services where there is a high degree of local benefit and significant discretion as to what local services are to be provided in each local government.

Many other developing countries, where the scarcity of resources is also critical concerns, have adopted a combination of political and administrative decentralisation, with selective devolution of public sector management responsibilities. There are numerous advantages to having some form of regional administration. These include more focused service delivery, better programme implementation and monitoring, more efficient information exchange, and better maintenance of order. Regional administrations can introduce regulations that are appropriate for the area's population and are better able to adapt policy and programmes to local requirements.

Within this framework, there should be room for some concurrency of functions, especially for roles which are traditionally handled by local government but identified as going to the central government through its de-concentrated agencies at regional levels. As the resources become available at the local level, this responsibility could be eventually transferred to the municipalities or rural community governments. If the principle of concurrency is put forward, the municipality or the rural community governments would not have to wait for specific central government approval to start implementing the function; they could do so if the local government had the means and the capacity to act. Therefore, if a service or task is already handled by either the central government or the local authority, the other cannot set up a parallel body to carry out the same task.

Urban-rural local democracy

Each emerging country has a unique set of circumstances that needs to be taken into account in establishing a post-colonial regime. Here the characteristics of each area, the traditions of the people, and the memories of the colonial past weigh heavily in the deliberations about how to structure local governance.

A local government system should also serve as an institutional mechanism to ensure people's participation in the democratic governance of the country. Given the characteristics of rural and remote areas of Timor-Leste, rather than setting up municipalities, perhaps it would be worth considering establishing rural local government councils with elected members from each village, for local decision making and representation. This would provide better representation for the community and a desire for minimal imposition in rural areas without the consent of the population in those areas. Research on local government structure has found the lowest cost systems are those where there is an urban municipality and a number of rural local government councils in an area and that both levels compete and cooperate, and that there is also a regional organisation to facilitate cooperation. The central departments' roles would be to provide resources and to establish the standards, supervision and monitoring. Elected officials, as local councils at the local level, would then represent the interest of their communities and liaise with government.
October 2005

departments for basic services, as they might not be able to provide these services themselves.

Partnerships and skills development

As the government's implementation capacity in rural areas is just developing, it may benefit from partnership approaches (nationally and internationally) in which the government will generally play a facilitating role with other organisations, NGOs, and the private sector playing a more proactive part in rural development in Timor-Leste. The NGO sector, like the rest of Timor-Leste's civil society, is in the process of rebuilding, and numerous NGOs already work on rural issues. NGO relations with government are relatively good (with some exceptions) and this may provide a basis not only for service delivery but also for awareness building and empowerment work by NGOs, though this is a highly sensitive area for government.

The issue here is how to both strengthen local governance capacity and enhance citizen participation, in order to bring rural people more into the mainstream of the country's economic and political life. Capacity building should emphasise specific skills development and youth employment, building up a national skills and knowledge base.

Potential problems

Some government members have voiced concern that decentralisation in Timor-Leste may have a negative impact upon their ability to manage macroeconomic policy, and that decentralisation actually helps foster corruption at local level. The reality is that centralised control of the economy as a means to enhance economic productivity is, at best, a short-term solution to what are essentially long-term economic problems. Secondly, corruption actually thrives at any level in surroundings where accountability is not open to public scrutiny. At the same time, inefficiency and ineffectiveness can flourish. Indeed, in many cases, the single most important rationale for strengthening systems of local governance is the need to disperse the monopolisation of power that is held by national governments. In many developing countries, much of the recent emphasis placed on strengthening local governance has been motivated by a desire to break the grip of sometimes corrupt national bureaucracies on development processes. Experience shows that in many developing countries, even though corruption is still perceived as substantial at all levels, it is less pronounced at local than at national level. Decentralisation may increase productive efficiency by limiting the leakage of funds and other resources. It is, therefore, critically important to ensure the existence of a system of multiple checks and balances on the exercise of political power, and the single most important one in any society involves the fragmentation of political power. Without question, the creation of strong local governments is critical to that development.

Conclusion

Decentralisation holds a lot of promise, but whether it improves public service delivery depends on the institutional arrangements governing its implementation. It is an important mechanism for attempting to decide on many issues at the level they arise, but decentralisation also works to ensure people's participation in the decision-making process. In Timor-Leste, it should involve the setting up of local authorities, empowered to take care of certain responsibilities entrusted to them by law, particularly the services which have the most direct impact on the well-being of the local population. Local authorities should have the power to use their own resources, or the resources that are given to them, according their own priorities and decisions. A local authority, within the limits of the mandate it received from the central government, should take its own decisions and should be accountable to the people who are most affected by the delivery of these essential services. Of course, this should be combined with a bottom-up procedure of suggestions from the grassroots to upper levels of government. However, a lack of resources and skilled personnel may make it difficult to put into place such a decentralised government structure within the first five to ten years after independence. During that initial period, there may have to be a greater reliance on a de-centralised public service delivery, which is organised from de-concentrated offices of the national departments in a few regional centres.

Another possibly important factor is the strength of desire of the central government to share powers with local authorities and the local capacity to exercise a share of the power. The transfer of authority can be done gradually as the capacity of local governments increase. At the local level, citizens should have channels to communicate their preferences and have their voices heard in local government. But the existence of such channels is not enough. To effectively influence public policies and to oversee local governments, citizens need information about government policies and activities. Also significant support and training will be required in order for the local authorities to successfully involve local people in meaningful tasks while broadening the base of public participation in rural development.

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Security system development in Timor-Leste: Critical issues and future challenges

Cynthia Burton, Australian National University

Introduction
In his May 2005 speech to mark the end of the UN peacekeeping operation in Timor-Leste, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General said the peacekeepers' departure showed the world's recognition of Timor-Leste as a safe and peaceful country whose security agencies were able to assume responsibility for internal and external security (UNMISET 2005). Five years after the traumatic events of 1999, just how capable is Timor-Leste of managing its own security? Are government initiatives and donor support for the development of the security sector well targeted and responsive to the country's needs?

That this is an important issue for Timor-Leste is beyond doubt. A December 2002 Asia Foundation survey on citizens' views on law and justice in Timor-Leste found that the main national concern was the economy, followed by violence and instability (Asia Foundation 2003:4). The Government of Timor-Leste's (RDTL) own assessment of its security situation is that it does not currently face a threat of overt military action from any other country, but has a number of internal and border security concerns such as the presence of a small core of former anti-independence militia leaders in West Timor; violence against women and children; poverty and unemployment in towns, especially Dili; land tenure issues in rural areas; the possible emergence of organised gangs; and transnational crime, among others (RDTL 2005b).

Security context
The UN defines human security as comprising the twin objectives of freedom from want (economic, health, environmental and other threats to people's well-being) and freedom from fear (the threat of violence, crime and war). Physical security and poverty elimination are seen as closely interrelated given that, without security, it is difficult for development to take place. Within this context, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) defines Security System Reform (SSR) as:

... seeking to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes... the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie, intelligence services and judicial and penal institutions ... [and] the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight, eg parliament, the executive and the defence ministry (OECD 2004:1).

Thus, the reform of security institutions should not be a goal in itself, nor confused with preserving the security of a regime, but should aim at serving and protecting both the state and its citizens. The OECD DAC identifies three key areas of an SSR policy agenda to achieve this, for which this paper will examine progress in Timor-Leste, namely:

1. Developing a clear institutional framework for providing security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors and a focus on the vulnerable, such as women, children and minority groups;
2. Strengthening the governance and oversight of security institutions; and
3. Building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities and open to dialogue with civil society organisations (OECD 2004:2).

A clear institutional framework
During Timor-Leste's governance by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), from late 1999 to May 2002, the need for coordination and strategic oversight of security institutions, and for these agencies to play apolitical roles, was recognised. This was written into Timor-Leste's Constitution and the first National Development Plan (NDP). UNTAET also established a National Security Council in late 2001. However, East Timorese participation was limited and there was insufficient time to build ownership before the transition to independence. The security sector also was not included in early reconstruction planning in a cohesive or systematic way. Support for rebuilding the security sector came from several different bilateral donors and different government departments of donor countries, not all of whom appreciated the resourcing requirements, complexity or time required for the task.

The legacy of these decisions became visible over time. At independence:
• policies and legislation to define the framework of the security sector were not in place, such as: the composition and mandate of the Superior Council for Defence and Security; civilian oversight; mechanisms; and the respective roles of the defence and police forces;
• the judiciary and national police were struggling to perform even basic functions;
• human rights and transparency and accountability mechanisms relied predominantly on the UN missions to carry out their roles;
• key linkages in systemic development between sectors had not been made (for example police and judicial criminal investigation and court procedures);
• budget oversight and affordability of the security institutions was unclear; and
• donor support was largely fragmented and uncoordinated.

Such issues were by no means exclusive to the security sector and, during the latter half of 2002, the new RDTL commenced a donor-supported planning exercise to develop a 'road map' for implementation of the NDP and a 'stability plan'. This was followed by a Sector Investment Programme (SIP) process which assisted the RDTL to clarify its sectoral policies, programming directions, public investment priorities and recurrent cost considerations.

The Security, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation SIP (Security SIP) and Rights, Equality and Justice SIP (Justice SIP), released in April 2005, represent a significant effort to deal with the shortcomings of the post-UNTAET security architecture. An approach to security is defined which focuses on the RDTL's consolidation of full responsibility for Timor-Leste's security, with the use of international diplomacy identified as 'the first line of defence'. The RDTL seeks to strengthen the links between national security and development objectives and includes attention to the linkages with key state organs such as the judiciary and independent oversight institutions. Medium term challenges are seen as building the security institutions' capacity and developing the country's own model to manage effectively a range of possible threats (RDTL 2005a). Importantly, there are plans to develop a National Security Policy (NSP) that:

... sets out a vision and strategy for national security, and articulates clearly the specific roles of all security organs of the State, and clarify government's objectives for structuring, coordinating and managing national security ... in a prioritized and affordable manner ... (RDTL 2005a:vii).

However, the SIPs do not include a focus on consultation and building linkages with civil society in SSR. For instance, will civil society groups be invited to provide inputs to the NSP?

Overall, the Security and Justice SIPs constitute a sophisticated SSR framework that incorporates many elements considered to be best practice by the international community. But how much of the content is actually East Timorese-owned? Due to circumstances, the SIPs were largely written by foreign consultants, with varying degrees of East Timorese input from sector to sector. Some international advisers believe the RDTL views the process as a game they must play to get donor resources (pers. comm. 2005). International experience of public sector institutional change is that such processes must be led and owned by the partner government if they are to succeed and be sustainable.

International experience also points to the importance of contextualising reform programmes to the local social, political, cultural and economic realities. Are there dangers of building up systems based on models that ultimately may not work well in Timor-Leste? A number of researchers have noted the absence of policy research and evidence on what actually works in SSR and the often conflicting donor policy agendas. Policies can become accepted orthodoxies without examination of the evidence or the alternatives (for example Forster 2000; Winkler 2002; Kennedy 2004).

... whilst advocating a holistic approach to SSR in other regions, Western governments have barely addressed the need to think of their own security sector as connected and requiring a coordinated approach between and within departments to ensure effectiveness (Forster 2000:10-11).

Much more research and evaluation is needed to find out what will work best in Timor-Leste.

Assistance to Timor-Leste's security sector could also become shaped by external agendas more than internal needs. There is a risk that the international terrorism and transnational crime agenda may dominate the assistance and advice, when basic skills are still being bedded down. For example, the national police force (PNTL) began drafting a counter-terrorism policy framework in early 2005 before it had developed its national policing policy (RDTL 2005b).

Alongside the SIPs, two other recent developments in the security sector are worth noting. In February 2005, legislation to create the Superior Council for Defence and Security was passed. The Council, chaired by the President, includes: the Prime Minister; heads of defence, justice, interior, foreign affairs, Falintil East Timor Defence Force (F-FDTL), and PNTL; National State Security Officer; and three representatives from Parliament. Its mandate is to advise the President on: defence and security policy; security force legislation; war, peace and national emergencies; and senior defence force personnel decisions. The Council will be key to the directions which security policy takes in Timor-Leste and the inclusion of core agencies and members of parliament is a strength. At the same
time, it will need to be backed by strong policy advice, a skill set that is still weak and underdeveloped in the relevant ministry, secretariat and parliament.

Likewise, organic laws on defence and policing were passed in May 2004 but have still not fully clarified the role of the F-FDTL in relation to the PNTL. The Security SIP states that the current Force 2020 study on future directions for the F-FDTL will clarify these aspects of the relationship (completed in mid-2005 with support from the Australian Government). Depending on who is consulted and how much awareness those conducting the study have of the dynamics within and between the police and defence forces, the outcomes may either reduce or increase tensions.

**Strengthening governance and oversight**

Civilian oversight of the security sector, both through State institutions and civil society groups, can be an important mechanism for ensuring effectiveness and accountability. The Secretariat of Defence (SoD), which oversees the F-FDTL, and the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which oversees the PNTL, are weak and require substantial assistance — particularly in the areas of policy development, financial management and administration. Sound linkages to civil society groups are virtually non-existent in both the MoI and SoD. Australia, Portugal, the UK, UNDP and other donors provide technical advisors to both the SoD and the MoI, but these agencies will continue to depend on such support over several years.

The Justice SIP identifies the strengthening of independent oversight institutions as medium-term priorities including: the Office of the Provedor, the Office of the Human Rights Advisor to the Prime Minister and the Office for the Promotion of Equality. Child protection, meeting international human rights obligations, and improving gender equity are related priorities (RDTL 2005c:20). The roles of the Parliament, President’s Office and Inspector-General’s Office are not mentioned specifically in the Security or Justice SIPs, though they also play important roles.

Timor-Leste’s Parliament has received only modest RDTL or donor assistance to strengthen its legislative and budgetary review functions. The parliamentarians are inexperienced and lack research, legal and other forms of support to more effectively carry out their role in Executive monitoring. Experience from democratic systems in Africa indicates when parliaments cannot effectively play this role, the risks of potential abuses of power and poor performance within the security sector increase (see, for example, Ferguson and Isima 2004). The President’s Office has also only received modest capacity-building support, mainly from Australia.

The links between human rights, the rule of law and justice are recognised in the Justice SIP. The RDTL established a human rights advisory position in the Prime Minister’s Office in 2002, signed up to many important international human rights conventions and treaties and completed a Human Rights Action Plan in 2003. Human rights focal points have been appointed at the district and line ministries level but their main responsibility seems to be data collection to meet treaty reporting obligations (RDTL 2005c:20). This emphasis could potentially be distracting from other practical domestic human rights needs in a situation of competition for scarce resources.

The establishment of the Provedor’s (Ombudsman) Office has been slow, with the position of the Provedor still vacant, and the Inspector-General’s Office — which is not independent from the Executive — has sometimes suffered from delays and transparency issues in Executive follow-up on cases. The Justice SIP notes that the staff in the Provedor’s Office is small to carry out both investigations and informational activities, particularly if this office assumes a large role in overseeing the armed forces and the police. Likewise, the Justice SIP calls for more training on investigative journalism and reporting on corruption, noting ‘the quality of reporting is weak’ (RDTL 2005c:24). However, little budget is actually allocated for these activities.

Most security sector policy and legislation is not being developed in close consultation with civil society, nor is there much monitoring of these issues by civil society groups. The closest one gets to this is law and justice monitoring through international NGOs, such as the Asia Foundation, and a small number of local NGOs like the Judicial Support Monitoring Program. If security objectives are to be achieved, there need to be high levels of understanding, ownership and local participation. Support and advocacy for more public consultation on SSR policy development — particularly in the development of national security and defence policies — and monitoring of SSR by civil society groups should be a priority of the RDTL and donors.

More broadly, there has been donor-RDTL policy dialogue and activity on the development of independent oversight institutions and civil society strengthening. The Justice SIP also contains a call for improved donor coordination in these areas. This is welcome but, in the process, both the RDTL and donors need to ask whether there is a danger in relying predominantly on donor financing for the development of these institutions without an upfront commitment to further RDTL recurrent cost resourcing? And how serious is the commitment to human rights and independent oversight? The RDTL leadership does not always convincingly demonstrate the separation of powers or democratic principles as seen in incidents where there has been questionable use of police force, for example during the Suai public rally and Dili mosque raid in 2004.

Management and monitoring of security expenditure levels has been a concern of both the RDTL and donors. A recurrent
cost ceiling for policing and defence was set in the Transitional Support Programme's Action Matrix as part of the RDTL's poor budgeting process, which is regularly monitored. The Security SIP also offers the first summary of resources from all sources going into defence and policing. If the UN peacekeeping operation is excluded, estimates of total spending on the police, defence and other security institutions can be roughly estimated around US$230 million over the past five years or 11-12 percent of GDP.

... clearly a level of spending that is not sustainable for a relatively poor country ... with pressing development problems on many other fronts (RDTL 2005b:7).

The SIP proposes that total expenditure for police, internal security and defence be set at about US$150 million over fiscal years 2004-2005 to 2008-2009 or about 6.5 per cent of GDP. After this, security spending would decline to around four percent of GDP (RDTL 2005b:ix). This appears to be going in the right direction. At the same time, the current ratio of police per head of population is about 1:300 (over 3,300 officers), which is approximately twice that of developed countries and four times that of other developing countries (with plans for another 250 recruits in 2005-2006) (RDTL 2005b:16). The defence force is also very large for a small country, at 1:435. The combined personnel numbers have put upward pressure on the country's security budget in relation to other developmental priorities.

The SIP also seeks considerable donor investment in physical infrastructure when maintenance budgets are already struggling. The Force 20/20 study is examining these issues in relation to the F-FDTL and an Australia-UK police capacity-building programme is strengthening police planning and budgeting, but what if overall proposed expenditure is found to be unsustainably high? If so, what are viable solutions that will not create more problems than they solve if they involve decisions about shedding staff, including veterans in a poor labour market?

Security forces and judiciary
The initial recruitment policies for the PNTL and F-FDTL were controversial and have contributed to tensions between the two forces. The early selection of many police from the former Indonesian police force led to tensions with the F-FDTL and between the political and police leadership. In the case of the F-FDTL, decisions on its creation and composition were linked to an urgent need to deal with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) issues for ex-Falinitil fighters. While the DDR programmes largely met their main objectives, the planning timeframe was too short to fully analyse the complex political and social dynamics of ex-combatants. For example, the current F-FDTL leader is highly respected by most former Falinitil fighters. What will be the impact of an eventual change in leadership, given that there is as yet no obvious quality succession pool and this is not a homogenous group?

Donor coordination in defence has been reasonably effective. Australia is the largest donor and is providing support to the F-FDTL to develop its policy, administrative, and financial capabilities over an extended timeframe (five to ten years). The challenges are considerable.

Unlike the F-FDTL, which depended on bilateral support for its early development, policing was dominated by the UN missions, with police from over 40 countries providing training and other assistance to the PNTL. However, this was being done without an agreed model for cooperation with the RDTL, leading to confusion within the PNTL. Linkages between the police, judicial and penal systems were minimal. These issues were identified prior to the end of UNTAET and a UN-led donor-RDTL Joint Assessment Mission was undertaken in November 2002. Subsequently, Australia, the UK and the UN provided technical advisers to the RDTL to build institutional development planning and budgeting capacity. A major bilateral Australia-UK law and justice capacity-building activity also commenced in June 2004.

The PNTL is slowly making progress, including plans to strengthen community policing and support the implementation of legislation on domestic violence, the most reported crime in Timor-Leste. Planning and budgeting functions are starting to take shape, and the PNTL did manage to maintain discipline during recent demonstrations over religious instruction in schools. However, human rights continue to flare up as a controversial issue, the most recent incident involving an American citizen, which led to the suspension of the US International Criminal Investigation Assistance Program. Reports of corruption and competency issues among the PNTL's border patrol units have also increased in recent months.

Both the F-FDTL and the PNTL are facing issues of low pay and conditions of service. Such issues can push security forces into corrupt practices. In Sierra Leone, development assistance has included resourcing the police with uniforms, equipment, supplies and salaries (Fitzgerald 2004). However, there are risks of creating dependencies or diverting government resources to unsustainable forms of expenditure. These are hard issues but require early attention if RDTL and donor capacity-building and institutional efforts are to be sustainable and appropriate.

Timor-Leste's SIPs are silent on plans for its intelligence services. It is important that the RDTL's plans in this area are made public. International experience has shown that civilian oversight of intelligence services is necessary to give political guidance to these agencies, to monitor their performance and to prevent political abuses (see, for example, Born 2005).
The judicial system is governed by an unclear legal and policy framework, combined with poorly trained and inexperienced personnel. While the penal system has also been the subject of joint assessment and past international support, there has been relatively little attention given by donors to this pillar of the justice system. The RDTL has recognised these weaknesses. In late 2002, UNDP and the RDTL carried out a judicial sector review and developed a coordinated justice system assistance programme. The RDTL has also identified a number of actions in the Justice SIP including: establishing laws to regulate the justice sector institutions; developing a clear policy for the judicial sector; putting in place oversight mechanisms; and increasing the capacities of the sector, including support for prisons. Support for rights, equality and justice (and local government) are projected to increase from US$40 million to US$70 million up to 2007-2008, with an additional US$19 million requested from donors (RDTL 2005c). While there are several donors to the justice sector, the US and Australia being the largest (Justice SIP 2005), it is unclear whether these funding expectations are realistic. If not, what are the implications for development of the justice sector?

Also, customary law is given little priority in the Justice SIP. Finding ways to incorporate East Timorese justice models into the formal system would seem to be an effective means to develop a more affordable and efficient judicial system, as has been the experience in many other countries (Hohe and Nixon 2003; see Graydon paper, this issue).

While the RDTL has made progress in a difficult sector, some important political questions remain. For example, how can better relations be built between the Executive and other arms of the judiciary, which are currently characterised by tension and mistrust? How can independence in the selection of judges and prosecutors be maintained, while ensuring that competent personnel are appointed with accountability for their performance? The recent Judicial Training Centre (JTC) act seems to blur these lines, as it implicitly links the appointment of key positions to the Executive, through the Ministry of Justice's JTC candidate assessments.

Issues for future development cooperation

The RDTL has developed a sophisticated and thoughtful approach to SSR but it will be a major challenge to build ownership of it and implement it. It will also require long-term and well-coordinated donor support. The Australian government is a particularly important player, being the largest bilateral donor to defence and policing and one of the largest to the justice sector. The law and justice and defence programmes, and the RDTL, could work together more closely to identify ways in which to develop more complementary, mutually reinforcing roles between these programmes. Both governments could also better recognise the significance of the relationship and develop protocols related to development cooperation in this sensitive area.

As SSR proceeds, it is well worth all stakeholders asking: what are the existing institutional practices and incentives that have worked best in Timor-Leste? Are there ways to build the rule of law that may be cheaper and better? Do donors adequately understand the politics of change (that is, political allegiances, sources of future tension and power issues) in Timor-Leste to assess the likely impact of assistance on these dynamics? Are development cooperation policies and approaches based on research and evidence? There are key roles to be played by governments, academics, NGOs and other civil society organisations in finding answers to these questions.

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This paper describes some of the roles local NGOs in Timor-Leste have played in the last five years and considers the issues they now confront. It was the central roles played by youth and students, the underground resistance movement, the church and women in East Timor which helped bring the nation into existence. Details of this have been documented in part by Kohen 2001, Meden 2002, Nicholson 2001 and Pinto 2001. During the 1999 crisis, existing local NGOs were frustrated by their exclusion in the early weeks of the emergency (Bano, Hunt and Patrick 2001; Brunstrom 2000, 2003; Patrick 2001). They have since been critical of aspects of the response, especially the roles of the IMF and World Bank. the latter's Community Empowerment Program (especially its loans element), the unsustainability of some of the aid provided, and the dependency mentality which it has contributed to (The Rolling Think Tank Initiative 2004).

However, the end of Indonesian colonialism made room for NGOs and civil society to flourish. In January 2000 there were a mere 34 local NGOs registered with the UN, but by early 2002, 231 local NGOs were registered with the NGO Forum, which had by then taken over this role. The expansion of NGOs was not only numerical. Local NGOs moved into many new areas and sectors, though they were predominant in areas such as agriculture, education, health, small business and livelihoods, women's rights, and human rights. The NGOs brought special attention to vulnerable groups such as children, widows, and orphans. The re-formed human rights NGOs consolidated an already highly visible profile in documenting current and former abuses, undertaking human rights and civic education and advocacy, and lobbying for an international tribunal. Leadership tended to come from some of the NGOs which had existed earlier, and had re-established themselves with support from the international community.

In May 2002, as the new nation was declared, international development funding settled from the peak of the emergency to a lower, more sustainable level and gradually the number of international NGOs and official donors with a presence in Dili declined. Donors had used NGOs for short-term response to the crisis, to help get some basic livelihood and agricultural activities going, to promote civic education and democracy in the nation-forming process, and to assist particularly vulnerable groups. They supported women's advocacy for equal rights and participation, and made efforts to support veterans in a transition to a civilian life. While donors maintained some funding for NGOs, both international and local, their attention was clearly focused on building the state's capacity to perform its essential functions.

**The role of five NGOs in Timor-Leste since 2003**

Examples of the recent work undertaken by local NGOs is provided by the following five case studies.

**Hak**

Hak was formed to provide legal aid to victims of human rights abuse and political prisoners. It also documented the human rights situation and communicated that to the outside world. Now that a number of new legal aid organisations have formed it has reduced its casework and prefers to focus on proactively helping to build a state and a society which uphold and promote human rights principles. Hak monitors and comments on new laws and tries to ensure that they are in line with the human rights principles enshrined in the Constitution. It advocates for adequate public discussion about impending legislation (such as the Amnesty Law, Election Commission Law, the law establishing the Provedor's Office); works with the Justice Ministry and communities involved in complex land conflicts; contributes human rights education to police training at the Police Academy; works closely with the Prime Minister's Human Rights Adviser, for example on developing a National Human Rights Action Plan, and with the President in his Commissions for Veterans and Former Combatants.

Hak is also involved in basic human rights awareness-raising and education in the districts and nationally through organising 'base discussions' at sub-district levels, contributing radio programmes, publishing a newsletter, and undertaking many public speaking engagements. In addition they continue their efforts to gain justice for the victims of the serious human rights violations of the past through a campaign for an International Tribunal, and assist the Truth, Reception and Reconciliation Commission in its work.

**Fokupers**

Fokupers began by focusing on the link between women's health and human rights and offering support to women political prisoners and victims of violence (see de Sousa paper, this issue).
After immediate psychological and socioeconomic support to women survivors of some of the worst traumas of September 1999, their focus was on reducing the high levels of domestic violence. They have also been actively involved in the East Timorese Women's Network (Rede Feto) and successful efforts by East Timorese women to gain parliamentary representation and to have an Office for the Promotion of Equality in the new government. Fokupers work closely with that office and have been involved in drafting proposed domestic violence legislation and assisting to prepare Timor-Leste's first report to the CEDAW Convention. They continue their support to individual victims of violence with counselling and support, including legal and mediation support. They document cases for a data base, working with the police and other agencies to try to establish some effective domestic violence protocols; operate a women's shelter and a child care centre and are involved in gender analysis of proposed donor programmes. An important role is their work promoting education and awareness about gender equality through workshops, publications and radio programmes, as well as through a civic education curriculum.

**Caritas Dili**

Before September 1999, the main activities of Caritas Dili were supporting Catholic health clinics and particularly a TB programme as well as operating a rural development programme and providing emergency relief to internally displaced persons. After this date, Caritas was contracted by the UN for five years to operate a national TB programme on behalf of the transitional government. It did this very successfully, with considerable international support, gradually handing it over to the Government to operate itself from the start of this year. In the health area it is now starting to re-focus on developing a much stronger community based health education effort to try to reduce the prevalence of malaria, respiratory tract infections, diarrhoea, and maternal mortality. There is also a new programme focusing on HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention.

The rural development programme has been re-established in Comorro Valley and Maubara, undertaking sustainable agriculture and agroforestry, terracing, water supply, fish ponds, horticulture and training. The programme is now able to encourage community organising, something which was not possible before, but the staff are still developing their skills in this area. The programme is expected to expand into new areas over the next few years. Caritas Dili is now planning to develop a social development model which they have seen in the Philippines, developing Diocesan social action centres with a social education and social transformation programme at local levels to empower the poorest people. They also recognise that self-determination requires higher levels of self-reliance by everyone, including parishes and Caritas itself.

**ETADEP**

ETADEP is a well established agricultural NGO which has been operating across Timor-Leste since 1987. More recently it has supported agricultural programmes in four districts, trying to help increase production of rice, vegetables, trees and fruit, as well as livestock. ETADEP provides credit to farmers and hires out or provides loans for agricultural equipment such as tractors or threshing machines, as well as providing a broad range of training in agriculture, bookkeeping, environmental and gender issues. In the past they had to work indirectly with farmers, largely through local priests or individuals. Now they can work directly with groups of farmers and can take a more community development approach rather than a top-down technical assistance method practiced during the Indonesian time. They and Halarae, another agriculture and agroforestry NGO, worked in 2004 with the Ministry of Agriculture on a Field Farm School at Aileu, which enabled two of each of their staff to be trained along with government trainers in integrated pest management, and then to work with local farmer groups using the methodology.

One ETADEP staff member was also involved with a government study of cooperatives in Sumatra. ETADEP is a member of the HASATIL network which is promoting sustainable agriculture using organic methods, and are learning a great deal from opportunities for farmer exchanges and interaction with other organisations interested in these approaches. They recognise that they need to achieve greater sustainability in their own organisations and in the agricultural methods they promote.

**Timor Aid**

Prior to September 1999 Timor Aid operated on a very small scale inside Timor-Leste, focusing on livelihood projects and providing humanitarian relief. During the emergency it grew from a staff of five to over 400 within 12 months, largely due to its partnership with an Australian NGO, Australian Foundation for Asia and the Pacific, which helped it win large emergency and rehabilitation contracts (for example shelter, road building, health), and due to its extensive networks through the Timorese diaspora which attracted funding and international volunteers from far and wide. Once the emergency phase was over Timor Aid had to dramatically downsize. It now focuses on five major areas of work:

1. **Capacity building for its staff and the local NGOs in districts which whom it works;**
2. **Civic education and youth civic education, working closely with the Ministry of Education and the National Civic Education Commission;**
3. **Poverty reduction through microfinance, weaving projects and marketing; health education and trauma healing and promotion of the Tetum language;**
4. Assisting people with disabilities; and
5. Managing the photo archive project housed at the Independence Hall.

Timor Aid has offices in three districts and has worked in collaboration with government in a number of the aforementioned areas.

Networks
One of the interesting features of the NGO environment in Timor-Leste is the way several important new NGO networks have formed. These include:

- Centro Informacao Independente Tasi Timor (Independent Information Centre on the Timor Sea)
- Dai Popular — popular education
- East Timor NGO Forum
- HASATIL — sustainable agriculture
- International Finance Institutions (IFI) Working Group
- International Tribunal Network
- Mane Contra La Violencia (Men Against Violence)
- Rede Feto (Women's Network)
- Timor Sea Campaign

These networks enable NGOs to make good use of their limited resources, learn from each other and, especially where advocacy is involved, it seems to have some particular merits. In an environment where NGOs are still feeling their way with the new government, working together seems to be a useful strategy which gives each individual organisation some protection and support. It is also a sensible and useful strategy to enable them to liaise with the relevant government department or ministry efficiently, and to support each other to work in new ways.

Challenges and issues for NGOs
Today the challenges facing local NGOs in Timor-Leste are complex. In a new country where change has been fast and dramatic, many NGOs are still working out their own roles and relationships as well as working out the type of relationships they want to have with the new government. The government itself, unfamiliar with NGOs, has not really framed its own thinking on how its sees the role of NGOs and civil society in the development of Timor-Leste. Even the concept of an NGO is relatively unknown, especially in the community, and a great deal of work is needed to build trust between community members and NGOs, wherever they are from.

Relations with the State
According to neo-liberal theory, civil society (which is broader than NGOs but includes them) is viewed as having three key roles: to act as a check on state power; to promote democracy (especially procedural democracy, for example through civic education); and to provide low cost service delivery. Thus in post-conflict settings one might find NGOs playing some or all of these roles. Various writers and studies have also suggested that NGOs can contribute to peace and conflict resolution; socio-economic development; and rebuilding social capital and local governance (van Rooy 1998; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; UNDP 2001).

Aid, through local organisations, especially in the immediate post-conflict period, frequently reflects democracy promotion and service delivery roles in particular. One of the challenges in Timor-Leste is for the community and the government to clarify with NGOs what they see as their role in the next decade of the country's development. At present, and perhaps this is a useful way to proceed, those parts of government which want to explore work with NGOs are doing so, while somewhat mixed messages are coming from different ministers about their interest in engaging with NGOs.

For NGOs the challenge of forming relationships with government is made more difficult because the only model of NGO or civil society-state relationships many have experienced is within a repressive state, although they are now seeing some new models in Indonesia itself. It is hard for NGOs and government alike to envisage and create a cooperative, collaborative, complementary relationship, where both work alongside each other towards the nation's development. Roles and relationships have to be worked out and this requires new skills and attitudes, which will take time to develop both within NGOs and government. The relationships between NGOs and government at present vary according to the issue and the experience of people on both sides, with some friction at times, while in other areas there has clearly been very positive collaboration.

Currently, the legitimacy of some NGO views is being challenged by some government officials, especially as NGOs generally have very small membership bases. NGOs will have to consider the sources of their legitimacy carefully, and be exemplary in terms of their transparency and accountability. Preventing corruption and developing trust are key issues for NGOs. These issues are particularly important for the credibility of all NGOs who play any sort of 'watchdog' role of government and donors. Unless they have systems to ensure their own integrity they will be on weak ground in their dialogue with others.

Many NGOs are recognising that the old centralised top-down model of the Indonesian system will have to change if self-determination is to mean something more than just having their own nation. If it is to mean that communities can begin to determine their own needs and priorities and shape the kind of development they want, with the very limited resources
currently available from the state, NGOs which have developed a sound approach to community development may be able to help bring modest improvements to rural lives and livelihoods relatively quickly. An example is provided by the SAHE Institute for Liberation and others experimenting with cooperatives and organic approaches to agriculture.

Nevertheless, NGOs’ advocacy with and for, the rural poor is likely to be a feature of their work which may from time to time bring them into conflict with a government trying to develop a market economy within an extraordinarily tight budget. Most seem to do their advocacy relatively quietly, through behind the scenes, personalised approaches in Dili. Lack of decision making authority and resources in the districts also means that local level advocacy is largely ineffective. NGOs will have to juggle their roles as advocates for the poor and their efforts to be partners with the government for development. Managing the politics will not be easy in the still maturing political environment especially as the first parliamentary election approaches. Yet it is vitally important for future government-NGO relations.

NGOs are still, in some sense, on shaky ground as despite some efforts by UNTAET as far back as 2001 to advance an NGO Regulation Process, issues of NGO regulation remain unresolved. At present the Ministry of Justice has an associations’ law drafted to grant legal status to for-profit and non-profit organisations alike, pending the development of a Securities and Exchange Commission. It is not yet clear how this will relate to a law or regulation specifically on charities or non-profit organisations, which the Ministry of Planning and Finance may administer.

**Sustainability of the NGO community**

Many of the NGOs are going through a difficult phase of readjustment, trying to find their roles for the long term as well as securing funding. For many, their future existence will depend on strong voluntary contributions as long-term funding prospects look rather limited.

One of the most significant challenges to NGOs is to sustain themselves in a period of reduced funding. Some have developed relationships with international NGO donors which may last for some years, others are developing small ‘contract’ arrangements for conducting activities (such as trainings) on behalf of certain donors, or creating income-earning opportunities to try to become more independent of aid funds. Some require their ‘clients’ to pay for services, albeit at discounted rates compared to commercial prices (for example ETADEP charges farmers for use of its tractors). However, most are still heavily reliant at this stage on their international donors. Further, the initial emergency period provision of vehicles and computers may be costly for them to sustain.

**NGOs and governance in Timor-Leste**

Before coming to the question of how to cooperate with the local NGOs in Timor-Leste I would like to try to draw together some of the ways I think local NGOs can contribute to better governance in Timor-Leste. In doing so I want to acknowledge that NGOs are part of a modern sector, along with the new state, yet there remain in place more traditional forms of governance. One of the lessons from the Pacific Islands and Aboriginal Australia is that getting appropriate relationships between modern and traditional governance structures is very important for sustainability of the development. Timor-Leste has to work those issues out for itself, but it has the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of others who failed to do that, and whose development has been confounded as a result. In their work, NGOs would do well to consider how they think this intersection should be developed.

A strong theme from a number of NGOs is the need for a form of community level self-determination and greater self-reliance from the bottom up. NGOs could play a valuable role in this, as they can succeed in implementing these ideas with communities in some specific locations. This is an area where opportunities for skill sharing and mutual learning would be valuable. Evidence of sustained success will be needed. There are already some small examples on which to build, but there is scope for more evaluation and documentation of successful approaches.

NGOs can also weave relationships between community members, local and national-level authorities and donors where relevant. The development of networks of trust, and ‘social capital’ in a society which has been greatly fragmented and divided by the occupation, displacement, loss of land and people over decades is a very important governance role for NGOs and others, such as the church. Building trust, resolving conflicts, promoting everyone’s human rights and contributing to community development may help address the critical socio-economic situation which must improve if Timor-Leste is to remain sufficiently stable with its rapidly growing population to build a more secure economic base over the long term.

Finally, Timor-Leste NGOs should play a role, along with the media, in promoting government accountability and transparency to citizens. This will require them to first model good practice themselves, and then to strengthen their own research and advocacy skills and their ability to provide relevant information to the community, primarily to empower them to hold government accountable. The ability of NGOs to foster community debate about relevant public policy issues could be a very useful contribution to the development of a poverty-sensitive democracy in a semi-literate society with poor communication infrastructure.
Note
1. I am grateful to Ms Josephine Dongail, formerly from the Ministry of Planning and Finance, for this information.

References
Women of Timor-Leste: Seeking freedom in a free nation

Rosa de Sousa, Fokupers, Dili

The Indonesian military occupied East Timor for 24 years, during which time they had strong control over people's ability to speak out about their situation. Timorese women suffered from various kinds of violence. A lot of people talked about human rights and the brutality of the military towards Timorese people especially toward men, but there was little information regarding women's suffering. At that time, there was no women's organisation or NGO that paid attention to the situation of women. In 1997, about 15 men and women tried to break the silence by establishing a new NGO called Fokupers (Communication Forum for East Timor Women; see also Hunt paper, this issue).

Fokupers has assisted 467 women victims of violence such as sexual abuse, rape and interrogations, as well as widows and mothers who had lost their children as a result of the Indonesian military occupation. Fokupers conducted individual and group counselling and provided economic support during the emergency period. Up until now Timor-Leste people, especially those who had lost their children and husbands, are still waiting for justice.

Fokupers and domestic and sexual violence

The Indonesian occupation is over now, but Timor-Leste women continue to face violence. The patriarchal system still dominates the society. Where tradition and customary law favour men over women, this means that men own property, men inherit and men make all the important decisions. As a much higher percentage of women are illiterate, they become subordinated and economically dependent on men. The consequences are that Timor-Leste women are victims of violence that very often occurs inside their own homes, and are victims of decisions made both in the home and by the state.

One step forward is that women have started to break the silence of domestic violence and are now ready to go to the police station or an NGO to report it. In 2003 there were 179 domestic violence cases and 42 sexual violence cases (rape and sexual harassment) reported to the Dili District Police. But 104 cases against the accused were dropped on the women's initiative. In 2004 there were 246 domestic violence cases and 45 cases of sexual violence (rape, attempted rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment) (see Bere paper, this issue).

During 2003 Fokupers assisted 35 domestic violence and 25 sexual violence cases. In 2004 Fokupers dealt with 30 cases of domestic violence and 24 of sexual violence and up until May 2005, they have assisted with 16 domestic violence and 12 sexual violence cases. These numbers are just the tip of the iceberg. We must not think that domestic violence didn't exist during Indonesia's occupation, as it has existed in Timor-Leste for a long time, but was largely hidden from public view or discussion.

Why domestic violence is hidden from public view

The reasons women give for domestic violence being hidden include:

- family pride and status;
- the mentality of patriarchal system is ingrained;
- lack of information;
- not enough security in the government system;
- women are economically dependent;
- domestic violence is regarded as a private matter;
- no law yet that protects women as victims;
- lack of support from other institutions; and
- people/family will blame the women.

All of these factors contribute to strengthening the cycle of violence and lead to a growing number of women and children living in fear and injustice.

Support that Fokupers offers to Timor-Leste women

Fokupers recognises that women alone cannot answer and solve the problems. That is the reason why its motto is give a hand together to end violence. This is the spirit with which we work to realise our vision of a world with gender equality and justice between men and women. Our mission is to promote women's rights and strengthen the socio-economic capacity of Timor-Leste women, through assistance/accompaniment, policy, advocacy and community organising.

In cases of helping female victims of violence, Fokupers Accompaniment Division offers support through counselling, shelter, therapy, legal advice and preparing victims for court. Fokupers recognises that it is not enough to help women deal with violence, but that we should offer a hand to address the root causes of such violence.

Fokupers advocacy includes activities such as public discussions, on television and face to face, preparation of publications and articles in the print media, workshops and group discussions with women and with men, training,
including with police and with public servants, and advocacy on legislation with members of parliament and others.

Community organising
Working for women and children not only requires knowledge, but also our hearts and our love. And it's also not really enough to work by ourselves. For that reason Fokupers is looking for partners who want to support us giving a hand to help develop and improve the social and living conditions in Timor-Leste, especially for women, and to cut the cycle of violence by supporting Fokupers' activities with warmth and partnership.
Building peace through creating and strengthening friendships:
An exploration of the progress of friendship agreements

Fiona Ninnes, School of Professional Development and Leadership, University of New England

(P)eacebuilding understands that relationships create and emanate social energy and are places to which energy returns for a sense of purpose and direction (Lederach 2005:75).

Introduction
This paper explores and evaluates the principles, dynamics, and activities of the friendship agreements. Friendship agreements represent a new phase in Australian-East Timorese relationships and offer new possibilities in the way we interact with neighbours. This paper forms part of a larger project, funded by the Australian Research Council, exploring processes of peacebuilding and reconstruction in Timor-Leste. It is divided into four sections: in the first the beginnings of and the meaning attached to the friendship agreements are explored. Then the successes and challenges faced by current friendship groups are evaluated from a peacebuilding perspective. Finally, there is a list of recommendations, some of which are from seasoned groups wanting to pass on lessons learned to new groups, and some of which represent key findings from this research.

How is friendship interpreted?
Friendship agreements are a product of the troubled history shared by Timor-Leste and Australia. They have their roots in World War II when Timorese villagers assisted Australian soldiers as they battled the Japanese army. More than 40,000 Timorese were killed by the Japanese in reprisal for their spontaneous support for the Australians. After the withdrawal of Australian troops, the then Australian Government dropped hundreds of leaflets by air over the villages in Timor-Leste that read: ‘Your friends will never forget you.’

Some 55 years later, when the people of Timor-Leste were voting in the national popular consultation, the Victorian Local Government Association in partnership with the Australian Council for Overseas Aid facilitated the attendance of 40 Australians as international observers to the ballot. In the horrific aftermath, many Australians including a variety of community groups and local government associations offered practical humanitarian and material support to Timor-Leste.

In late 1999, the Timorese CNRT representative to Southern Australia, Abel Guterres, was approached by Darebin, Moreland and Port Phillip City Councils to establish friendship agreements with towns in Timor-Leste. Members of these councils had witnessed the ballot and the aftermath and wanted to formalise their support for the new nation. These relationships were viewed by those initially involved as different to the sister city relationships that many local governments are involved with, in that their guiding principles were to be the promotion of peaceful coexistence and giving support. These friendship agreements sparked enthusiasm among other local government associations, community groups and faith based organisations and today there are 37 in existence.

Friendship agreements are striking in their lack of homogeneity. Although a statement of principles and set of guidelines exist, the communities involved in promoting the agreements have adapted the concept of friendship to equate with their requisite set of skills and available resource base. For example, those groups with volunteers that have skills in development work take a community development oriented approach; those with volunteers with experience in local government issues are developing agreements based around transferring local governance skills; and those groups with volunteers whose perspective is charity or faith based have concentrated on providing material goods and assistance.

The meaning the groups place on the term friendship differs from group to group and is informed by their perspective on what it is they are trying to achieve. Although all recognise that friendship is necessarily a two-way process, those groups that concentrated on material assistance are extremely unclear about what they as Australians could learn from the East Timorese. They viewed their friendship as an act of giving material assistance to people who had less access to resources or skills. The act of giving constituted friendship. They expected little back as they measured the relationship in terms of what they could give. They placed emphasis on the logistics of getting material assistance to Timor-Leste, concentrated less on the more intangible relationship building side and were often frustrated by the lack of progress in the development of their agreement.

Those groups that had firmly established relationships were quite clear about what friendship meant. Being friends meant building a relationship based on respect, mutuality, exchange and
compassion. The relationship was seen as very complex with no set rules and groups recognised that their particular friendship would be influenced by the activities that were pursued. Friendship was interpreted as a network of links between Australian individuals and their community, and the East Timorese individuals and their community. The aim of the agreement was to widen and deepen those networks. Several groups emphasised that these agreements fundamentally differed from sister city agreements in that there was no obligation of mutuality. They were also very definite about what Australian participants were receiving in return: lessons on humility, forgiveness and sacrifice. Many spoke of witnessing the benefits of collectivism over individualism, something Australia had lost. All recognised the difficulties of building cross-cultural relationships within a context where access to reliable means of communication is limited, and saw it as a slow process of building trust and confidence.

What constitutes success?
Successful agreements were characterised by the number and scope of activities achieved or the strength of the relationships built within Australia as well as between Australians and East Timorese. Agreements were seen as means of community building in Australia — getting people who would not normally mix working towards a common goal. It also brought people into closer contact with their local government association and made them aware of what their local council could offer in terms of resources, skills and networking capacity.

Those groups with the financial resources to employ an Australian based project officer and/or a Timor-Leste based Australian volunteer were much further developed in terms of activities, relationships and strategic vision. Having a paid employee to devise, manage and progress the agreement resulted in more concrete results as well as more solid connections. Those agreements with project officers had committees set up in both Australia and Timor-Leste and were actively working on their chosen activities and developing plans for continuing activities. Groups that relied solely on the goodwill of volunteers were limited in how much they could achieve. They depended on the volunteers having the time and energy to plan and promote activities and grow the friendship. Groups that had the funds to place an Australian volunteer in Timor-Leste had a solidity and continuity of connection that allowed meaningful and sustainable relationship building to occur. They worked and lived in the community, were present at meetings of the East Timorese committee and were able to oversee and encourage the development of activities.

The Baucau Buka Hatene Centre is a clear example of what can be achieved with the assistance and encouragement of a Timor-Leste placed volunteer (see French paper, this issue). Similarly, the Youth Centre in Suai represents a vibrant resource tailored directly to community needs and community capacity to provide those needs. The centre provides Suai youth with leadership training, English and Portuguese language classes, computer software and hardware, and HIV/AIDS prevention awareness. Furthermore, under the auspices of the centre a district youth council was established which has become the umbrella for all the district's youth organisations.

Other key successes relate to the provision of essential infrastructure and services such as the:

- provision of water reticulation in Manatuto;
- medical equipment in Aileu;
- electric generators for the hospital in Liquiça; and
- playground and kindergarten equipment in Same and Los Palos.

Challenges
The main challenges identified by the groups are listed below with some reference to similar findings in the international literature pertaining to municipal linking across cultures.

1. Reliable and consistent access to means of communication.
2. Unequal partnerships where the East Timorese are viewed as passive recipients of Australian largesse.
3. Essential nature of bipartisan political support. International literature confirms that bipartisan support and formalising links are essential if municipal links are to succeed (see, for example, Cremer et al. 2001; Hewitt 1999a, 1999b, 2000).
4. Lack of finances from either partner. Groups not financially supported by their local government authorities depend on fundraising activities, therefore volunteer time and energy is spent raising the resources to be able to function rather than actually planning and implementing programmes and activities.
5. Meaningful evaluation procedures to ensure the activities and principles of the agreements continue to remain relevant. Evaluation needs to be based on questions such as: What were the short- and long-term impacts of a link? Who benefited? Who lost? Was there genuine joint planning and consultation? Was there genuine human growth on both sides? Does the link equip both communities to be more responsible participants in world affairs?
6. Ensuring sustainability, in terms of both project and personnel. Changes to key personnel in the district administration or local government can lead to a hiatus in the relationship. Of equal importance is ensuring the sustainability of the volunteers of friendship committees and groups. Groups may have to spend time devising strategies to ensure that there is a continuation of
volunteers; they may also consider giving long-term volunteers breathing space while encouraging them not to give up the group completely. Deepening the networks between the various groups is one definite way in which groups can enhance their prospects for sustainability.

**Key recommendations**

Those interviewed for this study were very aware of the lessons they had learned. Of primary importance to all groups with local government connections was the necessity of devising and implementing activities and plans in partnership with the district or sub-district administration to ensure that friendship efforts do not block, interfere with or duplicate Timor-Leste's National Development Plan. A visit to the linked area and community soon after the agreement is first formed was also deemed essential.

It was also suggested that agreements would be more successful if the groups form durable partnerships with others working in the same district or elsewhere in Timor-Leste. Some groups gave examples of how they had networked with Australian Volunteers International, members of the Catholic Church, Rotary, linked school programmes and other friendship groups.

All emphasised the necessity of starting small by focusing on something achievable. This would involve not only assessing and prioritising the needs of the East Timorese counterparts, but more importantly, recognising the limits of a group's capacity in terms of skills base, energy levels and practical support potential. It is vital to be able to deliver on what you promise.

The goals and objectives of the agreement need to be clearly articulated. This will involve being clear on what is meant by friendship and working towards strengthening the relationship side of the agreement as well as providing skills transfer and services. One key informant emphasised the importance of recognising the skills and capacity that had allowed the East Timorese to endure years of oppression and build a strong resistance movement that directed the transition to independence. Agreements that situate their efforts at strengthening that capacity, working with what already exists in terms of skills base, energy levels and practical support potential, are likely to be more successful.

Having a strategic plan with clear goals and objectives and the personnel and resources allocated to meet these will ensure that both parties to the agreement know what is expected. This will involve being aware of a group's volunteer skills base and recognising that people may be brimful of enthusiasm yet not have the capacities to deliver on projected plans and outcomes.

Ensuring regular and open channels of communication will allow for more open consultation around needs and priorities. Given the current difficulties with communication in Timor-Leste, it is hoped that the new friendship liaison officer can act as a conduit for the groups.

Groups also learned the necessity of being sensitive to the environment in which the agreement is operating. This involved respecting East Timorese needs while being aware of the implications of material aid. To what extent are the goods being sent dependent upon continuous supplies of electricity and regular maintenance? It is vital that the assistance given is both useful and able to be utilised by the recipient community. Perhaps the most appropriate question to ask is what is the most appropriate and practical assistance a group can deliver that will produce tangible outcomes?

Finally, many emphasised the primary importance of investing time and energy in building durable relationships, recognising that these relationships may become fractured due to changes in personnel and thus will need constant nurturing if agreements are going to succeed. Building a strong and durable friendship will require a long-term commitment from both parties. Relationships such as these are about building trust and confidence and this is necessarily a slow process.
I was born in Manatuto. My mother said it was either on the night of the 20th of June or in the early hours of the 21st, 1946, in the scorching heat that ripens the rice. By then, my sister Felismina, born two years earlier, was probably enjoying childhood delights in the balmy afternoon of a coastal village: an earthenware bowl of steaming chicken soup, with locusts from the plains at harvest time, or with balichão: seafood preserves whose aroma of algae would waft even into a child’s dreams, interrupted by the shrieks of fright at the sticky touch of dead octopus and amid stories of crocodiles. Only the Bible and the civilization of colonialism were able to destroy the bonds that tied the Timorese to their pair of goats, their vegetable plot and their beliefs in sacred sites (Gusmão 1994:4).

Evocative with joyful indigenous imagery the opening epigraph above comes from the autobiography of the first President of Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão. It was a text written secretly in his Indonesian prison cell in 1994. Xanana’s birth in 1946 was attended not only by the native midwives of his hometown of Manatuto on the north coast, but also by the ghostly figure of the Grande Dame of European colonialism, Portugal. This light-skinned baby was delivered into the old world of Portuguese Timor, a society founded on the greatness of Portugal’s early discoveries and fed by racism and colonial oppression.

The conflict between the two worlds, native and colonial, framed his early years. Xanana developed an ambivalent and conciliatory relationship to his Portuguese colonisers, encompassing both a hatred of their racism and repression, and a great love of their culture and language. As a young man Xanana’s ever growing disenchantment with his white masters became channelled into the positive but competitive projects of succeeding in the civil service and building up an exclusive Timorese soccer team who could beat the Portuguese at their own game. In fact when some Timorese were told of his leadership in the early 1980s they said, ‘Who? The goalkeeper?’ (Niner 2004:34).

His habit of transcending conventional boundaries from an early age and his uncompromising determination to follow his own unique vision remain strong elements of his personality in leadership. Xanana expresses his vision artfully and convincingly not just through his political writings but also passionately through his poetry. A key element of his leadership is an ability to communicate a vision that people can relate to and commit themselves to.

Until the 1970s the Portuguese colony of Timor was in a colonial time warp in the midst of newly independent Southeast Asian neighbours. But on 5 May 1974 the new Portuguese regime authorised the establishment of political parties as part of the long overdue process of decolonisation. In his 1994 autobiography, Xanana recalls his scepticism about this new political process that was creating tensions and divisions in Timorese society: ‘I struggled between getting involved and keeping to the sidelines. It was not that I did not want to join in, but I could see that the situation could get completely out of hand.’ But months later he says he realised that, ‘if I wanted to fight for my Homeland there was only one way to do so,’ and during FRETILIN’s first year anniversary celebrations on 20 May 1975 he joined them (Gusmão 1994:21). Yet as he further details in his autobiography he was always uncomfortable with open conflict and always sought to negotiate and compromise.

Resilience
On 28 November 1975, FRETILIN declared East Timor independent at a formal ceremony outside the palace in Dili and named Xavier do Amaral the first President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (RDTL) and Nicolau Lobato Prime Minister. Xanana, who was then working for the new Department of Information as a journalist and newspaper editor, was nominated to the Central Committee, FRETILIN’s 50-member policy making council. Nine days later, on 7 December 1975, the Indonesian military invaded Dili.

Armed with a recently augmented arsenal of modern NATO weapons taken from Portuguese stocks, 20,000 FRETILIN troops put up substantial resistance for the next three years. Behind FRETILIN lines life was easier than in occupied areas: food was still adequate and people were united. Xanana, previously trained during a three-year period of national service in the Portuguese Army, became a Falintil fighter, then commander. He lived in the mountain and bush camps alongside rural peasants who still today make up the mass of the Timorese population.

Day-to-day life in the traditional villages was organised by kinship and locality in a strictly hierarchical society. The local hereditary king or Lurá was regarded as having divine attributes and his power was almost absolute. The Timorese lived according to animist Lulik belief systems where the living and ancestor spirits co-existed. A growing intimacy with indigenous culture during the war profoundly affected his conception and promotion of Timorese or ‘Maubere’ nationalism. This resulted in acceptance of his leadership by traditional society, a privilege not extended to many other leaders, and to Xanana’s belief that he possessed a deep intuitive knowledge of the desires of the average Timorese.
Sacred home to the souls of Timorese ancestors, Mount Matebian was the site where Xanana Gusmão's life changed and he was transformed forever into an awas Timor, a warrior son of Timor. It was this crisis that transformed Xanana from an apprentice leader to a serious and hardened reorganiser and military commander of the remaining resistance forces. There can be little doubt that the gruesome events he witnessed during the endless bombardments had a dramatic effect on him. They forced him to take the initiative, escaping the terrifying encirclement down the back of the mountain with other surviving Falintil.

The dark years
This period and the years to follow, which the East Timorese describe as the really 'dark years' of the struggle, can be described as a crisis transformation and they undoubtedly toughened him. During the brutal 24-year war with Indonesia Xanana was transformed from a young apolitical outsider into a hardened guerrilla commander and keen political strategist who ultimately became the central unifying figure of East Timorese nationalism.

Throughout 1979 and 1980 Xanana and his Falintil accomplices walked from village to village through enemy strongholds to consult with the people about whether to continue or end the war and to contact remnant resistance forces. This period of grassroots consultation became the basis for his decision to reorganise the battered resistance. What Xanana learnt about guerrilla war during this time served him as 'the base for an organizational structure of the resistance' (Gusmão 1994: 58). His unilateral decision on Matebian to trust in people who had surrendered and nurture a clandestine network provided him with the first essential building block in the task of reconstructing the resistance. A mark of his leadership style evident from this time was a willingness to include, and an ability to negotiate with, anyone who was willing to serve the resistance.

The National Council for Revolutionary Resistance
In March 1981 the First National Conference for the Reorganization of the Country was held near Lacluta. Clandestine grassroots organisations were set up inside the camps and population centres of the Indonesian occupied zones to support the armed resistance in the bush. Xanana was elected National Political Commissar, President of the CRRN (the Conselho Revolucionária de Resistência Nacional, the National Council for Revolutionary Resistance) and Commander in Chief of Falintil, thereby assuming the top leadership positions in all spheres of activity. Xanana explained his central role and the acceptance of his leadership at the conference:

At the conference there were thirty or more political cadres. There were two or three guerrilla companies but they didn't participate. I directed the conference explaining the past and the structure for the future; tracing new strategies, new policies. As part of my proposal I appointed each of the cadres to an activity. They all agreed to the proposals I put to them. When we referred to the leadership evidently they accepted me; there was no voting. I was unanimously acclaimed leader. I am not trying to justify the method, but since we had escaped Matebian on 22 November 1978, I was the one who had been responsible ... this was why I was already accepted as the leader at the conference. You can understand if you see the process as beginning at Matebian. If there had been another he would have been leader (Niner 2004:106).

Charismatic leadership often emerge in times of crisis, operating in the absence of formal rules, shaped by their transitory and deeply personal natures, and Xanana's leadership fits into this mould (see, for example, Willner 1968). We can trace Xanana's development during just such a period of history, from a young unconfident, uncommitted outsider, to a man who had created for himself a central role as charismatic healer to his shattered nation in 1999.

Charismatic leadership: Strengths and weaknesses
One crucial ability of Xanana's is to empathise intelligently with, and relate to, all sides. This fostered a focus on conflict resolution and in turn translated into a moderate and inclusive leadership style. Such a focus on settling disputes and establishing consensus is the mark of a 'middle-way' leader, which has been described by political psychologist Graham Little (Little 1983, 1997a, 1997b). Such leaders are charming, gregarious, future-oriented and often charismatic. With these attributes they are able to draw diverse groups together by negotiation and compromise. One weakness of such a leadership is that it hinges upon the charismatic leaders themselves as they create an expanding circle of colleagues and supporters with themselves at the centre. Other weaknesses include a tendency to substitute themselves for representative organisations in the belief they know intuitively what their people want.

I assert that Xanana believed the unity required for the independence movement to succeed could only be achieved by leading alone, above the internal factions, continually brokering political compromise both internally and externally. While some may protest, history has proved him right. He became the man at the centre, often solitary, searching for allies, and soothing grievances and grief: a middle-way leader to use Little's expression. However, this independent leadership style also fostered a propensity toward unilateral and undemocratic decision-making fitting to a military commander during a time of war but harder to maintain in the confines of a modern constitutional democracy that Timor-Leste now struggles to foster.
Imprisonment

In November 1992, in the lead up to the first anniversary of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, Xanana was captured in Dili. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but by March 1993 took up leadership of the movement from his prison cell. Imprisonment actually increased Xanana's international visibility and some hailed him as the Mandela of Southeast Asia. In prison, for the first time he became accessible to representatives of the UN, foreign governments, and human rights organisations. He also made invaluable links with Indonesian political prisoners, many of them important members of the pro-democracy movement. From his prison cell in Jakarta thousands of kilometres away from Dili he was now more central to the independence movement than ever.

September 1999 and its aftermath

In the lead up to the 1999 ballot, Xanana warned of possible violence and called for armed international peacekeepers, but was forced to compromise and agreed to proceed with the referendum. The dramatic and violent consequences of the Timorese choosing their independence are still grieved in Timor-Leste and a matter for domestic and international courts. In September 1999 the Indonesian government released Xanana from house arrest amidst the extensive military and militia slayings in East Timor that followed the announcement of the pro-independence vote. Initially taking refuge in the British Embassy in Jakarta after receiving death threats, Xanana fled to Darwin in Northern Australia. On September 15 1999, following massive violence, the United States at last pressured Indonesia into accepting a peacekeeping force and the UN Security Council authorised an Australian-led multinational force (INTERFET) to restore peace and security in East Timor. After travelling the world to garner support Xanana returned home to a devastated East Timor on October 22 1999. In sorrowful scenes of mass public grieving Xanana made emotional pleas for all Timorese to return home, to forgive and to rebuild. Only a true charismatic leader could have managed such scenes on a national scale.

Xanana often appears to be a reluctant politician and president and has given several reasons for his reluctance since the early 1990s. He has described a blood oath he took with other Falintil guerrillas, saying, 'that I would never accept any reward, for I was only at the service of an ideal shared by us all, nor would I ever foster the ambition for an office or position, for I was not struggling for that reason'. He explained his reluctance further in his 1999 New Year's message.

The history of the Third World is repeating itself: the leader of the resistance will end up as president, even if he is not up to the task; guerrilla commanders will be generals and politicians will strive to become ministers. All because we were the heroes: all because we worked hard, suffered more than others! If this were to happen, it would be an outrage to the whole meaning of our struggle, the whole meaning of the sacrifices made by our people. It would be a betrayal (Gusmão 1998:231).

He now has to live with this self-styled betrayal and it must cause certain feelings of reluctance and ambivalence about his current position.

2005

Once again he is alone and in the middle, brokering a future between his people and their old enemies. Somehow, like Nelson Mandela (who gave him much counsel during a visit to Salemba Prison in 1995 and since), Xanana has reached an empathetic understanding of the enemies of his past, he does not hate them and is able to look to the future, embrace them and explore a process of reconciliation, which is often criticised by his own people. Most struggle to understand and wonder where Xanana's passion for reconciliation and forgiveness could spring from. While it comprises a degree of diplomatic and economic pragmatism, it could be more practically explained as the natural inclination of a middle-way leader toward negotiation and compromise. It could also be explained more idealistically as the last resort of a man who has fully appreciated the worst people can do to one another, and who has decided to embrace its opposite. The leadership the East Timorese people have invested in Xanana has given him the power not simply to survive the tragedy of recent history, but to overcome it. Xanana's is a privileged position that accords him the power to forgive and imagine a brighter future. Not everyone is so empowered, yet it is not a bad example in a country struggling to overcome its past and build that brighter future.

References


Justice and democracy continue to be difficult issues in Timor-Leste’s development as a nation. Events of the past six months have highlighted the critical areas in this process towards establishing a self-sufficient judiciary. There is an urgent need for an adequately functioning court system based on the principle of the rule of law. A first step towards instilling the conceptual foundations for the rule of law is to ensure that justice be done in respect of the serious crimes prior to, and during, 1999. Simultaneously, serious staffing and resource issues must be overcome within the court system to allow the people of Timor-Leste access to justice on a day-to-day basis. This journey will be difficult and will require the combination of ongoing international support together with the domestic political will for improvement.

An overview of the past six months

On 20 May 2005 the mandate for the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) ended, as did the UN-sponsored Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC). The conclusion of the serious crimes process has left a significant gap in the ability to pursue human rights violations committed in Timor-Leste in 1999.

UNMISET has now been replaced by the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). UNOTIL represents a one year follow-on and special political mission that will remain in Timor-Leste until 20 May 2006. It amounts to a continued, although reduced, UN presence in the country, and is an acknowledgment by the international community that continued support is essential for the development of critical state institutions in Timor-Leste (UN 2005a).

The practical functioning of the judiciary faced a significant setback this year. Judge Claudio Ximenes, President of the Court of Appeal, announced in January that all 22 East Timorese judges had failed their evaluations because they had failed written examinations undertaken in May and September 2004. As a result, all East Timorese judges have been suspended from hearing cases in the District Courts. This decision is subject to an appeal petition from 19 of the judges, however the President of the Superior Council for the Judiciary is yet to make a determination of the validity of the appeal, which is required before he is to appoint three judges to hear the appeal (JSMP 2005a:12).

Similarly, Judge Ximenes announced in May that none of the East Timorese public defenders or prosecutors (including the prosecutor general) passed their evaluations conducted in late 2004. As a result, only three prosecutors (who had not been working long enough to take the evaluation) and one international prosecutor remain eligible to work in the courts of Timor-Leste (JSMP 2005b).

There are now no East Timorese public defenders eligible to work in the court system. There is currently one international public defender operating and a further two international positions have been advertised by UNOTIL and the United Nations Development Programme. This will be the status quo until mid 2006, at which time those who continue training at the Judicial Training Centre will be eligible to become probationary public defenders or prosecutors. As such, East Timorese private lawyers will continue to be the main source of representation for defendants, which raise concern given that there is currently no law which regulates the practice of private law.

The failure of the judges, prosecutors and defenders to successfully complete their evaluations has raised serious concerns about the language medium used in both the examinations and evaluations. In an article published in the Timor Post 27 May 2005 it was noted that the prosecutors and defence lawyers were struggling with the use of Portuguese. The Post reported National Parliament member Alexandra Cortereal as saying the criteria that the Superior Council of Magistrates uses for the evaluations does not concern the actual capacity of the candidates, but rather their Portuguese language skills (UNOTIL 2005). There is also anecdotal evidence of problems occurring in the translation of the evaluations from Portuguese into Tetum and back into Portuguese in the evaluation of East Timorese judges (JSMP 2005b). One such report was in regard to a question in the judicial exam which in Portuguese read ‘Which are the 10 Articles of the Constitution that contain Human Rights’, but when translated into Tetum read, ‘Which Human Right is contained in Article 10 of the Constitution?’

In the last six months there has been a winding down of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), the substantive aspect of which concluded in early July 2005 (see Zifcaf paper, this issue). As the CAVR was winding down another two new commissions were established.

October 2005 43
to address the human rights abuses of 1999. In February, the UN Secretary General announced the establishment of a UN- backed Commission of Experts to review the prosecution of serious human rights violations committed in Timor-Leste in 1999. The Commission of Experts is specifically charged with investigating the quality of the trials by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta and the SPSC in Dili, both of which have failed to bring the principal perpetrators to justice.

Meanwhile, in early March 2005 the governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia launched the bipartisan Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF), with the objective of establishing the 'conclusive truth' of what occurred in Timor-Leste in 1999, and to prevent a recurrence of similar events (DEPLU 2005) (see Sarmento paper, this issue). There exists an obvious tension between the objectives of these two commissions, with the CTF seeking to close the book on the human rights abuses of 1999, and the Commission of Experts to reopen previous processes with a mandate to recommend measures or mechanisms to hold the perpetrators accountable. This tension was manifest in the initial refusal by the Indonesian government to grant visas to the three legal experts of the Commission of Experts, a decision only reversed in late May, following amendments to the mandate of the CTF.

**Ordinary crimes and the district courts**

A gaping deficit in human resources has been one of the major impediments to the self-sufficiency of the courts, the justice system in Timor-Leste and the progress of democracy. Indeed, a report released by the Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JUMP 2005a:12) declared:

> In 2004 the greatest obstacle to the smooth functioning of the justice system in Timor-Leste was the lack of functioning of the district courts.

It had previously been hoped that the appointment of four international judges to work in the district courts late last year would reduce the backlog of ordinary cases as well as providing guidance and training to the East Timorese judiciary. Initially, 80 per cent of the district court cases were distributed to the international judges to allow East Timorese judges to partake in the preparatory training course at the Judicial Training Centre. However, since the failure of all 22 East Timorese judges in their evaluations, the international judges have taken on all cases in the district courts (op. cit.).

As a result, the capacity of the district courts have been significantly reduced. Whereas the Dili District Court had previously conducted up to six sessions per day, this figure has been reduced to between two and zero since the restriction on East Timorese judges. Similar reductions have also occurred in the other district courts (JUMP 2005a:13).

Information relating to the functioning of the district courts was provided by the President of the Court of Appeal last year. The JUMP (op. cit.) reported that in 2004 there were 420 cases awaiting trial before the Dili District Court, 64 cases in the Baucau District Court, 34 in the Oecussi District Court and 26 pending in the Suai District Court. These figures were in stark contrast to the data prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor General which indicated a backlog of around 3,000 cases (op. cit.). However, whatever the figures last year, it now seems almost certain that the restriction placed on the East Timorese judges, prosecutors and public defenders will further impede the functioning of the district courts and further increase the backlog of cases awaiting trial.

Inadequate administration and resources of prosecutors and public defenders has also placed significant strains upon judges and the administration of justice. Even prior to the recent announcement of the failure of all East Timorese prosecutors and public defenders, problems of continuity in representation or prosecution have arisen due to insufficient staffing and the requirement to attend training at the Judicial Training College (JUMP 2005c).

An illustration of the difficulties arising in the justice sector is a proceeding that was heard in Dili where members of the national police service stood accused of rape. At the original 72-hour hearing, there had been a total of five prosecutors and seven private legal aid lawyers, following which a number of the accused were held in pre-trial detention for ten months until the commencement of the trial. At the trial there was only one prosecutor (who had not been present at the 72 hour hearing) and two private legal aid defence lawyers, only one of who had been present at the 72 hour hearing. The judge only questioned one of the accused before adjourning the trial. When the court recommenced over a week later, two different defence lawyers and a different prosecutor were present. Unable to contact the defence lawyers who had previously acted for their clients, the new defence lawyers requested the judge to adjourn the remainder of the trial until the other lawyers were available. They then left the court. The judge then appointed an apparently random Portuguese person sitting in the body of the court to represent the accused, before releasing them because of the lack of evidence and because they had been in long term pre-trial detention (op. cit.). While it is unclear how frequent these types of events are, there is little doubt that such occurrences reflect poorly on the state of the judicial system and undermine public faith in the process.

There are also ongoing significant problems with court administration. Matters do not receive a case number until they are scheduled for trial, rather than when initially filed. As a result, it has been reported that thousands of cases have been 'lost' in the court or prosecutor's office because they never
actually reach trial. This is compounded by the fact that many of the court administrators and court actors have received no formal case management training. Even after a case has been scheduled and given a case number, many of the files are misplaced (JSMP 2005d).

The district courts also face other difficulties arising from insufficient resources and administration. In addition to these, the JSMP (2005a:18-19) have outlined issues which they have identified through their monitoring process. These include a lack of:

- coordination and communication between different groups in the justice sector;
- staff management to provide supervision;
- case management;
- financial management;
- computer networking;
- equipment such as printers or photocopiers;
- translation of East Timorese laws into Tetum; and
- a designated room for victims in the courts.

Despite the challenges, the East Timorese judicial system has managed to develop and evolve in some areas. In particular, the Suai District Court commenced operating in early March 2005, having previously operated out of the Dili District Court. Similarly the Oecussi District Court recommenced its operation in March 2005 and continued to operate one to two weeks per month (JSMP 2005e). However, as discussed above, the functioning of the district courts is now almost entirely in the hands of international judges, prosecutors and public defenders and therefore still to achieve self-sufficiency. It can only be hoped that the training undertaken at the Judicial Training Centre will be thorough enough to equip the judges, defenders and prosecutors with the necessary skill and knowledge to take control of the judicial system when the UN finally withdraws from Timor-Leste. It is noted that the current mandate is to end on 20 May 2006, with the probationary prosecutors and public defenders not due to return until mid 2006 (JSMP 2005e). The JSMP also estimates the current cost of the international court staff currently operating in Timor-Leste to be approximately US$6.5 million per year (JSMP 2005a:29). As such, the need for a self-sufficient justice system is becoming increasingly urgent.

**Issues of traditional justice**

The weakness of the current East Timorese justice system with all its human resource and administrative shortcomings has also been criticised for ignoring systems for traditional justice (see Graydon paper, this issue). It has been suggested that the establishment of the official judiciary took so long that villagers started to depend entirely upon local justice and it is now left to the people of Timor-Leste to reconcile the two justice systems in their daily lives (Hohe 2003:353-336). However, there has now been at least one decision in the Oecussi District Court where the presiding international judge determined that the case did not need to be tried under applicable formal laws because all parties had resolved their problems in accordance with traditional laws and customs (JSMP 2005f).

The application of traditional law is subject to a constitutional dilemma, as the primacy of formal criminal law is entrenched by Article 31 of the Constitution while Article 2.4 requires the State to 'recognise and value norms and customs of East Timor and any legislation dealing specifically with customary law' (Constituent Assembly East Timor 2002). Nonetheless, it seems clear that given the difficulties facing the East Timorese judiciary, traditional law will play a significant part in the practical application of justice. From this perspective, some form of recognition of the validity of traditional justice by the district courts would be a step in the right direction.

**The Court of Appeal**

For the immediately foreseeable future, the Court of Appeal remains the ultimate judicial body in Timor-Leste pending the establishment of a Supreme Court of Justice. Like the district courts, the Court of Appeal suffers from significant problems of efficiency and effectiveness. Foremost among these is the fact that as of March this year there appear to have been no civil matters heard. The explanation given for this by UNMISET's Transitional Working Group Report on Justice is that some of the judges in the Court of Appeal cannot read the Indonesian Civil Code. However, JSMP notes that an English version of the Code is available. As such there is, at present, no effective process to appeal a civil law decision of the district courts. This is compounded by the fact that as of March this year, no international judge had heard a civil case in a district court (JSMP 2005a:22). This is an unacceptable situation for the business community, both local and international, as it offers little comfort to potential investors who ordinarily would rely on the court system to protect their investments. The consequence of this is obviously dire for an emerging nation which will become increasingly dependent on private foreign investment as the UN involvement recedes.

Reports from those monitoring the court also suggest that sessions often commence at least one hour after scheduled times and are subject to unexplained postponements. Also of concern is the coordination and communication between the Court of Appeal and the district courts. In particular, there is a lack of notification of scheduling to district courts, which means that relevant parties and court actors are not in court when required and the transfer of court files are delayed, impeding adequate examination of court files prior to appeals (op. cit.).
Serious crimes and dealing with the atrocities of 1999

The issue of serious crimes in this context refers to violations of human rights including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture, particularly relating to that which occurred during the wave of violence that swept Timor-Leste in 1999. With the closure of the SPSC in late May 2005 and the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Court last year, there is now no formal mechanism to ensure that justice is delivered for the victims of human rights abuses in 1999. However, the Commission of Experts does have a mandate to review the functioning of the SPSC and the Ad Hoc Court and can advise the Secretary General on measures to ensure the accountability of perpetrators and justice for victims.

A review of the results of the SPSC indicates that many of those guilty of human rights abuses are yet to be held accountable. Through the SPSC, the SCU has filed 95 indictments charging 391 persons (440 defendants) with serious crimes. Of these, only 101 defendants have been before the court, with 87 tried to verdict, 13 cases withdrawn or dismissed and one found incompetent to stand trial. As such, 339 defendants have not come before the court. In many cases this is a result of the accused being in Indonesia, with East Timorese law not permitting trials in absentia and there being no extradition treaty with Indonesia (Rapoza 2005).

This failure to prosecute is even more alarming when considered in the light of the fact that the 95 indictments filed in the SPSC account for only 572 of the estimated 1,400 people killed in the violence of 1999. Although similar statistics are not available for other serious crimes, such as rape, the percentage prosecuted is likely to be even lower. It is little wonder then that Judge Phillip Rapoza, former chief judge of SPSC, expresses the view that 'the job is not done' (Rapoza 2005).

The Secretary-General of the UN acknowledged in his End of Mandate Report (2005b) that:

[m]any participants, particularly families of the victims of the 1999 violence, have expressed concern that the process was ending prematurely.

This also reflects the general concern expressed by both the East Timorese civil society and the international community that economic and diplomatic relations with Indonesia be put before justice. The International Federation for East Timor, the East Timorese Catholic Church, the international media and East Timorese labour organisations have called for the establishment of war crimes trials and rejected the attempt by the governments of East Timor and Indonesia to 'resolve once and for all the events of 1999' (JMP 2005g) through the CTF.

Hope of establishing some further form of war crimes trial is pinned on the Commission of Experts, as the Commission's mandate is to recommend measures and or a mechanism to ensure accountability, justice and reconciliation. However, without the support of the Government of Timor-Leste, let alone the Indonesian Government, such a trial would be very difficult in practice. Nonetheless, the Commission of Experts does serve the important role of keeping the serious crimes process alive and with it the hopes of the East Timorese victims that justice will be done.

Conclusion

In the last six months, both justice and reconciliation are still needed to heal the wounds of the past and allow Timor-Leste to proceed towards self-sufficiency. The Committee of Experts provides a possible avenue to achieve this as other roads come to an end. Meanwhile, the administration of justice has faced significant setbacks through the failure of judges, prosecutors and public defenders in their evaluations. When this is considered along with the administrative challenges facing the courts, it is evident that dramatic advances will be needed before the withdrawal of international support.

It is still unrealistic to expect the East Timorese administration to pursue justice from the Indonesian administration. However, the assistance of the international community must continue to be channelled towards the pursuit of justice for the atrocities committed in 1999 and to provide a platform for the rule of law. At the same time, an East Timorese domestic commitment is required to begin to takeover the practical day-to-day functioning of the courts. A great number of challenges are to be overcome in this process, yet through this joint commitment, a self-sufficient judiciary in Timor-Leste remains achievable.

* This paper is updated from that presented at the Conference of the Supreme and Federal Court Judges in Darwin, January 2005.

Notes

1. This case involved maltreatment of a woman by a minor, in which the parties had been reconciled through a traditional settlement process involving payment of compensation to the victim.
2. The Timor-Leste Constitution stipulates that the Supreme Court of Justice is to be Timor-Leste's highest court, however Article 164 states that the functions of this court will be exercised by the highest judicial organisation existing in Timor-Leste.
3. The International Federation for East Timor is a body representing more than two dozen NGOs from all over the world.

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The future of serious crimes

Tiago A Sarmento, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Timor-Leste

Introduction

The precursor to the establishment of a tribunal to prosecute crimes committed prior to, during and immediately after, the referendum in Timor-Leste in 1999 was the creation of two UN-appointed bodies of experts, charged with the task of investigating what had taken place at this time and determining responsibility for any crimes. To that end an International Commission of Inquiry on Timor-Leste (ICIET) and a group of three Special Rapporteurs visited the region in 1999 and 2000 respectively.

On the basis of their investigations both groups recommended the creation of an international tribunal. It was clear, however, that the creation of an international ad hoc court, along the lines of those established for Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, was never going to be popular with the Indonesian military and political establishment. To avoid the potentially humiliating specter of an international court, the Indonesian government set up an ad hoc national court sitting in Jakarta to try high level suspects. Accordingly the Secretary-General did not adopt the proposal of the ICIET or the Special Rapporteurs but instead recommended that suspects be tried by the Indonesian courts and that increased assistance be provided to develop the institutions of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) with a view to possible prosecutions in Timor-Leste. In late 2000 UNTAET finalised the framework for a hybrid court functioning within Dili’s District Court as a means of prosecuting perpetrators of serious crimes in Timor-Leste (see Marshall paper, this issue).

The Ad Hoc Court

The Ad Hoc Court, established in 2000, has jurisdiction to investigate and determine cases in which there has been a serious violation of human rights. Human rights violations are defined as being the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. Jurisdiction over Timor-Leste was limited to violations that took place between April and September 1999.

The Ad Hoc Court commenced its work in March 2002. Of the 18 persons indicted before the Court, 12 were acquitted and six convicted at first instance. All of the convicted defendants appealed either to the Court of Appeal or to the Supreme Court, the final court of review in Indonesia. Five of those convictions have been overturned and the sixth appellant remains free pending determination of his appeal by the Supreme Court. There is overwhelming evidence that the Ad Hoc Court either failed in or was prevented from discharging its responsibilities in accordance with international human rights standards (Cohen 2003).

The Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC): Jurisdiction

The SPSC have exclusive jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture (regardless of where and when they were committed), as well as murder and sexual offences committed between 1 January and 25 October 1999 (UNTAET 2002). The SPSC were therefore conferred with broad jurisdiction enabling them to prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed in relation to the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. Consequently, in JMP’s view, the SPSC are empowered to bring to justice those responsible for perpetrating serious crimes committed in Timor-Leste during the entire period of occupation as well as in 1999. Nevertheless the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), charged with prosecuting crimes before the SPSC, appeared to adopt an interpretation of the SPSC mandate which limited its jurisdiction to offences committed in 1999 (Hirst and Varney 2005).

Current concerns

The right of appeal

The end of the SPSC has meant the departure of the legal staff of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, but not the end of the legal process for those with appeals outstanding from its decisions.

Six matters are still to be heard by the Court of Appeal. But with the recently announced failure of all East Timorese public defenders and prosecutors in their evaluations, there are concerns that appellants may have difficulty obtaining adequate representation. The remaining public defender co-represented three accused before the Panel in only one of the six cases currently awaiting appeal.

The right to appeal is a vital guarantee of the right to a fair trial and there ought to be concerted efforts by the East Timorese courts to ensure this is provided.

Preservation of evidence

As part of the SCU’s handover to national authorities, critical documents have been translated, a comprehensive database of documents created, and detailed instructions provided in respect of indictments which did not proceed to trial. However, it is unclear how these sensitive materials will be stored and managed and
whether they will be adequately protected. There is therefore an urgent need to ensure preservation of the huge amount of evidence which has been gathered by the SCU, particularly in light of possible future initiatives to prosecute untried suspects. Furthermore, it is essential to maintain confidentiality of statements given by reluctant witnesses on the understanding that they will remain confidential.

The future of the serious crimes process

Commission of Experts

The acquittal of all but one of the suspects in the Jakarta trials and the failure of the SPSC to try any senior indictees prompted widespread calls for an independent evaluation of their performance. On that basis, the Secretary-General ordered the creation of a Commission of Experts in early 2005.

According to its terms of reference, the primary role of the Commission is:

- to assess whether the trials conducted by the SPSC in Dili and the Jakarta Ad Hoc Court were impartial and in accordance with international standards of justice and due process of law; and
- to evaluate the extent to which they have been able to achieve justice and accountability for the crimes committed in Timor-Leste (JSMP 2005).

The Commission is empowered then, to recommend to the Secretary-General measures which would ensure accountability of perpetrators and justice for victims.

The Commission visited Timor-Leste in April 2005 and consulted with various individuals and organisations, including JSMP, for the purpose of its investigations. The Commission visited Indonesia to conduct a similar investigation of the Jakarta trials and recommendations to the Secretary-General 'that Indonesia strengthen its legal capacity, that its Attorney General's Office review its prosecutions and that some cases be reopened as may be appropriate' (UN 2005). The Commission is compelled under its terms of reference to acknowledge and assist the Indonesia Timor-Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) in its work. Consequently the CTF cannot be ignored in contemplating future options for the prosecution of serious crimes committed in Timor-Leste.

Truth and Friendship Commission

The governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia announced in December 2004 the formation of the CTF to look into the violence which took place in Timor-Leste in 1999. As Jose Ramos-Horta, Foreign Minister for Timor-Leste, said, the work of the Commission 'would finally close this chapter. We would hope and intend that this initiative would resolve once and for all the events of 1999' (ETAN 2004). JSMP understands that the process of appointing commissioners is now underway and that the CTF can be expected to commence its work by the end of the year.

According to its terms of reference:
- the CTF is to establish 'the conclusive truth' of what occurred in Timor-Leste in 1999 to prevent a recurrence of similar events;
- the CTF will be confined to 'the period leading up to and immediately following' 1999's Referendum. Consequently, none of the crimes committed during Indonesian occupation prior to 1999 will be investigated;
- the process will not lead to prosecution. Furthermore, offenders who 'cooperate fully in revealing the truth' could be granted amnesty irrespective of the nature of their crimes;
- persons 'wrongly accused' of human rights violations are to be 'rehabilitated'. What constitutes a false accusation is not clear. It potentially means persons who have been accused of committing offences but have not been tried in court are entitled to rehabilitation (the meaning of which is also unclear); and
- CTF investigations will neither prejudice the work of the SPSC nor recommend the establishment of any other judicial body (DEPLU 2005).

It is therefore unlikely that the Indonesian and East Timorese Governments will support or endorse either of the two forums which have emerged as the principal options for continued prosecution of suspects.

International court

In its January 2000 report the ICIET recommended the formation of an international court to prosecute serious crimes committed in Timor-Leste during the Indonesian occupation. This assessment was mainly based on doubts about the capacity or willingness of Indonesia to bring perpetrators to justice (Council of Europe 1978:143). Norwithstanding this recommendation, the creation of a court was deferred on the basis of an undertaking given by the Indonesian government to try suspects in its own domestic courts. As described above, however, the trials in Jakarta are widely viewed as a sham. For this reason there are compelling grounds to establish an international court to try suspects who have not yet been tried, either at all or by way of a genuine, impartial process.

There will of course be obvious political obstacles to establishing an international court, particularly one along the lines of those dealing with Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, an international court would now appear to be the only means of ensuring a rigorous and impartial prosecution of those alleged to bear primary responsibility for the crimes against humanity committed in Timor-Leste. Furthermore, it is incumbent on the international community and UN legal
experts in particular to propose alternative models for international prosecutions which avoid the high cost or lengthy delays currently characteristic of international criminal courts. This option appears to have strong support among the international community and local civil society in Timor-Leste. If established, an international court could focus on prosecution of a select group of the most senior suspects while lower level offenders could be tried in the domestic courts of Timor-Leste.

**Domestic prosecutions**

Although funded by the UN, predominantly staffed by international personnel and operating under principles of international criminal law, the SPSC were specially-constituted panels of the Dili District Court. Therefore, they were under the jurisdiction of the courts of Timor-Leste. It is consequently possible for prosecution of offenders to continue in East Timorese courts within the framework of the SPSC. Nevertheless, given the present lack of qualified East Timorese judicial actors, this would require ongoing support from the international community. At a minimum, international judges would need to be supplied to hear serious crimes cases because two international and one East Timorese judge are required in such proceedings under current law. Resumption of domestic prosecutions would not, however, address the principal failing of the SPSC, namely, their inability to try suspects beyond territorial jurisdiction. For this reason, domestic prosecutions would continue to be confined to lower and possibly mid-level suspects.

**Reparations**

Timor-Leste was devastated by the scorched earth policy inflicted upon it in 1999. It will take many years and a significant amount of money to restore its infrastructure. In light of this economic need, the pursuit of reparations is a feasible option which ought to be given serious consideration (see Kent paper, this issue).

A well established principle of international law determines that states are obliged to provide reparations for any harm or damage caused by a wrongful act or omission on the part of that state (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927:29). This has also been recognised as a basic standard in any open and democratic society in which there is respect for the rule of law (Council of Europe 1978:143). The establishment of an international court to prosecute crimes against humanity committed in Timor-Leste would provide the opportunity to incorporate reparations provisions in its founding statute. Article 75 of the Rome Statute is a good example.

Funds for reparations could be administered by way of a specially-created ad hoc fund financed through international resources, taxes, private sources, the sale of state assets, or the recovery of assets from perpetrators. This model has either been tried or adopted in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Malawi, South Africa and Peru. These funds rely to a large extent on modest international donations. The reparations model is said to be appropriate where the number of victims is large but difficult to define and the domestic economy weak. This fits the situation in Timor-Leste.

There are numerous precedents for the establishment of international reparations funds administered under the auspices of the UN. If Timor-Leste does pursue internationally-funded reparations — in the absence of an adequately empowered international court or on the basis that the government of Timor-Leste was neither able nor willing to provide reparations for acts for which it was not responsible — it will have to seek international multilateral funding from appropriate target countries or lobby the UN for the establishment and financing of a UN-administered fund.

**Notes**

1. One of these acquittals was overturned by Timor-Leste’s Court of Appeal. See JSPM Report, *The Paulino de Jesus Decisions*, April 2005.

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Restorative justice in Timor-Leste: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Spencer Zifcak, School of Law, La Trobe University

Introduction

The idea that justice can be done in societies in political transition through the institutional mechanism of a truth and reconciliation commission is one that has captured the imagination of many nations in the past decade. The newly independent nation of Timor-Leste, with its tragic history of civil war, imperial oppression and ultimately successful liberation, is one of the most recent to have adopted the commission model. In the past three years, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) has undertaken the complex and hugely ambitious task of encouraging national, local and interpersonal reconciliation in the wake of massive civil strife. It is timely, then, to examine the nature of that task and the manner of its execution.

A truth and reconciliation commission, when functioning effectively, may be considered as the quintessential institutional embodiment of a process of restorative justice. Professor John Braithwaite (2003) defined restorative justice as:

A process where all the stakeholders affected by an injustice have an opportunity to discuss how they have been hurt by the injustice and to discuss, and hopefully agree, on what might be done to heal that hurt, to repair the harm.

In this paper, I will be concerned with the process of interpersonal reconciliation as conducted through the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) initiated by the CAVR and implemented in localities and villages across the country (see Kent paper, this issue).

The framework

On the best available estimates, it would seem that more than one quarter of the entire population of Timor-Leste perished in the years immediately after the Indonesian invasion of 1975. This constituted one of the gravest cases of genocide in the last century. During the 24 year occupation, several large-scale massacres occurred, of which those at Caras and Santa Cruz cemeteries are among the best known. The most recent instance was the mayhem initiated immediately after the East Timorese people indicated in the referendum of 1999 their overwhelming desire for independence. Approximately 60,000 houses were burnt, most governmental buildings were razed to the ground, and an estimated 1,350 people lost their lives.

Given the scale of these most fundamental transgressions of human rights, it was never feasible politically to consider that those principally responsible should be covered by any general or specific amnesty, as had occurred in South Africa. Consequently, prosecution for crimes against humanity was the principal strategy implemented for the achievement of transitional justice. Nevertheless, it was not the only strategy adopted.

Under the formidable influence of Xanana Gusmão, the idea that national and interpersonal reconciliation should be attempted in the interests of achieving local and national healing also took hold. And it was in response to this pressure that restorative justice joined retributive justice as twinned approaches for the achievement of the new political settlement.

In institutional terms, the combination was expressed in a threefold division of responsibility. To prosecute those who had committed crimes against humanity, the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) was established under UN auspices. In parallel, the Dili District Court was given exclusive jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, murder, sexual offences and torture committed between January 1 and October 25 1999 (see Marshall paper, this issue). Within the court, two special panels were created to exercise this specific jurisdiction. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) consisted of two international judges and one local judge. Appeals from the Panels were heard by a Court of Appeal.

Those who committed serious crimes that fell outside the definition of crimes against humanity in the relevant UN regulation were to be proceeded against in the ordinary criminal courts of the land. Their prosecution was placed in the hands of the Office of the General Prosecutor and their cases were to be heard in the Dili District Court in the same manner as those of any other person alleged to have engaged in criminal activity.

The CAVR formed the final component of the institutional framework. In exercising its responsibility for community reconciliation, the Commission was concerned essentially with minor political crimes committed at any time in the past 25 years. Perpetrators willing to come forward and admit to such crimes were not prosecuted but instead channelled into CRP hearings. The hearings were designed to bring them together with their victims, to forge new understandings between the parties and to provide for appropriate mechanisms of reparation and reintegration.
On the surface, this political settlement appeared to be a balanced and coordinated response to the challenge of achieving political and criminal justice. Beneath that surface, however, there were many practical gaps, cracks and problems. There is not space here to enumerate them all. However, one in particular requires special mention as it is relevant to every aspect of the justice project. This was the absence from the country, and hence from the relevant jurisdictions, of almost every major perpetrator of grave political crimes. The most significant perpetrators, from generals to corporals and militia leaders, fled Timor-Leste and live either across the border in West Timor or even further West in Java and elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago.

Consequently, the achievement of political and legal justice was, regrettably, compromised from the outset.

**The Commission: Principal objectives**

The Commission's principal objectives as set down in its governing regulation were:

- to inquire into human rights violations that took place in the context of Timor-Leste's political conflicts;
- to establish the truth with respect to alleged widespread violations;
- to refer specific violations to the Office of the General Prosecutor with recommendations for prosecution where appropriate; and
- to promote reconciliation and to assist in reception and reintegration of individuals guilty of minor offences into their local communities.

A CRP could be initiated only where a person had made a full admission of responsibility. Having received and accepted an admission in written form, the Commission could convene a reconciliation hearing. This hearing brought together the perpetrator and his or her victims in a public forum, the purpose of which was to determine whether the two parties may be reconciled and, if so, what reparation should occur. Where an agreement to reconcile was reached its terms were lodged with the Office of the General Prosecutor. A failure by the perpetrator to fulfill the terms of the agreement opened that party to prosecution for the offences admitted.

At the time of providing his or her statement, however, the deponent had to be informed that a copy of the statement would be sent to the Office of the General Prosecutor and that its contents may be used against him or her in a court of law should the Prosecutor choose to exercise jurisdiction. Under its governing regulation, the Commission was required to forward all statements submitted to it for the purpose of initiating reconciliation proceedings to the General Prosecutor's office for review. If that Office determined that it wished to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute, the Commission had to notify the deponent that it could no longer precede with the request for a reconciliation hearing.

The formal effect of these provisions should be clear. Any well-informed perpetrator of a moderately serious criminal act was likely to be deterred from engaging with the Commission's CRPs. This was because, at the time of making a deposition, any such person could not be sure whether their action would result in their being accepted by the Commission as suitable for participation in a local reconciliation procedure or, instead, being considered by the General Prosecutor as appropriate for criminal prosecution.

The great difference between the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and this one was the absence of any provision for amnesty. Whereas in South Africa a perpetrator, even of very serious offences, admitted responsibility for politically motivated crimes on condition of amnesty, there was no such prospect in Timor-Leste. Those who came forward had to do so voluntarily and in the full knowledge that their actions may result in prosecution even if this was not their intent in making their admissions. The crossover of jurisdiction, combined with the absence of amnesty, meant that only people who believed that they had engaged in quite minor criminal infractions would come forward with a view to reconciliation with their community. Still, much could be done, even given that limitation.

**Conduct of reconciliation hearing**

A reconciliation hearing was generally conducted in the following way:

1. The chair of the local CRP Panel would introduce the reconciliation process, explain how events would proceed and place the proceedings within their proper legal context. Introductory remarks were also made by village leaders and sometimes by traditional elders. The Catholic Church was represented by the local priest who introduced the Church's perspective and then led a prayer for the success of the proceedings.

2. The perpetrator/deponent was then asked to read his or her statement to those present at the hearing. These would include the victims of the crimes concerned and members of the local community who had chosen to attend. Following the reading, the deponent might make any further oral statement that he or she wished by way of elaboration, explanation or apology. The deponent's statement was followed by questions from the Panel seeking further clarification. These questions were addressed to issues such as the...
identity of others involved in the acts disclosed, the chain of command that was in operation during the criminal activity with which the hearing was concerned.

3. The victims present were then asked to respond to the statements made by detailing the impact of the crimes committed against them or members of their families. They were also invited to ask questions of the perpetrator to clarify his or her precise role and responsibility.

4. The members of the community present were then invited to make any statements or ask any questions of the perpetrator in relation to the matter.

5. At the end of questioning, which could be extensive, a conciliation conference is convened, chaired by the regional commissioner. The conference consisted of the members of the Panel, the perpetrator or perpetrators and the victims present. The purpose of the conference was to determine the nature of the reparation that the perpetrator should be required to make.

6. The outcome of the conciliation process was embodied in a Community Reconciliation Agreement registered with the Dili District Court.

The reconciliation process was followed and complemented by a reconciliation ceremony conducted in accordance with customary law and practice.

**Evaluation**

**Community Reconciliation Agreements**

The primary outcome of the process clearly has been the successful conclusion of Community Reconciliation Agreements between many hundreds of individuals and their victims or, where no victims were identifiable, with members of their wider communities. Very few hearings broke down. In this the role of CRP Panels was critical. The Panels handled a hearing process in which frequently sensitive subject matter was spoken about, and in which the prospect of angry if not violent exchange was always a possibility, with very considerable skill. This was particularly the case given that Panel members had no prior experience of mediation of this kind, were given brief but effective training and then had to learn what to do in effect as they went along. It is notable but unsurprising in this regard, that Panels were considerably more effective in their conduct of hearings towards the end of the process than they were at its beginning.

In the course of the process, the wider community may have come better to recognise what had occurred in their locality, how individuals there had acted wrongly, and what responsibility might properly be attributed to the perpetrators and to the community leadership. In so far as the appropriate lessons are learnt, this is likely to be enormously constructive.

At its conclusion, there is a sense in which the CRP has become a victim of its own success. Two hundred hearings were conducted and more than 1,500 perpetrators came forward. Approximately 30,000 people attended hearings across the country. It became apparent that there were many more individuals who had engaged in minor politically motivated crime who wished to come forward. On a rough estimate, it may reasonably be suggested that that only one-third of those who expressed an interest in facing their communities with a view to reintegration have been able to do so.

**Integration with formal justice system**

A further, very significant product of the process has been the successful manner in which it was integrated with the formal and informal justice systems. There were some difficulties initially with the process of registering Community Reconciliation Agreements with the district courts. Nevertheless giving force and effect to agreements reached, thus tying them into the formal justice system, was a good innovation that added a measure of gravity and consequence to the community process.

**Melding with the traditional justice system**

The mesh between community reconciliation and the informal, traditional justice system was no less important and constructive. The addition of adat (customary) processes at the conclusion of the regular, mediation proceedings enhanced the understanding and acceptability of community reconciliation across the country. There were, of course, differences in the degree to which these processes were regarded as significant in different localities. Overall, however, it is clear that in designing the process to incorporate elements of traditional justice, its founders made it more likely that the reconciliation process would achieve its objectives and that agreements made would endure.

**Legislative shape and sanction**

The detailed regulatory framework that governed the conduct of the CRP provided legal certainty to the process. It also considerably assisted in defining the relationship between the Commission and the other institutions which were designed to implement a comprehensive strategy for achieving transitional justice. One might quarrel with the content of parts of the regulation, particularly that which defined the relationship between the CAVR and the Office of the General Prosecutor, but to have the interaction's key aspects embodied in law was clearly beneficial.

Not every product of the CRP was positive, however. It revealed many problems in its wake. I deal now briefly with the most significant of these.
Uncovering the truth?
In observing the hearings it became apparent that however much the truth was desired, it was not in the end the principal consideration upon which reconciliation would be founded. Rather, a decision by victims or the community to re-embrace and reintegrate a perpetrator appeared to rest more upon the level of contrition he or she had demonstrated and upon the Panel's and the community's judgment of their character and social acceptability. The conclusion that community reconciliation was a success, therefore, needs to be tempered by the knowledge that the truth did not always win out. In its absence, then, forgiveness and a desire to leave a conflicted past behind became the key.

Looking after victims' interests
A desire to leave the past behind and by doing so commence the process of rebuilding interpersonal and community relationships had another problematic effect. In significant numbers of hearings it had the effect of putting individual victims' interests to one side in favour of the wider community interest. Consequently, it left some victims unhappy and unresolved. Having been brought into the process by the desire of the perpetrator to reconcile, these victims left it with their antagonists in a better social situation and legal position but with their own feelings still mixed and troubled.

Compensation?
Similarly, and more generally, it became evident in the course of my study that the provision of financial compensation to victims was an exceptionally important issue. A universal programme of compensation, even if only symbolic in monetary terms, was supported by almost everyone interviewed. Such a programme, if implemented, would make an important contribution to national reconciliation by affording tangible, public recognition to those who had suffered. Regrettably, a comprehensive programme of compensation is likely to remain beyond the financial capacities of a government and nation whose economic plight remains grave.

Justice gap
Finally, and most importantly, the key problem disclosed was the absence of prosecution and trial for those who it was known had committed crimes against humanity and other serious politically related offences, whether during the events of 1999 or previously. Most people I interviewed regarded the CRP as a qualified but significant success. At the same time, most regarded the continuing de facto immunity of serious and middle-level perpetrators from any criminal or civil prosecution as an unqualified failure.

Conclusion
In conclusion, then, both strengths and weaknesses in the CRP may readily be identified. As will be evident from the preceding discussion, not all the weaknesses were within the Commission's own capacity to control. But from those that were, significant lessons can be learnt, not only for the future of community-based reconciliation in Timor-Leste but also for other national commissions that may choose to adopt a CRP-type model in the future.

It would be wrong, however, to focus in too concentrated a manner on the weaknesses. Because taken overall the process, in my view, has been a considerable success. Much has been achieved in a very short time frame. And many innovations introduced, particularly that of the CRP Panels, have proven their value against expectation.

This generally positive reflection needs, of course, to be qualified. This is because a firm conclusion about the success of the CRP in particular and of the Commission in general cannot be made for some time yet. A short-term Commission represents not the end of reconciliation but its beginning. The hope is that the beginning will be positive and that the process, which involves the deepest settling of feelings over emotionally long periods of time, will end well. To quote Priscilla Hayner's (2002:254) study of 22 such commissions:

In choosing to remember, in recognising that it is impossible to forget these events, a country will be in a stronger position to build a more stable future, less likely to be threatened with tensions and conflict emerging from the shadows of a mysterious past. A formal effort to address these painful memories can begin a process that may well need to continue long after a short-lived commission, but can make a vital contribution in recognising what has long been denied. In the end, a truth commission should not attempt to close these issues. Instead, if done well, it should hope to transform this history from a source of silent pain and conflict to a point of public understanding and acknowledgment, so that the future is not continually hampered by an unresolved past.

References

Women and justice in Timor-Leste

Maria Agnes Bere, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Timor-Leste

Introduction

Women in Timor-Leste in particular face a vast number of obstacles when trying to access and obtain justice. This paper offers an overview of several recent Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP) reports into East Timorese women and justice.

Problems and obstacles

Findings from JSMP's March 2004 report Women in the Formal Justice Sector were based on a two-month period of observation, in late 2003, when the JSMP monitored the progress of all women-related cases before Dili District Court (JSMP 2004:4). During that time, the majority of cases relating to women were either delayed or postponed. The report's main findings included:

• more than half (55 per cent) of all criminal hearings scheduled during the monitoring period were women-related cases. Most of these (78 per cent) related to sexual violence;
• the average time taken to process women-related cases before the Dili District Court during this monitoring period was 274 days;
• the vast majority (41 of 49) hearings of cases involving women scheduled or observed by JSMP were postponed. Only six per cent of all scheduled hearings in cases involving women related to the presentation of evidence;
• very little progress was achieved in cases involving women. Only 16 per cent of all of women-related cases actually proceeded to trial. In almost all cases that went to trial, no significant progress was achieved towards reaching a final decision;
• during the observation period, the court issued no final decisions in cases involving women;
• while a number of complaints of domestic violence were lodged during the period of observation, not one domestic violence case was scheduled for hearing; and
• during an interview with JSMP one Dili District Court judge demonstrated gender bias. Attitudes such as this are clearly detrimental to women whose cases need to be handled effectively and sensitively.

From the total number of cases observed, the main reasons for delays and postponements of hearings were that several or all of the court actors required to be present did not attend these hearings. These absences included failing to attend the court on the date set for the relevant hearing or arriving on time at the court but departing without waiting for the arrival of the other required parties who were running late, resulting in postponement.

Based on the problems identified above, JSMP in April 2004 established a Women's Justice Unit (WJU) in response to strong support shown to the JSMP report and other requests for information about women in the formal justice sector. The WJU continues to monitor cases and decisions involving women in each of the District Courts of Timor-Leste, with the aim of creating transparency in relation to the treatment of women in the formal justice sector.

Based on observations made by the WJU some progress has been made by the courts in the processing of cases involving violence against women. This statement is based on the fact that almost every day there is a hearing of a matter concerning violence against women, particularly rape, and these hearings have culminated in the issuance of final decisions. Postponements continue to occur, however, usually due to the absence of the victim or the defendant.

Violence against women: The statistics

There is a large gap between the number of cases of violence against women that are filed with the police and the number that reach the courts. It should also be pointed out that acts of violence against women are seldom reported to police (JSMP 2005a:4).

In 2003, 361 cases involving violence against women were filed by the national police force (PNTL). In the first eight months of 2004, the national Vulnerable Person's Unit (VPU) recorded 300 cases of violence against women. These cases were separated into the categories of attempted rape, domestic violence, rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment. It is unclear what type of crimes are defined as sexual harassment.

Court records give an indication of the percentage of all cases that appeared before each court in Timor-Leste that involved sexual violence. These are given below. The records do not make it clear whether crimes involving domestic violence are included in these cases.
ongoing deficiencies of violence against women show that there are a number of the level of justice East Timorese women can expect. The fact that these cases reached a final decision is an improvement by the courts of Timor-Leste in mid-2005 in which JSMP monitored court cases involving women victims, only eight decisions regarding crimes of this type were handed down.

The JSMP (2005a:13) identified the following reasons for this disparity:

- victims and their families withdrew their cases due primarily to economic dependency and also because of threats made by husbands;
- police and prosecutors sent victims of domestic violence back to their family to settle their case;
- police and prosecutors tried to conduct mediation to reconcile two parties;
- prosecutors transferred cases to police and ordered further investigation (with investigations remaining incomplete);
- lack of communication and transportation, prevented the processing of cases;
- lack of evidence; and
- ongoing problems with court administration and court management.

However, there is some indication of positive change. JSMP monitoring indicates almost half of the trials being heard in the district courts of Timor-Leste in mid-2005 involve cases of violence against women.

Judgement

Eleven decisions were issued by the district courts from June 2004 to March 2005 in cases involving women. The issuing of decisions by the courts in cases of violence against women and girls is a positive step forward for the justice sector in Timor-Leste. The fact that these cases reached a final decision is an improvement in the level of justice East Timorese women can expect.

Nevertheless, the decisions handed down by judges in cases of violence against women show that there are a number of ongoing deficiencies (JSMP 2005b:25):

- sentences for crimes of violence against women were too short and did not reflect the severity of the crimes committed;
- judges did not apply international standards in their decisions, as they are required to under the constitution;
- judges did not apply an appropriate level of reasoning in cases involving sexual assault; and
- judges were insensitive towards gender issues or lacked knowledge about the rights of minors.

The police and traditional justice

JSMP also conducted interviews with village heads and sub-village heads for a report into police treatment of women in Timor-Leste. These community leaders said while they were aware of the criminal nature of domestic violence and sexual assault, because the formal justice process is so slow that they generally chose to settle such cases through customary or traditional mechanisms.

This report also investigated allegations of gender discrimination against women by the PNTL. Part of this report's focus included investigation into the notion that 'police do not consider cases of domestic violence or sexual assault seriously; that police officers themselves are involved in cases of violence against women; and that sexual harassment of female police officers is occurring within the PNTL' (JSMP 2005c:5).

The report found many police officers do not consider domestic violence a crime worth putting through the formal justice process. Minor cases (where there is no bleeding or obvious physical injury) are usually referred back to the families or village officials to be dealt with through the traditional justice process. Even when the PNTL arrest the suspect, they use a 72 hour pre-hearing detention limit to give the victim time to ask to withdraw the case from the formal justice process.

The report also found few PNTL, government officials, or women's groups see this as a problem. Nor did any of the interviewees complain that PNTL were not investigating these cases properly. However, JSMP also found, 'given the cultural constraints a victim has to overcome before she reports domestic violence to the police this state of affairs is not acceptable' (2005c:15).

Interviewees offered a number of reasons for preferring adat (traditional law) to the formal justice system to deal with cases of domestic violence:

- traditional law is the law they respect;
- the formal justice process takes too long;
- victims think the formal justice system is a waste of time and gives more support to the suspect;
- adat is more effective and efficient; and,
- the court, to date almost always Dili District Court, is too far away.

Only one of the 38 people interviewed said they thought the formal justice system was better than the traditional justice system. This is 'because with adat the suspect can do the crime again' and 'adat does not ask the victim her opinion on the decision' (op. cit.).
Conclusion
Under the terms of Timor-Leste's Constitution, and its obligations under a number of international treaties, women are guaranteed equality before and equal protection from the law. An essential first step to this is to ensure women are treated fairly by the police when they report a criminal act. Following this, they also require a fair judicial process. It is hoped that the JSMP's reports will help raise awareness and as a consequence improve women's access to justice in Timor-Leste.

References
Waiting for law: 
Land custom and legal regulation in Timor-Leste

Daniel Fitzpatrick and Andrew McWilliam, Australian National University

Introduction
This paper presents the theoretical and practical objectives of a 2004 Australian Research Council Discovery grant awarded to the authors for applied research on legal regulation and customary tenure in Timor-Leste. In theoretical terms, the research programme brings legal and anthropological perspectives to new regulatory approaches to customary tenure in the Third World. In practical terms, the project aims to provide detailed policy-oriented data to assist Timor-Leste's future regulation of customary tenure. This data will have a significant ethnographic component, involving fieldwork in selected areas of the country, informed by an overarching comparative legal policy perspective.

Interdisciplinary perspectives and significance
While attempts at greater interdisciplinary understanding between law, anthropology and economics are by no means new, they have been hampered by previous economic orthodoxies that supported the privatisation and individualisation of customary forms of tenure. In essence, these orthodoxies argued that customary land rights constrained economic development by suppressing investment and preventing the mobilisation of land within a market economy (Dorner 1972) and led to the unsustainable depletion of resources as individual resource users lacked property-based incentives to limit their exploitation (Hardin 1968:1243-1251). 'New institutionalist' models of developmental economics, particularly as illustrated by the World Bank's landmark 2003 land policy review report, take issue with both these contentions. In terms of economic development, this school of thought argues that it is tenure security which generates investment, not individuated or formalised property rights as such; and that in certain circumstances tenure security is provided more effectively and at a lower cost by customary rather than centralised state institutions (World Bank 2003:23-44). The resulting focus on 'tenure security' instead of differentiated formal rights, builds on legal/anthropological studies of customary systems which show that investment in observable land improvements — building houses, planting economic trees, fencing off plots — tends to be rewarded with strong and often heritable individual land rights (Bruce and Migot-Adhola 1994; World Bank 2003:47).

In terms of natural resource management, new institutionalist economic models also argue that enforcing customary regimes in relation to common property resources (pastuwelands, water points, forests, marine resources) can prevent unregulated encroachments by outsiders, and thus help prevent unsustainable resource depletion caused by 'the tragedy of open access' (Toulmin and Quan 2000:7; World Bank 2003:41-42). At the same time, the internal design of local systems can also prevent unsustainable extraction by community insiders through a combination of individual usufructuary rights, internal monitoring and enforcement procedures, relatively clear boundaries and ritually generated group solidarity (Ostrom 1990:90; Rose 1986:711). Hence the current focus of many Third World conservation schemes involves integration of traditional common property regimes into state-based resource management plans and associated forms of joint or co-management (Fox 1993).

These doctrinal developments are reflected in an increased legal recognition of customary tenure in many parts of Africa and Latin America. Generally speaking, the current focus of most informed policy advice is now on adapting rather than replacing customary structures (World Bank 2003:53,76). One challenge raised by this increased legal recognition of customary tenure is to generate policy-oriented data and analysis to underpin that recognition. This in turn raises questions of methodology. What, for example, are the most appropriate ethnographic techniques for determining the nature of property rights vested in individual group members, or the ability of the group to make authoritative decisions concerning those rights? What specific inquiries are necessary in relation to land disputes, their effect on tenure security and their management by traditional institutions, particularly in terms of generating proposals for external conflict resolution assistance? What type of data is necessary to allow integration of traditional resource management modalities into state-based conservation plans? Thus, one of the complementary aims of the research project is to monitor and evaluate effective anthropological field methodologies and ethnographic subject areas for informing land policy development.
Leste's indigenous societies. These principles affiliations are expressed and represented through membership to socially significant exogamous groups focused around the patrifilial or matrifilial patterns of relation. Typically these constitute and illustrate the socially embedded character of networks of kinship and marriage alliance variously ordered by property relations in Timor-Leste. While the specific ethnographic aim of the project is to produce data relevant to the key issues of tenure security (including land conflict) and natural resource degradation (Fitzpatrick 2002; McWilliam 2003a; Metzner 1977; Yoder 2003). In both cases, a key point highlighted by recent experience is the phenomenon of 'waiting for law' (McWilliam 2003a:321; Yoder 2003:20-22). That is, in a significant number of cases local participants have emphasised the need for state validation of local processes and decisions. Without this validation, legal ambiguity and uncertainty persists and impedes the resolution of land conflicts and the implementation of efforts to conserve natural resources. In the continuing policy vacuum, anecdotal evidence suggests that a significant revitalisation of customary tenures is taking place.

Designing a pluralist system in which state law and traditional institutions combine to address issues of land conflict and resource degradation is notoriously difficult. Great care needs to be taken to ensure that legal pluralism does not increase uncertainty by allowing disaffected land claimants to engage in forms of 'legal institution shopping' (Lavigne-Delville 2000:97-100; von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 1999:19). Equally, the traditional caution displayed by legal anthropologists in relation to policy advice and prediction, in favour of detailed explanation and critical analysis, needs to be borne in mind (von Benda-Beckmann 1995:325-327; von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 1999). Thus, while the specific ethnographic aim of the project is to produce data relevant to the key issues of tenure security (including land conflict) and natural resource management, this data needs to be interpreted and presented in terms of the foundational principles of Timor-Leste's indigenous societies. These principles constitute and illustrate the socially embedded character of property relations in Timor-Leste.

All of the 25 or so diverse ethno-linguistic communities of Timor-Leste are structured and reproduced through complex networks of kinship and marriage alliance variously ordered by patrifilial or matrifilial patterns of relation. Typically these affiliations are expressed and represented through membership to socially significant exogamous groups focused around the concept of sacred houses (*uma luli*). These structures represent ancestral origin houses where sacred heirlooms are stored and where affiliated members of the 'house', often living widely dispersed for much of the time, periodically convene to enact rituals and celebrate their mythic unity (Traube 1986). The basis of customary land tenures across Timor-Leste is therefore closely associated with the socially emplaced rights and claims asserted by members of these ancestral lineage houses and their affines (Fox 1980; Hicks 1976; Renard-Clamagirand 1982).

**Sacred houses and customary land tenure**

All of Timor-Leste's indigenous communities share this common concern with acknowledging the collectively inherited protocols and obligations of particular ritual origin groups. In so far as these origin or 'house' groups reflect territorially based assertions of control and knowledge, they also represent locally constituted forms of tenure and ownership over variously defined jurisdictions. Typically, their authority is legitimated by recourse to founding myths, and enacted through ritual sacrifice and ceremonial exchange. To the extent that common property regimes persist in Timor-Leste, they do so in terms of the authority of particular origin groups over defined areas of land or coastal waters. All claims to land within these areas by subsidiary settler houses and households are nested within the precedence and historically prior claims of the founding group/s. This relationship tends to be one of interdependency, and based upon long-term relationships of marriage alliance and gift exchange (Fox 1980; Fox and Sather 1996; McWilliam 2003b).

Origin groups, or socially constituted sacred houses also form the basis for customary political structures throughout Timor-Leste. Historically, political leadership over any territory or region was drawn from the particular groups that asserted and maintained ritual and emplaced authority over defined areas (McWilliam 2005; Traube 1986; Renard-Clamagirand 1982). In the shifting and complex colonial history of Timor-Leste, the capacity of any particular group to maintain its hereditary authority and position was a negotiated and frequently contested one. Nevertheless, over much of Timor-Leste, customary relations between land and political authority remain substantially intact, especially at local levels of practice in villages (*suku*) and hamlets (*aldeia*). Thus a crucial issue in designing customary tenure-related regulations is to frame them around ethnographic data that is focused enough to generate policy recommendations, yet open enough to encompass the multi-stranded and socially embedded complexity of traditional property relations.

The significance of this research project lies in its practical, theoretical and interdisciplinary dimensions. In practical terms,
there is a unique opportunity to help design regulations to govern customary tenure in Timor-Leste. The new constitution states that custom will be recognised and integrated into the national legal order (Section 2, Article 4), but budgetary constraints and the need to address politically sensitive urban land tenure questions mean that specific regulations to govern customary tenure are most unlikely to be promulgated in the near future. There is thus a window of opportunity to generate detailed ethnographic data on contemporary customary land practice, apply that data to a range of comparative legal policy options, and present the results to assist the development of high quality regulations. The design of the project adopts an applied policy and field based research programme to develop typological frameworks for addressing land tenure complexity in Timor-Leste. It combines comparative legal policy analysis with strategic ethnographic inquiry.

Ethnographic fieldwork
The field component of the project addresses two thematic areas of customary land management and practice: land conflicts and natural resource management. In seeking to articulate the principles and procedures by which different groups reproduce customary relationships in land across selected regions, particular focus will be given to the role and efficacy of traditional leadership, the continuing significance and relevance of origin groups as landholding entities, and customary practices directed to managing land access and jurisdictional boundaries. These elements have comparative application across the diverse societies of Timor-Leste where shared sets of social categories and ideas are reduplicative and differentially expressed in other regions (Fox 1980; Fox and Sather 1996; Stewart and Strathern 2000:14). A series of policy related considerations will inform the comparative approach. What are the limits of customary authority and arbitration over land practices? Where customary tenures have lost credibility or been transformed into individualised holdings, what regulatory role has been left to traditional leadership? Do internal processes of customary landholding and customary law contribute to a more effective management model of public reserves and lands for public purposes? Opportunities for creating joint or co-management systems of resource management will be canvassed especially in relation to conservation reserves covering catchment management, forestry development and marine resources.

Land conflict and tenure security
Land conflict arising from the widespread displacement and resettlement of populations under Indonesian rule is an endemic problem in rural Timor-Leste. Many of the conflicts have continued unresolved for decades, and, despite preliminary attempts by government to resolve some of the major issues, the problem creates political disruption, undermines tenure security and constrains productive investment. Field research will explore characteristics of land conflict in customary tenure areas. Research questions will cover an investigation of the background of land conflict in a variety of contexts: their scope, history, and provenance. We seek to explore the practical limits of customary mechanisms for resolving land disputes, and the role of traditional leaders (Liurai, Dato or local language equivalents). We ask to what extent land disputes involve intra-group and inter-group conflict between resident groups and outside encroachment or resettlement? What is the impact of land conflict on tenure security, particularly in relation to land improvements and intensifications in agricultural use?

Resource degradation and customary land management
Resource management and conservation forms a significant national priority in Timor-Leste. Integrated water resource and catchment management are crucial to ensure the long term viability and sustainability of land resources for agriculture upon which the majority of the population depend. Coastal and inshore marine environmental resources also represent important areas for sustaining economic development. The research represents an opportunity to explore and catalogue traditional processes of land resource management and evaluate contemporary practices leading to land resource degradation in selected areas. Research enquires will seek to understand a range of related issues. What is the relative effectiveness of customary mechanisms in conserving land resources and their scope for enhancement? What kinds of pressures and motivations have resulted in unsustainable cultivation practices? Is it appropriate to speak in terms of the 'tragedy of the commons' in Timor-Leste? To what extent might acknowledgement of customary land tenures contribute to a more effective management model of public reserves and lands for public purposes? Opportunities for creating joint or co-management systems of resource management will be canvassed especially in relation to conservation reserves covering catchment management, forestry development and marine resources.

Conclusion
In theoretical and interdisciplinary terms, this research project applies legal and anthropological perspectives to a major doctrinal shift in developmental economics. The resulting model, derived and tested in Timor-Leste, offers the potential to produce theoretical insights into relevant aspects of the disciplines of law, economics and anthropology. For example, do new institutionalist concepts of tenure security and common property natural resource management have sufficient cross-cultural validity to allow meaningful ethnographic inquiry? Are notions
of tenurial rights and common property rules, even as understood in a socially embedded context, nevertheless too simplistic to allow translation of ethnographic data into useful legal frameworks? Is the very notion of predictive and policy-oriented ethnographic inquiry, particularly in terms of concepts generated by new institutional economics, amenable to anthropological enquiry (von Benda-Beckmann 1995:325-327)? These traditional concerns of legal anthropology will be incorporated and addressed in the project, in particular to assess the integrity and utility of a law and economics approach towards customary tenure.

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Community views of justice and reconciliation in Timor-Leste

Lia Kent, Human Rights Projects, University of Melbourne Law School

Introduction

The perspectives of ordinary people can provide a useful lens through which to examine the success of the reconciliation process in Timor-Leste, providing insights into the desires and expectations they hold with respect to both reconciliation and justice. This paper is based on the findings of a research study conducted in Timor-Leste between February and May of 2004, which endeavoured to document community perceptions of the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) conducted by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR). The study focused particularly on the views of 'victims' and 'deponents' who had participated in CRP hearings. The research methodology involved individual interviews with 23 deponents and 23 victims, in the districts of Suai, Ainaro, Ermera, Aileu and Los Palos. It also included interviews with community leaders, CAVR staff members and other organisations, and observation of CRP hearings.

Background to the CRP

The CAVR commenced its operations in April 2002. The initial two year mandate given for its work was later extended by six months. In the promotion of community reconciliation the CAVR was authorised to initiate the CRP, designed to provide an alternative to the formal justice system for resolving some of the thousands of crimes deemed to be less serious yet committed in the context of political conflicts between April 1974 and October 1999. The CRP sought to address these less serious crimes at a community level through a programme of restorative justice (see Zifcak paper, this issue). In the context of an overloaded, inexperienced and under-resourced legal system it was recognised that there was little prospect these crimes would ever be dealt with by the courts (see Marshall paper, this issue).

Perpetrators of less serious crimes could volunteer to offer a statement to the CAVR which described their actions, and request to participate in a CRP hearing as a deponent. CRP hearings were presided over by a three- to five-person panel which generally consisted of local leaders, including traditional elders, church leaders and representatives of local women's and youth groups, and were chaired by a regional commissioner of the CAVR.

Deponents who participated in CRP hearings were generally poor farmers who had been recruited into the militia, and were involved in acts such as burning houses, stealing animals, and looting. In late 1999 and early 2000 in particular there were concerns that some of these individuals, many of whom had fled to West Timor following the ballot, may upon their return be subjected to violence by communities suspicious of their involvements. Hence, some form of reconciliation with the local community would assist them to reintegrate peacefully.

Deponents' views

The majority of the 23 deponents interviewed as part of this study were positive about their participation in the CRP at the level of their personal lives. While very few acknowledged experiencing any acts of retribution from community members, many felt that explaining their past behaviour to the community and 'clearing their name' had been beneficial. For example, some believed that community members had harboured suspicions towards them, that people spoke 'behind their backs'. A number described feeling 'freer' or 'lighter' following their participation in the CRP, or that the process had facilitated their children's acceptance into the community.

Despite the positive change in their own circumstances, deponents commonly referred to the reconciliation process as 'incomplete'. Many perceived themselves as the 'little people', often describing themselves as 'poor farmers', or as the 'branches of the trees rather than the roots'. While they were grateful for the change in their own lives, they found it confusing or unjust that only the 'little people' should be held to account for their actions, while the 'big people', those who orchestrated that violence in 1999, continued to live with impunity. In many cases the higher level perpetrators remained across the border. There was a sense that these leaders continued to 'laugh at them' behind their backs. Without 'justice' for the perpetrators and ringleaders, many deponents stressed they would continue to feel humiliated and made scapegoats for the crimes of the leaders.

It was always envisaged that the CRP would operate in a complementary manner with the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), established by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to conduct investigations and prosecute cases of serious crimes in the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC). The division of responsibility for serious crimes and minor crimes appeared on the surface to be a balanced and coordinated response to meeting the challenge of justice and reconciliation. Yet unfortunately the reality in Timor-Leste has been otherwise. The serious crimes process has been constrained...
by a myriad of factors including the national limits of its jurisdiction and the slow pace of prosecutions. A significant proportion of those responsible for the most serious crimes remain outside the reach of effective prosecution (see Sarmento paper, this issue).

In contrast, the CAVR has processed minor crimes through the CRP with remarkable efficiency and at its conclusion in March 2004 almost 1,400 cases had been successfully completed through this process (see Zifcak paper, this issue). The somewhat ironic result has been that those who were suspected of committing serious crimes are often those who have had to make the least penance to the community. Indeed, it is not difficult to understand why many perpetrators of minor crimes feel a sense of resentment and humiliation about this.

**Victims' views**

CRP hearings were also expected to provide a number of benefits to victims of minor crimes. The regulation establishing the CAVR, UNTAET Regulation 2001/10, 3.1 (f) named ‘assisting in restoring the human dignity of victims’ as a core objective and opportunity for victims to confront their perpetrators in a public context was seen as a contribution to this process. Indeed, the idea that individual and social healing is possible through revelation is a common premise in the establishment of truth commissions; the South African commission, for example, adopted the phrase ‘revealing as healing’ as its catch-cry (Minow 1998).

The views expressed by victims in Timor-Leste however, suggest many of those who participated in CRP hearings did so with complex and ambiguous motivations and expectations that often did not involve the desire for reconciliation.

For example, consider the words of an older man in Ainaro whose brother had been killed during 1999. This man was involved in the CRP as a victim because his house had also been burned down during the post ballot violence. He explained:

> My brother Mario was beaten until he was dead. His body was dumped in the mud. They killed my brother like a buffalo and threw him naked in the mud. How can I talk about the burning of my house when I don't know who committed this murder? The value of a house or buffalo is not the same as a human being.

This man’s experience highlights a couple of significant factors. It demonstrates the difficulty of neatly separating victims of minor crimes, victims of lootings, house-burnings and sealing of animals, from victims of serious crimes. In many cases, they are one and the same people. And it reveals that for those who have experienced the death or disappearance of a family member, it is almost inconceivable to contemplate a process of reconciliation while justice for serious crimes remains unfulfilled. The motivations and desires of these victims remain, overwhelmingly, the recovery and burial of bodies, the desire for a full and truthful account of the circumstances surrounding the death of loved ones, and the prosecution of those responsible. CRP hearings were often viewed as ‘stepping stones’ towards the greater goal of prosecutions. In other words, CRP hearings were often not about reconciliation at all, but were perceived as ‘truth-telling opportunities’ for gathering evidence and establishing the facts about the death of loved ones that may one day be useful in a court of law. And it is important to note, I think, that although the CRP mandate was restricted to minor crimes, a great deal of information related to serious crimes matters was aired during the ‘heat of the moment’ of a CRP hearing.

For victims who have lost family members, participating in a CRP hearing has not brought about a sense of closure. Several explained that rather than feeling lighter, they continue to feel ‘heavy’ or ‘broken hearted’ because the CRP hearing has caused them to remember once more the painful events of the past. As one young widow described it, ‘The CRP has opened my wounds again. Now what is going to happen?’

It is precisely because of the links made between reconciliation, truth and prosecution that many victims have been disappointed with what they perceived as a ‘lack of results’ achieved thus far. Ironically, the extremely successful community education process conducted by the CAVR has contributed to the making of these links and the raising of expectations. In its socialisation programme the CAVR explained very clearly to local villagers that the mandate of its work was restricted to minor crimes, but that a complementary serious crimes unit existed to tackle the serious crimes issues. In other words, the people of Timor-Leste have been sold a reconciliation and justice package and now expect the serious crimes process to logically step in where the CAVR has left off.

**Reparations**

The question of reparations, both of the material and the symbolic kind, is another factor that has exacerbated the ambivalence many victims feel towards the CRP (see Sarmento paper, this issue). Victims and community leaders frequently raised the need for economic assistance for vulnerable groups, in particular widows and orphans.

In the absence of reparations there continues to be a prevailing sense of being neglected by the government, a sense of being merely *morte restu* (left-overs from the dead), as one woman described it. ‘We have independence’, she said, ‘but our lives are still the same.’

Allied to this sense of being ‘forgotten’ is a perception among many victims of economic disparity between themselves and the deponents. Several expressed a view that the deponents continued to ‘live well’, continuing in their positions as civil
servants or teachers, while their own lives had not improved. These perceptions have aggravated the sense of disappointment and bitterness many feel. For many victims, talk on its own, in the context of a hearing about a house that has been destroyed, for instance, yet receiving no compensation for the damage, has not been enough. As one man in Ermera described it:

We talk and talk from morning to night and then come home and we are still hungry. How can we talk about reconciliation when we can't buy salt? Reconciliation needs to be about more than shaking hands.

Or, as a young widow explained:

I am tired of talking to many groups. I feel like many human rights groups have come and interviewed me and until now I have not seen any result. I feel as though no one cares about our welfare, our children, our day-to-day lives.

Reparations are often a vexed issue in truth and reconciliation processes. In the South African case, several years after hearings have concluded, the commitment of the South African government to pay reparations remains unclear (Picker 2005). In Timor-Leste a decision was made by the CAVR not to develop a comprehensive reparations package but, rather, to make recommendations regarding future reparations initiatives. Instead, the CAVR developed a limited victim support programme to address the needs of some of the most vulnerable victims.

Such decisions may be acceptable in the short term, however the issue of economic justice is likely to remain of paramount importance for impoverished survivors of human rights violations in Timor-Leste. So long as victims continue to experience the everyday violence of poverty and humiliation, the perception of injustice will continue. The development of a comprehensive reparations programme in the near future will be critical to the credibility of the reconciliation process and to the success of any future justice and reconciliation initiatives.

The place of victims within the CRP

The dissatisfaction many victims feel with the reconciliation process also highlights some broader concerns surrounding the place of victims within CRP hearings. An inadvertent consequence of a number of policy decisions adopted by the CAVR was the marginalisation of victims' rights and needs. The CRP process was designed primarily as a 'community' process to facilitate the re-entry of deponents into their communities and provide an alternative to the formal legal system in cases of minor crimes. While reference was frequently made to victims, and the potential importance of acknowledgment, apology and community service for victims was recognised, no specific role or responsibility was designated to them.

For example, a decision was made by the CAVR that victims' consent would not be required in order to conclude a Community Reconciliation Agreement. Decisions around appropriate acts of reconciliation to be performed by a deponent were left to the CRP Panel's discretion, although the victim could express their views on the matter. Moreover, victims would be unable to initiate a hearing, but would be called to participate in it at the request of a deponent. A decision was also taken that victims could not pursue civil action in relation to their case in future, following the resolution of that case within a CRP hearing.

The policy behind these decisions was well meaning, and based on the need to ensure that the cases of deponents would be settled in an achievable way. Allied to this were the practical difficulties of ensuring the consent of individual victims in cases in which a deponent committed a number of crimes in one community. In a large number of cases, deponents are seeking to reconcile with a number of victims in their community, rather than a single person.

Yet there were consequences for the rights and needs of victims. The preparation and briefing of victims prior to hearings was often accorded a lesser priority, and at times was neglected entirely, with the result that victims sometimes had little understanding of the process they were participating in. So, for example, it was not uncommon to hear a victim explain that they had little understanding of the purpose of the CRP. As one woman stated:

I took part in the reconciliation process because the CAVR came and brought me a letter one day, asking me to come to a meeting. I didn't know what the meeting was about, but when I got there the next day I found it was a meeting about my house that had been burned down.

The chances of such individuals being able to play a meaningful role within the CRP hearing, much less understand the legal implications of the process were obviously limited in such circumstances.

Conclusion

The diversity of views expressed by both victims and deponents reflects the complexity of past conflicts in Timor-Leste. The majority of deponents and victims continue to live in small, tight-knit communities in which lives are closely intertwined and where community relationships have long and complex histories. Both victims and deponents have diverse experiences and approached the reconciliation process with ambiguous expectations and motivations. Despite this diversity, perhaps the most striking finding of this research was the consistency of the demand for justice for serious crimes.

In the minds of victims and deponents alike, the CRP was perceived as inextricably linked to the goal of 'justice'. When
people spoke of 'justice' for serious crimes, they spoke of formal justice, of prosecutions. Among interviewees, it was an almost universally held view that it was not acceptable for perpetrators of serious crimes (defined by most interviewees as murder and rape) could not go through a community-based restorative process to atone for their acts.

Recently, consideration has been given to the possible continuation of CRP hearings in order to resolve some of the outstanding cases of minor crimes. My own view is that continuing the CRP process, in the absence of a commitment to ongoing serious crimes investigations and to the development of a comprehensive reparations programme, would be counterproductive. Indeed, it would only serve to raise expectations of justice, leading to disappointment and frustration if these expectations are not met.

Yet, there currently appears little cause for optimism about the future of serious crimes investigations. The Serious Crimes Investigation Unit was effectively shut down on 20 May 2005, together with the downsizing of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor. The large number of indictments, arrest warrants and trials still outstanding and the lack of capacity of the domestic legal system of Timor-Leste, makes it highly improbable that the process will continue without the support of the UN.

Further prosecutions are also threatened by the apparent willingness of East Timorese leaders to sacrifice justice in order to promote friendly relations with Indonesia. This position is demonstrated no better than in recent statements by the Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta before the UN Security Council and Human Rights Commission, in which he asserted that Timor-Leste needs 'restorative justice' focused on the future, rather than 'retributive justice' focused on prosecution, punishment and the past (Ramos-Horta 2005:3; UN 2005).

A March 2005 agreement between the governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia established the basis for a Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) based on a 'forward-looking and reconciliatory approach'. The agreement specifies that the CTF will not lead to prosecutions and provides a wide scope for the granting of amnesties in respect of even the most serious of crimes (DEPLU 2005).

These developments are clearly not going to meet the continuing desires of the people of Timor-Leste, in particular victims, for justice. While there are no easy answers, the voices of victims need to be listened to, and accorded the priority they deserve, if 'justice' and 'reconciliation' are to succeed.

Notes

1. The terms 'victims' and 'deponents' are used for consistency with CAVR terminology, and are defined within UNTAET Regulation 2001/10.
2. Serious crimes were defined in UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture.
3. While small Acts of Reconciliation were generally requested of deponents during a CRP hearing, they generally requested of deponents during a CRP hearing, they generally involved some act of community service, such as repairing a public building, rather than an act of direct benefit to victims. Section 22.1 of UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/10 provided that 'Acts of Reconciliation' may include: a) community service, b) reparation, c) public apology and/or d) other acts of contrition.

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Local justice systems in Timor-Leste:
Washed up, or watch this space?

Carolyn Graydon, Asian Law Centre, University of Melbourne

Formal justice: From marred beginnings to a modern mess
The aftermath of the 1999 Popular Consultation and resulting vote for independence by the people of Timor-Leste provided a unique opportunity for the development of a legal system tailored to the needs of the East Timorese population. The United Nations was empowered to provide interim administration prior to independence and to create key institutions, and embarked upon the process of developing a Western model of law. This process was commenced and continued based on limited consultation with East Timorese representatives and with little awareness of indigenous systems of dispute resolution (see Marshall paper, this issue). During the UN administration lasting from December 1999 until May 2002, little to no consideration was given to whether aspects of local justice systems which had serviced East Timorese communities for thousands of years, survived both Portuguese and Indonesian occupations and filled the legal vacuum between the departure of the Indonesian occupiers and the arrival of the UN could possibly be integrated with the nascent formal system to craft a legal system specifically for the social, cultural and historical context of Timor-Leste (Hohe 2003).

Members of the East Timorese Constituent Assembly, elected in August 2001 to write Timor-Leste’s Constitution, decided to retain the UN established system of law and declined to give substantive formal recognition, in Section 2, to local justice systems beyond symbolic respect for traditional practices ‘that are not contrary to the Constitution and to any legislation dealing specifically with customary law’ (RDTL 2002). This was contrary to views expressed in a grassroots consultation process on the content of the Constitution, indicating that communities wanted local systems of justice to acquire substantive formal recognition and usage. As the transitional period came to an end, it became evident that the UN and the Ministry of Justice had in many ways failed to create a sustainable judiciary and legal system for Timor-Leste leaving the government in the unenviable position of attempting to build upon a fundamentally flawed system. A number of independent reports thoroughly dissected and documented key deficiencies in the legal institution and capacity building efforts of the transitional administration, many of which flowed from the lack of a coherent or comprehensive strategy. The continuing dysfunction of the formal legal system in Timor-Leste today can be explained by a range of factors whose genesis can be traced to the transitional period including a lack of planning and resources, inexperienced and poorly trained law enforcement, judicial and administrative personnel, confusion around the applicable law, the absence of critical legal institutions provided for under the Constitution, long delays in the recruitment of international judges and inadequate monitoring and enforcement of professional standards for court actors (King’s College London 2003; Strohmeyer 2001a, 2001b).

More recent government efforts to ‘undo’ aspects of the transitional system have created further havoc in the already beleaguered system. Government language policy in the legal sector has further stretched already inadequate interpreting and translating services and is undermining the impact of training provided to court actors (JSMP 2004). The introduction of an evaluation system of court actors which all national court actors failed (JSMP 2005b, 2005d), has had the effect of removing all the probationary national judges, prosecutors and public defenders from performing judicial and court functions for the next two years and further exacerbated the problem of the non-functioning of district courts. In short, things are likely to get worse before they, hopefully, get better. While still in its infancy, the formal legal system has so far proven unable to cope with even the relatively small number of cases before it. District courts in Oecussi, Baucau and Suai have virtually collapsed before they ever became fully functioning (JSMP 2905c), resulting in a highly centralised system where most administration of justice is conducted from the capital, leaving justice even less accessible to the vast majority of the rural based population. The important opportunity and challenge to win the confidence of the civilian population after decades of foreign rule and abuse by legal institutions, has essentially been squandered.

Inherent limitations of formal justice
Even if the formal system was functional, accessible, cheap to use and provided timely justice, it would remain marginal or be considered a mere adjunct to the core justice needs of the East Timorese population, as in some crucial aspects it remains irrelevant to some aspects of local culture and expectations of...
justice. One example which came up in a number of instances in rural areas during recent field research was the concept of imprisonment as punishment. Where the majority of the population is involved in backbreaking subsistence agricultural work, the notion of being provided with free accommodation and three meals a day with no work requirement, albeit with the loss of liberty and separation from community, is sometimes considered a privilege, not punishment. This perspective is magnified where a spousal violence perpetrator is incarcerated which often has the effect of removing all means of support for the victim and dependent children, a plight considered a far worse punishment than imprisonment. Another key cultural expectation of justice which is not met by the formal justice system is the need for reconciliation between the parties for the matter to be considered properly closed. Again, this came up continuously in recent field research where local justice leaders and victims alike expressed the view that reporting one's husband to the police for spousal violence was akin to filing for a divorce as it left little prospect of reconciliation between the parties and again left the woman and her dependents at risk of abandonment, again perverting the point of punishing the perpetrator. Many of the weaknesses of the formal justice sector are unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future, not least the strict financial constraints of the East Timorese government which renders unaffordable a legal system capable of penetrating deep into Timor-Leste's rural heart. One virtually unavoidable conclusion is that alternative dispute resolution processes of some form are indispensable and will remain a core feature of the East Timorese legal system, whether formally acknowledged and recognised or not.

**Timor-Leste's local justice systems**

Local justice systems currently fill the legal void left by the teetering formal justice system. The literature emphasises the diversity and highly localised nature of these processes, hence no unified 'traditional legal system' exists in Timor-Leste but rather a collection of local practices (Mearns 2001; Hohe and Nixon 2003). However, there are a number of core traits or common values which enable more generalised characterisation. Common features of local justice systems include their predominantly oral practice and transmission and their use of similar procedures involving each of the parties providing their version of events, and a process of mediation or arbitration where community leaders decide or mediate who is at fault and then oversee an agreement. Punishments most commonly consist of the payment of compensation but can include other sanctions such as oral or written undertakings to not re-offend, community work, public shaming or other restitution. Where agreement between the parties is reached, it is generally sealed by symbolic acts of reconciliation which includes drinking or eating together. The effectiveness or binding, compelling nature of the agreements depends upon the moral authority of the decision makers and the social pressure generated by the public nature of the proceedings occurring within small communities. Where agreement is not reached, either party can generally appeal to a higher local authority to reconvene the case (Mearns 2001, 2002; Hohe and Nixon 2003).

Another aspect of local justice systems which appears to be relevant to differing extents, is the notion that when a community member breaches a community or social norm they are also deemed to have trespassed upon the ancestral social order resulting in an imbalance within the overall cosmic system which must be replaced by the perpetrator through payment of compensation to, and reconciliation with, the victim/s. Failure to replace the lost value can result in punitive acts by the ancestors, such as the loss of crops or the death of a family member (Hohe and Nixon 2003; Hohe 2003). With the exception of murder and other serious physical assaults against the person (which may or may not include rape depending upon the circumstances), most see a role for the formal justice system only where local efforts have been exhausted and failed to produce an acceptable resolution. Those who bypass local justice mechanisms may in fact be penalised by local authorities for doing so.

**People pulling power or a lack of alternatives?**

Despite state legitimacy being withheld, local justice systems remain very popular, undoubtedly bolstered by the shortcomings of the formal justice system, but also due to being considered inherently valuable to grassroots communities. Features commonly cited in support of their popularity include their accessibility, affordability, immediacy, legitimacy and effectiveness within grassroots communities, use of local languages, understandability to the parties, promotion of strong family relationships, compensation based sanctions and their efficiency in bringing closure to disputes and promoting reconciliation between parties who live in small, close-knit communities. One recent study found that local justice mechanisms enjoy strong public confidence with more than 90 per cent of respondents believing that local justice mechanisms can be trusted as fair (Asia Foundation 2004). It is clear that the cases reaching the formal justice system represent only a tiny fraction of those occurring and that even out of those, a sizeable proportion are withdrawn from the formal system (JSMP 2005a), and referred back to local justice mechanisms by police, prosecutors and, in some instances, by courts, before being finally determined (JSMP 2005c). Ad hoc practices have developed outside of any law or regulation, hinging solely upon the judgements of individual bearers of authority. Another
variation on this pattern is the increasing incidence of police and prosecutors diverting cases from the formal justice process and mediating matters themselves outside of the law, often in cases involving crimes against women or other vulnerable groups (Swaine 2003) (see Bere paper, this issue).

Local justice or injustice systems?
Local justice systems also present a number of key weaknesses which include the lack of safeguards against violations of human rights, inconsistency and lack of certainty of decision making, vulnerability to partiality and corruption of local decision makers, lack of intellectual rigour in investigating claims and apportioning fault, absence of basic fair trial standards, limited enforceability of decisions through force of social conformity and the lack of fairness and accessibility concerning particular classes of persons including women, ethnic and religious minorities, poorer, less influential and new members of communities (JSMP 2002; Ranheim 2005; Mearns 2001, 2002). In light of the continuing failings of the formal justice system, there has been increased interest in examining possible models of accommodation of both justice systems, however in the rush to embrace local justice mechanisms as an answer to the formal justice systems' woes, its advocates can tend to gloss over some of the more troubling human rights issues faced especially by vulnerable groups, such as domestic violence victims. It is salient to recall that just as critical theorists have identified that modern law often privileges the needs and interests of dominant groups, custom based local justice systems may reflect an equally or more problematic alternative system for entrenching powerful social groupings at the expense of more vulnerable members of the society. In the process of enforcing social norms, local justice systems may further ensconce underlying values and practices which render vulnerable groups susceptible to violations of their rights (Sheleff 2000).

The need for, and challenge of, reform
Given the very significant challenges that may be faced by vulnerable groups seeking justice from local justice mechanisms, do they, or rather should they, have a role? An approach which is both pragmatic and normative may assist in answering this question. Pragmatic in recognising that indigenous justice systems offer an affordable and accessible forum of first resort and are likely to remain an essential part of the justice matrix in Timor-Leste for the foreseeable future, whether they are officially smiled upon or not. For many in Timor-Leste, especially vulnerable groups, formal legal enforcement is frequently an option only in theory. The lack of real alternatives means that indigenous justice systems should become a focus for reform and adaptation if they are currently incapable of delivering justice to vulnerable groups such as women (Nyamu-Musembi 2000).

Any approach should also recognize normative dimensions by acknowledging that any reform agenda should be focused at the grassroots level because people primarily draw norms to regulate their interpersonal relationships, including within families, from their immediate cultural setting (Sheleff 2000). The two legal systems are already highly interdependent but only through the improvised and unregulated decisions made by individuals. A more considered government-led process is essential to bridge the current gap between theory and practice, without which the prospects of the rule of law being firmly established in Timor-Leste continue to corrode. The lack of clarity regarding the legal system/s continues to create confusion amongst the populace, encourages 'forum shopping' between the two systems, and creates a risk of double jeopardy. Perhaps most importantly, failure to resolve this tension results in widespread abuses of human rights potentially putting Timor-Leste in breach of numerous constitutional and international treaty obligations which require the provision of adequate protection to its citizens against arbitrary exercises of power. While debate and research concerning local justice systems continues among non-government organisations and individuals, Timor-Leste's government has so far rejected all overtures to give serious consideration to formalising a role for local justice systems; hence reform in this area remains a challenge consigned to the future. Lack of current government engagement on this issue does not alter the assessment that despite the great difficulties and challenge of doing so, reform of indigenous justice systems should be a central part of any strategy aimed at strengthening the functioning and capacity of the justice system in Timor-Leste.

Transforming local justice to strengthen human rights practice
So what kinds of transformative processes could be contemplated to strengthen human rights practice in local justice systems? Such processes will be legitimate and most effective if they are internal to the cultures they operate within, for example by utilising a 'cultural transformation' (An-Na'Im 1994, 2002) approach which recognises that culture is dynamic, responds to social change and undergoes transformation over time. The example of Timor-Leste clearly demonstrates the limitations of relying on formal state-based human rights safeguards where already substantial formal legal safeguards exist but have only muted or superficial effect because the state is new, weak, poor and has limited reach. A deeper consensus throughout the various communities of Timor-Leste needs to be secured to ensure durable human rights protection. Especially government, but also human rights advocates should not overlook the importance of engaging custodians of culture and communities in ongoing relationships rather than focusing solely on state
apparatus as the primary vehicle for social change. A process of long term cultural transformation could provide new opportunities to creatively expand the field of human rights practice and is likely to produce more durable and sustained results as the change accomplished will have been achieved from within indigenous East Timorese cultures (An-Na'im 2002).

With appropriate state nurturing, a long-term process of cultural transformation could be undertaken to reform local justice systems so that they are better capable of protecting human rights and becoming a recognised partner in Timor-Leste's justice system. One factor rendering local justice systems in Timor-Leste conducive to cultural transformation is the post-conflict reconstruction phase which provides an environment supportive of change and renewal, and an opportunity to revitalise and rethink indigenous justice mechanisms. This could be done in light of the new reality, which involves not only the demise of foreign occupation of Timor-Leste, but also an overall 'shake-up' of who does what and how, making it an ideal time to make similar demands upon indigenous justice mechanisms and urge that some practices be open to question and reformulation given contemporary circumstances. The years of neglect in the development of indigenous law in Timor-Leste, caused by it operating under the harsh conditions especially of Indonesian occupation, may have sharpened the need for more rapid change or development hence providing an additional opening for creative, selective revival and reform of areas where criticism is persuasive and pertinent, such as the areas of human rights and gender equality (Sheleff 2000).

In addition, local justice systems are already undergoing their own 'velvet' revolution with the introduction of democratic elections for local leaders, including compulsory female representation. Early readings of the first local election results indicate strong community support for this process, hence providing additional evidence that the national mood is conducive to fundamental changes to the core of community life. This assertion is further supported by the election of a substantial percentage of newcomers to the positions of hamlet and village chiefs, and that the outgoing chiefs have peacefully relinquished their power and accepted the legitimacy of the newly elected leaders. This process marks a radical departure from the usual selection processes for local leadership which for the main was based on a mix of hereditary rights and selection by senior male community members.

Ready, set, stop:
Waiting for the green light

Preliminary results of recent field research indicates that local justice leaders are surprisingly open to engagement in debate and training around human rights issues in the local justice domain. They crave the opportunity to talk to each other and to engage with the government on how they can best fulfill their roles. Early indications are that many view positively suggestions that local justice mechanisms could over time be reformed to mitigate human rights concerns. There was also support for an approach of identifying human rights values already entrenched in East Timorese culture as the basis for running education campaigns concerning sensitive human rights issues such as domestic violence. Some accommodation between formal state law and the 'living law' of Timor-Leste is inevitable. Protecting the rights of vulnerable groups is a key concern in the furthering of this debate. The path to reforming local justice mechanisms so that they are better capable of protecting human rights is long and difficult yet essential and would provide the best chance of creating long-term sustainable human rights protection within a legal framework which reflects the unique East Timorese cultures. The key missing element of the equation is the political will to get the ball rolling.

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Independent development is possible, but difficult, in a small country like Timor-Leste. It requires solidarity and independent thinking. Yet independent thinking is constantly under threat from what might be called the 'Anglo economic technocracy', a mindset which stresses privatisation, uncoordinated investment and supposed open markets.

This paper will discuss some of the problems of Australian engagement with East Timorese development, then consider the independent elements of East Timorese development policy, before reflecting on some future possibilities.

Australian development thinking has been shaped in a neoliberal environment, conditioned by an Anglo-imperial legacy, which has created a self-image of competitive, free market achievement, and of international mentoring in the canons of 'good governance'. The fact that substantial public investment and subsidy underlies Australia's own 'open markets', and that Australian overseas interventions are generally viewed with deep suspicion and hostility barely ripples the public debate in this country. There is a great Australian bewilderment over the causes of this foreign suspicion and hostility.

This blind spot is most obvious in the case of Australia's intervention in Iraq which was initially to avert a supposed threat, but continues in the name of helping the Iraqi people. A similar situation applies in Timor-Leste. The aggressive pursuit of commercial advantage by the Howard administration in its oil and gas negotiations has alienated many East Timorese, destroying much of the goodwill created by Australia's belated protective role in 1999. Yet a parallel set of problems for the relationship has been set in train through the Australian projection into Timor-Leste of its own development ideology — a mindset based on privatisation, land registration, big corporate development, leverage through aid agencies, 'open markets' and education in the doctrines of 'Anglo economic technocracy'. Australians who see themselves as friends of Timor-Leste might like to reflect on the problems caused by projection of this neoliberal ideology.

**Myths of neoliberal development**

No developed nation became wealthy through a programme of 'open markets'. Rather, such an approach has been promoted by the imperial powers, in pursuit of new market openings. The wealthy nations made their gains mostly through a combination of building important public institutions, mass education, the strategic coordination of public and private investment, and outright colonial plunder.

Arguments for a developing country to intensely specialise and focus on 'export oriented agriculture' will benefit small groups of exporters and foreign investors, as well as providing some foreign exchange for imports. They will also contribute to substantial environmental damage. However, such developments will not translate into mass education, health care and the infrastructure necessary for local markets and widespread economic participation. Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a classical example of the failure of export oriented, resource based development. Massive amounts of export revenue (consistently over 40 per cent of GDP) have been generated over three decades from mining, oil, gas and logging, but the economic benefits were largely captured by foreign investors and some local privateers. There was very little trickle down. Most children in PNG still do not have affordable access to a secondary education, and basic health indicators are very poor (UNDP 2004). An 'Anglo economic technocracy', in the form of World Bank technical assistance and numerous AusAID programmes, must bear much of the responsibility for the failure of the PNG model.

Australian ignorance of this problem is linked to some domestic illusions. Over the past two decades, Australia has presented itself as an example of a robust, open market model, with a speciality in agriculture. Successive governments repeatedly claim that Australia would compete better internationally if only unfair barriers to agricultural trade were removed. Drawing on this self-image, Australia urges open market agriculture on its small aid-dependent neighbours (see, for example, Vaile 2002).

However, the commercial success of Australian agribusiness was built on several important non-market developments. The first of these was the theft of the land mass from the indigenous population — a still unresolved and bitter issue. Second, substantial public or public-backed infrastructure in the form of roads, rail, ports, finance, communications and scientific support (for example, the CSIRO), underwrote and continue to underwrite the capacity of Australia's exporters. Thirdly, historical advantages accrued through the British system of imperial trade preferences (dismantled in the 1960s), a range of internal and external protection measures (for example, margarine quotas to protect the milk industry), as well as the

October 2005
Minister Mari Alkatiri has urged greater coordination in also commitments to a development plan and strategic investment programme for prudent measures to manage oil and gas revenue. Signing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement is expected. Among the confidence-building measures aimed at foreign investors (joining the World Bank and IMF, ensuring the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement) and prudent measures to manage oil and gas revenue, there are also commitments to a development plan and strategic investment programme. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri has urged greater coordination in investment, aid and resource use, mass education, greater self-reliance and 'new ways of thinking'. A Sectoral Investment Programme will act as a road map for this strategy. Foreign debt has so far been avoided (see Alkatiri paper, this issue). The development plan includes a consolidation of the subsistence and domestic produce sectors and is a licensed control of natural resource use.

Agriculture remains central to planning, yet foreign aid agencies have had little enthusiasm for capacity building that was not export-oriented. Agriculture Minister Estanislau da Silva complains that the UN transitional administration (UNTAET) 'did little in their two and a half years', and adds that the government is now committed to rehabilitating irrigation and dry lands rice fields (da Silva 2005). Despite the ideological resistance of the World Bank and AusAID to a focus on Timor-Leste's rice industry, a draft National Food Security Policy has emphasised consolidating and improving domestic food production. Practical measures are to be directed at support for small farmers and include improved seed supplies, home gardening, livestock development measures, some expansion of irrigated rice areas and diversified cash crop development. Home gardening and permaculture of fruit and vegetables would be supported. Infrastructure and other support would be through modest extension services, unsecured microcredit, feeder roads and possible marketing support (MAAF 2005:18-28). Rice production could be doubled to make Timor-Leste 75 per cent self-sufficient in its rice needs with improved seed varieties and an expansion of irrigated areas, even without additional fertiliser. Food reserves (rather than buffer funds), in case of 'harvest failures or disruptions in supply' would underwrite this food grain policy (MAAF 2005:18-20, 32).

Secretary of State for Tourism, Environment and Investment, Jose Texiera, has said that, as 80 per cent of East Timorese people get their income from agriculture, 'the improvement and development of agriculture is a key priority of this government' (Teixiera 2002). So support for stable and diverse production, as well as access to local markets, must take first priority. This means local roads and affordable inputs as opposed to the PNG model of rural infrastructure serving only the export-oriented plantation industries.

Agricultural export capacity would be a modest addition to the central food security concern. Export income is expected from the improvement of coffee quality and coffee marketing, and from the diversified group of crops serving subsistence and local markets. The development of copra, vanilla, fruits, spices, cassava, nuts, beans and chicken could allow wider participation in local markets. There is as yet no suggestion of oil palm estate or mill development, nor the consolidation of land required for such a move (MAAF 2005:21-22).
Problems and lessons

Independent development policy in Timor-Leste faces two major problems: the determination of the development banks to open large infrastructure investment opportunities for foreign companies; and the disempowering, neoliberal education offered to its young people.

Working with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has assumed responsibility for power and water in Timor-Leste. It has a privatisation agenda (ADB 2002) that is not reflected in, and is in some respects contrary to, the National Development Plan. Privatisations may also breach Sections 8 and 54 of Timor-Leste’s Constitution, which seeks to maintain local ownership of land and ‘permanent sovereignty’ over East Timor’s wealth and natural resources (Constituent Assembly East Timor 2002). Nevertheless, the ADB (2002) sets out clear plans for water privatisation in Timor-Leste, a plan consistent with its earlier report Water in the 21st Century (ADB 2000), which argues the case for moving water ‘from a public good to priced commodity’. But what does this mean for poor people’s access to water? Bolivia is currently in the middle of a revolution, due in part to the rejection of World Bank water privatisation programmes.

In power, the ADB has received private consultant reports which recommend privatisation of management and billing, supposedly to deal with the recurrent blackouts in Timor-Leste towns. It might be, for example, that a large public debt will be proposed to build the infrastructure for a national power grid based on the suggested Los Palos hydroelectric scheme. Yet ADB managed privatisations will be pushed in Timor-Leste because they are good for big foreign investors, not because they are appropriate for Timor-Leste. Major problems of access will arise in any privatisation scheme, and this will generate inequality and resentment. The ADB argues that Timor-Leste does not have the capital or the expertise to provide basic power, water and sanitation, and the country’s insecurity about its poor basic infrastructure makes it vulnerable to these arguments. But the ADB’s policy leverage on the government would increase with a large loan. Big borrowings from a development bank would weaken the capacity of an East Timorese Government to pursue further public infrastructure development and investment coordination.

The influence of disempowering, neoliberal education among East Timorese youth could work to internalise the assumptions of ‘Anglo economic technocracy’. This will not contribute to ‘new ways of thinking’. Haven’t some East Timorese students already returned from US and Australian universities, preaching ‘free markets’? There are murmurings in East Timorese debates about the need for a new educated elite, Timor-Leste’s own ‘Chicago boys’. But while the call for a new educated class is totally appropriate, the form of education sought should be discriminate. The ‘Chicago boys’ were a neoliberal trained group of North Americans who helped Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile, after the 1973 coup, and went on to pioneer the hated structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s in Latin America. Timor-Leste can do better than this.

The real lessons for East Timorese students of development lie in East Asian models of coordinated public and private investment, along with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)-backed model of industrial cluster development. Looking at the coordination of networks of small and medium businesses in a range of developing countries (but Bangalore in India is the model case study), UNCTAD stresses the need for improvement in technology, skills, innovation, trust, cooperation and learning, as well as competition and exports (UNCTAD 1998:7). In practical terms, in Timor-Leste, this might mean the linking of public colleges and infrastructure development with a well-planned tourist industry, as well as coordinated marketing initiatives in coffee, processed foods and textiles. The country’s comparative advantages have to be progressively upgraded, not locked into low return rural commodities. This certainly demands a long term commitment to mass education, and to ‘new ways of thinking’.

Conclusion

Independent development in Timor-Leste is a promising but delicate creature. It faces some formidable structural and ideological obstacles, not least from its Australian friends, whose track record for respectful foreign interventions is not good. The myth of development through simple ‘open markets’ has been faced down to some extent by the East Timorese leadership. In the field of agriculture, through keenly felt need and past food insecurity, a genuinely autonomous policy is being developed. Challenges lie ahead in infrastructure and education. None of these problems have quick and easy answers. Mass education and the building of public institutions and domestic infrastructure will bring returns in the longer run. But to develop new commercial opportunities, Timor-Leste might better look to the lessons of the East than the ideology of the West.

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Agriculture in Timor-Leste: Some personal observations

Rob Wesley-Smith, Tropical Agricultural Scientist

Introduction

In the debate on priorities for growing export crops or basic food crops in the early life of the new nation, I believe in feeding the people first. We need to consider agriculture in its widest context and how it links to people's lives, education and cultural priorities, working simultaneously from top down and bottom up.

Agriculture, seen holistically, is the basis for better health and can provide cheaper health services than health professionals. I refer to preventive health strategies, mainly provision of adequate nutrition, clean water, sanitation and its integration with gardening and shelter.

Cultural aspects of education and development

Many people grow insufficient food for themselves due to a lack of understanding of good nutrition or possibilities for growing food. For example, in towns including Dili — or coffee growing areas with limited land — pots or edges of small gardens or even rooftops can be used to grow nutritious herbs, fruit and vegetables. Animal and human waste can be used as fertiliser and composted mulch, instead of being burned.

When poor people grow good quality fruit and vegetables they are likely to sell it for much needed cash rather than feed their families. Adult education for extension workers and programmes in agriculture and health are needed to enable people to understand the benefits of growing food for their families.

In cattle country many farmers do not or will not recognise that high producing animals need much more feed and the practice of penning animals at night with no food or water will lead to underproduction or disaster. The resultant skinny cows are not 'sick, mister', but starving! In urban areas many people simply do not recognise that their chickens are growing slowly and that most will not reach adulthood. What is the best approach for 'education for life' with limited budgets and Timor-Leste's disrupted past? Many still feel that having fought off the invader they are 'bullet proof' and it may be some time before these views abate. Traditional values sometimes mix with religious values which can hinder development and this, combined with the inequality between men and women, can also hinder development.

Environmental factors

Timor-Leste has a mystique of being a jungle-clad mistymountainous landscape, with fertile valley slopes and floors. Older activists would be familiar with idyllic villages and more than a dozen basic cultural and language groups. Despite some truth in this, it is questionable whether the mountains were ever thickly forested. More cooperation between corn and rice growers to spread labour requirements and attract more eco-tourists for cash injection into the economy is needed to revisit this view of paradise.

Tree exploitation took place during Portuguese colonisation, although some teak was eventually planted. The rate of exploitation rapidly escalated under the Indonesian military regime between 1975 and 1999, when all sandalwood was cut down, but it is not clear which vested interests have benefited from remaining stocks. The Indonesian military also cleared land to remove cover from the armed resistance by fire and aerial spraying of herbicides (soon after receiving BroncoOV10 aircraft from President Jimmy Carter around late 1977) and by bulldozing on a grand scale in the mid to late 1990s around the resistance centre of Los Palos. These late-cleared plains and plateaus are now being so heavily grazed it is doubtful that they can regenerate without assistance, even with the will of the people.

When the UN administered Timor-Leste, importation of cheap kerosene from Indonesia was stopped, without an ecologically viable alternative, so East Timorese people had to cut trees for firewood for cooking. In conjunction with the East Timorese penchant for burning, heavily cut forests on hills became barer and the rivers run browner. Awareness of this seems to have only developed recently.

Why are trees important? Trees and their ground cover of leaves affect the water holding regime, allowing water to soak in and run off slowly or seep out in springs and other water outlets so rivers run slower, longer and cleaner. The presence of trees may even affect rainfall. Trees hold the soil together to protect fertile topsoil, provide useful products for building, fibres, food, medicines and so on. Tree canopies provide a cooling effect in summer and help make the environment a pleasant place to be — aesthetically pleasing to locals and tourists alike — which is important in attracting and keeping tourists. The value of tourism and niche marketing if the whole country stays organic may actually exceed the value of crop production gained by expensive imported mineral fertilisers. Agriculture is not very successful in the absence of fertile topsoil, mulch, effective water regimes, and so on.
An essential first step is to discourage, or even ban, burning of landscapes and leaves, followed by enhanced study, observation and education. Due to increasing population pressure and environmental damage, there is little room for traditional 'slash and burn' agriculture which some communities see as their right. Near the rapidly growing capital, Dili, a drive to Dare and past Mana Lu's place looks like paradise, but there are also patches of slash and burn agriculture and brown, exposed soils on steep slopes, where the first heavy rains will wash the topsoil to the town below. Dili drains are now inadequate, not because of increased rainfall, but because of increased sedimentation and runoff. There is an urgent need to protect Dili's water supplies, its reefs and marine life. During the recent Dili cleanup day it was disappointing to see that most cut grass was taken to be dumped or burned rather than converted on site into compost.

Strategies to improve the environment

To improve the tree situation in Timor-Leste, less usage, less burning of country and wood, more protection and more planting are recommended. Less usage can be achieved by alternative or fuel-efficient cheap clay stoves which have already been developed and used. Burning seems to be part of East Timorese culture. Strategies to reduce the amount of burning could include:

- edicts and penalties to prevent burning;
- education and research to quantify and demonstrate advantages and disadvantages of burning;
- consultation with communities about their culture and acceptable alternatives to 'slash and burn'; and
- consideration of compensation payments if longstanding rights are dispensed within the short term.

Once leaves are left on the ground for water holding and infiltration to improve, worms return, digging becomes easier, and plants grow better. Disadvantages, such as build-up of pests need to be taken into consideration. Digging of small swales (shallow pits perhaps one metre long), beginning at the top of slopes, is also very important.

Protection of existing and potential forests requires the processes already described. An exemplary was seen in Fatomean district, in a lu'ile (sacred area) where the NGO Haburas works with people, the spirits and ancient traditions to protect and replant forest areas. The southern central plains are well forested and care needs to be exercised as these are developed. Control of grazing animals, especially goats is essential. Design and implementation of large and small protection fences is as important as planting trees.

Replanting is obviously needed in some areas, where protection alone is inadequate. For forests, collection of favoured local species including sandalwood can be done for cash by older people or those with traditional knowledge. Sandalwood growth rates have been improved in north-west Australia and it may be useful for Timor-Leste to buy new improved seedlings. Most East Timorese do not know that such seeds must also be planted with host plants, as sandalwood is an obligate parasite. For tree cash crops the government should provide planning, advice and assistance. High quality hardwood timbers and possibly some fast growing softwoods, for example Douglas Fir, should be planted, where feasible, in mixed stands with legume trees, for ecologically sustainable growth, disease resistance, and aesthetic value. Legume shrubs and trees form the basis of quality feed for grazing animals.

The use of tree legumes needs to be encouraged for integrated animal production. Yards and fences can be living fences of edible trees, of which there are few examples — Leucaena varieties for fences and feeding may need work to get the best lines. Leucaena was reduced by psyllid insect attacks in the late 1980s, so surviving plants are probably more resistant to insects. A pattern of improved production was introduced to Amarasi villages in West Timor and made its practitioners relatively wealthy. Rows of Leucaena were cut for feed to animals in pens or tethered. The falling leaves and the root nodules improved the soil between the rows. Before planting corn between the Leucaena, it was severely cut back, and the feed debris steeped in animal waste was spread on the soil, resulting in excellent production of corn and beans. By the time these vegetables were ready for harvest, the Leucaena had recovered. Despite this success, the method did not spread to neighbouring villages.

Animals

Animals produce high quality protein but only a modest percentage of food per land area compared to plant foods. However, grazing animals can convert pasture plants or otherwise unused grass and weeds into quality food, recycling such material into readily available nutrients. Animals are also useful for cultivation, transport and status purposes and may contribute to pest control, especially chickens and ducks. All animals need to be well managed so they do not overgraze and cause erosion and ingress of weeds. Goats are the worst animal in this regard and the massive overgrazing and erosion seen near Manatuto is a classic example. Controls are needed, by herdspeople, and/or fencing of damaged areas, but whether this can be enforced under present arrangements is questionable. Chickens are most important for human nutrition, and the availability of creep feeders could maximise protection and growth.

The local Bali or Banteng cows are well adapted and suitable for Timor-Leste. They can survive on small amounts of feed, and always produce a calf each year, born small as a survival attribute. The only purpose of a cow is to grow a calf each year and if it can't do that, it is eaten. Yet good nutrition is as important for cows as for humans. Growth rates of calves are

Development Bulletin 68
Leste is not self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs, especially cereals. This is due to many factors, including the continued importation of cheap rice following the distribution of emergency aid in 1999-2000. The availability of cheap rice will probably always deter local production. Other factors include:

- forced dislocation of many East Timorese by the Indonesian military occupation;
- loss of relationships to traditional lands;
- loss of some growing and survival skills, such as preserving seeds for new crops;
- aspirations for cash and a new life in the cities by many, especially young people who would otherwise be providing labour on farms;
- some feeling that the world will provide; and
- poor infrastructure and support services.

Research and/or improvements in the following areas could yield results, such as:

- re-establishing best varieties for each ecological situation, and enhancing the skills to preserve those seeds;
- use of legume mixed plantings or rotations;
- use of some short-maturity crops for early food;
- use of mulch and animal wastes as fertiliser;
- animal availability for farm work;
- use of machinery including efficient cultivators for animals and tractors, and small mills; and
- protection of crops and harvested produce.

**Protection**

People around the world invest money and effort into growing things but do not protect them, leading to considerable post harvest loss. In Timor-Leste such losses can lead to starvation, especially in the lean months of the late dry season/early wet season before new harvests are ready. One hears of rats causing havoc, yet dogs which could be hunting rats may themselves get eaten in hungry times. Rat hunting is an instinct, so ratting dogs could be selected and some imported for cross breeding. Harvested crops should be stored more securely, for example in clay pots, drums (cleaned 44 gallon drums), or small purpose-made metal silos. People with skills in building small cement brick and plaster water tanks, could adapt these to close fitting roofs and a small base outlet for grain storage. Abandoned water tanks could be used. Effective protection must, of course, be provided for the crops themselves, for tree plantings, for vegetable gardens and so on.

**Weeds**

Weeds are rife throughout many areas. Some, such as Bellyache Bush, and the Siam Weed were deliberately sown by Indonesia according to anecdotal evidence. The effect of overgrazing is to deplete edible pasture plants, allowing weeds to grow rampantl. Weeds take space that can be used for growing food or trees. Many East Timorese do not see weeds as we do; they are just there. On a trip to Fatomea and Fatolulic upland districts, where villagers have no electricity and poor communications, the grass generally looked already well eaten, but along the road edges there were hedges of weeds including Siam Weed. An aphid has already been introduced against a new pest of coconuts in Baucau and south to Viqueque districts. In Darwin, smaller or dwarf coconuts from Thailand have resistance to coconut leaf beetle, and new varieties should be introduced for future...
food security — smaller types are safer and easier to harvest. Now that Darwin is threatened by cane toads, Timor-Leste could also apply quarantine restrictions against Australia.

Conclusion
For the best development strategies, each part of any process must make a profit. The Agristas philosophy of supported development, including feeding programmes and end-product marketing may be appropriate in Timor-Leste. The Soil and Foundation Water Conservation, a Philippine NGO with staff experienced in the adoption of unique low-income rural community methodologies, can be regarded as the model of an NGO to help establish business-driven development supported by the public sector.

Note
1. Rob Wesley-Smith is a graduate of Rural Science, the first mainstream ecologically based degree course, with nearly 30 years professional experience in government in the Northern Territory (not far from Timor-Leste) in a range of research and advice capacities and as an activist supporter. From October 1999 to Feb 2000, Rob helped with seed acquisition and distribution in Timor-Leste, and has been back many times since as a volunteer. He initiated making simple clay stoves to try to alleviate the excessive cutting of trees. In November 2003 he took 55 Brahman cattle to the subdistricts of Suai and has just been back to these districts. This paper is available online at: http://hem.bredband.net/poltom/OTK/agriculture050728.htm
Household food security and subsistence production in Dili

Kyra Peake, School of Resources, Environment and Society, Australian National University

Introduction
A critical challenge facing the administration of Timor-Leste is how to achieve a state of food security, that is, how to ensure that all people have sufficient food at all times. The problem in Timor-Leste is complex and chronic but is crucial to the maintenance of social stability and must be addressed if the nation is to succeed as a democracy. As food security is one of the most fundamental human needs, its absence is both a symptom and a cause of a malfunctioning society. To avoid state failure, the government of Timor-Leste must meet the expectations of its citizens by delivering certain public goods, of which human security is arguably the most important. Food security is not just a rural issue — in Dili, almost 40 per cent of households experience food shortage (World Bank 2003). This paper discusses the nature of Dili’s food security problem and examines the role of subsistence production in achieving food security for urban households, based on analysis of ten household profiles compiled from field interviews conducted May-June 2004. The stories of three households serve to illustrate the experience of food insecurity in Dili and to reveal some of the linkages between food security status and livelihood.

Manuel’s story
Manuel lives with his wife, his parents and five siblings. The household has multiple income sources, commercial fishing being most important followed by sales in a beachside kiosk. His parents cultivate corn, cassava and vegetables in a large garden which are sold from a small roadside kiosk outside the home. This year has been too dry to grow vegetables but they continue to stock the kiosk, with purchased vegetables. Manuel’s brother is employed as a taxi driver and is paid on a commission basis. The household has not experienced food shortage since the conflict of 1999. They consume a range of foods, with fish daily and meat bie weekly. They always have enough money to purchase food as income shocks are consistently buffered by the diversified income base of the household. For example, the time of heavy rains damages vegetable crops but is also the most productive fishing season and therefore the beachside kiosk is also profitable.

The concept of ‘food security’
Food security is defined as existing when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 1996:para 1). The concept is commonly defined as having three sequential components, namely availability, access and utilisation (Tweeten 1997). Thus, there must be sufficient food available, people must be able to access that food and then be able to adequately prepare and extract nutrients from it.

A more complete representation includes two further conditions which must be met at each of these three phases: a physical condition of sufficiency or ‘enough-ness’ and a temporal condition of security or certainty across time.

The conditions of sufficiency and security lie at the very core of the food security concept. ‘Sufficiency’ is conventionally defined in a biological sense — a sufficient quantity in calories and a sufficient quality in nutritional and safety terms — however it also includes sociocultural dimensions such as food preference and cultural acceptability (Maxwell 1996:159). ‘Security’ refers to the ability to access and utilise sufficient food at all times; that is, both now and into the foreseeable future and is not just a physical condition but also defines a personal sense of well-being that is free from anxiety.

Pedro’s story
Pedro is the sole income earner for a family of seven people. Having no fixed employment, Pedro takes on occasional short-term carpentry work and otherwise sells iced drinks from a cart. During the very heavy rains he cannot operate the drink cart and so, in the absence of carpentry work, is entirely engaged in subsistence cultivation and fishing. The household grows rice, cassava, beans and pumpkin, a small annual corn crop, and has a large number of banana trees. All production is undertaken for subsistence purposes, however produce is sold opportunistically. In the study year, Pedro’s family experienced food deficiency for four months, when they reduced meal sizes and consumed a lesser variety of food. For two months banana became their primary staple as they could not afford rice or corn. This difficult period occurs annually during very heavy rains and is characterised by a period of worry in which Pedro will seek any work possible. The corn harvest in March improved the food situation only slightly, the real improvement coming two months later when a new income source became available.

Food security in Timor-Leste: Not just a rural problem
It is well-documented that Timor-Leste suffers a complex and chronic food security problem. The World Bank reported that, in 2001, 90 per cent of Timorese households experienced food shortage for at least one month of the year (World Bank 2003).
UNICEF found in 2002 that 47 per cent of Timorese children are moderately malnourished with 25 per cent 'severely malnourished' (UNICEF 2003:40). An annual 'hungry season' affects most of the country, associated with the harvest cycle for corn, the main staple (ADB 2001:82). The food security problem in Timor-Leste is characterised as a product of the subsistence nature of East Timorese agriculture, constraints of poor soils and a variable climate, high dependence on imported foodstuffs, compounded by poor transportation and marketing systems. Essentially, the food security problem is presented as an element of rural poverty.

However, food security is also a very real problem for urban dwellers, with 39 per cent experiencing food deficiency in 2001, half of whom reported shortage for a period of four months or more (World Bank 2003). Childhood malnutrition rates are comparable to those in rural areas (UNICEF 2003). Comparative information on urban and rural food security is presented in Figure 1. While the issue in Dili has been overshadowed by the sheer magnitude of the rural problem, closer examination reveals that urban food insecurity is potentially deeper and more complex even if not as extensive.

Rural households typically experience seasonal food shortage in a recurrent, predictable pattern. There is a high degree of certainty that the harvest will bring relief. In contrast, Dili households exhibit a diverse range of food deficiency patterns, a consequence of dependence on purchasing and the individualised nature of urban livelihoods.

One implication of this is the greater potential for food security to be a chronic problem in Dili. The 2001 Survey of Sucos (villages) found that, of the 498 sucos in Timor-Leste, the only four that report shortage all year round are in Dili (ADB 2001). Where subsistence producers usually experience cycles of shortage alternating with surplus, households that purchase food may experience an ongoing inability to afford sufficient food. Given Dili's very high unemployment rate, many may experience chronic food insecurity. The urban/rural comparisons in Figure 1 probably mask greater inequality in the city where relatively wealthy and secure households coexist with the landless, unemployed and chronically food insecure.

**Figure 1: Comparison of food security indicators across rural and urban households**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Urban Centres*</th>
<th>Rural Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The proportion of the population that experienced at least one month of food shortage</strong></td>
<td><strong>39%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The average period per year in which households did not have enough food</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.8 months</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The average period per year in which households had more than enough food</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.4 months</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Chiefly Dili

**Luis' story**

Luis and his wife live with their three siblings and three young children. Four adults are employed full-time in the formal sector earning a constant wage as security guards and cleaners. The household grows up to two annual crops of corn and a small amount of cassava on a large plot of Indonesian abandoned land. They also gather fruit and flowers from papaya trees. Rice and vegetables are typically consumed all year with corn added for variety and meat or fish consumed weekly. The household experienced three months of food shortage over the preceding year, when they reduced meal sizes. This occurred when a child fell ill, forcing Luis and his wife to cease work to care for him and creating the additional burden of medical expenses. Luis' wife began selling papaya products but ultimately the family borrowed heavily to survive this period. Both were able to take unpaid leave so long-term food security was not jeopardised, though they had to be very frugal and work hard to repay their debts. They say that children's illness and funerals cause the difficult times.

**Food security and livelihood in Dili**

Analysis of the household profiles revealed that food security status for Dili households was essentially a product of financial security. In Dili, where food is typically available all year, a household will be food secure if it always has sufficient funds to purchase the required food. Financial security is achieved by securing a constant and regular income source and by accumulating wealth such that shocks can be buffered as they arise. For profiles households, those with the lowest levels of food security were the households without a regular income source. Among those with a regular income source, food security status was essentially determined by their ability to buffer financial stress.

Financial security is very difficult to attain in contemporary Dili. Household economies, and indeed the entire urban economy, were obliterated in the events of 1999 and, five years on, the city has urbanised rapidly with limited corresponding growth of the urban economy. Dili's unemployment rate, while unknown, has been estimated at 70 per cent (ASPI 2002). Many people find themselves in marginal, low income activities. As few households are able to engage in saving, interruptions to income or unexpected expenses such as funerals can result in a failure to access sufficient food through the market economy.
Purchasing is not, however, the only means of accessing food—home production allows households to obtain food without cash and therefore may enable households to achieve food security despite financial insecurity.

The potential of subsistence production
Theoretically, the practice of urban subsistence production has merit for its potential to overcome risks to purchasing by allowing the household to bypass the cash economy entirely. Studies from around the world have variously found that urban subsistence production may supplement the diets of urban dwellers (Mougeot 2000) or act as an emergency reserve (Niñez 1984; Marsh 1998).

Supplement and reserve functions correspond respectively to the sufficiency and security conditions of the food security concept. Firstly, urban subsistence production may improve the sufficiency dimension of food security by supplementing purchased food, enabling consumption of greater quantity or higher quality of foods than could be acquired through cash purchases alone. Secondly, it may improve the security dimension by enabling direct access to food in times of economic stress.

Engaging in subsistence production is a diversification strategy with producers apportioning risk by straddling both subsistence and cash economies in constructing a livelihood. By bypassing the cash economy, subsistence producers are able to buffer against shocks both to their financial security and to food supply at the national level, as reflected in price. Furthermore, the centre of control remains with the household. By producing, households simultaneously and actively cause food to become both 'available' and 'accessible' to themselves.

Subsistence production in Dili
Urban food production is conspicuous throughout Dili. While some such production is undoubtedly commercial, a high proportion is probably for household subsistence. In 2001, 50 per cent of Dili households obtained some portion of their weekly diet from subsistence production and 15 per cent of all food consumed in Dili households was home produced (World Bank 2001).

The four significant forms of subsistence food production occurring in Dili were cultivation, gathering, fishing and livestock rearing. Cultivation was most important in terms of scale and dietary contribution. Dili households cultivate two types of garden plots. First, an annual crop, typically corn, usually alternated with cassava during the dry season. The quantities produced in Dili are insufficient to store and mostly consumed at harvest. Dili is not well suited to cultivation of rice, the preferred staple. Second, there are small gardens of mixed vegetable plants that can be harvested piecemeal throughout the year. Households exhibit considerable variation in the extent, type and regularity of cultivation activities and the potential contribution to the household diet varies accordingly.

Gathering fruits and flowers of papaya or banana trees was another significant form of subsistence production that all households engaged in on a regular but ad hoc basis. The overall dietary contribution made by gathering is not usually high; nonetheless it is an accessible food source requiring minimal investment.

Fishing is not common among Dili households. It is likely, however, that fish, representing a vital source of protein, is rarely purchased, due to inflated market prices in Dili. Thus, by engaging in fishing, households probably improved their nutritional status.

Livestock rearing is widespread across Timor-Leste, however, livestock is not a major food source. Domestic animals may be a status symbol, an item of social exchange, an asset to be liquefied in times of economic hardship and a food source. Generally, the use of livestock as a food source is limited to special occasions. Non-meat food products, such as eggs, are not used by all households. Despite limited use, livestock may be important for nutritional sufficiency for some households.

Subsistence production for food security?
In terms of sufficiency, subsistence production contributes by supplementing purchased food. It contributed to the regular diets of the profiled households, comprising between one per cent and 50 per cent of food consumption at the time of fieldwork. Only some low income households, however, usually rely upon production to access a sufficient quantity of food. For others it simply improves the household budget. Regardless of household income, subsistence production may improve the nutritional sufficiency of diets, particularly when households produce foods with a high nutritional value and high market price, which they would not otherwise purchase.

In terms of improving security over time, subsistence production acts as an important reserve or safety net. Households that experienced a failure in their capacity to purchase sufficient food typically became dependent upon subsistence production. Had they not engaged in food production, they would have experienced more severe food deficiency or may have resorted to short-term coping strategies that undermine future livelihood. This was the consequence for Luis' household, which engaged in enough production and subsequently suffered food shortage and was forced into debt.

Overall, subsistence production was most important for households without security of income. Generally the contribution of subsistence production increased with decreasing food security. Thus, even with substantial reliance on subsistence production...
production, the least financially secure households remained the least food secure. This highlights the fact that financial security is the primary determinant of food security with production, at best acting as a supplement or temporary reserve. Subsistence production was critically important to low income households — although not actually enabling them to achieve food security, it reduced the severity of food shortage, thus enabling survival without compromising future livelihood.

**The limits of subsistence production**

Subsistence production does not necessarily counteract financial insecurity to achieve food security. Its capacity to do so is limited in at least three respects. First, biophysical risks and seasonal variations mean that production does not provide a reliable, constant food source. Second, in the city there are spatial constraints on staple food production. Third, and specific to Dili, the preferred staple, rice, is not cultivated locally due to soil and climatic constraints. Rice constitutes a significant portion of Dili diets, and so all households depend upon purchasing to meet their staple food needs.

**Conclusion**

Food insecurity affects a sizeable portion of urban households. It is an insidious problem in the city where the wealthy may neighbour the chronically food insecure.

In Dili, household food security is achieved through financial security: with sufficient funds, required food is always accessible. The widespread food security problem is therefore symptomatic of the difficulty in attaining financial security in contemporary Dili.

Subsistence food production, particularly cultivation, is common and enables households to bypass the market economy and access food directly. Subsistence production improved the food situation of participating households by increasing the sufficiency of regular diets for low income households and offering an emergency source of food. This practice is critical for survival for some as it prevents starvation and avoids the need for stressed households to resort to damaging coping strategies. Subsistence production must therefore be supported in urban planning. This is particularly important given the current uncertainty over land rights and rapid urbanisation within the physical constraints of the mountains and the sea.

While the practice may be of crucial importance for household survival, subsistence production does not actually achieve the broader goal of food security. For financially insecure households, subsistence production did not prevent food shortage; rather it reduced the severity of food deficiency. It therefore did not enable households to achieve true food security. Due to inherent constraints, the reality is that households will always need to purchase the bulk of their staple food needs and preferred foods and that purchasing offers a food source that is not subject to seasonality.

The food security problem in Dili must be addressed through a multidimensional strategy that recognises the importance of subsistence production for survival while addressing the greater structural problem of building financial security so that the broader ideal of food security may be achieved.

**Note**

1. I would like to acknowledge the assistance and guidance of my supervisor Dr Peter van Diermen and Mr Ken Johnson from the School of Resources, Environment and Society in the preparation of this paper.

**References**


Reconstructing the coffee republic: Development and colonialism in Timor-Leste

Damian Grenfell, RMIT University

Introduction
In late 2003 the coffee chain Starbucks ran large colour advertisements in a major Australian newspaper. With a trademark reading ‘Starbucks: romancing the bean’ the advertisement was presented as if on coffee coloured parchment and cloth, with coffee beans scattered across the page. After eulogising the social impact of Starbucks in the Chiapas, the advertisement commented on how the company pays an additional premium for quality coffee. ‘Why? So it can help fund health and education projects’ in places such as Timor-Leste. The advertisement asked ‘Is there a people anywhere who deserve a break more than the Timorese?’ and in answering went on to claim that Starbucks helped build and equip a health clinic in Timor-Leste (The Age 2003).

Culture and history of coffee
The fact that the coffee cherry is represented on the country’s new 50 cent coin gives some indication of the importance of coffee in Timor-Leste. Coffee is grown throughout the republic, concentrated in Ermera, Liquica, Ainaro, and Aileu districts. The majority of the crop is grown for export trade, although it is a popular local drink. Growers sell coffee either as the red cherry, parchment, or final green bean, as little roasting is undertaken within Timor-Leste. In the complex and wrenching reconstruction process on the scale of Timor-Leste, there is enormous variation in how aid and development projects are enacted. In the coffee industry, some NGO-style organisations work with East Timorese communities while other ventures are purely commercial in nature. Another type of organisation is hybrid, integrating development initiatives with actual business practices. Of particular interest is a project initiated by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) enabling access to East Timorese coffee for corporations such as Starbucks. The nature of this project helps in understanding the on-going relationship between coffee and colonialism in Timor-Leste.

Coffee was first introduced to Timor-Leste in 1815 by the Portuguese colonial administration. The development of the coffee industry was led by Governor Jose Celestino da Silva across the turn of the 20th century. Sociedade Agricola, Patria e Trabalho (SAPT) — the initials of which can still be read on warehouse gates in Dili — was one of the dominant commercial ventures in the coffee industry in Timor-Leste during the Portuguese colonial era (Gunn 1999). Following the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste in 1975, the coffee industry was quickly monopolised by military interests. A 1979 decree by the Indonesian governor formally transferred the assets of SAPT to PT Denok Hernandes Indonesia, a company set up by senior Indonesian army officers to raise money for the armed forces and for corrupt self-interest.

Current control of the coffee industry
The National Cooperative Business Association of the USA (NCBA) is the current implementing agency for a USAID project to develop coffee in Timor-Leste, a project established well before the 1999 independence vote. In 1993, with CIA backing, NCBA and USAID officials sought to break the coffee monopoly in Timor-Leste run by the Indonesian military. As the US did not formally recognise Indonesian sovereignty over Timor-Leste it was unable to set up a project directly in the territory, therefore NCBA was contracted to run the project on behalf of USAID. By the end of 1994, NCBA had set up an office in Dili and have since sought to develop the coffee industry by providing technical assistance, as well as management, marketing and training. Needing to rebuild infrastructure following the destruction and looting of 1999, NCBA has transformed the Indonesian-run Timor-Leste Federation of Cooperatives (PASKUD) into a company called the Cooperativa Café Timor (CCT) in the post-independence phase (Oxfam 2003).

Although other companies export larger amounts, the NCBA project dominates the export of quality coffee from Timor-Leste. It buys red coffee cherry roadside and controls processing until the green bean is ready for shipping. The organisational reach of NCBA is unparalleled. Purchasing coffee from many inland and mountainous areas, NCBA has four wet-processing plants, a large dry-processing plant in Dili, as well as extensive drying fields and warehousing in Timor-Leste. NCBA is, as it boasts, the largest private sector enterprise in Timor-Leste: by 2003 there were 16 primary rural organic cooperatives, more than 500 farmer groups and 19,584 farm family participants on 25,858 registered blocks of land. NCBA operations do not cover all of the estimated 200,000 people estimated to be partially dependent on coffee (Pomeroy 2001). Nevertheless, NCBA’s ambition is to expand throughout the nation (NCBA 2003).
Colonialism and development

Colonialism, a common phrase, incorporates control by force of one society by another. Modern forms of colonialism, usually framed by contingents of imperial forces keeping locals at bay, were typically associated with the expansion of European power (though in practice not always the case) and the establishment of colonies across various continents. While aspects of modern colonialism continue in many respects, this has increasingly become overlayed by forms of neo-colonialism which can be understood as the rule of one society by another in a form that does not necessitate a significant embodied presence. Societies come to be held in check and control not by the threat of force, but by being integrated into global markets where current centres of power can still dictate to a significant degree the day-to-day circumstances of people in distant places. ‘Development’, especially in post-conflict/disaster scenarios, becomes an ideal moment in which the major lines within society (Iraq and Aceh are recent examples) can be re-drawn by those who have extraordinary power in relative terms — international organisations such as the United Nations, NGOs and of course national aid and development programmes.

The link between Starbucks and East Timorese coffee is an obvious starting point as an intersection between development and colonialism. The role of projects, such as that run by NCBA, can be read as an attempt to ensure that ‘developing’ countries shape their national economic infrastructures in such a way that they base their economies upon commodity export goods for purchase by transnational corporations. While oil may be a more obvious example of colonial practice in Timor-Leste, coffee is potentially no less dramatic. Starbucks itself does not have a direct presence in Timor-Leste, nor has it helped directly build any health clinics, for example. Rather, NCBA facilitates the sale of coffee by CCT to international coffee brokers, such as Holland Coffee, who also claim that it has been responsible for building health centres in Timor-Leste (Holland Coffee 2005). These distributors in turn sell to corporations such as Starbucks. The fair trade accreditation that CCT has achieved through the Fair Trade Labelling Organisations (FLO) means that at the point of purchase a premium is paid on top of the actual purchase price. This additional financial payment is to be used for the development of communities in coffee regions with this transfer of capital allowing companies such as Starbucks and Holland to make the claim that they help build health clinics.

Fair trade and development

The development of fair trade principles in recent years is yet to attract a necessary level of critical appraisal. However, the NCBA project in Timor-Leste opens up some lines of potential criticism. Fair trade accreditation appears at times to cement both colonial relations and the exploitation of coffee workers. It ostensibly satisfies the concerns of a Western consumer public by ensuring an additional transfer of income back into the growing communities, yet this remains an approximate five per cent premium which the corporations appear to pass on to the consumer via higher prices. In Timor-Leste in 2004, NCBA was purchasing the cherry at 14 cents per kilo from growers on the roadside, yet the sale of 20 kilograms of cherry at this rate would still not earn a grower enough to buy one cup of coffee in any of the restaurants in Dili. At the other extreme, Starbucks is able to post profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars (Starbucks 2003). Starbucks profit is, of course, gained in many ways other than the relatively small amounts of money made on selling East Timorese coffee. However, given The Age advertisements, coffee that has been deemed to be fair trade is used as a key marketing strategy for a company like Starbucks in order to attract niche markets and new consumers and to create the image of a ‘good corporate citizen’. Even with fair trade accreditation, power remains at the corporation and consumer end of the commodity chain rather than with the actual growers. The real profits are made by corporations and success of programmes is determined by consumer’s conscience and the capacity of corporations to market the coffee as fair trade.

At a broader structural level, the implications are potentially very serious. A development project that lays infrastructure for an industry at a time when little else exists, in combination with a programme that is able to sustain people just above subsistence level, but without enough to financial support to diversify, runs the risk of creating structured dependence. In such a case, the continued sale of the green bean to transnational corporations would appear virtually guaranteed.

This situation often remains unquestioned, due to assumptions that coffee production per se should be encouraged to any degree in Timor-Leste. It may suit the interests of US-based transnationals to have a variety of coffee supplies over the long term. However, given that malnourishment is a common problem in Timor-Leste (United Nations World Food Programme 2005), development projects that promote food security and support agricultural production for East Timorese consumption have a higher priority.

Development projects resulting in relationships between growers who remain relatively poor and corporations that show massive profits, is one way to think about how the coffee industry is situated in relation to colonialism. The question of control through a society can also be found in the effect of the industry within Timor-Leste. On different publicity materials, CCT is said to be both fully Timorese owned and to run as a cooperative (USAID Brochure), despite there being no cooperative law in Timor-Leste. The basis of these claims is that CCT is a member-
run organisation that elects its own representatives. However, it is very difficult to imagine CCT functioning independently of the NCBA advisors who make all major decisions about the running of the company, a point confirmed by NCBA arguments that the East Timorese remain unable to manage CCT alone for the foreseeable future (Oxfam 2004). Moreover, despite the rhetoric, coffee farmers who sell to the CCT are believed to have no sense of a cooperative structure with a relationship to management like that of any corporation (La’o Hamutuk 2002; Oxfam 2004).

An organisation like NCBA also plays a disciplining role, as people’s lives are increasingly restructured by market demands. The penetrative effect of the market shifts people into a global market, linking their livelihoods to the vagaries of the trade in that commodity. While NCBA claims that the price farmers received at ‘farm gate’ for coffee improved fourfold in the first week of operations during the 1995 coffee season, the relative world price for coffee has fallen considerably since then — by as much as 70 per cent since 1999 (Oxfam 2004). In recent years, collapse of the coffee price has meant that communities are unable to derive a substantial income from coffee crops while there is a lack of infrastructure to grow other produce.

The disciplining role of NCBA is repeated within the nation, the structure of the NCBA project clearly intent on ensuring that the market is seen as the central determinant of resources in society. Branded ‘Café Clinics’, the health clinics that Starbucks and others claim credit for do provide a critical source of health services in Timor-Leste. These clinics are in effect funded by the premium that is assured by fair trade accreditation and are further subsidised by USAID funds. The original intention of the clinics was, however, that only members of CCT and their immediate families could access those medical facilities, thus communities were disciplined by tying their work directly to health provision and reinforcing the necessity of coffee production. Under the weight of popular demand, the ‘Café Clinics’ were opened to all community members, although it was planned that in 2005 there would be a return to a ‘members only’ service. Even if this does not occur and clinics are handed over to the state, the relationship between work, health provision and export is still drawn, with other non-coffee growing areas conceivably not receiving the same level of health care, irrespective of their needs.

Conclusion
The market may appear to be the normal way in which to organise communities, rather than state-owned or genuinely cooperatively run and community-led structures, for example. This is invariably confirmed by the weak state structures in Timor-Leste, with many state institutions either failing, or at least lacking significant resources, which in turn means that there is often a lack of monitoring of large international aid projects. There are few avenues by which to check various rumours circulating about NCBA activities: that phenol-rich water is not adequately decontaminated before it is pumped back into streams; that underage workers, who are not allowed to work under fair trade accreditation, are told to not come to work during the inspection period or; that NCBA trucks were used to bring protesters down from regional centres in the recent Catholic-led protests against the government. In Western countries, some level of media scrutiny and monitoring by government is possible, yet in Timor-Leste this often remains impossible.

One of the difficulties in making these kinds of arguments is that we are immediately confronted with the day-to-day realities of malnourishment, lack of health facilities, high infant mortality and the consequences of extended periods of trauma and extreme poverty. However, projects such as the USAID based scheme in Timor-Leste represent long-term projects with long-term consequences and may work to lock people into poverty rather than alleviate poverty, despite Starbucks’ advertising. The immediate benefits of such schemes should not necessarily be ignored or dismissed, but need to be more readily matched with longer-term strategies for ensuring that the formal independence of Timor-Leste does not represent a hollow victory for its people.

Note
1. Two classics on the question of colonialism and differentiation are Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth and Albert Memmi’s The Colonizer and the Colonized. To read comprehensive analysis on terms such as colonialism and neo-colonialism see Robert Young’s Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction and Leela Gandhi’s Postcolonial Theory. The discussion in this article is underpinned by an application of a methodology known as ‘constitutive abstraction’, as used by writers such as Paul James in Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community. However, this methodology is re-applied here not to questions of social integration at the level of the nation, but to the different ways colonial relations are constituted simultaneously and across one another. Lastly, on contemporary expressions of colonialism, see David Harvey’s excellent book The New Imperialism. and also Naomi Klein’s critique titled ‘Baghdad Year Zero’ on the intersection between development and conflict in contemporary Iraq.

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Fertility and reproductive health of women in Timor-Leste: Results from the 2003 Demographic and Health Survey

Iwu Dwisetyani Utomo, National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National University

Timor-Leste has a population of 924,642 and a total fertility rate of 7.8, the highest in the world. There is little indication that the high birth rate will be curbed soon. In the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (see Snell et al. family paper, this issue) half of all currently married women indicated a desire for more children regardless of the number of children they already had; only 17 per cent wanted no more children. This high fertility rate is sustained by the fact that less than one in five women had ever used family planning, and only one in ten women was using contraceptives (National Statistics Office Timor-Leste et al. 2004; Ministry of Health et al. 2004).

This paper examines the childbearing and childrearing of East Timorese women, their roles as well as their employment status and household decision-making power. As East Timorese women comprise almost half of the nation's population, it is critical to gain an understanding of their productive and reproductive roles in the sociocultural environment, and any barriers that might disadvantage their status.

Setting and demographic conditions
The many years of conflict and violence experienced by the East Timorese had a tremendous impact on the health of the nation, as people survived under conditions of absolute and relative deprivation. Furthermore, national health policies and programmes are still in the making. Most people have limited access to clean water and poor sanitation, and this impacts women in particular. Short birth intervals are common and the high birth rate exacerbates poor housing conditions. Access to modern health facilities is limited, and women have little negotiating power in the household.

Recent demographic estimates indicate high levels of extreme poverty in Timor-Leste. In 2001, life expectancy was 57 years, the infant mortality rate was 80 per 1,000 live births, the under five mortality rate was 143 per 1,000 live births, and maternal mortality was 420 per 100,000 live births (UNDP 2002:76-77). Malaria, respiratory tract infections and diarrhoea were, and continue to be, the major causes of death. Nutritional problems are endemic even though three-quarters of the population work in subsistence agriculture. Since 2001, the situation has probably worsened: 41 per cent of the population live on less than US$0.55 a day. In rural areas, 46 per cent of the population live in poverty compared to 26 per cent in urban areas (World Bank 2002).

Since independence, the nation's health profile has not changed much. The DHS revealed 14 per cent of children under five years of age had a cough accompanied by short, rapid breathing (symptoms of acute respiratory infection), and a high percentage of children aged under five had fever. In the two weeks prior to the survey, ten per cent of children under five had suffered diarrhoea. Forty per cent of children under five were underweight and 14 per cent were severely underweight. Furthermore, 48 per cent of children under five were stunted and 27 per cent were severely stunted. Stunting may contribute to difficulties in cognitive understanding and learning. Only 18 per cent of the children aged 12-23 months were fully immunised against tuberculosis, pertussis, polio, tetanus, and measles. As for the mothers, 38 per cent of non-pregnant women had a low body mass index or evidence of chronic energy deficiency, and 13 per cent of women in Timor-Leste were less than 145cm in height, associated with small pelvic size and an increased risk of delivery complications (Ministry of Health et al. 2004).

Timor-Leste has a deeply embedded patriarchy, and women's status is low as they are seen as a commodity, having been purchased by the husband's family in the form of a dowry. Their low economic status also weakens their household bargaining power and thus it is not surprising that violence against women is high (see Bere and de Sousa papers, this issue), and often goes unreported.

Women's lives, reproductive career and burdens
Women's health is threatened by the fact that 90 per cent have home births because they feel embarrassed to be assisted by someone outside their immediate family. Many sick children are left at home without proper health care and this may contribute to the fact that many die before reaching the age of five (Jurnal Perempuan 2005).

The following case studies, collected in March 2003 during the DHS pre-test, illustrate why East Timorese women prefer to give birth at home. The alternative, giving birth using modern health facilities or even taking babies or children there, is not...
women's health problems and the childbearing burden in Timor-Leste.

I have five children; the youngest is eight years old. I have delivered all of my children at home assisted by my husband. Like many Timorese women, I prefer to deliver at home. For 40 days after delivery I cannot wash my hair, I have to wear warm clothing and eat and drink warm food as well as bath in warm water for six months. If we do not follow these practices we can get sick and might die. We believe also that these practices space children so Timorese women practice them. We are so astonished by the fact that women from Java seem to be not looking after their health after giving birth by drinking and eating cold food and not keeping their body warm. We cannot do that as we will be sick and might die.

(Natalie, late 30s, married, waitress, Dili).

I live only several kilometres from this Community Health Centre. This is my first daughter, she is seven months old, she has diarrhoea, and is not eating well. That is why I have brought her here to this Centre. I have sought help from the traditional birth attendant, but still her health has not improved. When I gave birth, a traditional birth attendant assisted me at my house; my mother was there as well. Everything was all right then. I was breastfeeding her but now my breast milk seems to have dried up, so I bottle feed my daughter. I hope she will be well soon. She is underweight and has been looking very sick.

(Joanne, early 20s, married, Aileu).

I fell in love with my husband when I was still in high school. We met in my village as he was assigned to work in my village by the army. He is still now working with the national armed forces but his post is not in this village so he only comes home to visit our daughter and me every other month. I was still 16 when we got married and he was in his early 20s. He proposed to my family and as I am the eldest girl from ten siblings, my parents agreed and we got married. I got pregnant soon after. I did not have a clue about becoming pregnant and delivery. I recall her saying that this is the pain that a woman has to bear to become a mother. My mother assisted my delivery in her house. My mother kept encouraging and supporting me during the process of the delivery. I recall her saying that the following case study outlines the division of labour between a husband and wife in a household with four children all aged under nine (a younger child died before its second birthday). Like other households in Timor-Leste, the wife, Lucy, is the first to wake up, start the fire and prepare breakfast; she is also the last to go to bed. Lucy is responsible for looking after the children, gathering vegetables, cleaning the house, getting the children ready for school as well as working in the field, fetching water at least three times a day and collecting firewood. The husband's daily chores, not as varied as his wife's, involve working in the field, looking after livestock, and collecting firewood and vegetables. He also has time to chat with his male neighbours before he goes to bed. Every day, Lucy walks 7.6 kilometres while her husband walks four kilometres.

The division of labour identified in this family is common in Timor-Leste. In addition, like many households in Timor-Leste, this family had one child die before it reached the age of five. This case study raises a number of questions that need to be addressed if the health status of East Timorese families is to be improved, including:

1. How can East Timorese women look after her own health and reproductive health needs if each and everyday day she is responsible for so many different tasks that are physically and emotionally straining?
2. How can she concentrate on herself if she has to focus on being the family care-giver and household manager while continuously struggling to make ends meet?
3. How can she keep her family healthy if she has little health knowledge, limited financial resources, and when public health facilities are limited and out of reach?
4. How can East Timorese women retain their health when a high frequency of deliveries is the norm?

Conclusion

East Timorese women face many disadvantages with regards to their reproductive health and childbearing conditions. The strong patriarchal environment reinforces gender inequities, violence against women is common, and almost all of the household chores and management duties, as well as childbearing and childrearing responsibilities are seen as women's work. This reality is worsened by the fact that women are powerless in respect to making decisions or deciding how economic resources are used within the household.

Poverty as well as post-conflict trauma makes women's lives extremely difficult. Many women are stunted and their health is further threatened by the high numbers of children they give birth to. As their educational levels are low and their health-related knowledge is very limited, East Timorese women prefer home births, which is often self assisted. This may explain why maternal mortality is high.

Various NGOs are working to help empower women, and the Ministry of Health is also trying to improve women's health and well-being. But if the government does not take strong measures towards providing family planning information and education, and develop strong policies and programmes on birth limitation and birth spacing, East Timorese women's childbearing and childrearing responsibilities will not decrease. What is more, if policies and programmes relating to these issues are not reinforced at grassroots level, they will have little impact.

Note

1. The 2003 Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey was conducted by a team of officials and researchers from the Ministry of Health and Statistics office, University of Newcastle and Australian National University. The survey is a cross-sectional household survey in which 4,320 households were selected using a cluster sampling method representing four different geographic areas in Timor-Leste. The survey addressed 4,177 ever-married women aged 15-49 years and 3,917 ever-married men aged 15-54 years. There were 5,431 children less than six months who were also included in the survey for nutritional status testing including anthropometry measures as well as haemoglobin examinations. Men and women were surveyed on separate standardised questionnaires, and their nutritional status was also examined.

References


Health: Family issues in Timor-Leste

Beverley Snell, Lidia Gomes, Misliza Vital, Michael Dibley, Odete Maria Freitas Belo, Sarah Moon, Clement Malau, Nelson Martins

Introduction

Timor-Leste has the highest maternal mortality rate in the region with an estimated 880 per 100,000 live births. Around half of births occur at home and access to obstetric care is limited. Under five child mortality is also extremely high, at around 82 per 1,000 births. In a forum focusing on health, family issues were seen as core to addressing these far-reaching concerns.

The Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) was carried out by the Ministry of Health in Timor-Leste in 2002-2003 (see Utomo paper, this issue). This survey has informed the direction and implementation of programmes and interventions undertaken by the Ministry, particularly those focusing on women’s and children’s health. Men’s participation and utilisation of health services, and their role in their family’s utilisation of health services, are also relevant. Women’s and children’s health are addressed primarily through the Reproductive Health Strategy and Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI).

It is recognised that there are discrepancies between maternal and child health figures from different sources. In this document we refer to DHS data.

The Demographic and Health Survey

This survey was the first comprehensive assessment of the demographic, health and nutrition status of the population of this newly independent state. The DHS was designed to fulfil the following specific objectives:

- provide data concerning the basic demographic profile of the country, including fertility and infant and child mortality rates needed for development planning;
- assess the nutritional and anaemic status of the adult and child populations to plan and prioritise future interventions;
- provide baseline information about health and nutritional status of the population and use of health services for future evaluation of national health programmes;
- provide baseline information about fertility and contraceptive prevalence rates to evaluate future child spacing programmes;
- analyse factors associated with fertility and use of family planning methods, maternal and child health, use of health services and adult illnesses;
- analyse factors associated with malnutrition and anaemia especially in women and children;
- assess men’s participation and utilisation of health services, and their role in their family’s utilisation of health services; and
- create standard demographic, health and nutrition indicators to facilitate cross-country comparisons for programme managers, policy makers and researchers.

A cross-sectional household survey was conducted May-August 2003, involving a cluster sample of 4,320 households from four different geographic areas in Timor-Leste. The survey was designed to provide estimates of key demographic, health status and health service usage indicators at national level, and for selected policy relevant subgroups of the population based on geographic location (west, central and east), the nature of the district (urban versus rural), and major agro-ecologic zones (lowlands and highlands).

Maternal health

The total fertility rate of Timor-Leste registered as the world’s highest in 2003, according to the DHS, at an average of 7.8 children born per woman. Women wanting to control their fertility have had limited access to knowledge of how to do so, and limited access to safe acceptable methods of birth control.

Table 1: Fertility and family planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (children born per woman)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median birth intervals (months)</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women knowing any contraceptive method</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men knowing any contraceptive method</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women currently using any method</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmet need for family planning</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS 2004
To improve access to contraceptive supplies and widen information about family planning, a comprehensive programme of integrated reproductive health care was developed. It includes culturally and socially appropriate promotion of family planning options, and the provision of accessible contraceptive supplies and services for all women and men in Timor-Leste.

The vast majority of births in Timor-Leste occur in places with poor access to emergency obstetric care; less than 20 per cent of births are assisted by trained personnel. Undoubtedly, these factors contribute to the nation having the region's highest maternal mortality rate. What is more, most pregnant women have nutritional deficiencies and short birth intervals.

As Table 2 shows, knowledge of HIV and AIDS and of ways to prevent transmission is extremely limited among married women and men. Health education needs to start with the basics: information about what HIV and AIDS mean, along with the dangers of HIV infection.

### Table 2: Safe motherhood and knowledge of HIV and AIDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe motherhood</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antenatal care from health providers</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women receiving tetanus toxoid two doses</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Births delivered in a health facility</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother with medical assistance at delivery</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant women with anaemia (Hb&lt;120g/L)</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mothers receiving vitamin A postpartum</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-pregnant women with low BMI (&lt;18.5kg/m²)</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-pregnant women with anaemia (haemoglobin &lt;120g/L)</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIV and AIDS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women having heard of HIV and AIDS</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women knowing two or three ways to avoid HIV infection</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS 2004

Strategies developed to address the issues identified in Table 2 are:

- Family Planning Strategy, March 2004;
- Reproductive Health Strategy 2004 to 2015;
- Strategy for Health Promotion 2004 to 2010;
- Immunisation Strategy, July 2004;
- Nutritional Strategy, July 2004; and
- Strategy for Maternal Waiting House (draft in progress).

The government of Timor-Leste recognises the importance of the availability of quality health services to all women during pregnancy and childbirth. It pledges access to free basic and comprehensive maternity care — comprising quality antenatal care, clean and safe delivery, and postpartum care — for all pregnant women, whatever the circumstances of their pregnancy and delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Health is promoting knowledge of pregnancy and childbirth issues as well as of available services. Emphasis is on birth spacing, maternal nutrition, timely referral to skilled birth attendants, clean delivery procedures, access to emergency obstetrical care, and involvement of husbands in supporting pregnant women through the pre- and post-partum period. To achieve its outcome, the Ministry has also devised the following strategies:

- improve quality and coverage of prenatal, delivery and postnatal care;
- improve accessibility of emergency obstetric care;
- integrate the sexually transmitted infections (STI) and HIV programme into maternal and prenatal care.

### Implementation

Ministry of Health staff are implementing a range of education and communication strategies aimed at enabling women and their families to recognise complications and to encourage health promoting behaviors before, during and after pregnancy and delivery. In 2004, the Ministry launched its Safe Motherhood campaign focusing on the importance of at least four antenatal visits. More than 20 different kinds of promotional material have been distributed including Livrinho Saude Inan ho Oan (Mother’s Health Book), and home-based maternal records with an integrated child growth monitoring and immunisation schedule.

Essential care standards have been developed, including midwifery standards of general, antenatal, intra-partum and postnatal care, as well as emergency obstetrical care at different levels of the health system. Antenatal care is used as an opportunity to detect and manage nutritional deficiencies and to treat endemic diseases such as malaria and STI. It also offers prophylaxis with tetanus toxoid, anaemia and iron/folate supplementation, planning for place of birth, and for informing women and their families about when and where to seek care. Postpartum care includes breastfeeding support and counselling, the prevention or early detection of maternal or newborn complications, as well as contraceptive advice and vitamin A supplementation.

Community based health posts and community based health care providers are important resources in improving maternal care. Currently, around 90 per cent of the population has access to health care facilities. All districts have ambulances, Community Health Centres have radios, and roads are in varying conditions for travel across the country. To ensure health services
are available as close as possible to people's homes, peripheral facilities are being upgraded and Maternal Waiting Houses established. Improved quality care is being provided through district-based interventions — a Maternal and Child Health District Programme Officer is assigned to each district health team. Recruitment, in-service competency based training and initial midwifery education, and deployment of skilled attendants is underway in a drive to make trained assistance available for every birth. There are currently 274 midwives in Timor-Leste.

**Family planning programme**

In July 2003, a national workshop on the draft Family Planning Policy was conducted, following feedback on an earlier draft from representatives of 13 district-level communities. Almost a year later, the policy was accepted by the Council of Ministers. The Timor-Leste government recognises the importance of spacing births and reducing the extremely high birth rate as a means of reaching its goals of eradicating poverty, reducing the country's high levels of maternal and child mortality, and improving the health of mothers and children.

Family planning, (including natural family planning), information, counselling and services are accessible at all levels of the public health system so that all couples and individuals in Timor-Leste will have the means and information needed to make informed and free choices about the number and spacing of their children.

To ensure such services are client centered and adhere to the highest professional standards, ongoing training and information to relevant health care providers will be provided, and the supply and effective distribution of the widest possible range of contraceptives will be secured. The strategies for the Policy's implementation are:

- increase knowledge of birth spacing;
- improve accessibility of contraceptive services and widen the range of contraceptive options;
- increase the active participation of men in reproductive health issues and promote the use of male contraceptive methods; and
- integrate STI programmes into family planning services.

**Implementation**

Culturally and religiously sensitive information, education and communication on family planning materials, which respect people's individual choices, are in the process of development. These include flip charts, posters and brochures on family planning including natural methods. Each family planning service delivery point must:

- provide complete and accurate information about all available methods. At least three different modern methods of contraception must be offered or referred. Advice on natural methods along with condoms, oral and injectable contraceptives will be made available at health post level; contraceptive subdermal implants and intra-uterine devices (IUDs) will be added from the level of Community Health Centres; and sterilisation will be available at referral hospitals and higher level health centres with appropriate equipment and trained staff;
- provide services to all who require them regardless of age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, knowledge of languages, income level, or any other criteria; and
- all health facilities will have allocated private space for family planning counselling and be equipped to provide clinical care.

Thirteen midwives and one general practitioner received training for national master trainers on family planning counselling and clinical skills, with support from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Ongoing training of health providers on family planning counselling and clinical skills is done by the national master trainers. They also train health care providers on the technical and managerial aspects of contraception and on appropriate interpersonal communication and counselling skills. Two years of funding for contraceptive devices has been requested from UNFPA ($138,000), assuming a contraceptive usage rise from 11 to 15 per cent. These materials include Depo-Provera, contraceptive pills, IUDs, intra-dermal implants and condoms.

**Infant and child health**

In Timor-Leste, there are critical infant and child health concerns. There is a very high under-five mortality (125 per 1,000 live births reported 1989-1993) and a severe shortage of doctors. All of the major childhood diseases are common including acute respiratory infection, malaria and other fevers, diarrhoeal diseases, and nutritional disorders. Table 3 outlines these concerns.

Malnutrition is a major problem, resulting in underweight children as well as wasting and stunting. Wasting is associated with undernutrition and failure to recover from frequent illness; stunting is a result of chronic undernutrition during infancy and childhood.

- wasting: 12-18 per cent children (0.5-5 years);
- underweight: 43-60 per cent; and
- stunting: 47-55 per cent.

An integrated approach to child health focusing on the well-being of the whole child, IMCI, has been adopted by the
Ministry of Health as a key strategy to deal with infant and child health concerns. IMCI's strategy is the only current child policy document, though there are references to child health in the Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), Nutrition, and Reproductive Health Policies. IMCI aims to reduce death, illness and disability, and to promote improved growth and development among children under five years of age. IMCI includes both preventive and curative elements that are implemented by families and communities as well as by health facilities. The IMCI approach enables health staff and communities to address the most common childhood problems. It also seeks to provide guidelines for referral to specialised health services.

**Table 3: Child health statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infant and child health concerns</th>
<th>per 1,000 births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neonatal mortality rate</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (≤1 year, 1999-2003 DHS)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under five mortality rate (1999-2003 DHS)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child health and immunisations</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children 12-23 months fully immunised</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children with acute respiratory infection symptoms treated in health care facility</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children with diarrhoea treated with oral rehydration salts</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nutrition and anaemia</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children exclusively breastfed, ≤4 months (% in sample)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median duration of any breastfeeding (months)</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 6-59 months receiving vitamin A supplementation (% in sample)</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children with anaemia, haemoglobin &lt;110g/L, (% in sample)</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS 2004

The Ministry of Health embraced the philosophy of IMCI and made a commitment to programme implementation in 2000-2001. Implementation was well established by 2002-2003 and IMCI, along-with EPI, led the development of the child health strategy in the new health system. Since 1993, there has been a reported decline in under-five mortality. Across Timor-Leste, more than 80 per cent of children aged 12 to 23 months are not fully vaccinated against all six common vaccine-preventable childhood illnesses. Coverage with individual vaccines, according to the most recent EPI Survey (WHO/UNICEF 2004), showed the anti-TB BCG at 72 per cent, tetanus and polio (DPT3/OPV3), 57 per cent, measles, 55 per cent, and tetanus (TT2) at 60 per cent.

**IMCI strategic goal**

The strategic goal of IMCI is to improve the health and well-being of children under five through the introduction of a comprehensive integrated package of health care services, as a component of the Basic Package of Services available in all Ministry of Health facilities. The objectives of this strategy are:

- provide a comprehensive package of health care services to sick children aged one week to five years;
- strengthen the health system for a more efficient and effective delivery of health care services;
- improve the linkage of the health facilities to the communities they serve; and
- enable the empowerment of families and communities to identify the health needs and care for the health of their children.

**Implementation**

There are three programme components:

- improving staff case management skills;
- improving the health system for effective management of childhood illness; and
- improving family and community practices (CIMCI).

Overall, the first and second components of the programme are in the expansion phase. A midterm review was held in June 2003 following the end of the early implementation phase, while the expansion phase is ongoing. The third component, CIMCI, is only implemented in a very limited fashion although a strategic guideline for implementation exists.

The following is a summary of achievements towards IMCI's first component involving the training of first level health workers — nurses and midwives from community health centres, hospitals, the National Centre for Health Education and Training, and the National Hospital in Dili:

- 381 individuals received training, the majority of whom are government staff;
- ten districts completed staff training (another three underway);
- 27 facilitators trained;
- follow-up training conducted six to eight weeks after every training; and
- ongoing supervision by the District Health Management Team has continued at three-monthly intervals after training.

It is important to point out that the implementation of IMCI in Timor-Leste is unique in that it has occurred concurrently with the redevelopment of a health system that was destroyed in 1999. IMCI thus guided development of several health system issues, particularly child health, for example medication (Essential Medicines List), indicators (Health Management and Information Systems [HMIS]) and supervision tools.
Other specific achievements, relevant to the second component, include:

- support to the national immunisation programme;
- adaptation and production of child health record and growth card; and
- support to health promotion activities: vitamin A, de-worming and growth monitoring.

The third component is still being implemented. However, achievements to date include a strategy for developing implementation guidelines for CIMCI. Some NGOs (such as CARE and World Vision) are implementing CIMCI in selected districts but this is not a standardised programme. The CIMCI flipchart has been adapted for use in health promotion.

Other IMCI-related successes
IMCI was one of the earliest programmes implemented by the new Timor-Leste Ministry of Health. Thus IMCI served a very important role in providing a leading example of how to:

- adapt a programme for Timor-Leste;
- integrate a programme;
- conduct training of trainers and other training;
- establish supervision procedures;
- commence data collection (before HMIS); and
- conduct a programme review meeting.

Other successes, associated with the handover of the programme from WHO to the Ministry in mid-2004, were ownership, commitment and leadership. However, many challenges remain.

Challenges
There are a limited number of facilitators for training and the same pool of trainers train many other programmes. In the second component, supervision needs strengthening. Clinic management skills remain very weak, impairing IMCI implementation. There are ongoing problems with drugs/supplies management and with staff not implementing IMCI. HMIS are not fully implemented and clinics still lack fundamentals: water, power, communication, and transportation are still very limited and some clinics are inaccessible in the wet season and cannot refer.

The third component is not yet effectively implemented. Strategies to develop guidelines exist, but have not been implemented. Inter-sectoral collaboration and the Community Health Worker system are still relatively new concepts. Overall, there is weak district level ownership and management:

- until recently there were no district level personnel for IMCI;
- the District Health Management Team is not strong in IMCI, thus cannot provide good support;
- the IMCI programme is not well integrated with Communicable Disease Control, malaria, nutrition and EPI.

The distance of isolated health posts poses enormous difficulties. In some case there is only one person to supply all services with no electricity, radio or water. Getting IMCI and other important programmes to these isolated areas is a major challenge.

Currently UNICEF and WHO, along with CARE International and Cooperative Cafe Timor are partners in the IMCI programme. Further partnerships are planned with BASICS (a US funded body with a focus on child survival) and Health Alliance International (which focuses on neonatal care and IMCI).

Future plans include:

- complete full training and implementation of IMCI;
- conduct ongoing activities related to the second component of IMCI;
- further develop CIMCI; and
- link IMCI to the Health Promotion strategy and development of the Community Health Worker system;

A final IMCI evaluation is planned for mid 2006. Full implementation nationwide including CIMCI is expected within five years; however, there is little or no in-country experience of this. There are other challenges to be met in the future: no broader child health policy is yet developed and referral care and neonatal IMCI, although planned, has not yet commenced implementation.

Notes
1. Beverley Snell and Clement Malau, Centre for International Health, Macfarlane Burnet Institute for Medical Research and Public Health; Lidia Gomes, Mistiza Vital and Odete Maria Freitas Belo, Ministry of Health, Timor-Leste; Michael Dibley, University of Newcastle; Sarah Moon, Australian Red Cross; Nelson Martins, Universidade da Paz, Timor-Leste.
2. This refers to the percentage of currently married women (interviewed) who either did not want any more children or wanted to wait before having their next birth, but were not using any family planning method.

References
Ministry of Health 2004, Draft Timor-Leste 2003 Demographic And Health Survey Key Findings, Dili.
Strengthening health systems in Timor-Leste

Beverley Snell, Nelson Martins, Clement Malau, Odete Maria Freitas Belo, Lidia Gomes, Misliza Vital, Sarah Moon

In a newly independent state, development of a strong, sustainable health system is a priority if reductions in excess mortality among poor and marginalised populations are to be achieved and if major health risk factors are to be dealt with. This paper outlines the plans and achievements of the new health system in Timor-Leste, and the strategies devised by the Ministry of Health for addressing the continuing health challenges.

The health situation at independence

Following the post-referendum violence in Timor-Leste and the destruction of the health system, the priority was to address immediate health needs and resource inequities, and to coordinate external assistance to the health sector. The country needed to be able to react to external offers of support, demands for information and action, and the sometimes clashing agendas of international NGOs, the UN, as well as other donors and external actors. Long-term health system development could not even be considered.

Several months after the conflict, East Timorese health staff formed the East Timorese Health Professionals Working Group. With the assistance of the WHO and UNICEF, the group put together a plan for the future Timor-Leste health care system. This led to the establishment of the Interim Health Authority which operated throughout the ‘interim’ period leading up to the official formation of the Ministry of Health. There were significant health-related issues to consider:

- the old (Indonesian) health system was inefficient with many facilities and staff under-used and costly. Some facilities had up to 25 staff, ineffective equipment, were under-funded and therefore did not provide quality services, probably contributing to low utilisation rates;
- infant and maternal mortality rates were very high;
- the population was predominantly village dwelling and engaged in subsistence agriculture; and
- the major adult health problems were malaria and TB, and diarrhoea and pneumonia for children — similar problems to those in surrounding developing countries.

Currently, the Ministry of Health addresses priority life threatening diseases and illnesses within the community through the Basic Package of Services within the principles of the Health Policy Framework and the National Development Plan. It is structured around a primary health care framework extending basic services and interventions directly to the community.

Basic package of services

The basic package of services focuses on communicable disease control, maternal and child health, non-communicable disease control, health promotion and environmental health. The package is delivered through preventive, promotive, curative and rehabilitative interventions. The first point of access should be at health post level, with the referral path from health centres without beds to health centres with beds to the hospitals (Tilman 2004).

In some areas Timor-Leste still relies on external technical support to assist implementation and to strengthen capacity. However, the Ministry of Health has developed a range of policies and guidelines to steer assistance. Of particular importance is the Guiding Frame for Developing Proposals for Interventions in the Health Sector of Timor-Leste, a pro-forma for agreements between the Ministry of Health and individuals and agencies wishing to provide assistance. By entering into an agreement with the Ministry of Health, external agencies can develop meaningful partnerships that will lead to sustainability and ownership.

Strong health systems are needed for the successful implementation of health interventions. These systems include a sound structure from the village to the central levels, including all logistical components such as communications, transport, power and water. Of equal importance are the capacity of the system and human resources at all levels.

Ministry of Health structure

Timor-Leste has a population of 924,642 divided between 13 districts, 65 sub-districts, and 446 sucos (villages). Health services are provided by six hospitals, 67 Community Health Centres, 174 health posts and 87 mobile clinics organised in the following way:

- central services: Directorate of Health Service Delivery, Directorate of Administration, Finance and Logistics, Directorate of Policy and Planning;
• district health services: Community Health Centres, health posts, and mobile clinics; and
• specialised services: hospitals, National Centre for Health Education and Training (NCHET)/National Institute of Health (which will replace NCHET), National Laboratory, Central Pharmacy.

Current health work force
There are currently 11 postgraduates in the health workforce (a specialist surgeon and ten public health professionals). There are 52 doctors, eight of whom are away on specialisation training, two dentists, and seven public health personnel. There are 1,800 nurses, two of whom are graduates, with 150 at academy level. There are 530 midwives, 264 of whom are civil servants, 46 assistant pharmacists, 70 laboratory assistants, and 160 sanitary inspectors.

The district health service
At district level, it is particularly important that the health system is strong as it is at this level that most people access the service. The District Health Management Team is made up of a district health officer, a deputy health officer, a district public health officer responsible for communicable diseases and an environmental sanitation and nutrition officer.

District health planning is based on a community consultation process, beginning with a consultation with the community to assess needs and scheduled to take place in January and February each year. Needs and services are prioritised and a draft plan is formulated in March/April. After further consultation, the district plan is submitted to the Ministry of Health in May each year. Implementation of district plans requires a close relationship with the community, collaboration with NGOs, and a good working relationship within the health team. Because of the still limited capacity of the national health teams, NGOs are collaborating to help fill gaps until the full human resource capacity is reached.

Constraints to implementation of district plans include:
• inability to accept all requests from communities as they all have different priorities;
• limited capacity and motivation of health team members; and
• difficulty in obtaining budget allocations on time.

Health information systems
Health information systems are crucial for the delivery of appropriate health care as they provide quantitative information that can identify changes and trends in health status as well as qualitative information about service delivery. They provide the basis for targeted interventions and planning. Health information systems include infectious disease surveillance and weekly and monthly reporting on the utilisation of services and quarterly reporting on all other matters. These reports are assessed thoroughly and form part of the monitoring and evaluation framework. Perusal of the health information reports and results of monitoring and evaluation are linked with supervision.

Supervision
The district health service staff supervise other staff and programme activities of the Community Health Centres and health posts, ensuring that activities are implemented according to the annual plan. They offer advice, support and on-the-job training. Achievements have been impressive but human resources need further attention. It is recognised that supervision presents enormous difficulties as some health posts are very isolated.

Coordination and collaboration at district level
The human resources and facilities at the district level still have limited capacity to provide health services to all communities. Assistance from external NGOs and individuals is welcome. However, it is crucial that services provided are endorsed by the Ministry of Health and provided in collaboration with the district health officer. This sort of cooperation develops a partnership and helps provide uniform services. Monitoring and evaluation can be undertaken along with other district health services and a smooth handover of a sustainable health service staffed with local trained workers will be possible when the assisting organisation moves out.

Capacity building in the health sector
Major problems confronting human resource development in Timor-Leste have been identified in the following areas:
• an undersupply/oversupply in certain types of health personnel;
• sufficient staff trained but not recruited;
• training not commensurate with skills needed;
• low morale of the health workers; and
• inadequate human resource management and planning capacity within the Ministry of Health.

Challenges
The mass departure of health workers including senior professional staff, in September 1999, had a huge impact on capacity to deliver health services. The new Ministry of Health was confronted by the need to absorb a large number of mid- and lower-level health workers who were trained under the Indonesian health system. The number and training of these health workers did not match the needs so it was necessary for the Ministry of Health to rationalise the human resources with...
October 2005

the services that were to be provided. This process led to significant low morale of health workers in the civil service due to uncertainties of future government employment. As a direct result of the large number of unemployed health workers in the community, unregulated private practice has grown.

Within the Ministry, an inadequate skill mix remains. The Indonesian health system employed a vast number of health workers, many often performing a single task. As a result, health workers are reluctant to take new roles or are ill-prepared for multi-skilled tasks. The capacity of local training institutions to cater for new training requirements remains underdeveloped.

The key strategies for improving the capacity of health staff are to:

- improve human resource planning;
- recruit available workforce according to needs giving priority to health posts and Community Health Centres;
- develop and implement education and training systems;
- improve human resources management; and
- develop and implement mechanisms for registration, regulation and quality control of medical practitioners.

Guiding principles for human resources development

The key principles are to give priority in training and staffing to underserved areas and primary health services; for health services to be delivered by multi-skilled personnel with appropriate skill mix at each level through an integrated approach; and for all training programmes to be based on identified needs and delivered in the most cost-effective way.

Institutions need to be strengthened to provide a framework for human resources development and the training institutions need to be strengthened to train the necessary number of health professionals to accepted standards. The policy and legislative institutions need to be strengthened to provide accreditation and regulation of practices of individual health professionals and to provide accreditation of training institutions.

Support for human resources development

Funding and technical support are needed for human resources development but the challenge is to build capacity to ensure sustainability and ownership and to avoid undermining the new, emerging health system. At the moment, human resources development support is received from bilateral and multilateral sources and international NGOs. The NGOs' rationale for their support is that they are well intentioned, cost-effective and transparent, grassroots based, and not over burdened by bureaucracy.

Capacity building to ensure sustainability and ownership

It is important that aid management strategies clearly provide:

- a model for meaningful collaboration between expatriate workers and their local counterparts;
- mechanisms for development of long-term equitable professional relationships;
- support for the public sector so that sustainable interventions can be undertaken to facilitate implementation of policies; and
- consideration for cross-sectorial cooperation, so that public, private, NGO and church agencies work together and respect government policies.

The Ministry of Health document, the Guiding Frame for Developing Proposals for Interventions in the Health Sector of Timor-Leste, provides a pro forma for official agreement to provide assistance. By entering into an agreement with the Ministry of Health, external agencies can develop meaningful partnerships that will lead to sustainability and ownership.

Future challenges in human resources development

International assistance is still required but the approach needs to be appropriate and all assistance needs coordination. The Human Resources Development Plan focuses on a gradual reduction of international assistance. A policy on the distribution of skilled health professionals is needed and a policy for inclusion of the private sector needs to be explored with a view to possible private-public funding. Evidence based policy is being developed by the Health Research Centre for Operational Research in Timor-Leste. Tax will be a major source of health funding and some out-of-pocket expenditure and insurance is being considered.

Coordination of health sector support

Human resources in the Ministry of Health need to be expanded to undertake all the tasks involved in implementation of strategies. The number of staff with technical experience is relatively limited, especially in consideration of the massive tasks that face them in the ongoing rebuilding of the health system. In the interim, in some areas, Timor-Leste still relies on external technical support to assist implementation, to fill some gaps, and to strengthen capacity.

The National Health Strategy, the Reproductive Health Strategy, the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) guidelines, and essential drugs list and treatment guidelines have been developed. There are opportunities for visiting health professionals to assist the Ministry to implement the national strategies from health post to hospital level, to help build the capacity of East Timorese health workers, and to contribute to sustainability.
Assistance provided to the health service

Considerable technical assistance is provided by specialists from outside Timor-Leste. For example, specialist programme support and advice is provided by Caritas Norway and AusAID through their TB, mental health and oral health programmes. Specialised clinical service support is provided by the Royal Australian College of Surgeons, Chinese and Cuban specialists, Health Net International and individually-hired specialists. General clinical services are supplemented by district medical officers with the assistance of some Cuban doctors. Management and clinical training is also provided by specialists from outside the country.

Scholarships have been provided for medical doctors whose studies were disrupted after independence (25 medical students), along with two new medical students. Specialisation training will be provided in Indonesia, Philippines and Fiji, the nurse Bachelor degree will be upgraded to a graduate degree and there will be specialist training for medical equipment technicians, pharmacists and anaesthetists.

Guidelines for external assistance

The Ministry of Health’s guiding frame document is intended to better coordinate the efforts of all stakeholders, including national and international institutions/NGOs, and UN agencies interested in contributing to the development of the health sector in Timor-Leste. This guiding frame entered into force on 1 June 2005.

Proposals should be submitted to the Ministry of Health. The Committee for Evaluation of Proposals under the chairmanship of the Vice-Minister for Health will assess and discuss the proposal. After approval, a Memorandum of Understanding, spelling out all terms and conditions in which the intervention will be implemented, will be signed.

Another important guideline for external assistance is Guidelines for Donations of Drugs, Consumables, Equipment and Assets to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

Successes since independence

There has been an enormous amount of goodwill from donors and other actors since independence. The East Timorese health leaders developed a vision and a plan. Partnerships with multilateral and bilateral organisations and NGOs have facilitated the development of a range of important policies and guidelines. However, challenges remain in identifying and addressing gaps in health development in Timor-Leste. These include managing and coordinating all contributors and raising awareness of the existence of guiding documents among all sectors and groups wanting to assist the Ministry of Health.

Notes

1. Beverley Snell and Clement Malau, Centre for International Health, Macfarlane Burnet Institute for Medical Research and Public Health; Nelson Martins, Universidade de la Paz, Timor-Leste; Odete Belo, Lidia Gomes, Misilza Vital, Ministry of Health, Timor-Leste; and Sarah Moon, Australian Red Cross.

2. This guiding frame does not apply to country strategies or other overarching planning documents of UN agencies. However, separate proposals with the intention to seek additional funds from donors should follow this guiding frame.

Reference

Cross-sectoral responses to health for all in Timor-Leste

Beverley Snell, Nelson Martins, Damian Hoy, Odete Maria Freitas Belo, Lidia Gomes, Misliza Vital, Clement Malau, Sarah Moon

The Ministry of Health recognises health as a cross-sectoral issue. The strategic goal for their policy document, Intersectorial Action Framework for well-being and health (IAF), is:

...enhanced well-being and health of the peoples and communities of Timor-Leste through a shared understanding of public health problems and a combined approach of all of government along with the community itself to address key determinants of health.

Its purpose is:

to provide recognition by the Government of the Republic of Timor-Leste that the health and well-being of the peoples and communities of Timor-Leste can only be improved through a collaborative approach to recognition of priority health problems and their causes and subsequent public and individual action. In conjunction with that recognition, the IAF provides direction for joint government and community action to bring about positive changes in living and life conditions by coordinating efforts for positive change. It identifies key areas for action; guidelines and mechanisms for better coordination across various sectors and community in an integrated manner.

This paper explores the cross-sectoral responses to TB, HIV/sexually transmitted infections, diarrhoea and water and vector borne diseases.

Re-establishing TB services in Timor-Leste

In 1995, TB prevalence in Timor-Leste was reported to be as high as 707 per 100,000 population (WHO 1998). In 1999, during the emergency period, TB cases were reported to have increased due to the lack of food, clean water, shelter problems, sanitation and disruption of previous TB services (Martins et al. 2003).

In 2001, the notification rate was 446 per 100,000 for all forms of TB and 154 per 100,000 for new smear positive pulmonary cases — the highest rates in the Southeast Asian and Western Pacific Regions (WHO 2002:295). By 2003 at 335 per 100,000 it was still the highest rate in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific (Martins et al. 2003).

Cross-sectoral partnerships

Following the disruption to the health services due to political conflict in 1999, many people from many different organisations contributed to the establishment of a National Tuberculosis Control Programme (NTP) and within a few months, the programme was operational in all the country's districts. The keys to success of the NTP, where other programmes have failed, were coordination, cooperation and collaboration based on the acceptance that the NTP programme was practical and important and that there was a single East Timorese political voice. Barriers included the shortage of money and drugs, as well as poor infrastructure and transport in a setting of mass displacement of people. In addition, a range of agencies and individuals each claimed the right to treat TB patients. At the time, health services were largely run by international NGOs who were bound by their own mandate, mission and work focuses while key to successful management of TB is uniformity in procedures for case finding, diagnosis, treatment, record-keeping and encouragement of compliance.

At the same time there were important enabling factors. There was a high level of staff motivation and stakeholder commitment among donors, politicians, community and church leaders, and the community itself. International consultants showed willingness to be flexible in their approaches to the situation, and contributions from UN and international agencies including the World Food Program, International Organization for Migration, Red Cross, and International Force East Timor, were crucial.

The TB control programme today

By the end of 2004, the NTP covered all sub-districts in Timor-Leste. The successful completion of treatment rate was 81 per cent and a decrease in the case notification rate became noticeable. Now that a good recording and reporting system is in place and there are acceptable quality laboratory results, further expansion to the community using trained cadres will be undertaken. This scheme will help address the low compliance rate and the still high drop-out rate. It will be important for raising TB awareness in the community.

Programme achievements

An external review of the achievements of the programme (Heldal and Elsony 2003) showed that:

- 10,722 patients were treated 2000-2002;
- 34.9% were new infectious tuberculosis cases;
• 46.4% were smear negative/paediatrics cases; and
• 15.0% were extra-pulmonary cases with a few re-treatment cases.

With regard to treatment results:
• 73% of cases reported were treated in 2001; and
• 81% of cases reported were treated in the first quarter 2002.

Challenges for TB programme delivery
The major challenges to the programme are largely structural but cultural beliefs and location are also problematic. The main issues are:

• health promotion and prevention activities are still relatively weak;
• road and transportation system make access between patients and service providers difficult;
• there is a strong belief in traditional medicine;
• poor housing and environmental conditions facilitate disease transmission;
• poor communications systems inhibit service delivery and contact with patients;
• widespread poor nutrition resulting in difficulties recovering from TB;
• geographical difficulties;
• low staff morale in the Community Health Centres due to feeling of lack of ownership;
• drug resistance is beginning to emerge; and
• HIV infection has already been reported in the community and co-infection with TB is a worldwide problem.

Intersectoral collaboration will play a strong role in addressing the above issues.

The way forward
The plan is to hand the TB programme over to government, allowing an integrated response and the implementation of interventions to strengthen the response to TB from the village level, through the Community Health Centres to the central level. Community ownership will be strengthened and the community will be involved in control of TB and other fatal diseases. Submissions for funding can be made to the Global Fund for TB, Malaria and HIV to help address all these diseases in an integrated manner.

A TB Management Guidelines Committee has been formed and the National TB Strategy is being updated as part of an intrasectoral programme within government.

Addressing HIV and AIDS in Timor-Leste
The prevalence of HIV infection and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) is not known because the surveillance system is incomplete. However, it is known that there is unprotected networking of infected individuals. The transmission of infection is closely linked to poverty, social conflict, population displacement, influx of foreigners with diverse cultures and behaviours, high rates of illiteracy and lack of educational facilities. At the same time, the Catholic Church is very strong in Timor-Leste and has venerated community leaders. These factors influence the ability of individuals to protect themselves or their partners against STIs, including HIV.

The situation
Although no comprehensive information is available, some studies have been undertaken. For example, Oxfam found sex workers active in Suai and other border areas; in 2004, the ALOLA Foundation identified 284 sex workers in Dili and acknowledged the complex issues pushing women and young boys into sex work. These included poverty, sexual violence and insecurity. In 2004, Family Health International (FHI) identified 500 women selling sex for money in Dili and recorded sexual risks among taxi drivers and Defence Force personnel along with very little condom use. They also detected a significant history of intravenous drug use among students.

From laboratory and blood bank reports FHI (2004) detected 24 HIV positive cases of whom six were female and 18 male. Five have died and five are receiving treatment (FHI 2004). Three per cent of sex workers tested were positive and one per cent of men who have sex with men were HIV positive. Other STIs, including gonorrhoea, chlamydia, syphilis or yaws were also found. Fifteen per cent of female sex workers and men who have sex with men were found to have a STI. Among taxi drivers and Defence Force personnel the infection rate was 13 per cent and eight per cent respectively.

Members of the most vulnerable groups in society are also the most marginalised and it is recognised that these groups need to be empowered to enable them to protect themselves from HIV infection. Women, for example, need economic security so they do not have to sell sex, and commercial sex workers and women need to be empowered to protect themselves.

The HIV epidemic follows a predictable pattern. There is a rapid increase in infection in the most vulnerable groups, usually sex workers and injecting drug users, then a spread via the clients or partners of sex workers or injecting drug users into the general population. The top priority is to prevent spread into the general population and to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups.
Addressing HIV and AIDS

The Timor-Leste National Strategic Plan for a Comprehensive and Multisectoral Response to HIV, AIDS and STS 2002-2005, requires active participation and responses from sectors such as education, communication, construction, finance, planning, public works, transportation, social welfare, labour, law, judiciary, tourism, military and police. The Ministry of Health sees that HIV infection is not just another health problem, but has the potential to subvert the building of a new nation. It is the responsibility of every East Timorese to prevent HIV.

The government, through the Ministry of Health, coordinates implementation of the Strategic Plan across ministries, between levels of government (national, district, suco), with NGOs, in the private sectors and in civil society organisations.

The current strategy is to create an enabling environment to prevent and treat HIV and other STIs. Coordination, research and evaluation mechanisms are important for promoting development responses to reduce HIV vulnerabilities. To build community resilience, multisectoral involvement and collaboration are needed.

Mapping is vital to detect what is happening in the community that might have an impact on the spread of HIV infection. It is important to identify vulnerable groups and possible sources of infection. They may be among street children, male and female sex workers, men who have sex with men, uniformed services, foreign visitors, returnees. Mapping and situation analyses can expose mobility patterns and profiles, urban-rural differentials, gender differentials and cultural shifts.

The Ministry of Health, through the national strategy, has indicated that for a multisectoral response, all sectors will determine how the spread of HIV is caused or contributed to by their sector, how the epidemic is likely to affect their sector's goals, objectives and programmes, where their sector has a comparative advantage to respond to limit the spread of HIV and to mitigate the impact of the epidemic.

The education sector is often one of the first to be considered in the development of a cross-sectoral response to health issues. Education is more than just a vehicle to develop life skills curriculum. Teachers themselves are a primary target group for education. Where the epidemic has taken hold, the teaching workforce is significantly affected by HIV infection. While teachers are a resource for curriculum development, they are also a link with HIV-affected families and may be aware of what is happening in households (for example, whether families and carers have enough food or income, and whether there is support for orphans).

The Church is a very powerful sector in Timor-Leste. It has been involved in negotiations and supports Ministry of Health strategies to prevent HIV transmission. The condom issue has been discussed openly and although the Catholic Church cannot recommend the use of condoms, the clergy are prepared to tell people how to use them to prevent HIV transmission.

The National AIDS Commission is the government body that coordinates response to HIV at the national level. Multisectoral representatives, including the Church, are members of the Commission. Strategies for responding to HIV depend on situation analysis and mapping in each sector. A cross-sectoral approach in the prevention of diarrhoea

Diarrhoea is a key contributor to the very high infant and under-five mortality rates in Timor-Leste, and is one of the three most common childhood diseases along with acute respiratory infection and malaria. In Timor-Leste, 85 per cent of the population live in rural areas and often have poor access to health services. Prevention of disease can help to reduce these high mortality rates. Commonly, diarrhoea is spread by human faeces, in fluids or on food, fingers, or microbes from faeces carried by flies.

There are a number of measures that should be used to help prevent diarrhoea. In a review of studies in 1991, Esrey et al. found that hygiene (especially hand washing) and the safe disposal of faeces through sanitation were the two most effective ways to prevent diarrhoea. More recently, a review by Fewtrell et al. (2005) confirmed that these measures are very important, but also found that water quality plays a major role in the prevention of diarrhoea. Another very important factor in the prevention of diarrhoea is the promotion of exclusive breastfeeding to six months of age.

How can we improve work in the prevention of diarrhoea? Prevention activities need to:

• be conducted within the government structures;
• ensure that community consultation and ownership are a focus; and
• ensure there is coordination between all parties.

Collaboration between a range of sectors is needed and has the advantages of sharing ideas and resources and reducing the likelihood of problems arising after having commenced activities. For example, in planning for water systems at the village level in Timor-Leste, it is important to involve different sectors in the following ways:

In deciding on the water source:

• spiritual leaders may be important to assess whether or not it is a sacred site;
• farmers are important to involve to ensure that animals are not likely to be defecating in the source; and
• engineers are important to involve to ensure there is the gradient necessary if it is a gravity-fed system.
In deciding on where to place the tap stand:

- women should be involved as they are often responsible for water collection;
- the community as a whole should be involved to ensure placement is equitable and consensual;
- village leaders can be very useful in helping to resolve disputes;
- engineers should be involved to ensure appropriate design; and
- health experts who are aware of health implications, such as the need for water drainage to prevent mosquitoes breeding in puddles, should be involved.

In addition, with greater access to water, there may be an increase in other breeding sites such as water buckets, tanks, and so on. The community, especially women, need to be involved in addressing these issues. The health and education sectors will be important to raise awareness about prevention of malaria, dengue and other vector-borne illnesses.

In the installation of systems it is important that:

- community mobilisers are involved;
- the community is involved, particularly to ensure ownership;
- farmers are involved to help decide where pipes should be laid;
- engineers are involved to ensure design is adequate;
- spiritual leaders have input on site selection;
- agriculture and forestry for site selection and impact; and
- infrastructure and public works to assist with the design and to possibly assist the supply of some materials.

Working together to achieve common objectives

It is important to consider what mechanisms can help to facilitate better collaboration in the prevention of diarrhoea and other diseases. Some of these will involve meeting with other sectors (including the community, government departments, and the private sector), and:

- taking the time to build relationships with them;
- finding out what they are doing;
- assessing potential opportunities for collaboration;
- assessing what can be learned from them;
- assessing how to best work with them;
- planning together with these sectors; and
- having cross-sectoral strategies and building capacity across the sectors, for example, capacity in situation analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation, proposal development, and so on.

Note

1. Beverley Snell, Damian Hoy and Clement Malau, Centre for International Health, Macfarlane Burnet Institute for Medical Research and Public Health; Nelson Martins, Universidade de la Paz, Timor-Leste; Odete Belo, Lidia Gomes, Misliza Vital, Ministry of Health, Timor-Leste; and Sarah Moon, Australian Red Cross.

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The contribution of education to development: Some issues for Timor-Leste

Helen Hill, Victoria University

Education in Timor-Leste’s development

People are the key resource of any country and the key to development. How they are educated and motivated and enabled to put into practice the skills they have learnt will be a key factor in whether a country is economically successful or not. The main resource of Timor-Leste is not the Timor Sea oil and gas fields, nor the coffee crops. As Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri reminded us in the opening address of this conference, it is the East Timorese people, and their willingness to develop their minds, their capabilities and their skills and their motivation.

The East Timorese, throughout the struggle, always saw a major role for education, not only as a tool for reconstruction but also as a right. They needed to use their intelligence and motivation in extraordinary ways to achieve victory over the Indonesian military through the three-pronged strategy of the armed wing, the diplomatic front and the clandestine front. Now they must apply that same sort of strategic thinking to the development of the East Timorese economy.

The East Timorese Constitution affirms in Section 59, first clause:

The State shall recognise and guarantee that every citizen has the right to education and culture, and it is incumbent upon it to promote the establishment of a public system of universal and compulsory basic education that is free of charge in accordance with its ability and in conformity with the law (Constituent Assembly East Timor 2002).

The Melbourne conference on Strategic Development Planning for an Independent East Timor in April 1999 concluded:

Education is a key sector in the transformation of the East Timorese society and economy. The schooling system and non-formal educational opportunities must be responsible and flexible to meet the needs of other departments and projects and promote equity and participation (Millo and Barnett 2003).

The plan called for transformation of the teaching-learning process and educational liberation, focus on skills needed for development as well as the promotion of East Timorese identity and valuable traditions. Goals of the strategic plan included:

• full exploration of Timor-Leste’s human resources in all sectors of national interest;
• emphasising quality in the teaching-learning process;
• coordination of foreign resources;
• promotion of the history of Timor-Leste;
• developing national identity based on East Timorese cultural identity and universal human values; and
• fostering of independent and critical thinking and a spirit of free and scientific inquiry (Millo and Barnett 2003).

However by September 1999 education at all levels was brought to a halt by militia action. About 95 per cent of schools and many post-secondary education institutions were destroyed; school furniture was looted and teaching material burned. Physical reconstruction of the education sector began immediately with the World Bank’s Emergency School Readiness Project. Its main focus was on repair and re-equipping of militia-damaged school buildings and on teacher recruitment. During this phase a huge debate took place over whether furniture should be locally made or imported, unfortunately there was not such a widespread discussion of what should be taught in these schools to turn them into genuine East Timorese institutions and to develop an education system suitable for a small country, rather than a small province of a large one.

If Timor-Leste had been able to exercise its independence in 1975, it would have entered a very different world of planning for development, where countries typically wrote ‘manpower plans’ and calculated how many people of each set of occupational skills they needed. While this was often done in a less than satisfactory way, it at least focused Ministries of Education on discussing what should be taught in the schooling systems, and required them to communicate closely with school leavers. With the coming of the neo-liberal agenda the philosophy rapidly changed to one of relying on the market to make decisions about skills development.

During the emergency phase of November 1999-2000 the former Indonesian textbooks were reprinted with a short message from Xanana Gusmão recommending their use. Many were critical of Xanana for agreeing to do this as many of the books were highly unsuitable, full of mistakes and contained material offensive to East Timorese, yet at that time the emphasis had been on creating a sense of continuity and so-called ‘normality’
for children and not disrupting their education to re-write the textbooks. But the old Indonesian curriculum has continued on long after the emergency period was over, outliving its use in many parts of post-reformasi Indonesia where it is regarded as part of a bygone era.

After a year 3,000 teachers were recruited from the 7,000 who had been teaching voluntarily, by means of a written test only, which was, in effect, a simple test of general knowledge in the Indonesian language (Nicolai 2004:115). There was thus no possibility of selecting teachers for their ability to teach. The importance of educational leadership and management cannot be underestimated. Proper selection, training and remuneration for school principals, subject coordinators and school administrators will be vital if the resources put into training teachers is not to be wasted.

**Debates on education and development in the international community**

During the 1990s, the UN engaged in a wide-ranging series of conferences on topics such as environment, women, human rights, population and education. East Timor’s leaders were too pre-occupied to focus on the two on education. One took place at Jomtien, Thailand in March 1990 and produced the *Jomtien Declaration on Education for All*. The other, the Fifth International Conference on Adult Education, took place in Hamburg, Germany, and adopted the *Hamburg Declaration on Adult Learning*, outlining the importance of lifelong learning in addressing many of the world’s development problems and an *Agenda for the Future relating to education for democracy, sustainability, human rights, the changing nature of work, health and the environment*. A further conference was in April 2000, in Dakar, Senegal, just as Timor-Leste was emerging from the large-scale destruction of its whole schooling system. This conference adopted the *Dakar Framework for Action*,1 which commits governments to achieving quality basic education for all by 2015 or earlier.

It is these conferences, together with the UN conferences on women, health and social development, which provided the content and rationale for the Millennium Development Goals, which have become part of Timor-Leste’s own development strategy. It is a pity that Timor-Leste missed out on the debate that went into these goals. A reading of Timor-Leste’s Sector Investment Program on Education and Training reveals that the concept of ‘lifelong education’ needs to be much more clearly understood in Timor-Leste.

**Quantitative evidence on impact of investment in education**

The World Campaign for Education Now argues that primary schooling is a key element in overcoming poverty. They quote successes by countries such as China, Cuba, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica and Vietnam where governments invested in education, enabling fees to be abolished at primary level, and which led to substantial economic growth two decades later, and a higher level of human development achieved in these countries than in many others with a much higher GDP per capita (Oxfam 1999). It is important, they argue, that universal primary education be the first priority, before expanding secondary education and putting a great deal of investment into higher education.

This is a lesson that the fast developing countries of Asia learnt in the 1970s, in particular Singapore and Hong Kong, which have no resources but their people. While the World Bank for years argued that the ‘East Asian Miracle’ came about as a result of free market policies, and deregulation of the economy, this was hotly contested, even by some of the World Bank’s own authors. Many of these countries — Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong — had far from free market policies, on the contrary they relied heavily on state intervention and economic planning, and state subsidies for public goods such as telecommunications and public transport, albeit within a fully capitalist framework. In their early years they also promoted import substitution and protection for ‘infant industries’ while their institutions were developing. Instead of free markets being the key to high growth levels, these writers argued it was the great attention paid by Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan to primary and secondary schooling and broadening the base of participants in higher education and technical training that was more significant in the development strategies of these countries.

Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore all achieved universal primary education in 1965, well ahead of other developing economies, and ahead even of Portugal. Now the World Bank’s own research backs up the importance of universal general education for development. The fast developing countries of East Asia not only registered higher levels of investment in education two decades before experiencing rapid rates of economic growth, they also demonstrated higher levels of educational achievement than in many developed countries and were the first to eliminate gender gaps in school enrolment (World Bank 1999:43-47; Cypher and Dietz 1997:285).

The schools in these East Asian countries all have a very long day and require the students to learn difficult and often multiple languages. The elimination of gender gaps is important, as the home learning environment of children, including the educational level of the mother, correlates closely with academic success. It is noticeable also that the East Asian ‘tigers’ have invested in transport to school and provision of affordable school lunches, textbooks and school uniforms. This is necessary to bring in the last few per cent of children, particularly girls, and remote students, into schooling. Special measures and special
forms of schooling are often needed for those in remote regions and for those who need to be involved in agriculture while pursuing their education.

Andy Green has pointed out that the 'tiger' countries put more emphasis on general education than they did on technical education, even though technological skills were clearly an important part of their model of development. In these 'developmental states', he also points out that education developed as part of a careful state-sponsored plan for development of the economy which also emphasised investment in infrastructure, housing and health and was, to some extent, motivated by a desire for survival in an environment of regional hostility (Green 1997:47-48).

In contrast to the East Asian economies, some of Timor-Leste's other neighbouring countries that are rich in natural resources, such as Australia and the Melanesian countries, have been slower to learn the importance of investment in human resource development and the importance of intellectual capital in socio-economic development. Australia to this day relies on immigration as a way of bringing many skills into the country rather than educating enough of its own citizens. Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu were lulled into complacency by the thought of large reserves of mineral wealth which would bring in revenues. Not enough effort was put into developing skilled nationals to manage those natural resources, to link them with other sectors of the economy and thus take advantage of the natural resources to provide an increased standard of living for all.

The Portuguese-speaking countries unfortunately paid even less attention to investment in human resources, and followed policies which led to high wastage rates from formal education, in particular, and failure to teach initial literacy in the mother tongue. On the other hand Tonga and Samoa, two countries which educate children in the mother tongue and then teach English as a second language, have Oceania's highest cohort of students continuing to the end of secondary school and entering higher education in the English language.

Qualitative contributions to the study of education's contribution to development

In 1994 UNESCO convened an International Commission on Education for the 21st Century which identified four 'pillars' of learning necessary for all citizens in the modern world and particularly in a democracy:

- learning to know (general and specific knowledge);
- learning to do (occupational skills, life skills);
- learning to live together (intercultural understanding); and
- learning to be (autonomy, judgement and personal responsibility) (Delors 1996).

In discussions on the contribution of education to development, they also form a useful corrective to those views which see education as purely cognitive learning or memorising, or those which see education as a commodity subject to the rules of the market and one measured simply in terms of years spent sitting in a classroom, by the examinations passed or by the amount of money spent on schooling.

The CEOs of five of the world's major youth NGOs (the YWCA, the YMCA, Scouts, Guides, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), in a significant statement looking at the particular challenges of education in the era of globalisation, define education as:

a lifelong process which enables the continuous development of a person's capabilities as an individual and as a member of society. The purpose of education is to contribute to the full development of an autonomous, supportive, responsible and committed person (Casey et al. 1998).

This definition is consistent with Amartya Sen's views on economic development as a means of expansion of capabilities of members of society (Sen 1999). In the worldwide debate on the relationship between education and development, while greater attention is now being paid to investing in schooling, it must also be remembered that increased spending on education is not, of itself, sufficient to overcome poverty. Back in the late 1960s the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal observed that, in Asia, unequal access to education, along with unequal access to land, was one of the greatest sources of inequality within society as increased government spending on education often goes to help those already advantaged (Myrdal 1972).

Unfortunately Timor-Leste's education system is still largely geared towards what it was during the Indonesian occupation — selecting the most intelligent East Timorese and preparing them for jobs in the Indonesian economy. While not many East Timorese were given positions of responsibility in Timor, they could go and work in factories and the public service in Indonesia, and were encouraged to do so. Agriculture was largely carried out by those who failed in the schooling system, which accounts for its very low level of productivity. Now that Timor-Leste is independent, its education and training policy must be carried out in much closer cooperation with its economic development strategy. Or there will be a danger that the best jobs will go to foreign workers and East Timorese will attempt to migrate elsewhere in search of work and the country will not develop.

The content of schooling

The content of most schooling at all levels remains the Indonesian subjects with the Indonesian curriculum simply because no other was available in a language which most students
understand. This means that in most respects East Timorese schools and universities are still Indonesian institutions, carrying on with cultures and traditions that were intended to make the East Timorese feel like second-class citizens. For example the belittling initiation rituals introduced under Indonesian rule, for new entrants into each level of schooling, have continued after independence without proper thought as to their effects on many individuals.

Philip Foster, in his classic article 'The Development Fallacy in Vocational Education', observed that donors often think that there is a heightened need for more 'vocational' and less general education in countries at an early stage in their nation-building. On the contrary, he claims, general education and vocational education serve different purposes and are 'hardly substitutable', and observes that, for many jobs, the best vocational education is in fact general education (literacy, languages, history, mathematics, communications skills, and so on) (Foster 1977, 2002).

A more recent qualitative approach is that of Michael Gibbons and his colleagues in the 1990s. They argue that there are now two distinct areas of knowledge in modern societies, which they call Mode 1 and Mode 2. Mode 1 is knowledge of the discipline-based type, typically produced in universities. Mode 2 is socially distributed knowledge, the knowledge of application that is produced in workplaces outside the university sector, it is output driven, specific and transient. It uses methods that might not be seen as legitimate when measured against the traditional university criteria for knowledge production, but it is valuable in economic terms and vital for social and economic development. Much of this knowledge is tacit and by its nature transdisciplinary (Gibbons et al. cited in Gonczi 2004:24). This partly explains why graduates of universities in many countries are ill-prepared for the workplace. They have spent their time learning the systematised academic disciplines, propositions and theories, which are often tested without reference to the student's imagination, or acquisition of Mode 2 knowledge.

In formerly colonised countries Mode 1 knowledge invariably comes from outside (often the colonial power) while Mode 2 knowledge can be a mixture of modern technological know-how and indigenous knowledge. Overcoming the low status of indigenous knowledge in education systems is particularly crucial for development and needs to be addressed in Timor-Leste if agricultural productivity is to increase.

Achievements
An important achievement has been the publication of Manual Lisaun Pratika Fisika: Ba Mestre Sira Iha Escola Pre-Secundaria Timor Lorosa'e, by the Faculty of Education at the University of Timor-Leste. This book gives experiments which can easily be done with little equipment which illustrate important principles of physics. It is illustrated with photos of East Timorese students doing the experiments, half of them girls (Gabrielson 2002). Hopefully it will be made available widely and followed by others on biology, chemistry and food science as this sort of important knowledge is too important to wait until students have expertise in Portuguese. It is also important for people to see scientific texts in the language of the people, not only in the language of the educated elite.

The fact that many students in Timor-Leste can reach the end of university without much experience of Mode 2 knowledge makes it hard for them to be effectively employed when they begin to look for jobs. This is a terrible waste of human resources into which a large investment, often family investment in the private universities, has been made.

Australian consultant Geoff Saunderson recommended there were greater returns to be had by training those already in employment (Saunderson 2001), thus Australia put its efforts into the Civil Service Academy and other forms of 'capacity building' rather than into Universities in Timor-Leste. The reality is that general education and so-called 'capacity building' should not be separated, they should go hand-in-hand and opportunities be given for young people to engage with the work force or with society in general, while continuing their education and skills development.

Notes
1. The Jomtien Declaration, the Hamburg Declaration, the Agenda for the Future, and the Dakar Framework are available online at www.unesco.org/education.
2. At the beginning of each new school or university year, new students are required to sweep the streets and perform a number of humiliating activities at the behest of the older students (and sometimes of the teachers), in most countries this would be regarded as bullying and Efforts taken to stop it. A new ceremony for welcoming students into new schools and universities in an independent Timor-Leste is definitely required; Dili Institute of Technology has pioneered this.

References


Popular education and peace building in Timor-Leste

Deborah Durnan, University of New England

An important development in Timor-Leste in recent years has been the re-emergence of popular education, an activist-based approach to development work originally used by FRETILIN in organising the rural population in 1974-75 (Hill 2002). This paper briefly introduces some organisations now engaged in popular education and discusses their work in the context of theories of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, based on ongoing research as a student with the Centre for Peace Studies at the University of New England. The purpose of this paper is to encourage aid agencies, development workers and donors to support this particular approach to post-conflict development work.¹

Definitions

In recent years, an extensive literature has emerged on peace building, analysing specific forms of development work in societies emerging from armed conflict. For the purposes of this paper, a simple definition of peace building is:

...more than simple methods of teaching and learning — it depends on a political analysis of power and a commitment to equality and democratic process. [It is]...a collective process that seeks to give voice to those who have been silenced, to empower those who have been disempowered, and to bring about liberation, on both personal and societal levels. Liberation grows out of social awareness, community organising, creative action, self-reliance, the use of local resources and culture, and a persistent commitment to human dignity (La'o Hamutuk 2002:17).

Popular educators are part of an international movement and can be found in all fields of adult education and development work. A recent definition of this approach, from the National Institute for Adult and Community Education (NIACE) in the UK, echoes the words of Dai Popular:

Freire's approach is based on asking questions about the root causes of social and political problems rather than focusing on the symptoms, in order to plan strategies to address them. According to Freire, oppressed people need...to be able to critically assess the kinds of ideas, contexts and relationships which are usually 'taken for granted' or accepted as inevitable (Thompson 2000:2).

An important characteristic of popular education is that it draws its strength and ideas from social movements, such as trade unions, student associations and women's organisations, from people organising to effect social and political change. It emphasises the learning that occurs when people take collective action, and it uses an 'action-reflect' model as the basis of its pedagogy (Kane 2001). Because it seeks to engage people as active and critical agents in the process of social transformation, it is particularly appropriate to the tasks of peace building, which require people to transform both themselves and their communities in order to move from a culture of violence to a sustainable culture of peace.

Historical and social context

Popular education begins with a process of reflection on experiences, linking the current lived experiences of individuals and communities to the broader history which has led to their contemporary reality. Timor-Leste today is the product of a fractured history, in which violence and oppression sit side by side with resilience, resistance and ultimately victory — a victory in which the strong cultural identity, traditional practices and local knowledge systems of ordinary people played a key role.

¹...more than simple methods of teaching and learning — it depends on a political analysis of power and a commitment to equality and democratic process. [It is]...a collective process that seeks to give voice to those who have been silenced, to empower those who have been disempowered, and to bring about liberation, on both personal and societal levels. Liberation grows out of social awareness, community organising, creative action, self-reliance, the use of local resources and culture, and a persistent commitment to human dignity (La'o Hamutuk 2002:17).

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The experiences of the people of Timor-Leste include a long history of colonisation by the Portuguese, a brief period of democratic development in 1974-75, and a brutal invasion and genocidal 24-year occupation by Indonesia, in which 200,000 people died and, by the time of liberation, up to 90 per cent of infrastructure was destroyed. On the other hand, the same period saw the development of a widespread national resistance, with three interdependent 'wings': the armed fighters of Falintil, the internal underground, and the external or diplomatic wing. In the ballot of August 1999, the resistance showed its strength, its deep connections with the mass of people, mobilising 78.5 per cent of the population to reject the offer of autonomy under Indonesian rule. Then, in a remarkable transformation, by 2001 the independence movement was able to win an overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly, chaired by FRETILIN president and ex-Falintil commander Lu'ollo; then to lead the development of a democratic constitution and ultimately, in May 2002, to form the first independently elected popular government, with FRETILIN's General Secretary Mari Alkatiri the first Prime Minister.

The legacy of this fractured history remains, however, in the social, economic and political conditions in which the majority of people find themselves. In a total population of 925,000, 48 per cent are aged 17 years and under — a result of very high adult mortality rates during the Indonesian occupation. This young population is growing rapidly, at a rate of three per cent per annum. Health remains poor, with an average life expectancy of 57 years, and infant/child mortality rates of 80-130 per 1,000 births. There is a huge cultural and linguistic diversity, with up to 20 different languages spoken. Up to 20 per cent of people speak Portuguese, and more than half speak Tetum, the two official languages. Eighty per cent of the population live in rural districts, of whom 94 per cent are engaged in subsistence agriculture and fishing. Only one-fifth of people are directly involved in the cash economy — 48 per cent live in absolute poverty. The majority of young adults have had little secondary schooling, especially since the 1990s, when a new wave of resistance began to spread through the countryside; 46 per cent of adults have had no schooling at all. Consequently, illiteracy rates are very high, between 50-90 per cent, with the highest rates among women in rural and remote areas. Of particular importance is the fact that in the age-cohort 35-44 years — the group from which most communities draw their development 'leadership', economically, politically and culturally — 67 per cent of men and 87 per cent of women have not completed basic or primary schooling. The vast majority of the population has therefore had little if any experience of formal education, and that which has been provided reinforced colonial, patriarchal and urban-based unequal development.

Re-emergence of popular education

The reality of poverty, high mortality rates and illiteracy — products of Timor-Leste's own specific history — provides the rationale for the re-emergence of popular education, first used by FRETILIN and its women's organisation OPMT (Organización Puertorriqueña de la Mujer Trabajadora) as an organising strategy in the countryside in 1974-75. A new generation inspired by the example of the national resistance heroes Vicente Sa'he and Rosa Muki Bonaparte, who led that work and were killed by the invading Indonesians, is seeking to revive this tradition. They are getting some support, particularly in their demand for a national literacy campaign, from members of the current government who took part in the earlier work. Then, as now, the aim of popular education was to mobilise the rural majority to become active participants in building a new and independent nation. Self-determination has been achieved in a formal sense, but this is just the beginning. The challenge which popular educators in Timor-Leste are seeking to address is to work with the people on their own terms, starting from the reality in which they now live, to help them transform that reality by becoming active agents in the process of building their new nation. To do this, the popular education movement today is drawing on young people who were active in the resistance, training them to take on new roles as community development workers and popular educators. Their efforts are being supported by an international network, which includes popular education organisations in Indonesia, the Philippines, Cuba and Brazil; and some international NGOs, especially Oxfam, who have used this approach in other countries, including Mozambique.

A major milestone in the re-emergence of popular education was the formation of Dai Popular, in January 2002, a network of 35 local NGOs, independence activists, and community organisers committed to building a popular education movement. This network seeks to remobilise activists from the independence movement and the resistance and to work in alliance with the new government, mobilising the rural poor, especially women. One of their major priorities is to work with people who are illiterate, to ensure that they are not swept aside and marginalised as development takes off, but are encouraged to bring into the process of reconstruction the knowledge and wisdom of their traditional life, as well as that gained from their experiences of resisting and finally defeating colonialism. The next sections of this paper demonstrate concrete ways this is being done in the work of two organisations that are part of the Dai Popular network. A major recent development was Timor-Leste's first national adult literacy conference in September 2004, at which Dai Popular's members, with strong support from Oxfam, joined in partnership with the Ministry of Education, government.
officials from the districts and international donors and NGOs to discuss the development of a national literacy campaign using a popular education approach.

**Fokupers**

Fokupers is a local NGO which uses popular education to work with women victims of violence and social inequality, continuing a tradition of work initiated in the 1970s by OPMT’s founder, Rosa Muki Bonaparte, which also continued throughout the period of Indonesian occupation. Fokupers was a lead agency in the women’s constitution campaign in 2000-2001, which resulted in major changes to the draft constitution guaranteeing women’s representation in parliament and other key rights for women. It has adopted popular education as a method of training its community-based workers and joined in training sessions led by the Indonesian NGO, INSIST, with other organisations from the Dai Popular network. Fokupers approach embeds education campaigns on women’s rights into work around locally-identified issues, such as livelihood and health. Its workers live in the villages, using members’ homes for their classrooms and discussion spaces. They work in collaboration with other popular education organisations, for example, the agricultural NGO, HASATIL, and with district administration officials including the police. Men are included in their programmes, supporting the formation of men against violence groups. Most importantly, they link local issues and concerns to the national development debate, as they did in the campaign for a new constitution. They are now taking the same approach with work on domestic violence legislation. For Fokupers, violence against women is a political issue, not a personal issue, and it sees its role as challenging traditional and colonial models of development based on patriarchy.

**Sahe Institute of Liberation**

Named for the FRETILIN leader Vicente Sahe, who brought the concept of popular education back to Timor-Leste after meeting Paulo Freire in Portugal, the Sahe Institute of Liberation was established in 1998, as a study group among Timorese university students in Jakarta. Its activists played a major role in the lead up to the 1999 ballot, distributing educational material in the countryside. Today, it is working to re-activate independence activists, who, it says, were ‘demobilised’ by activities of the UN and international agencies after 1999, who took charge of the development process. In the words of one of its spokespeople, Nuno Rodrigues, ‘If NGOs act as the ‘bridge’ the people become the victims and are left behind’ (pers. comm. April 2004). Their aim is to educate and mobilise rural poor to take control of development and ‘nation building.’

**Eskola Ukun Rasik A’an**

Sahe has been the lead local agency in the development of a key component of popular education in every country where it is practiced, namely the ‘activists’ school’. In Timor-Leste, they have adopted the name *Eskola Ukun Rasik A’an*, which translates from the Tetum as ‘self-determination school.’ This is an eighteen-month popular education school, in which participants learn and practice the popular education approach. It consists of six ‘reflection’ workshops, which are interspersed with periods in which the participants work and live in their villages and apply what they are learning. They begin by evaluating what they have learned in this practical trial of the methods and approaches in a workshop. Each workshop focuses on a particular theme related to development and reconstruction. The curriculum includes:

- traditional and resistance knowledge, history and experiences;
- social analysis, including the role of women;
- land ownership and sustainable land use;
- livelihood projects including cooperatives;
- primary health care and use of traditional medicines; and
- critique of ‘classic’ education.

At the time of writing (2005), the first ‘cycle’ of workshops had just ended and was being evaluated.

**Conclusion**

This has been a very brief introduction to an important movement led by younger activists in Timor-Leste’s independence movement, who are embracing an internationally recognised approach to development work in impoverished and marginalised communities. Their work recognises the political nature of development, and addresses the needs of the majority (who are not well educated but have extraordinary knowledge and experience), encouraging them to play an active role in national development. Popular education is potentially a powerful force in peace building, to the extent that it can contribute to four key areas of national development:

- assisting Timorese adults to play active roles in decision making about economic, political and cultural development at local, district and national level;
- fostering the development of sustainable agriculture, both cash cropping and traditional subsistence production, to achieve food security;
- helping people develop sustainable options for individual livelihoods, and community and national economic development; and
- building the understanding, knowledge and skills needed to restore relationships, regain dignity and to recover from the trauma of colonisation and war.

110
Moreover, in the language of peace building theory, popular education is now producing a key 'peace dividend', transforming anti-colonial resistance activists into nation building community educators.

The theory and practice of popular education rejects 'transfer' education, the idea that the knowledge and skills needed for national development can be acquired through an education imported from outside the country. Consequently, it works for the development of a Timor-Leste curriculum and pedagogy in adult education, one grounded in the reality of life for the majority of Timor-Leste's people. Popular education activists oppose the 'elite formation' which they say will occur if the focus is only on the formal education system. In time, they say, this will reproduce inequality within Timor-Leste, weakening and undermining their country's freedom and independence.

Despite its undoubted value to the process of peace building, the future of popular education in Timor-Leste is by no means assured. Its development to date has relied on support from a very small group of international donors and aid agencies, most notably Oxfam, and it remains to be seen whether the movement will be sustainable as that support declines. For the foreseeable future, it will need advocates and supporters at the national and international level, to prevent its particular approach to adult education being marginalised in the rush to develop the formal school education system. Most importantly, popular education organisations need to strengthen their partnership with the government of Timor-Leste, many of whose leaders and officials share with the popular educators a history and a commitment to popular mobilisation. The main challenge now is to activate the promised national literacy campaign, as illiteracy is a major obstacle to achieving the goals of the national development plan. This provides an opportunity for multisectoral collaboration between the Ministry of Education and other ministries, particularly Health and Agriculture.

Note
1. My analysis has been greatly assisted by comments and feedback from St. Nuno Rodriguez from Sahe Institute for Liberation, and from people in OPMT (Organización Puertorriqueña de la Mujer Trabajadora /Popular Women's Organisation of East Timor), Oxfam and the Ministry of Education's Non-formal Division who have elected to remain anonymous. The wider context for the material which follows was presented in another paper, Boughton, B and Duman, D 'The political economy of adult education in Timor-Leste', presented to the Timor-Leste Studies Association Conference, Melbourne 16 June 2005. Copies available on request: djdurnan@bigpond.com.

References
Teachers’ work in Timor-Leste: Some issues

Marie Quinn, University of Melbourne

Introduction
The release of the National Development Plan in 2002 highlights education, like so much of Timor-Leste’s infrastructure, to be in a critical state.

East Timor has an illiteracy rate of 50-60 per cent. 46 per cent of the current population have never attended school. Almost two-thirds of the female population is illiterate. The primary enrolment rate is low, as are school retention rates. Approximately 20 per cent of children enrolled in primary schools rarely attend classes ... There is a substantial shortage of trained teachers and teaching quality is low. In the 2000-2001 school year, for example, of the 2,091 secondary school teachers, only 106 had formal secondary school training. The curriculum introduced during the Indonesian occupation is viewed by East Timorese students and teachers as outmoded and irrelevant (East Timor Planning Commission 2002:143).

Since 2002, the government of Timor-Leste has worked to strengthen the country’s education system, by designing curricula and conducting training and planning for resource development to assist classroom teachers and school administrations. In order to realise these plans, the nature of personnel who work with students on a day-to-day basis needs to be taken into account: what constitutes their concerns in education, their goals and their vision for students in schools.

This paper uses data from interviews conducted in January 2004, when a small group of teachers in one school were asked about the nature of their work, its challenges and their hopes for the students. Recent government documents concerning education, as well as donor reports about the state of education in the country, have sought to address some of these issues, and this paper suggests that teachers’ perceptions, experiences and insights offer much to policy makers in setting goals for the education sector.

Methodology
The four teachers who took part in this study were from a government primary school in Baucau district. The school is situated about 15 kilometres outside the town of Baucau, in a village setting. The teachers taught across years one to four, with 12-26 years of teaching experience. The youngest teacher was 36 years old and the oldest 47 years old. Three of the teachers had three months of formal teacher training; Jose, the youngest, had had no formal teacher training. The interviews, one group interview and individual interviews with Jose and Maria were conducted through interpreters and then translated into English. Open-ended questions were used in the interviews to ascertain what teachers identified as the nature of their work. A number of themes emerged from the group interview, which were further developed in the individual interviews.

Reasons for being a teacher
Asking why they had become teachers revealed not only the participants’ personal histories, but also their strong sense of education as a means of strengthening the country through its people.

I have thought to become a teacher because I taught during the Portuguese time [prior to 1975] before we went to the mountains. I also taught during the Indonesian occupation and now I am continuing to teach. This is because I would like to contribute to help my sisters and brothers because the future of Timor-Leste is going to be in their hands.

(Maria)

Since I was in school I had the intention to become a teacher. Secondly, as a citizen I also felt that I have a responsibility to contribute toward rebuilding our nation through education ... before I became a permanent teacher, I worked as a volunteer teacher for seven years. In seven years I only earned a little money to support my children. I have been a permanent teacher for only two years. I feel that this is a permanent job for me and I will never change it.

(Jose)

The experience of being a volunteer teacher is not unusual within both the primary and secondary sectors. During the Indonesian occupation many of the teachers in schools were Indonesian nationals who subsequently fled the country during the events of 1999. One of the priorities in the aftermath of the destruction, however, was to have schools up and running in some form, staffed by volunteer teachers like Jose. There are still significant numbers of teachers in schools who work as volunteers, particularly in rural and remote schools (World Bank 2003). Even if volunteers have progressed to permanent teaching status, they represent a particular orientation to teaching - they have learnt to teach using their own experiences rather than undergoing specific training in theory or practice. In relation to retraining and ongoing support for these teachers, they need to be acknowledged for what they have learnt about the nature of children and learning and not seen as ‘unqualified’ in the emptiest sense of the word. The challenge for training...
programmes will be to utilise the considerable experience and dedication brought by these people to the education sector.

**Curricula**

One of the biggest concerns expressed in teacher interviews was that their work lacked direction in curricula. Recognising their own lack of experience, they looked to the educational authorities to provide a framework within which to work.

Within a week I teach language, social science and natural science. I teach these subjects each day and we also have art, mathematics, religion and civic education. At the moment we haven't got a proper curriculum. We follow a book and then we also receive instruction or we do a course. Sometimes we attend workshops. Now and again we attend workshops in Dili as well. These small workshops teach us to make a plan. But up until now we don't have a set curriculum. *(Maria)*

Recently the government has released a national curriculum that will be implemented from September 2005 (MECYS 2004a). These documents set out subjects to be covered and time allotment per week for each year level. A five-year plan for resource development and training of teachers to use these curricula documents will allay some teacher anxieties about teaching the 'right' subjects to their students.

**Resources**

Teachers were mindful of the lack of resources and training in their schools and also of the differences between urban, rural and remote schools across the country. Teachers were also aware of inequitable opportunities existing throughout the country.

In grade one and two, as I see it, we lack many things to help us to establish a proper programme to set up in the classroom. Training helps us to learn more about generating the children's understanding about writing, reading, counting and drawing pictures. These new methods can help us. *(Joes)*

We can compare the young children in the mountain with those in the city. City children can develop more quickly because schools have more teaching aids. On the other hand, the children up in the mountain hardly learn anything even though the teachers always try very hard to teach them. *(Carlos)*

One of the issues for resource development will be showing teachers how to use resources effectively. It will not be a case of merely distributing books; teachers will need to know how to use reading matter to actually teach literacy skills and subject content. Since teachers have not had the luxury of using charts, workbooks, cards and other teaching aids, the challenge will be not only to provide resources, but also the knowledge of which aids actually assist teachers to teach.

**Training**

Teachers have already participated in workshops to strengthen their practice and share knowledge with colleagues.

For example, some of my colleagues who have participated in training have been able to share with or help others when they came back. If I'm the one chosen to attend a course, I have to ask others to come together so that we can set up a plan. At the workshop some of us attended in Dili or Baucau, some learnt about planning, some learnt about how to use local aids and were able to pass on the information. After the training we organised a time so that we could share the knowledge with others, so that those who didn't participate in the workshop also knew how to use new ideas. *(Joes)*

Another issue Maria raised was pertinent to focus when training teachers:

Part of the training I am still confused about. Should we work together on a programme which comes from the Education Centre or from the orientation? We often received invitations to attend workshops and we have attended many times. The first time we went to a course was in the year 2000 in Fatumaka. Then we had another training course in Baucau. The teachers' college always teaches mathematics. I don't know about other districts, but in Baucau [district] we get a lot of help. Do they inform the Department of Education or is this their own programme? I don't really know whether they have permission from the Department of Education. However, they do give a lot of help and the Department of Education also runs courses. *(Maria)*

These are interesting issues for teachers in many contexts apart from Timor-Leste. How well coordinated is the training and professional development on offer to teachers? Is there a development programme or is the ad hoc nature merely confusing and counter productive? It is heartening in Timor-Leste that teachers are asking these questions, as they recognise the need for coordinated and purposeful training?

**Language**

'Language policy formation within multilingual nations depends on historical, cultural and socioeconomic contexts through which patterns of language use will emerge' (Davis 1994:178). The decision to use Tetum and Portuguese as official languages, and as the languages of instruction, reflects the particular history of Timor-Leste. What teachers do in classrooms is based on pragmatic choices that reflect the goals of the curricula and their language.

With religion, I teach in Tetum. However, with mathematics I try to use only Portuguese, but I have to use Tetum as well. If [the students] still cannot understand I must use other languages to help me to explain. *(Maria)*

*October 2005*
We use two languages in grade six. These are the Indonesian language and Tetum ... In grade four we use three languages, Portuguese, Tetum and our own local language. In grade three we have three languages as well, local language, Portuguese and Tetum ... This is because we don't know exactly what language to use, and [because of] the situation of the children at primary school because these languages are from other countries, not our own. Firstly, we try to find a way or a method to use so that the children can quickly understand the concepts. Secondly, we are also being told in the workshops or training to use other languages such as the local language or dialect to help the children quickly understand the concepts. So, we use the official language but we also use local language as an introduction.

A teacher's choice of language of instruction is also likely to relate to their own experience of language of schooling. Most are of an age to have completed their schooling in Indonesian; their ways of operating in the discourse of school are then mediated through this language and they might be inclined to use Indonesian with students who also started formal schooling in the same language. Indeed, the World Bank's figures on teachers' self-identified competency in Portuguese, Tetum and Indonesian show that teachers see themselves equally proficient in speaking, writing and reading in Indonesian or Tetum (World Bank 2004). Where teachers share the same first language as students its use is not surprising, despite the fact that these languages are not official languages of schooling. While Tetum is identified as the most commonly spoken language, 'other languages' that teachers use at home are significantly represented (World Bank 2004:154). Teachers are therefore prepared to utilise whatever linguistic resources are at hand to assist students to learn.

Wong Fillmore (1985) identified great educational advantage when teachers are able to understand the first language children bring to school. What is pertinent here is that Wong Fillmore's study showed how literacy in a second language is increased when teachers understand home language and use the target language to teach (ibid). Thus, what is at stake in the Timor-Leste context is the understanding of the relationship between language use and literacy and that literacy in any language is strengthened through multiple use of a language in context and across various modes for various purposes (DETYA 1998; OECD 2004). For students to gain literacy in the official language as well as pedagogic aides and as languages of instruction. A study within the Education Department advised that Tetum should constitute the initial language of instruction:

The implication is that Tetum should constitute the language of instruction for at least the first two grades, accompanied by no more than the minimum of Portuguese which could be formally introduced in grade three or four. Policy needs to be clearly articulated on this important issue and language training for teachers adjusted accordingly (Davison 2005:14).

The rationale for this policy to be adopted and implemented, with language training, needs to be carefully articulated so teachers are aware of the classroom implications. Teachers' current practice and experience need to be understood in order to implement changes in policy.

Difficulties

Teachers, of course, face practical challenges in their work:

This is our difficulty that as a teacher, we earn US$123 [per month]. Everyday we spend this though we walk [to work]. If there is a course somewhere, we have to go and spend more money ... This is what we sacrifice to do our duty

Another difficulty is caused by of our low salary. I just want to concentrate on school and not bother about other things, but we have to have more information. More information means we need to have more time. Again we have to walk and we have to spend money on training. These are our difficulties

Teachers face the conflict between a desire to participate in ongoing training and the need to earn a living, to support their often extended families. For permanent teachers, wages are not high and there is no differentiation in salary level for training or fulfilling extra duties. This was addressed in a recent consultancy report regarding the nature of teachers, which recommended pay scales for various qualifications and duties undertaken, which may provide promotion opportunities or even the chance to be paid for work already conducted, making life a little easier for family breadwinners (Romiszowski 2005).

The future

When looking at their work, teachers had a strong sense of what they hoped for their students, and the role of community support.
Oh ... well, my expectations for them in the future is that they will become teachers, nurses or qualified in different fields but it depends on their parents. If the parents keep supporting them, they will be successful in the future, if not, they can't go further.

(Maria)

I think that since Timor-Leste has become an independent country I would like to undertake my duty in contributing to the development of our nation. Because education is very important to a nation, these children need the motivation to come and learn ... If they succeed, I feel that I also will be proud.

(Jose)

It is often said that children are a great resource for a country — for this to be developed, a strong teaching sector is imperative. Teachers of Timor-Leste have supported the country through great change and their experiences have shaped their own perspectives of the purpose of education and its delivery. Any change in the education sector must acknowledge the work of these people, the knowledge they possess and have developed within their continued work, and use this as a starting point upon which to build. It is unfair to regard these teachers as 'untrained' and to not acknowledge the specific skills they have had to develop to keep schools functioning throughout the last six years. Their voices need to be heard, their reasons for teaching need to be considered and any further training needs to build on what they have already achieved for the nation's development.

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The ecology of language planning in Timor-Leste

Kerry Taylor-Leech, Griffith University

Introduction

Language planning can be broadly defined as 'activity most visibly undertaken by government ... intended to promote systematic linguistic change; to modify language behaviour in a community of speakers'. Language policy can be defined as a set of ideas, laws and practices intended to achieve the desired change (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997:xi). Language policy and planning is certainly used to pursue the agendas of those in power. However, in this paper, I present it as a way of sustaining endangered languages and controlling the spread of dominant languages. Using the metaphor of language ecology, language planning can be understood as the active management of the language environment.

An ecological metaphor offers a holistic framework for understanding the linguistic situation in Timor-Leste. Hornberger suggests that the ecology of language metaphor:

captures a set of ideological underpinnings for a multilingual language policy, in which languages are understood to live and evolve in an eco-system along with other languages, interact with their sociopolitical and cultural environments and become endangered if there is inadequate environmental support for them in relation to other languages in the ecosystem (Hornberger 2002:35-36).

I argue that active management of the language ecology will protect and promote multilingualism in Timor-Leste by allowing space for all languages in the system and that a model of additive multilingualism offers the best chance of an inclusive and accommodating language policy.

Three sets of forces influence the language ecology of Timor-Leste:

- the dominance of English;
- the legacy of colonialism; and
- the politics of language and identity.

English is one of the imperialist languages labelled by Pakir (1991) as 'killer languages' because of their displacing effect on local languages when they enter the ecology. The presence of English-speaking international aid organisations is a further complicating factor in the East Timorese language ecology.

The tendency in newly independent countries to officialise the former colonial language has invariably resulted in the dominance of the colonial language and limited opportunities for indigenous language speakers. Timor-Leste has adopted its former colonial language, Portuguese, as the official language but, like a number of more recently independent states, has also officialised an indigenous language, Tetum. In response to strong popular support for Tetum as a symbol of national identity, the Constitution declared Portuguese and Tetum co-official languages and included a commitment to developing and valuing Tetum and the national languages, that is, the vernaculars. The Constitution acknowledges for the first time that Timor-Leste is a multilingual society. It remains to be seen whether Timor-Leste is able to avoid the legacy of colonialism and establish a balanced multilingual ecology.

The East Timorese nation has changed profoundly since it first declared independence in 1975 and was immediately annexed by Indonesia. FRETILIN constructed an anti-colonial national identity in the notion of the Maubere people. Today, traditional racial and ethnic identities coexist with new multiple identities, particularly among Timorese youth. Experiences of colonialism, occupation and the diaspora have reshaped identities of a number of groups who have varying attachments to languages and perceptions of their role. An ecological approach to language planning will allow for the fact that individuals may identify being East Timorese with a combination of languages.

History of language policy and planning

Five distinct language policy and planning phases can be identified in Timor-Leste, coinciding with the key phases in its turbulent history.

Portuguese contact and colonisation (1500s to 1975)

Although explicit linguistic expansion was not a policy of Portugal, the colonial period in Timor-Leste was marked by missionary language planning in the use of local languages to promote Catholicism. Twentieth century Portuguese colonial policy was assimilationist, designed to produce an obedient, Lusophone elite who saw themselves as Portuguese and would bolster the colonial regime. It was this elite who spearheaded the independence movement, influenced by events in the Portuguese African colonies and by liberation politics, popular in Europe at the time. Most of its members were educated in Portuguese and their loyalty to the language was strong.

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (1975)

FRETILIN had a clear language policy in which Portuguese was the official language and Tetum the national language.
Much of FRETILIN's popularity stemmed from its popular education and Tetum literacy campaign. In its founding declaration it stated its intention to study and cultivate the indigenous languages.

**Indonesian occupation (1975-1999)**

Indonesian language planning followed the policy it had employed throughout the archipelago, using Bahasa Indonesia as the language of unification and modernisation, with English as a second language (rejecting the colonial language, Dutch). Bahasa Indonesia was developed as a *lingua franca*, like Swahili in East Africa, as a symbol of regional identity, independence and integration. This period in Timor was marked by the aggressive spread of Indonesian and the prohibition of Portuguese, which came to be used as the clandestine language of the resistance. Transmigration encouraged the spread of Indonesian and the forced movement of populations combined with genocidal military strategies to cause widespread displacement of speech communities. Neither the Portuguese nor the Indonesians tolerated Tetum or vernacular languages in the classroom. Both systems relegated these languages to very low status. These policies contributed to the development of subtractive multilingualism, which resulted in very low levels of education and literacy. The use of Tetum by the resistance and church leaders, who insisted on using it in Mass after Portuguese was banned (as the language of the colonial 'enemy'), contributed to its symbolism as the language of national identity.

**Post-referendum/UN administration (1999-2002)**

This period was marked by the arrival of the outside world to Timor-Leste in the form of INTERFET, the United Nations (UN) and a large number of international English-speaking aid organisations. Although they did not exist to promote English, they generated pressure to use the language. A common assumption among predominantly monolingual Anglophones in Timor-Leste was that learning English would resolve the linguistic 'chaos' they perceived in the country. On the part of the East Timorese, some parties saw political advantage in supporting English. Its association with technological development and modernity made it attractive to some opposition groups and many young people who learned some English in the Indonesian education system.

**Independence (2002-)**

Since independence the implementation of post-colonial, post-conflict language policy and planning has begun. The Constitution honours FRETILIN's choice of Portuguese as the official language during its brief interregnum of 1975. The grammar of Tetum and its lexicon are being standardised and expanded. Work has also started on recording the vernacular languages.

**Current use of languages in Timor-Leste**

Statistics before the recent census are outdated and unreliable. The census results will reveal a more accurate picture of language use. Until these figures are released, the current sociolinguistic situation can only be generally described. While Portuguese is reclaiming its place in the language ecology, between 60 per cent and 80 per cent of the population use some form of Tetum (Hajek 2000:409). Heavy borrowing from Indonesian has made Tetum a highly non-standard language that has lost touch with its oral traditions and diverged from its classical forms (Hajek 1999). The national languages, or vernaculars, remain in the private, family and rural domains. English and Indonesian, which the NGOs persist in using, compete with the official languages, reducing the incentive to shift to Portuguese and to learn the official orthography of Tetum. Many documents are written in English and jobs are often advertised in Indonesian, which is also frequently cited as a desirable criterion for employment. Television Timor Lorosa'e recently ran a series of programmes teaching English, a gesture that seemed to defy language policy. The Constitution acknowledges the dominance of both languages in the region and their presence in the language ecology. As a way of managing the two languages, Section 159 of the Constitution (RDTL 2002) states that they will have the status of working languages 'for as long as deemed necessary.'

In a democracy people cannot be forced to speak certain languages and can make choices about the languages they consider advantageous to learn. Thus, if people decide it is in their interests to learn English, they will learn it, regardless of language policy. However, if English is allowed to enter the language ecology in an unplanned way, like a non-native species with no competitors, it will threaten weaker languages in the system. This is happening throughout the South Pacific. It is predicted that hundreds of vernacular languages will die in the South Pacific region in this century as a result of the dominance of English (Baldauf and Djite 2003:221).

A brief look at the challenges facing language planners reveals a complex situation and a fragile ecology.

**The press**

Journalists describe difficulties of writing in Tetum due to a lack of formal functions and genre, abstract language and technical terms. Loanwords and coined words cause ambiguity and confusion. Williams Van Klinken (2001) notes the tendency of journalists, when writing in Tetum, to use Portuguese noun phrases, plural markers and gender agreement. These structures differ from Tetum, causing further comprehension problems for readers.
Standardising Tetum

The Instituto Nacional de Lingüística (INL) at the Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa’e (UNTL) has produced an official orthography for Tetum based on four principles of renovation (Hull 1999):

- Tetum-Praça¹ is the basis of the written language;
- Indonesian loanwords are to be avoided and eventually eliminated;
- Tetum-Teriké² and Portuguese are the source languages for borrowing or coining words; and
- All loanwords should conform to the rules of the orthography.

The return to ethno-cultural origins of Tetum is an important marker of difference from Indonesia. A laissez-faire approach to word borrowing and spelling is therefore not politically expedient and will not assist mass communication in Tetum, for which a standard is urgently needed. Moreover, whilst it is a right to learn and use one’s mother tongue, it is also a right to learn to speak, read and write in the official languages if one is to be an active, informed citizen. Failure to teach and learn the official languages effectively will disadvantage minority language speakers economically, politically and socially.

The judiciary

In February 2004 the Superior Council of Magistrates adopted a directive on the use of official languages in the judicial system. The Language Directive, as it is known, requires every court actor to use the official languages. Documents not submitted in official languages must be returned and given eight days for resubmission. The Judicial Systems Monitoring Project (JSMP), the strongest critic of the Language Directive, points out that ordinary people need to use their local languages in order to understand court hearings, that Tetum lacks legal terms, and that many court actors are not fully proficient in Portuguese (see Marshall paper, this issue). The JSMP (2004) also raises the issue of linguistic variations in the interpretation of terms and delays in the judicial process that may occur when documents are returned.

These are the challenges of language revival. On the one hand, as the JSMP argues, it is vital that justice is not miscarried by errors of interpretation or delays, which could lead to loss of public confidence in the system. On the other hand, use of official languages in intellectual spheres enhances their prestige. The use of Tetum in formal domains is vital for the modernisation and expansion of its vocabulary. It is also unrealistic to delay language reform until all court actors reach full proficiency in Portuguese, as only a minority will ever attain this and will need to be high-level bilinguals. This process could take a minimum of one generation. In two important recent developments, the INL has prepared a glossary of Tetum legal terms and 23 students have graduated from a course in legal translation and court interpreting using official Tetum. This is a significant step towards promoting multilingualism in the judicial system.

Education

Language-in-education planning is the most important site for language planning because languages are formally learned through schools. Schooling in many multilingual countries has traditionally been conducted through ‘submersion’ programmes where the second language is the language of instruction (Skutnabb-Kangas 1981). Teachers in such systems, who are often survivors of submersion schooling themselves, can rarely do more than talk at students and elicit rote responses, resulting in student disengagement from learning, low achievement and high drop out rates, especially for girls (Benson 2004).

Educational language reform in Timor-Leste is being phased in through the primary school system. Tetum is the medium of instruction in pre-primary schools and curriculum policy states that primary schools must use Portuguese as the medium of instruction from grades one to six. Portuguese will be introduced in junior secondary grades from this year. The national curriculum framework for 2004-2009 will start with five hours of Tetum and three hours per week of Portuguese in grades one and two, reversing the proportion each year to six hours of Portuguese and two hours of Tetum by grade six (MECYS 2004).

There are differing views about the value of starting instruction in official languages early. Lopes (1998) argues that early introduction allows for optimal development of proficiency. Benson (2000) and Bruthiaux (2002) support a more gradual transition from the mother tongue to official languages by grade five. The main challenge will be avoiding submersion in both languages, which can be achieved through content-based teaching, educating teachers in second language teaching methods and valuing the mother tongue as a resource in the classroom. Content-based learning takes place when students are taught a language via the curriculum subjects at a level appropriate to their cognitive level. Teachers are trained to negotiate meaning through context and the use of the first language. This differs from submersion where children are expected to acquire the language at the same time as acquiring new academic concepts and are taught by teachers who do not speak the language well, relying on translation and rote learning.

Vernacular languages and literacy

Space in the linguistic ecosystem is needed for vernacular languages, which may become devalued with the development of Tetum, Portuguese and English. The use of vernacular languages in early education is known to provide a sound
cognitive base for learning in a second or third language. Examples from many countries (see, for example, Hornberger 2002, Benson 2004 and Litteral 1999) have shown that the use of vernacular languages in the early years of schooling has positive effects on pupil retention, learning rates and the transition to literacy in a second language. A critical issue will be the production of literacy materials in Tetum and the vernaculars for children and adults that go beyond the classroom and reflect East Timorese culture, values and realities so that literacy can flourish. Students emerging from such a model of additive multilingual education will have good command of the official languages and their first language. They will also have something more: the knowledge that their linguistic and cultural heritage is valued in society.

Hornberger (2002) states that multilingual language policies are about opening up ideological and implementational space in the environment for as many languages as possible. Hornberger observes that language policy must overcome both institutional and attitudinal difficulties in order to be successfully implemented (ibid).

Dialogue and collaboration can counter negative community attitudes by engaging the public in debates and encouraging participation in language revival projects. Some ways for this to happen include:

- providing a range of reading material in the official and the national languages;
- encouraging participation in story making/writing in Tetum and Portuguese;
- offering prizes for pieces of writing that extend genre;
- celebrating oral literature, poetry and song; and
- holding language and teacher training workshops, cultural festivals, in-school and outside-school events for both adults and children, which provide rich environments for language acquisition.

These are examples of the approach that popularised the standardisation of the Kadastrandusun language in Sabah, Malaysia. The key factor was that communities became actively engaged in the process (Lasimbang and Kinajil 2000).

Engagement at community and classroom level means involving the grass roots agents of language planning — teachers, community elders, NGOs and networks — in dialogue with academics and linguists. The Hundred Schools Parent-Teacher Association Project presents a golden opportunity to engage with parents on the issue of multilingual education. Parents often want their children to learn the colonial language because they see it as the language of opportunity, reinforcing the low esteem of local languages and their speakers. It is important to convince parents of the value of learning in the vernaculars in children's early years at school.

In an additive model of bi- and multilingualism, parents play a useful role as models of the local languages. Both parents and children can identify with school because it validates the language that is used at home.

Conclusion

If the East Timorese language ecology is to be sustained, then language planning should provide genuine space for all languages in the system. By creating this kind of space, some of the concerns about Portuguese may be overcome; there will be room for Tetum and the national languages and there will be less threat from English and Indonesian. Creating space may mean, for example, that vernacular languages are officially recognised in district courts and in hearings where the defendant does not speak the language of the court. A key factor in the maintenance of languages is their use in intellectual domains, so documents should continue to be written in Tetum as well as Portuguese. NGOs and aid projects can contribute by respecting language policy and making serious efforts to use the official languages. The media has a responsibility to disseminate information and mobilise popular support for official and national language development.

Friendship groups that want to send untrained English teachers to Timor-Leste should examine their motives carefully. Do they think English is inherently 'good' for the East Timorese or are they responding to a genuine need? What will the real long-term benefits be for the recipients? As English speakers we need to tread as lightly and respectfully through the East Timorese language ecology as we would through its biological environment.

In summary, policy success requires dialogue and community engagement in language planning from the bottom up as well as top down. Valuing languages as rich resources evolving in relation to one another is vital to the success of language policy and planning and can contribute to an East Timorese identity that is inclusive, accommodating and truly multilingual.

Notes

1. In 1997, according to the 'engco' model, the five main imperialist languages were: English, German, French, Japanese and Spanish. Portuguese came in eighth place. In 2050 Mandarin, Hindi, English, Spanish, Arabic are predicted to be at the top (Graddol 1997).

2. Tetum-Prasa is the variety of Tetum spoken in Dili and its environs and used as the lingua franca throughout much of Timor-Leste.

3. Tetum-Terik is classical Tetum spoken on the south coast and primarily associated with traditional culture (Williams Van Klinken 2001).

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Children's peace education in post-conflict Timor-Leste

Danielle Ujvari, Development Studies, University of Melbourne

Introduction
Timor-Leste's history of occupation, violence and oppression has left a legacy of mistrust and trauma that today manifests itself in the form of pervasive domestic violence and sexual violence against women, fear, shame, and a general sense of disempowerment. While the population as a whole suffered, East Timorese children, as with young people worldwide, have been disproportionately affected. East Timorese society is so interconnected. The Transformative Arts and Human Rights Education (TAHRE) programme, devised by the non profit organisation Ba Futuru in 2004, was inspired by a belief that tackling the devastating impact of conflict in Timor-Leste requires a deliberate and concerted effort to overcome the social and institutional barriers against the full respect for human rights, and increased support and facilitation for children's healing and their involvement in public and private decision making.

The TAHRE programme
The Transformative Arts and Human Rights Education (TAHRE) programme, devised by the non profit organisation Ba Futuru in 2004, was inspired by a belief that tackling the devastating impact of conflict in Timor-Leste requires a deliberate and concerted effort to overcome the social and institutional barriers against the full respect for human rights, and increased support and facilitation for children's healing and their involvement in public and private decision making. It is premised on the principle that children's well-being, empowerment and capacity building are vital to their full participation in, contribution to, and enjoyment of the benefits of the reconstruction and development of Timor-Leste. More fundamentally, however, Ba Futuru has proceeded from the assumption that the actualisation of this vision must involve creating the space for children's voices to be heard, and allowing the children of Timor-Leste to choose for themselves how best to improve their lives as children, and as citizens of a free nation.

The TAHRE programme currently consists of 14 hour-long workshops, with activities broken down into five, ten, 15 and 20 minute sections. The workshops utilise a number of techniques to engage the children and impart lessons. These include: brainstorming, guided drawing and imagery, storytelling, partnering and mentoring, game playing and role play, and the creation of individual, paired and group artwork.

Recognising that children, particularly those who have suffered extreme loss and trauma, are often initially extremely shy and withdrawn, and may have had limited contact with Malay (white foreigners), the opening sessions focus primarily on building trust, establishing a positive rapport with the children, and creating a safe and comfortable space for their expression. Following discussion between facilitators and the children on how we might work together and the agreement of some foundations and 'ground rules' of the programme, the children then create personal name badges and journals, which they use throughout the course of the programme to draw, record ideas, feelings, and so on.

Over the coming sessions, children's thoughts about themselves and their knowledge of human rights and children's rights are assessed. Through brainstorming, role plays and group discussions, we examine concepts of human rights, self worth and conflict resolution, the relationship between respect for oneself and the human rights of others, and how to maximise both in the achievement of wants and needs. Timor-Leste's human rights obligations under international and domestic law, and the role of human rights in the rebuilding of the nation, are also considered. The final sessions draw key concepts together, and evaluate the impact of the curriculum by re-assessing children's understanding of human rights and conflict resolution, of how they feel art has helped them learn and heal, and of changes in their sense of self and respect for others.
Why peace education?

Rebuilding society after conflict is a complex and lengthy process, encompassing a wide range of social, political, developmental, and humanitarian goals. Yet it is more than the rebuilding of physical and social infrastructure: it requires the establishment of a climate of peace.

In the wake of Timor-Leste's independence, President Gusmão (2003) spoke of Timor-Leste's path to peace:

Timor-Leste is finally able to initiate the building of its own path to peace after more than two decades of war that ended in a brutal and violent manner in September 1999... Given the experience from its recent history, the people of Timor-Leste have come to know well the meaning of peace. For this reason it is committed to preserving this asset, which was attained with such hardship... We are determined to cultivate a culture of peace, which will become the basis for individual tranquility and collective security of Timorese society.

As the Director-General of UNESCO (2002:2), has commented: 'Peace is more than an absence of war. It means justice and equity for all as the basis for living together in harmony and free from violence.' The sense of peace and living together in harmony is significant for the people of Timor-Leste, who suffered violence not only at the hands of foreign Indonesian occupiers, but also from fellow citizens in the form of local East Timorese militia.

The centrality of human rights education and the fostering of values that endeavour to prevent conflicts by addressing their root causes have gained greater momentum in this context. In the wake of three international decades dedicated to peace and human rights education and renewed commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, Kofi Annan (2005) declared:

The world must advance the causes of security, development and human rights together, otherwise none will succeed. Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.

Peace education is particularly crucial in the post-conflict context, as conflict exposes people to violent means of problem solving and the abuse of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

At the macro level, the TAHRE programme provides critical momentum toward the peace, reconciliation, and nation-building process by fostering a positive attitude toward human rights and conflict resolution in Timor-Leste. It bolsters the United Nations' vision of peace, security and sustainable development through education and is a positive step towards the implementation of the raft of international human rights instruments that Timor-Leste has acceded to since independence. At the micro level, the strong emphasis in the TAHRE programme on cooperative learning and the exploration of concepts of human worth and dignity contributes to the development of skills, knowledge and attitudes based on respect for self and others and the peaceful mediation of disputes. Peace can only be enjoyed by a society if each individual is at peace. President Gusmão once declared that overcoming the restlessness bred by war and the subsequent building of peace must begin within the mind and spirit of each citizen:

Peace must arise from people's behaviour and it can only be established in a society when it thrives in the conscience of each individual as a treasure to be protected and cherished. Peace cannot simply emerge from the serenity of minds; peace can only be built on the solid foundations of the respect for Human Rights, democracy and social justice (Gusmão 2003).

Focus on children

While there is an imperative to inculcate peace values with all citizens, children merit special attention. Because of the longevity of the conflict, the majority of Timor-Leste's youth have experienced a lifetime of violence, grief and anxiety. Although their physical scars will often heal, the trauma and emotional scars can, without intervention, last a lifetime (UNICEF 2005: 41). These in turn may have significant long- and short-term effects on their mental health, quality of life and subsequent behaviour as adults (Fisher 1998; Machel 1996:paragraph 170).

In addition to their vulnerability as dependents, children are often disproportionately affected by violence as they are still forming ideas about the world and themselves (Fisher 1998). Adolescence is widely recognised as a highly significant period in childhood development, a time when young people 'learn future roles and the values and norms of their societies' (Machel 1996: paragraph 170). In particular, young people begin thinking about concepts such as truth and justice, which influence the course of their lives (UNICEF 2002b:4). Children who grow up living in violence are more likely to turn to violence themselves as a method of problem-solving (Fisher 1998). Knowledge of human rights amongst East Timorese youth is low. A recent UNICEF (2002a:4) survey revealed that only 44 per cent of children in Timor-Leste believe that children, like adults, have human rights; 50 per cent of children believe they do not.

In order to break the cycle of violence and develop a strong, human rights-based foundation for post-conflict society, children must replace these habits with an understanding of, and appreciation for, human rights and corresponding obligations, and peaceful dispute resolution techniques (Myers-Walls 2002). As Inacia Flores, Director of Santa Bakhita orphanage, wrote in a personal letter of support for for Ba Futuru:

Timor-Leste is the newest nation of the millennium, trying to improve the situation of the East Timorese people and build a human rights environment. All citizens are trying hard and working hard so that the nation becomes strong and democratic. This begins with the children, so that they will be good citizens in the future.
Similarly, a recent UNICEF paper noted:

Bursting with energy, curiosity and spirit that is not easily extinguished, young people have the potential to change negative societal patterns of behaviour and break cycles of violence and discrimination that pass from one generation to the next. With their creativity, energy and enthusiasm, young people can change the world in astonishing ways, making it a better place not only for themselves but for everyone (UNICEF 2002b:1).

The human rights knowledge the children develop impacts on their capabilities to analyse the world around them; to understand that human rights are a way to improve their lives and the lives of others; to take action to protect their own rights and the rights of others; and to use human rights as the basis for resolving potential conflict. Similarly, learning to embrace conflict as an opportunity for win/win outcomes and experimenting with non-violent reactions to conflict situations based on respect for each other allows children to experience and develop faith in their worth and their capabilities to achieve peaceful solutions. As children see that they are valued, and that their contributions are valued, that they are listened to, and that they are able to move forward beyond the devastation they have suffered, their sense of well-being improves.

Creative activities as a learning medium

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) recognises the special needs of children in conflict and establishes a broad framework for post-conflict intervention. Article 39 requires states to ‘take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts.’ Such recovery and reintegration ‘shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child’.

In this context, creative activities can play an important role in restoring a sense of normalcy and routine. Children have a natural tendency, after a stressful or traumatic event, to look for something predictable and familiar. Creative activities are something children can relate to; art and music are, essentially, a form of play. Engaging with conflict-affected children through creative activities can help them put their world back in order, while at the same time providing the opportunity for experiences that open the way for, and motivate learning in, all domains of functioning (War Child 2005). Painting, drawing, role play and music are often a more accessible, less threatening means of exploring issues and communicating than verbal mediums. They are therefore useful tools for children who are non-verbal, who are deficient in their communication skills, or who for whatever reason — emotional distress, lack of vocabulary, linguistic barriers — cannot discuss their feelings or experiences in words (Lark 2001).

Creative techniques also provide an avenue for children to vent and express ‘negative’ emotions such as anger, pain, and fear. Children learn that all emotions are legitimate and can use art, music, games and role play as positive ways to express those feelings. Importantly, these activities not only address what is wounded, they also support what is strong, encouraging children to live more fully in the moment rather than being stuck in memories of the past and fears about the future (Lark 2001). The experience of playing, and of doing so in a safe, supported environment, allows children to relax and open up, and to develop their self-esteem, self-confidence and social skills. They are moreover safe, healthy sources of gratification, providing opportunities for achievement in a positive, non-competitive context (War Child 2005; Amnesty International 1996).

These factors combined lend strong support to the use of creative expression as a pedagogical tool. The TAHRE programme heavily emphasises deconstructing attitudes toward violence and exploring the role of human rights as a basis for respecting self and other and resolving disputes. Despite the complexity of these ideas, media such as game play, role play, and music and painting helps lighten the mood and provided fun, colourful documentation of the children’s ideas and achievements. They also enable the children to connect at a level to which they relate, and to experiment with demonstrating related values such as respect, tolerance and understanding into day-to-day life.

In addition to its therapeutic and utilitarian value, the use of creative activities resonates well with East Timorese culture: the strong traditions of expression and storytelling through Taiu weaving, and the burgeoning art scene encouraged by Arte Moris, a free art academy and gallery in Dili. East Timorese culture is a fusion of traditional customs and values, of attitudes and behaviours adopted during the course of annexation and violent occupation, and of hopes and expectations created as a result of the long fought for and recently won independence.

Despite the persistence of traditional views of social organisation, most evident in relation to attitudes toward women, as in any community, there is much about East Timorese culture that transcends politics and simply celebrates life. The diversity and richness of East Timorese culture evident in the landscape, the myriad of languages, the food, the music and art, the immense optimism and generosity ‘still provides East Timorese with strong senses of identity both as Timorese and as members of [their] various tribes’ (Roystead 2003:9). The TAHRE programme explicitly aims to provoke positive changes in participants’ beliefs, attitudes and values, within a framework that respects, complements and incorporates elements of Timor-Leste’s culture.
Through art and creative expression, it provides an opportunity for children and their communities to reconnect with the peaceful, celebratory aspects of East Timorese culture while concurrently promoting values such as open communication, peaceful resolution of conflicts, personal safety, respect for human rights, and a belief in self-worth and the equal worth of others.

Conclusion

You have a chance to bring significant positive changes into the lives of the children you work with ... You have the power to change children’s feelings of fear, shame and guilt into feelings of self-respect, self-esteem and trust towards other people. You have the power to change hatred and fear into respect and love (Ulezac 1997: Foreword).

Evidence overwhelmingly supports both the devastating impact of conflict on children, as well as the importance of post-conflict intervention. Where, as in Timor-Leste, the longevity and pervasiveness of the conflict has been so endemic, children are at risk of absorbing and perpetuating the culture of violence that has shaped their young lives. Ultimately, this threatens to undermine not only their emotional and psychological well-being, but also their relationships, their engagement as colleagues, parents, partners, and citizens and, importantly, their ability to build a safe, peaceful and prosperous nation for themselves and their children. The provision of a safe and structured environment for the release of trauma and anxiety and the development of human rights awareness and conflict resolution skills can play a key role in breaking the cycle of violence and fostering a culture of peace.

Ba Futuru’s TAHRE programme uses creative activities as a means of assisting children in their return to childhood, and of engaging with children who were initially too shy to speak, or with whom communication was limited by linguistic differences. Given the opportunity to explore their feelings artistically, the children invariably relaxed, becoming more open and bolder in their expression. However, the curriculum was formulated with the premise that for a programme to achieve sustained change, it was necessary to go beyond emotional catharsis and also impart skills and values that can guide children who have been exposed to violence with alternative models of behaviour. Consequently, the programme also took into account both the cultural and historical context of present day Timor-Leste, as well as the future human resource needs of the nation and the children who would grow to fill those roles.

Children are beautiful to work with, their creativity a delight and their thirst for knowledge inspiring. As Timor-Leste rebuilds after decades of violence and devastation, sowing the seeds of peace, healing and human rights in their young hearts and minds will allow peace, healing and human rights to flourish in society. And this can only strengthen the nation: as a people, as a whole, and as a member of the international community.

Note

While undertaking an internship in Timor-Leste in 2004 a colleague and I established Ba Futuru, a non-profit organisation, to assist children in their post-conflict recovery. Drawing on our respective backgrounds, we developed the TAHRE programme. We piloted the programme with children and staff at the Santa Bakhita orphanage, Dili. We are currently pursuing funds to expand the programme into further childcare centres.

References


Young people and change in Timor-Leste

Ann Wigglesworth, Victoria University

Introduction

Since 1975, young people have had a significant impact on unfolding political events at critical times in Timor-Leste. This paper traces the roles that young people have taken through the change process in Timor-Leste and highlights issues and tensions that affect them today.

Who are considered young people? They include the youth who participated in the liberation struggle in the late 1990s, now young adults in their mid- to late-twenties, many of whom are disadvantaged in terms of education and employment. Today's young school leavers and tertiary students in their early twenties are too young to have been politically involved in the struggle for independence. This paper draws from group discussions in Melbourne with East Timorese student members of the East Timor Student Association (ETSA). Young people in Timor-Leste have been educated in Bahasa Indonesia, a language which is part of the national identity, thereby creating a barrier in a country where the official language of government is Portuguese.

Timorese often define young people as aged between 18 and 35 years. Their perception of their role in society is as significant as their age — as they have not yet reached the status of seniors and community leaders. Traditional culture and authority are important factors in defining the role of young people, yet powerful Western influences have brought major changes to their expectations and aspirations in just a few years.

Young people in the liberation struggle

Following the Indonesian invasion in 1975, the liberation struggle was carried out from mountainous areas by small guerrilla units supported by willing recruits of young Timorese who went up into the mountains to take the place of fallen comrades (Cox and Carey 1995).

A third of the population of Timor-Leste perished in the years following the Indonesian invasion. Indonesia did, however, contribute to Timorese development, by introducing universal primary school for the first time. From 1976 to 1992 the Indonesian administration reportedly spent US$750 million on development projects in Timor-Leste, half of which was for government expenses and security-related road building. Over 50,000 children were enrolled in secondary school, 50 times more than during the Portuguese era and illiteracy rates fell from 90 to 52 per cent of the population by 1990 (Cox and Carey 1995).

In 1989, the resistance leadership promoted a new role for the student movement to alert the world to Timor-Leste's plight. Major demonstrations were organised to coincide with the visits of Pope John Paul in 1989 and the US Ambassador, John Monjo, in 1990 (Nicholson 2001).

When Sabastiao Gomes, a student activist, was shot by Indonesian forces in 1991, several thousand — mostly young people — joined the funeral procession to the cemetery. Fully armed troops opened fire on the young mourners killing 27! students and youth (Pinto 2001). This Santa Cruz massacre was a pivotal moment for the resistance struggle. New strategic directions followed, with RENETIL, the movement of East Timorese students studying in Indonesia, working with Indonesian student organisations to gain their sympathy for the Timorese struggle and promote issues of democracy within Indonesia (Nicholson 2001).

When President Habibe took power, political expression and organisation was permitted for the first time since 1975 and, on 9 June he offered Timor-Leste 'special autonomy' in exchange for Timorese recognition of Indonesian sovereignty (Nicholson 2001). The East Timor Student Solidarity Council (ETSSC) was formed in June 1998. It was unaligned with a political party or the resistance and focused on peace, democracy, reconciliation and the promotion of self-determination through a referendum. In June 1998, ETSSC carried out a series of demonstrations in Dili, calling for an end to human rights violations and greater freedoms. It was a brave act and for the first time since 1975 Indonesian authorities did nothing to stop political expression in Timor-Leste (ETAN 2000).

ETSSC initiated debate on the future of the country through 'dialogues'. Students travelled to every district, holding forums in which the people were invited to express their views on the future of their country and to inform people on the meaning of a referendum. Lansell Taudevin, an Australian aid official, wrote of these dialogues:

If there is one characteristic that typifies the students' activities in East Timor it is maturity. Their actions and reactions have been deliberate and well thought out. They maintained a rational, calming influence throughout the period. There were many opportunities and calls for aggressive and confrontational action. They could have gone onto the streets as their counterparts did in Jakarta and created havoc. Instead, they...
exhibited great control and civil responsibility which went far beyond the norm. They spread out into the rural areas, forming teams to hold dialogues in every corner of Timor-Leste. They brought these results back to Dili and tried to contribute a rational and widely based view of the aspirations of the East Timorese (Taudevin 1999:185-6).

By late 1998 the political situation worsened as Indonesian supported militia started to carry out random attacks and these forums could no longer be held. As the UN-sponsored ballot drew near, ETSSC students worked to ensure people knew where, when and how to register and vote. The students were targeted and some were killed for their efforts (ETAN 1999). The personal sacrifice that young people have made for the liberation struggle is significant and many of those involved in that struggle feel that they have the right to jobs, but are disadvantaged because they abandoned their education for the struggle and are less qualified than others (ETSA 2005).

Experience elsewhere shows that where young people have played an important part in a liberation movement, their loss of a role at the end of the struggle can lead to alienation and marginalisation. A study of young people in youth organisations who contributed to the liberation struggle in South Africa traces their changing roles between the 1980s and 1990s from disciplined violent struggle to crime. After the ban on the African National Congress was lifted, the failure of political leadership to engage youth movements in the new political environment led to an increasing incidence of disorganised violence and crime (Marks 2001). Similarly, inadequate attention was given to the integration of young people into society after the armed struggle in Mozambique. Many young soldiers were sent home without adequate material or psychological support, resulting in a high incidence of pessimism, depression and aggression, which contributed to their engagement in violent crime (Aird, Erraimie and Errante 2001). In Timor-Leste, the importance of supporting young people who committed themselves to the struggle is of concern to the government and recognised in the National Development Plan (East Timor Planning Commission 2002).

UNAMET recruited over 400 UN volunteers to make up the corps of electoral officers, assisted by 600 local Timorese staff (DFAT 2001). As the language of communication was English, young educated Timorese with some English training were recruited. As there were insufficient numbers of Timorese proficient in English, many UN staff were initially unable to communicate effectively with their interpreters. In addition, large numbers of translators were needed to produce communications in four agreed languages — Tetum, Portuguese, Indonesian and English. Young Timorese were also employed to translate communiqués into Tetum, but as this was an oral language, they faced problems in reaching agreement on the correct spelling of Tetum words. This sudden and massive requirement for interpreters and translators catapulted large numbers of young Timorese into a new context of foreign values and an English language medium of communication, creating steep learning curves and opportunities to acquire new skills.

Following the post-ballot violence, the international community returned to the devastated country in October 1999. The UN task was to establish a civil administration and a huge emergency relief effort was mounted involving hundreds of foreign aid agencies. This influx of foreign funds brought opportunities in emergency programmes for young East Timorese who had developed their English skills during the UNAMET period and for other young East Timorese returning from overseas studies.

International development agencies presented challenges to East Timorese development due to their lack of knowledge of East Timorese culture. The World Bank’s Joint Assessment Mission in 1999 did not take into account traditional East Timorese practices or that any development had already taken place, resulting in the devastation of infrastructure and planned project support (Gunn 2003). They also failed to recognise civil society organisations such as those that had formed to support the liberation struggle — including women, youth and church organisations (Patrick 2001). The Community Empowerment Programme (CEP), through which the World Bank established local councils for oversight of grants and credits for recovery and development activities, excluded the existing local leadership who did not have the literacy requirements. This resulted in young people ‘who either had some kind of‘project experience’ or had proven themselves to be good leaders in the clandestine movement’ being elected to the CEP Councils, yet ‘the lack of seniority of their members means that most of the councils have not yet developed any real power. Political and ritual authority are strongly connected to age’ (Ospina and Hohe 2002:115-116). As a result local councils often deferred to the authority of traditional power structures.

Young people and the international community

After Timor-Leste experienced more than 20 years of relative isolation from the international community, the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) arrived in May 1999 to establish the conditions for the UN-sponsored ballot, planned for August 1999. In this short space of time they were required to set up structures for the registration of voters and voter education, a task made considerably harder by the escalating violence perpetrated by the pro-autonomy militia throughout the period.
Young people and national development

The national development strategy for Timor-Leste is outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP), the development of which involved a nationwide consultation of 38,000 citizens. The NDP notes that half the population is less than 18 years old, with 16 per cent of young people estimated to be unemployed. There are 15,000 to 20,000 school leavers joining the labour force every year. The NDP identifies following concerns in relation to young people:

- high levels of unemployment and underemployment in the agriculture sector;
- need for vocational training programmes;
- need to develop and implement a strategy for decent and productive work; and
- young people who missed out on education due to their involvement in the liberation struggle need productive skills for employment or self-employment.

According to ETSA students, once rural youth receive some education they no longer want to work on the family farm. If students attend secondary schools they have to move to the district town and do not want to return to work in their villages. Tertiary educated students also do not want to return to the districts, resulting in a movement towards Dili as education levels increase. Baucau, the only other significant town which attracts young people, shares the problem of unemployment with Dili (ETSA 2005).

Lessons from the Pacific show that it is important to consider young people at an early stage of national development. In some Pacific countries young people have become protagonists of crime and violence where social and economic structures have left them feeling powerless and undervalued. In the Solomon Islands, where 7,500 young people annually seek employment in a market offering only 3,800 jobs, the lack of opportunity for youth in rural areas contributed to violent armed conflict in 2000-01 (AusAID 2003). In Papua New Guinea (PNG), the widespread problem of youth dissatisfaction leading to violent crime is known as 'rascalism'. Law and order responses to crime and violence in PNG and Bougainville are believed to contribute to the problem of violence. Some authors suggest that programmes promoting traditional customs and community organisations are most effective in finding solutions (Howley 2005; Regan 2005).

The status of young people during the resistance was intricately linked to political affiliation and the liberation struggle. Today, FRETILIN related youth organisations still exist but do not engage in any activities as they have no budget (ETSA 2005). Some leaders claim they are 'still waiting for orders from CNRT' (Ospina and Hehe 2002:63).

Culture and change in Timor-Leste

The choice of Portuguese as the official language is unpopular with young East Timorese and the decision to include Tetum was a specific response to demands from the younger generation, of whom 90 per cent of under 35 year olds were educated in Indonesian (Leach 2003). A study of the links between language, culture and identity in Timor-Leste shows that, although for older East Timorese, Portuguese language and culture are strongly linked to the resistance, for young people, the choice of Portuguese raises 'fears of their exclusion from symbolic sources of power and cultural identity in an independent East Timor' (Leach 2003:141).

ETSA students are pragmatic — they recognise that their lack of Portuguese is a disadvantage in securing government jobs, although they have colleagues who have succeeded. They believe that speaking English will provide opportunities for international work and enable access to further study and knowledge from the rest of the world. Portuguese, on the other hand, is seen to offer limited linkages to a small number of Lusophone countries (ETSA 2005).

Young people in Timor-Leste respect their elders and value community traditions that provide their distinct East Timorese identity, but they also want change. While community bonds are seen as a great strength in their culture, young people are also seeking equality. East Timorese students complain that when they return from overseas with a good education, older people continue to treat them as inexperienced and unable to take on adult roles (ETSA 2005). Educated young women express concern that their families continue to expect them to adopt traditional housewife roles even though they may be equal income earners with their husbands. Although young people hold differing views about the merits of the dowry system and other traditional practices, many believe that cultural change is needed (ETSA 2005).

Ospina and Hohe's (2002) CEP case study illustrates that young people do not want to neglect traditional values, believe that these values should be modified but not disappear and so they seek a combination. For young women, the issue is more challenging than for young men, as there is no gender equality in traditional customs. It is a new concept for women to participate in decision making and sharing power with men.

Thus there are conflicting demands of traditional spheres of authority on the one hand, and individual expectations and competitive aspirations of the modern world on the other. Detraditionalisation is described as a transition from a society where community is everything, to a society in which all individuals have rights (Heelas 1996). Rather than leading to 'anarchical individualism', the transition allows for a new ethic of humanity in which exclusive traditionalism, which breeds animosity with those who 'do not belong', is replaced by greater acceptance of the values of equality and human rights (ibid).
Conclusion

During the resistance young people had clearly defined and active roles under the leadership of resistance commanders and political leaders. This changed when Indonesia started to accept possible East Timorese autonomy. Some students adopted distinctive roles and separated themselves from old political affiliations, for the first time establishing a leadership independent of traditional authority.

The arrival of the international community in 1999 opened up new opportunities for young educated East Timorese. Accelerated programmes of English learning and the influence of Western cultural ways has resulted in widespread English, just six years after UNAMET struggled to recruit 400 East Timorese English skills. Now, many young people find work in international agencies or local NGOs and are exposed to the Western world. NGOs are major employers and have opened up new democratic space, some taking on roles as critics of government and international influences on national policy, establishing a new relationship from one of support to one of challenging the national leadership.

Since independence, young peoples' organisations have no longer had a role in national strategy and need to find their own resources. Young people are therefore challenged to find a place for themselves in the new political and economic environment. There is an increasing urgency to earn money, East Timorese students stating that a major concern now is their personal need for money (ETSA 2005). Strong political allegiance to the liberation struggle has been replaced by a greater diversity of commitments embracing change, straddling the traditional and the modern, believing in community values and starting to look for their own survival in a changing world.

Tumultuous political change in Timor-Leste hastened the advance of individual values and questioning of established order. Young people are finding their own way forward and traditional values are being questioned in the broader spectrum of human rights, justice and equality. Young people's high expectations have the potential to challenge the national leadership, so it is in the country’s interest to ensure that opportunities exist for young people to positively contribute their skills and idealism to the national development of Timor-Leste.

Notes

1. A series of conversations were held with ETSA students to support them in preparing a contribution to the conference: 'Cooperating with Timor-Leste: Ideas for good development practice'. Twelve students participated in a total of five conversations.

2. RENETIL (Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste) is a youth organisation established by East Timorese students in Indonesia in 1988 to campaign for East Timor's independence and later, to engage East Timorese youth in national reconstruction.

3. FRETILIN (Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste) related youth organisations include the Organisation for Timorese Youth (OJT) and the Organisation for Timorese Youth and Students (OJETIL).

4. CNRT (Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense/National Council of Timorese Resistance) was the peak body of the East Timorese people’s resistance to the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, established in February 1999 with Xanana Gusmão as President and formally dissolved on 9 June 2001.

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Working with libraries in Timor-Leste

Lyle French, Friends of the Biblioteca Universidade Nacional de Timor-Leste

Introduction
This paper examines cooperation between East Timorese librarians and their Australian colleagues in re-building the new nation's libraries. While the main focus is the Biblioteca Universidade Nacional de Timor-Leste (UNTL library), many issues explored here are relevant for libraries throughout the Land of the Sleeping Crocodile: the rebirth of the UNTL library is a case study in the reconstruction of a library service in Timor-Leste.

The challenges facing libraries in Timor-Leste are not unique. Other countries in the region have experienced long periods of colonialism, conflict and occupation that have had a severe impact on libraries. In Cambodia, for example, the library sector is now being steadily redeveloped, despite constraints such as a lack of funding, a weak tradition of reading, and basic employment conditions for library staff (Bywater 1998). This paper looks at libraries in Timor-Leste in general, before returning to the UNTL case study.

Libraries and Timor-Leste
Different types of libraries are playing a role in the development of Timor-Leste. There is an emerging public library sector for general users (for example, Xanana Gusmao Reading Room1), some small school libraries (Lolotoe Junior High School library), libraries at the post-secondary level (UNTL library, Dili Institute of Technology (DIT)2 library), and special libraries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation library). These libraries are providing their user groups with access to some printed resources and information and communication technologies (ICT), supporting basic literacy, and providing library collections for government ministries.

Understandably, library policy has not been a high priority in Timor-Leste since 2002, as more urgent priorities exist. There is no unified library policy, and no detailed plan for a national library with accompanying legal deposit legislation (Manolis 2005:92-94). In ASEAN countries, a typical public library system consists of a national library and local public libraries with outreach services such as mobile libraries. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam emphasise rural library services (Sabaratnam 2003:601), and also have educational and specialist libraries.

An Australian study of the value public libraries bring to their communities suggests that libraries make a contribution to communities in four key areas: enabling free public access to ICT; creating informed communities; promoting lifelong learning and literacy; and building connections between individuals, groups and government (State Library of Victoria 2005:5).

In Timor-Leste there is potential for libraries to play a key role in achieving the nation's educational goals. The Ministry of Education, Youth, Culture and Sports (DRTL 2005cv) identified the following four objectives to attain these goals:

• achieve universal primary education;
• develop post-primary education (secondary, technical/vocational, tertiary education and training) to enable citizens to be productive, and meet the needs of the economy and society;
• promote adult literacy to fulfil basic learning needs of adult population; and
• ensure access and participation in education is equitable and open to disadvantaged groups, especially the rural poor and women and girls.

Community library models
A flexible model for rural and remote 'libraries' in Timor-Leste warrants consideration; such a model could involve a community centre/library owned and run by the local community in partnership with a donor organisation or government programme. The facilities and services provided would vary according to the needs of the local community, for instance: the centre as a place for informal learning; or a venue for cultural activities; or a repository for indigenous knowledge. Joint use library models could also be considered for urban areas.

In India, the government, NGOs, educational institutions and business have contributed to rural development by introducing e-governance, e-learning, e-business and digital libraries (Nikam 2004:213). In Timor-Leste, joint community centres/libraries could also be sites for introducing the government's planned internet for isolated villages pilot project and non-formal education programmes (DRTL 2005a:17, 2005b:49). Libraries in rural and urban areas could also play a central role by providing a learning environment for the youth and education programme involving the creation of a national network of 12 reading rooms to support teaching and learning as a path of non-formal education (DRTL 2005b:46). Libraries in schools could also double as ICT centres and public libraries.

October 2005
The Baucau Buka Hatene Friendship and Learning Centre, established in 2004 as a project of the Friends of Baucau, is based on the Australian neighbourhood house model. Baucau is the nation's second largest urban centre. A committee of elected East Timorese run the Centre with advice and support from the Friends of Baucau. Capacity building education programmes at the Centre include literacy, numeracy and vocational training in language and computers, small business enterprise; and there is a women's resource room. The Centre also provides a community meeting space and a library.

Union Aid Abroad: APHEDA in Timor-Leste

The only university in Indonesian occupied Timor-Leste was the private Universitas Timor Timur (UNTIM) in Dili. But in August 1999, like much of the other infrastructure, UNTIM and its library were burnt down. Australian People for Health, Education, and Development Abroad (APHEDA)\(^1\) has played a central role in the creation of the main library service for the nation's new university, the UNTL.\(^1\)

APHEDA's work in Timor-Leste began in 1998 with the support of locally initiated educational opportunities. The aims of APHEDA in Timor-Leste are to provide ongoing support for the development of non-formal and adult education as a foundation for a strong civil society and to support the development of a cohesive and peaceful community by working with local communication and training structures.

Between 2001 and 2004, APHEDA ran capacity building projects in Timor-Leste to improve livelihood security, social harmony and to build civil society. Twenty-five Australian advisors (ADV) provided training and mentoring to 14 NGOs and East Timorese government officials. APHEDA's work with the university's library has been an important capacity building project; volunteers have provided mentoring and training to UNTL library staff. In Timor-Leste, APHEDA has been willing to listen, learn and engage constructively with stakeholders (government, NGOs, civil society) to understand what the problems are and to work with partners for a solution. One outcome of this cooperation has been the forging of a strong working relationship between APHEDA and head librarian Venceslau do Rego.

APHEDA UNTL library project milestones

The following is a summary of achievements of East Timorese library staff working with ADV.

**September-November 2000: ADV Judy Blood**

Pilot project to establish a small library with East Timorese staff comprising four librarians and a library assistant; pilot library not open for general use. Australian donated library software (Athena) installed, enabling library staff to use library software and computers for the first time. A badly damaged building was identified as suitable for a new university library and plans were made for the renovation of the site.

**July–September 2001: ADV John Sloan**

Cataloguing and circulation training and processing of the growing book collection; pilot library room had collection of books catalogued and shelved; library only for teaching staff use.

**January–March 2002: ADV Judy Blood**

Library collection and staff moved to new building. Basic library services established and the library was opened for students in January. Challenges included a leaking roof, heat and dust, ventilation, and library security.

**November–December 2002: ADV Karen Myers and Pamela Thompson**

Athena was upgraded to multi-user version 9.1 and the network on five PCs was re-established. Data backup procedures introduced to prevent loss of electronic catalogue records due to power supply disruptions. The library was closed to students to allow roof repairs.

**June–December 2003: ADV Jill Haynes**

A half-day workshop for Timor-Leste libraries was staged in Dili. As a result the Asosiasiun Biblioteka no Informasaun Timor­­Leste (Timor-Leste Library and Information Association, ABITL) was formed in mid-2004. Additional library building, cataloguing, and ICT work completed.

**January 2005: Friends of the UNTL Library (FUNTLI's Alarico de Sera)**

Week-long intensive workshop in basic library skills supported by APHEDA to: 11 library staff from the UNTL library, Dili Institute of Technology, the Xanana Gusmao Reading Room, the President's Cabinet library, the Catholic Teachers College in Baucau and the Universidade Dili.

**June 2004–now: ADV Karen Myers**

Working with local staff to establish the multimedia computer laboratory in the UNTL library. The laboratory gives students access to MS Office software; 12 PCs are networked with a print server and a laser printer. Other activities included hardware training, upgrade of electricity supply, and stocktake of the main collection.

**July 2004**

ABITL's inaugural meeting with representatives of 22 information services in Timor-Leste. The UNTL's head librarian
was elected general coordinator of the five-member ABITL board. ABITL aims to improve the condition and services of existing and future libraries and information service organisations in Timor-Leste as it considers them to be fundamental resources to quality education.

**October 2004**

ABITL strategic planning day held at the Xanana Gusmão Reading Room.

**2005: ADV Karen Myers**

Training in Athena and network problem solving. Staff learning how to handle error messages generated by Athena, as well as backing up and restoring database data after system failures due to the inconsistent power supply. Staff also learning problem solving procedures such as dealing with printer problems, hardware failures and network issues.

**Friends of the UNTL library**

In early 2002, a group of librarians in Melbourne formed a Victorian group to support the UNTL library. The group's inaugural meeting was hosted by the Australia-East Timor Association (AETA) at the Blue Room, adjacent to the AETA office. By mid 2002, the group had adopted the name FUNTLL Vic. The purposes of FUNTLL Vic are to raise funds and other forms of aid to assist in the rebuilding of the UNTL library, to promote awareness of the project, and to work with FUNTLL in other Australian states and territories. So far the group has run two successful film fundraising nights. An important resource that has underpinned the work of FUNTLL has been the project website at www.unlabor.net.au, provided pro bono by Social Change Online.

Also in mid 2002, FUNTLL members secured a Myer Foundation grant enabling local UNTL library staff to undertake training and English language tuition at Charles Darwin University (CDU). The training programme is not designed to provide formal library qualifications, rather, it will help UNTL library staff acquire a solid library skills base, and see first hand how a tertiary library can function. The CDU does offer library technician and degree programmes, including work placement positions for students and, as the nearest Australian tertiary institution to UNTL, is well placed to create long-term beneficial relationships for both institutions. In 2003, UNTL library's head librarian undertook training and English language tuition at CDU; another library staff member is scheduled to undertake training at the CDU in the latter half of 2005.

FUNTLL Vic has a committee of individuals with a collective share of broad experience in library networks as well as in community organisations. It is also fortunate to have Alarico de Sena as a member. Originally from Timor-Leste, de Sena is fluent in Tetum and works in Melbourne as a library technician. His commitment is a great example and his involvement has enabled the group to engage with Timor-Leste in a more informed way.

FUNTLL Vic members have also been actively assisting other libraries in Timor-Leste, including those at the Xanana Gusmão Reading Room and the DIT. Several tertiary and post secondary libraries in Victoria donated steel library shelving for the DIT library (the UNTL library had a surplus of shelving donated from Australia). Rotary sent several containers of the shelving, supported by DIT donor funds, and several other organisations assisted with the transport of the shelving.

As early as 1999, many Australians responded to the Timor-Leste emergency by donating English language book materials with the expectation that these resources would help with the reconstruction of the education system. Unfortunately, the current demand is for printed materials in Indonesian. FUNTLL Vic took responsibility for storing, sorting and disposing of several hundred boxes of donated books. After advice from FUNTLL Vic's partners in Timor-Leste, 35 boxes of resources were sent to Dili for the vocational education and training sector. Most of these resources were for learning English, comprising sets of books and cassettes, as well as dictionaries. Some Indonesian non-fiction books were also sent to the UNTL library.

**Future training**

In 2005, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports identified the improvement in the collection and services of the UNTL library as one of four projects to develop higher education (DRTL 2005b:23). Tying in with this, on the basis of visits to libraries in Dili, FUNTLL Vic identified four main areas that could be addressed by future training, all of which would be conducted in local language:

- technical services including acquisitions and cataloguing and also in user services such as circulation, reference, and reserve collections;
- management training for planning, organising, budgeting and managing a library, collection development and preservation of materials;
- computer and information literacy training to enable staff to be competent end users of computer hardware and software. Information literacy training would develop an understanding of how information is organised and how to find information in an accurate and effective way. Computer skills such as in the use of MS Office need to be developed; and
- use of automated library management systems (database software).
According to FUNTLL Vic member de Sena, Australians can work with the East Timorese in tackling the above training needs as follows:

- volunteers can be sent to train UNTL library staff;
- scholarships for East Timorese library staff to train in Australia;
- practical training in Australian libraries; and
- Australian volunteers can utilise long service leave and retirement to volunteer to work on the UNTL Library Project.

Support from Australia's public libraries sector

Patti Manolis, manager of Community Learning and Libraries at the Maribyrnong City Council in Victoria, undertook a study tour of libraries in Timor-Leste in mid-2004. Her report of the study tour is essential reading for Australian organisations and individuals intending to work with libraries in Timor-Leste. In early 2005, Manolis made a second visit to Timor-Leste, and she also coordinated two large fund-raising events in Melbourne in 2004 and 2005, raising more than $50,000 for the purchase of new books for libraries in Timor-Leste. The FUNTLL Vic committee is pleased to be working with Patti to develop libraries in Timor-Leste. Her work is an excellent example of a leader in a profession engaging with Timor-Leste and becoming an advocate in their area of expertise.

Conclusion

This paper has looked at the emerging library sector in Timor-Leste, and briefly explored how community centres acting as ICT access hubs and libraries could work in Timor-Leste. The centres could help bridge the digital divide, allowing East Timorese better access to non-formal education as well as providing access to print resources such as books, newspapers and magazines.

This paper also identified APHEDA as an agency at the forefront of renewal efforts for the UNTL library, with contributions from specialist support group FUNTLL Vic. Currently FUNTLL is fund-raising towards the purchase of new books published in Indonesia, and facilitating the development of more training programmes. The relationship between the CDU and UNTL has significant benefits for Timor-Leste, as shown by the example of the library staff training programme.

With the formation of ABITL, the East Timorese now have a sound foundation for the library and information sector in Timor-Leste. A library training course is also soon to be established at DIT. By effectively working with partner organisations in Australia and Timor-Leste, Australian NGOs and leading librarians continue to play an important cooperative role in the development of libraries in the world's newest nation.

Notes

1. Xanana Gusmão Reading Room, founded in June 2000 and the first public library to open after the end of the Indonesian occupation, is a place where people in Dili can access information to educate and expand their knowledge about Timor-Leste's history, culture and development. The Reading Room aims to strengthen East Timorese identity, increase awareness of the nation's history, and empower the East Timorese to make informed decisions about the nation's future.

2. DIT, inaugurated May 2002, is a non-government, community-based, non-profit education provider delivering vocational training and higher education in Timor-Leste for youth, resistance veterans, and specific community needs. DIT is located in Bairro Pite, Dili.

3. APHEDA is the overseas aid agency of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and works in Timor-Leste through their Dili Office, staffed by Australians and local people. APHEDA works in 15 countries around the world providing livelihood support and running capacity building programmes. www.apheda.org.au

4. UNTL started classes for 5,000 students and 1,500 bridging course students on 27 November 2000. The main campus is in central Dili and there is an Engineering campus at Hera.

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Wrestling the crocodile: Information technology development in Timor-Leste

Lev Lafayette, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Melbourne

Introduction
For the purpose of elaboration 'wrestling the crocodile' is an information technology (IT) community term for engaging in a particularly complex IT related issue that challenges the technician with the strength, speed and diversity of problems. For obvious reasons, relating to Timorese mythology, 'wrestling the crocodile' is an appropriate double metaphor for dealing with the issue of effective IT development assistance from economically and industrially advanced nations to a country such as Timor-Leste. The reasons for this complexity start with problems relating to basic social and physical infrastructure, extrapolate to include matters of maintenance and training and are finally confronted with what should be the first issue considered — utility.

A personal perspective on computer use in Timor-Leste
Consider a well-meaning Australian who, having recently spent a few thousand dollars upgrading their personal computer to the 'latest and greatest', spares a thought for the plight of the East Timorese, our close neighbours, living in impoverished conditions. This Australian thinks that perhaps one of the things a Timorese family could use to improve their lives is an old computer. So they wander down to their local friendship city association, arrange for the computer goods to be bundled up for the next lot of 'gifts', which may eventually find their way to a school or community centre, or even an extended family in a distant district.

Is it possible to imagine a worse allocation of scarce resources? A desktop computer is not light and costs a significant amount of money to transport from Australia or New Zealand to Timor-Leste. In transit, components are shaken and possibly damaged. Finding replacement components is almost impossible in Timor-Leste, even in the relatively technologically-advanced capital. Assuming that the computer does arrive undamaged and gets through the notorious harbourside customs, it then has to travel many miles along winding mountain roads to reach, for example, Same. Assuming that the journey is successful and the system is actually allocated as planned, the problem then arises of how it is going to be used. Electricity in regional capitals is sporadic at best; each and every sudden loss of supply adds additional stress to computer components with the risk of disk head crashes. Dust and humidity also contribute to the risk of damage, not to mention mosquitoes and spiders deciding that the computer is a fine place to live. The operating system — probably MS Windows 98 — is already obsolete and is of course, in English, as are the manuals, if provided at all. There is no Internet or networking and the machine is used for a few games of solitaire before something breaks and it is thrown out, becoming a testament to inappropriate, even if well meaning, technological gifts.

Appropriate use of computers
The main issue is complete lack of consideration of the utility of computer technologies in the East Timorese context. It is imperative that a significant degree of project planning occur prior to the provision of what is effectively an end-user tool, rather than haphazard donations with the hope that somehow the utility will become obvious and the necessary social and physical infrastructure will arise automatically with the provision of computer systems. Bold scope and long-term objectives are not to be regarded negatively as long as there is sufficient attention to detail and utility. Consideration is therefore required to determine the usefulness of computers and their applicability to the people of Timor-Leste.

Additional care must be taken at the outset to ensure that the 'simple' lives of the East Timorese, and their low level of economic development and infrastructure, is not interpreted to mean that computers do not have any utility in the East Timorese context. It is difficult to imagine a strategy that would permanently impoverish the people of Timor-Leste than the suggestion that they do not need information technologies. The changes in telecommunications and IT over the past ten to 15 years are impressive, yet this is only the beginning. With sufficient infrastructure, equipment and training, the people of Timor-Leste would use information technologies for the same reasons that they are used in advanced economies. The primary uses of computers are as:

- devices to communicate asynchronous recordable data between points — the benefits that this could provide to medical, educational, policing and commercial activities are self evident;
• organisational management tools — national database development for medical, educational and policing needs, production of minutes, agendas, plans of action, memos, spreadsheets, databases and so on; and
• computing tools — programming, planning, modelling and systems organisational tools.

Limitations to achieving the potential benefits of computer use in Timor-Leste include:
• lack of physical network infrastructure, sporadic electricity supply;
• lack of maintenance technologies and maintenance crews;
• lack of social capital and educated users; and
• poor organisational development.

To address these limitations, the recommended solution for the geographical and infrastructure environment of Timor-Leste is widespread wireless networking. Kofi Annan (UN 2003) once referred to this solution as ‘particularly effective, helping countries to leapfrog generations of telecommunications technology and infrastructure to empower their people’. Certainly the ‘lay of the land’ in Timor-Leste is conducive to such a technology. The distance between Ainaro and Same is 60 kilometres by road. But the real distance is only 16 kilometres. The longest distance between district capitals (excluding Oecusse) is Baucau to Lospalos, at 60 kilometres. Even so, it is well within fiscal possibility to use sub-districts instead. Certainly the option of a variety of wireless networking solutions has been the recommendation of all IT professionals who have studied Timor-Leste’s infrastructure. By way of comparison Mauritius has recently taken the opportunity to make almost their entire mountainous island accessible to wireless networking.

These recommendations were, and are, helped by the existence of usable telecommunications assets, including no less than 23 towers throughout the country as part of a total of US$20 million worth of IT assets ‘left behind.’ Under such circumstances, it is difficult and indeed, demonstrably foolish, to look past microwave technologies for national networking in Timor-Leste. The climatic conditions make frequency diversity a necessity, with competing claims for low band (fewer towers, taller) and high band (more towers, smaller), although there is a necessary bias arising from the pre-existing towers. Expert considerations accounting for all these factors suggested that a 6-7 GHz band is the most suitable with prospective tenders requiring the ability to implement a Synchronous Digital Hierarchy network with self-healing architecture. Such a network can carry fixed voice, mobile, TV and radio.

For electrical supplies, recent developments do indicate the viability of solar power for ‘village level’ computer technology, to the point that the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh in late 2004 started using solar powered computer systems for educational needs in remote villages. The Uttar Pradesh Education for All Project Board bought 1,000 computers for all 79 districts in the state, however, lacking a stable electricity supply schools have purchased solar panels (costing approximately A$2,500 each) which provide sufficient electricity to power the computers in each school. Even in Dorset, England, not exactly known for its sunlight, solar technology has been utilised since 2004 for almost 50 computers at Medina High School. Distributed, independent and renewable energy sources are a realistic and effective investment for electricity supply in communities where centralised power with ongoing costs is simply not viable.

In many ways, the lack of social capital, the low level of organisational development, and the lack of educated users and maintenance crew can be more difficult than the lack of physical infrastructure. Even under these circumstances, the government of Timor-Leste is to be applauded for its initial emphasis on raising the literacy rate and general level of education. For obvious reasons, raising these standards must occur prior to increasing computer and technical literacy. Unlike many who perceive Timor-Leste’s linguistic diversity as problematic and question the wisdom in choosing a relatively obscure language such as Portuguese as a national language, in the long run such choices can be turned into a positive. While short-term international trade advantages will clearly arise through ability in English, Mandarin and Bahasa the romance languages should not be discounted. The future possibility of a highly literate, multilingual Timor-Leste that acts as a regional translation centre (perhaps even challenging Singapore in this role) is far from improbable.

Assuming a useful degree of general literacy, computer literacy and technical training is required. In Timor-Leste’s case, this is significantly different to the mainstream sort of computer education received in advanced industrial nations. In such circumstances, with stable infrastructure, ready supply of replacement components and so forth, many computer training packages are more strongly orientated towards routine administrative tasks using specialised applications. This is quite inappropriate for Timor-Leste’s conditions, indeed, such teaching as common as it may be in economically advanced nations, would be a terrible waste of resources. In relative terms, much stronger emphasis must be placed on hardware, networking, and operating systems knowledge rather than applications and programming. This is simply a result of the conditional circumstances. If and when Timor-Leste’s social and physical infrastructure develops, the relative weight can be altered.

Opportunities and conclusion
An interesting side effect of these circumstances however is the opportunity for Timor-Leste to make substantial contributions to software development and open source software applications
and programming development in particular. This could be both for general use for all regions in similar conditions to Timor-Leste and for the particular conditions and organisational requirements for Timor-Leste itself. After all, in an environment of relative impoverishment it simply does not make sense to utilise the more expensive proprietary solutions (even if software piracy is rampant throughout the country). As a very modest contribution to this Peter Gossner, Kevin Scannel and I have added a list of words for Tetum spell checking for the OpenOffice application suite.

In summary, effective IT cooperation with Timor-Leste requires both bold vision and a realistic assessment of needs. Impractical assistance in skills and equipment which are inappropriate to the current or future needs of Timor-Leste, no matter how well intentioned, are not helpful. This paper serves only as a general overview of opportunities and directions that could assist Timor-Leste; specific recommendations are worthy of more thorough investigation. To return to the metaphorical title, it must be recognised that unlike other 'crocodiles' in IT the crocodile of Timor-Leste, although extremely challenging, can be, if treated properly, a friend for life.

Reference
The case for rural communications

In Timor-Leste, 32 per cent of the population and approximately 480 villages have never had effective telephone communications. Lack of communications contributes to appalling neonatal death rates (see Snell et al. paper on family health, this issue), a chronic lack of education facilities, difficulties with governance, isolation of communities and poor prospects for economic development. An important government objective is to establish a sustainable community telecommunications system linking all villages and towns within each district by May 2006.

Telecommunication services available in rural communities are in stark contrast to those taken for granted in Dili and district capitals. The lack of any affordable means of telecommunication between isolated rural villages and their sub-district or district capital has the following adverse effects:

1. It is impossible to summon emergency medical assistance in a reasonable time frame as villages are often three or four hours journey by foot from their sub-district centre where there is access to the health department radio network. By the time help is summoned and reaches the village, medical emergencies have often become much more severe and in some cases the patients die.

2. Trained midwives who encounter complications during deliveries cannot obtain advice from more experienced midwives or a doctor, resulting in higher infant mortality and maternal mortality rates than in larger towns and cities.

3. Access and availability to instructors and advisors for breastfeeding, nutrition and basic baby care is limited because of travel times, leading to high infant mortality rates.

4. Children frequently have to walk considerable distances to attend school, and combined with the lack of skilled teachers, is a key factor in the relatively low participation rates.

5. School principals and teachers in isolated villages are unable to access further education and training in their profession yet this training is desperately needed if the quality of education in rural schools is to be improved to reach standards available in more developed areas. Rural primary teachers and some secondary teachers still receive formal education or training in how to teach. Time taken to travel to sub-district centres prevents attendance at evening classes.

6. There is a need to improve agricultural practices and the government has a number of programmes planned or in place to improve the productivity of this sector. Better telecommunications and the ability to deliver evening classes for adults, for example, without the need for them to travel, could greatly increase the reach and speed of delivery of these programmes.

For education, adverse outcomes of isolation and poor communication are numerous. Isolated village pupils experience low standards of teaching resulting in poor literacy and numeracy. Unsatisfactory scholastic results and lack of regular guidance and support affect teacher morale, leading to absenteeism and difficulty in recruiting teachers. At the end of this process rural children fall further and further behind their urban counterparts increasing the divide between developing urban areas and static, poor rural communities.

Overall, the results are the direct opposite of those envisaged in several of the development priorities, described in the National Development Plan (NDP). Examples are Priorities 49 and 53, which appear under the title 'Poverty reduction, rural and regional development':

49. The main goals of poverty reduction within the plan are to achieve rapid economic growth, to deliver training and health services, establish social safety nets, and create skilled and professional human resources for an effective use of labour. Rural development will be competent, efficient, accountable and transparent.

53. Balanced regional development will be achieved through focusing on reducing imbalances in education, strengthening the economic bases of districts, improving access to infrastructure for relatively disadvantaged areas, allocating central government resources to districts based on population, land area, level of development and specific locational problems (RDTL 2002:8-9).

At the plenipotentiary meeting of the International Telecommunications Union in Morocco, Timor-Leste was
identified as a country most in need of assistance (ITU 2002). The government of Timor-Leste has identified telecommunications as one of eight stabilisation priorities, yet there are no plans for public telecommunications in villages (Ministry of Transport, Communications and Public Works 2005).

Timor Telecom is the incumbent telecommunications service provider in which the government has a small stake. The current agreement with Timor Telecom does not require telecommunications services to be provided outside district capitals. In fact, Timor Telecom, like most telecommunications carriers, has no specific expertise in the low cost two way radio technologies that are typically used in developing countries.

Rural communications system in Atabae

The need for rural communications has not yet elicited support from donor countries, major aid organisations or commercial interests, so Connect East Timor (CET), a non-profit organisation with no commercial interests, is seeking to address this 'black spot'. CET's objective is to promote a higher priority for low cost, rural and remote communications in Timor-Leste and to raise funds which would enable some 480 villages to be connected using simple, low cost, robust solar-powered radio communications technology.

CET has the equipment, expertise, skills and project capability to connect all villages in Timor-Leste within two years. Effective working relationships with government and several communities have been established over several years.

CET has recently installed a low cost, reliable radio communications system using such technology in eight villages in Atabae, namely: Rairobo, Poetete, Nunedoi, Punatae, Atabae, Aidabassala, Biamarae and Damlaran. Connection has been provided in the office of the sub-district administrator and senior health worker's house. This is a limited trial (demonstration project) and CET is continuing to liaise closely with the community in Atabae, through its leaders, to ensure that future expansion of this system will benefit from the experience of using and supporting such a system in a rural community of Timor-Leste. Equipment maintenance and support arrangements have been put in place.

Excellent support has been provided by the Government of Timor-Leste. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri has given the CET campaign his personal support, and that of his government. Ovidio de Jesus Amaral, together with officials in his Ministry for Transport and Communications, have provided a great deal of assistance for the demonstration project.

CET is now seeking support for a more ambitious pilot project that would include development of appropriate applications in the health, education, agricultural and administrative sectors using low cost communications such as the system installed in Atabae.

Some examples of the potential benefits from the pilot project are:

- capacity building of the Ministry for Health to respond quickly and efficiently to medical emergencies advised by radio from the villages to sub-district health centres;
- real time support for trained midwives during complicated births using mobile hand-held radios;
- explanations and tutorials of distance learning materials for teachers, midwives and natal nurses in isolated villages using the radio system;
- support to agricultural extension workers via the radio system; and
- strengthening of sub-district administration across key sectors of the economy.

Nationwide rural communications options

CET has sufficient equipment donated by Australian organisations to provide a national rural telecommunications network in Timor-Leste. Two types of equipment are available: village radio equipment (250 radios, repeaters and ancillaries) and GSM mobile phone base stations worth in excess of US$20 million when new, and still in very good condition; ancillaries including antennas, rectifiers and cabling in sufficient quantity to provide over 100 operational mobile phone cells across Timor-Leste, thus helping to extend the reach of the Timor Telecom network.

While CET has raised several tens of thousands of dollars, national coverage of sub-districts and to 480 villages requires at least A$4 million for the village radio system and A$10 million to install and support 65 cells of the GSM mobile phone base station system (thus covering out to the sub-districts). These estimates include transport, shipping, building towers, solar electricity power suppliers, and specialist items or support. The impact of a national deployment of village radio equipment or GSM mobile phones to rural areas could result in a telephone coverage being extended throughout rural villages.

Funding rural communications

Realistic assessments indicate that there is little possibility of funding rural communications initiatives through international telecommunications organisations or companies. Even in Australia, rural telecommunications has low priority for such companies.

Donors and development partners of Timor-Leste have to date given communications infrastructure little or no consideration. A World Bank (2004) report on education failed to consider use of telecommunications, radio or television to deliver education — areas in which Australia and many other countries have considerable experience. The lack of funding opportunities for communications appears to be due to several factors:
critical and higher priority requirements to rebuild key infrastructure destroyed during the Indonesian occupation;

- an emphasis of support for individual health, education and agriculture sectors without considering the underlying communications infrastructure which would leverage investments in each of these areas; and

- lack of capacity and data to assess whether infrastructure initiatives such as communications can provide sufficient added value to other sectors such as health or education to justify a higher funding priority.

Telecommunications can add immense value to local economies, for example:

- produce can get to market at the right time;
- travel to and from rural areas simply to speak to someone in a district capital or Dili can be avoided;
- phone or mobile services can be re-sold by street traders;
- efficiency throughout the rural economy improves; and
- population drift to urban centres can be reduced if rural educational opportunities, adequate health care and employment are available.

CET has confirmed that the Ministry of Education (with a dynamic distance education section) needs telecommunications for rural teachers. The Ministry of Health wants to utilise telecommunications for health promotion and training, and the Ministry of Agriculture wishes to support outreach workers. Sector Investment Plans prepared by the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Ministry of Health recognise the important of rural communications, but have only allocated small, and as yet un-funded budgets to rural communications initiatives.

The government also recognises that communications are essential to improve administration and security, yet an integrated strategy (or set of funding priorities) for rural communications as an essential, enabling technology is still to be clearly defined.

Integrated rural investment and projects

Any investment strategy for communications in Timor-Leste should make an economic case for integrating telecommunications in rural aid and investment projects. This should include the benefits of communication for:

- schools, health clinics and administration;
- agricultural, fishery and construction projects efficiency gains; and
- building capacity of teachers and nurses to use telecommunications and information technology to improve service delivery in villages.

Many opportunities exist for integrating communications into projects which develop other sectors of the economy, including:

- transport projects such as road building to provide opportunities to include communications cables and access to telecommunications facilities;
- energy projects (solar, hydro, gas) to provide electricity for telecommunications and computers in villages;
- electrical transmission projects to provide the opportunity to service telecommunications facilities and install optical fibre to enhance national communications routes; and
- curriculum planning of school, university and college courses and professional development can provide the local skills required to sustain communications infrastructure and information technology infrastructure and reduce dependence on foreign expertise.

Actions to address the funding gap for rural communications need to encourage:

- Australian government support for CET;
- development partners to work with the Timor-Leste Government to assess and include telecommunications in cross-sector funding priorities;
- telecommunications requirements to be built into projects, for example, schools should be built or supported with adequate communications provision; and
- NGOs working together to fund rural communications that will improve the efficiency of their projects.

Conclusion

Communications infrastructure is recognised as an essential enabler of rural development in most countries. Australia, like many other countries, also recognises the political importance of ensuring that people living in remote and rural areas have adequate access to high quality and affordable communications. In recent years, hundreds of millions of dollars have been directed towards this area through federal programmes such as Networking the Nation. Australia has developed the School of the Air, Royal Flying Doctor Service, and telemedicine services to service rural areas.

Yet Australia, and countries worldwide have been unable to assist in building communications for the people living in rural and remote areas of Timor-Leste. The same standards and
policies for rural communications development to the rural and remote areas of the developed countries should be applied to development assistance programmes for Timor-Leste.

Notes
1. Resolution 11 of the 2002 Marrakesh Plenipotentiary Conference resolved that 'a significant part of any surplus income over expenditure derived from TELECOM activities should be used as extrabudgetary income for the Telecommunication Development Bureau, for specific telecommunication development projects, primarily in the least developed countries.' For more information see: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ctelsurp/index.html.

2. CET is a community based campaign that seeks to address Timor-Leste's communications 'black spot' and secure funding for development of telecommunications infrastructure and services in rural and remote areas of Timor-Leste. For more information and contact details see: http://www.connecteasttimor.com.

3. Prime Minister Mari Alkatari stated in 2005: 'I fully support the Connect East Timor Campaign and trust that the people and Government of Australia, and other prospective donors will consider the needs of our country and continue to generously support the campaign, as many have already done.'

4. GSM refers to a worldwide standard for mobile phones. Although not within CET's original concept, it was considered appropriate to accept and hold on trust for Timor-Leste a major donation of this equipment which would otherwise have been destroyed by the donor.

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Renewable energy in Timor-Leste

Kevin Bain, Friends of Same

This paper summarises recent policy discussion of renewable energy in Timor-Leste, and highlights the potential for small hydroelectricity generation to support economic activity in rural areas. This technology needs greater exposure to the Australian Timor support network, as well as to the East Timorese. More generally, I suggest that overseas supporters and donors consider their capacity to support electricity provision to remote and poor communities, due to its pervasive effect on development.

How important is electricity?

A recent multi-agency poverty report on Timor-Leste claimed the provision of electricity to all households would reduce poverty by 26 per cent and increase consumption in those households by 20 per cent (RDTL et al. 2003:209). Whatever the accuracy of the percentages, they suggest that electricity provision significantly magnifies the effect of support programmes. How diminished are literacy and education programmes in communities where there is no lighting after dark? If much hard work and resources are wasted in education and elsewhere due to the lack of electricity, then it should not be too quickly dismissed as just a useful add-on, too hard, or somebody else's business.

Electricity's enhancement role applies to programmes, economic activity and social well-being:

- education and literacy programmes — computers and multimedia, lighting for reading and homework at night, teachers and professionals being more prepared to live in rural locations;
- communication — internet connections, radio broadcasting and reception, charging of mobile phones;
- health — refrigeration for vaccines, energy efficient appliances such as low energy rice cookers and off-peak water heaters could reduce women's respiratory problems from cooking over open fires;
- environmental protection — replacing the firewood used in cooking and heating which denudes forests, promotes erosion, flooding and landslips, affects roads and housing stability, and limits agricultural options;
- local businesses and jobs — carpentry shops, pumping applications, refrigerated food, attractiveness to tourists, processing and milling of grain, coffee, coconuts;
- assemblies of local people — for decision making, library, educational purposes, concerts, dances, and sporting events are facilitated by ceiling fans, microphones, lights, amplifiers;
- family get togethers — to watch a video, chat or read at night; and
- safety and comfort — at home, in public places and roads; fires in the home from kerosene lamps and candles could be reduced.

Supply and connectivity

Detailed planning reports commissioned by the government and published over the past year (RDTL 2005a,b,c) map the current power situation. There are many important issues in the reports which are not canvassed here (demand management, energy efficiency measures, for example), but some of the supply and demand aspects are as follows:

- there are about 60 separate small grids throughout the country, almost all government owned, each powered by generators running on imported diesel fuel;
- fuel costs total US$8 million each year with the import price paid about 30 per cent higher than comparable countries;
- the tax-free price of diesel oil in Timor-Leste is 60 per cent higher than the price paid by non-subsidised buyers in Indonesia, which is an important comparison since Indonesia is a major source of imports, and competitor to locally produced goods;
- supply is monopolised (80 per cent) by Pertamina, the Indonesian Government oil company;
- estimates in 2002 suggest that Dili accounts for about 85 per cent of power consumption compared with 78 per cent in 1998;
- only in Dili is there a 24 hour electricity supply, all other grids operate for limited periods, usually six hours a day;
- 20 per cent of households nationally have power, including 18 per cent in the 13 district centres, five per cent in other rural areas;
• about 5,400 households are connected to electricity in the sub-districts with at least as many waiting for connections when the power supply becomes available;
• the recent installation of prepayment meters has led to a noticeable drop in domestic consumption; and
• only five of 35 sub-district stations were operating at the start of 2005, mainly due to lack of funds from local people to buy fuel; generator outages for months at a time are common, due to breakdowns or lack of parts or service personnel (ADB 2005).

Perhaps the most remarkable statistic emerging from these government reports is that 70 per cent of households in Timor-Leste (all those outside Dili and the district capitals) consume only one per cent of the reticulated electricity supply. Even allowing for the small amount of off-grid electricity generated through solar installations and private or portable generator sets, this illustrates the low level of secondary economic activity and jobs in rural areas.

Although industry has a tiny presence in Timor-Leste, the capacity of the private sector to create new jobs remains weak because of limited opportunities for investment. What level of business investment can we expect in the absence of a reliable electricity supply? What effect would such insecurity have on attitudes toward striving for achievement in life?

Government objectives for household connection
The National Development Plan (NDP) recognises that an effective system of infrastructure and services is crucial for agricultural productivity and poverty reduction, a determinant of business investment, instrumental to human development, and the foundation for private sector development. The NDP objective is for 80 per cent of households to be electrified by 2025, with 'micro- and minihydro...likely to have a significant role ... in isolated villages ... unlikely to be connected to the grid within a ten or 15 year time frame' (RDTL 2005c).

Preparation for the first rural electrification project is proposed in the Power Sector Investment Programme, including implementation strategies covering 21,000 households, and solar installations to another 7,000 households. An accelerated rural connection programme in 2006-2007 will begin following crucial policy decisions (RDTL 2005c).

Questions on major project priorities
The centrepiece of government strategy has been for a 27Mw hydroelectric scheme at Ira Lalaro in the far east of the island, with a high voltage transmission line running 190 kilometres to Dili, and providing power to Baucau, Los Palos and possibly Manatuto along the way. The plan was for this to be operational by 2010, with the next major transmission investment being south of Dili, connecting Aileu, Gleno, Maliana, Same, and Suai. There are significant environmental and agricultural impacts of this project, and traditional beliefs about the site make it a controversial decision. The project has been studied and discussed since Indonesian times, and is still rated top priority by technical advisers and the government.

The alternative now being examined is to utilise the 30 documented oil and gas seeps on the south coast which could offer an attractive alternative to a programme of hydropower/diesel generation. The government has allocated US$1 million for a demonstration project to harvest gas at Aliambata, in Viqueque, testing for the power generation potential of this resource. One possibility is that this electricity will be transmitted to load centres in the south and central region of Timor-Leste, and then to Dili.

This review leads to uncertainty about cost, industry structure, and funding sources for national electrification. The capital cost of the 20 year programme is not yet known with any degree of accuracy and will depend on the mix of thermal and hydro generation that is feasible. But the five year capital budget is US$142 million, with about US$130 million yet to be raised from public and private sources. The government recognises that the mobilisation of funding on this scale will pose a major challenge. Overseas funding is expected to be the main source of capital, with various private investment models, such as Build Operate Transfer (BOT) being canvassed in government documents. While the basic law for the power sector foresees an international public tender for a 20 year BOT on all operations of the government electricity authority EDTL, its consultants and some overseas donors are against privatisation as not a viable approach for Timor-Leste.

The government expects to decide on the country's optimal generation programme around mid 2006. If a generation capacity fuelled by domestic oil and gas is preferred, this would likely be developed by the private sector ahead of the Ira Lalaro hydro project, but simultaneous rather than sequential development is still possible.

Role of renewable energy
Internationally, major research interest and support by national governments and aid bodies (including DFID, EU, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, World Bank) and private companies (Shell, BP) has increased in recent years. Under the Clean Development Mechanism, carbon credits available to countries signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, including Timor-Leste, can make renewable energy cheaper.
by displacing hydrocarbon generated electricity. Philippines, Vietnam, China, Indonesia, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea have microhydro installations, with possibly 20,000 very small, portable installations in Vietnam, Philippines, and China.1

In Timor-Leste, the policy proposes a central role for renewable energy for locations outside Dili, whatever the decision on the major electricity options. The government’s Sector Investment Programme (SIP) looks at technical prospects for alternative power from hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal, but the money to go further requires development partner interest.

Wind: Based on a West Timor study, wind power is thought to be not viable in coastal areas, but viable in mountains and uplands. The dry season from April–October is also the windy season, creating complementarity with hydro generation. Potential locations are at Ira Lalaro and Foho Bagarkoholau, ten kilometres south of Dili. There is no expression of donor interest in a programme yet.

Onshore and Offshore Oil and Gas: The developers of the Timor Sea gas fields are strongly against transferring oil and gas to Timor-Leste, so liquefied natural gas for power generation seems unlikely. A new project at Suai has some prospect of rehabilitating a leaking oil and gas well and stopping pollution leaking since 1975. The trapped oil and gas could provide much of the local need for diesel fuel for electricity generation.

Geothermal: Atauro Island, north of Dili, may have sufficiently high temperature spring water to power a small generator, charging the eco-tourist resort a premium price, and providing local people with surplus power at low cost. No relevance to other locations is claimed.

Solar: Due to low population densities and low rural incomes, solar home systems are a lower cost option to electricity grid extension where lighting, radio, and television is the main need. However, there is a high upfront cost, requiring capital subsidies. Off-grid electrification, typically based on solar home systems, has relatively low potential for income-generating activities.

Bill Tynan, a Christian Brother working in Railako Kraik with support from Rotary, has installed 250 solar micro lighting systems, with another 500 planned. These cost A$280 each for a photovoltaic panel, battery and light, and reportedly provide light equivalent to a 240 volt 25 watt incandescent bulb — enough light for one room. This suggests a total cost of about A$210,000 to provide limited lighting to 750 households.

White LED lighting has become popular in some countries such as Nepal, although there is some debate about their benefits and cost compared to compact fluorescent lighting.2

Biomass/biodiesel: This renewable energy is not discussed in these reports, but filtered coconut oil as a substitute for diesel in engines is widely reported as a viable fuel in Pacific countries.

Mini- and Microhydro: The Power SIP (RDTL 2005c) says that ‘microhydro is likely to have a significant and continuing role in rural electrification in a number of isolated locations with mountainous terrain and high rainfall. In these areas, where grid connection would not occur for many years if ever, microhydro could provide the opportunity for mini grid development, perhaps 50 sites in a few remote parts of the country could utilise microhydro.

Studies funded by Norad, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, at Gleno, Belulic, Gariuai (minihydro) and Laclor are almost completed. Due to the steep topography of the country, there are few opportunities to form artificial reservoirs, and most are ‘run of river’ type, involving small diversions, then return of water to the stream. As yet, there are no mini- or microhydro installations in Timor-Leste.

Some advantages of small hydro
- can be cost competitive with solar, and provide greater electrical output, to support local business ventures;
- also direct-drive milling option for carpentry, grain, coffee or other processing (cheaper due to no electrics);
- largely benign in local impact, but issues of property rights/access, and fishing/farming/irrigation, need to be dealt with by local people;
- unlike other options, income-generating activities can provide funds for capital replacement or repair due to equipment damage, operations and maintenance; and
- project design can allow for integration into the electricity grid, where it exists.

Disadvantages of small hydro
- more relevant to high rainfall, mountainous areas with fast flowing watercourses, preferably year round;
- many tricky issues — technical choices on equipment and technology, siting, management/ownership structure, partnership with local community and the government, property rights and access, decisions on use of output (domestic, business, public facilities or demonstration project?), fee levels for consumers, cost, training, maintenance, technical support; and
- extensive project planning and installation costs upfront.
Conclusion

It seems likely that many rural communities in Timor-Leste will be without electricity for many more years, and the government will welcome additional support. A capital contribution from outside to establish a generation facility will be the only way to achieve electricity provision in these areas, with a partnership between an Australian service club, NGO, church or friendship group and a remote community. There are small groups in Australia which can raise A$200,000 or more for domestic solar installations. Similar funds can provide sufficient power from microhydro installations to support economic activity and employment as well as domestic lighting in small communities. This provides a more sustainable and autonomous basis for development.

Financial sustainability is a key issue and this is where microhydro, with its income-generation potential, has the edge. Experienced workers in the field say meeting the technical criteria is not enough: the local community must first want it and know why, understand it, operate it, and work to keep it going. An approach which combines professional expertise (in community development, hydrology, geology, financial analysis, engineering), with volunteer resources both in Australia and Timor-Leste seems necessary to maximise the chances of success.

Notes


2. See http://www.lightuptheworld.org/ for background. There is a strong Australian connection here, through Steward Craine in Tasmania.


References


RDTL 2005a, Overview of Sector Investment Programmes, Volumes 1-2, RDTL, Dili.

RDTL 2005b, Power — Priorities and Proposed Sector Investment Programme, RDTL, Dili.

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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness (Independence Hall Association 1776).

For Timor-Leste, a newly independent post-conflict developing country, these words apply as surely as they did 200 years ago, half a world away. For this discussion, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness could be paraphrased as physical and economic security, political security and emotional security. The focus of this article is limited to the physical and economic security of individuals and small groups.

Maslow (1970) argued that our survival needs are the base upon which we build our pursuits through to self-actualisation and happiness. Economic security provides for the physical well-being of the individual and those for whom they are responsible. In developing economies, in particular post-conflict economies, personal economic security may be a right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but in reality is often fleeting. This paper addresses three stages of ethical investment which exist or could exist: the historical social model; the existing market model; and a possible private model. Each model provides background to existing social enterprise activities which may operate as a not-for-profit enterprise, or a for-profit enterprise. According to Vern Hughes, each of these should reflect social justice values in the operations of their enterprises (Hughes n.d.).

The historical social model

Society has imagined, invented, initiated and imposed various ways of funding the needs of individuals, groups, businesses and governments. In the midst of these financial evolutions and revolutions emerged some organisations that put the needs of their customers, their members and their beneficiaries, first.

The three more recognisable forms still operating today are credit unions, building societies and friendly societies. Many of these organisations remain in the hands of their members but some institutions have de-mutualised and listed on the stock exchange. Some of these may still be considered for-profit social enterprises given their operational culture.

Credit unions are a part of the cooperative movement which has been revitalising itself in Timor-Leste since independence (ETAN 2002). Cooperative based lending helps strengthen access for individuals and small business and is complemented by the microcredit and microfinance activities of banks and institutions. Grameen Bank and Opportunity International have improved the livelihoods of many people worldwide, including Timor-Leste, freeing them from unconscionable interest rates by providing access to microfinance loans with just terms (Grameen 2000; Todd 2002).

Lending and investment are, however, distinctly different as the following discussion about investment in business activities in a developing country shows.

The existing market model

Ethical investment can be as simple as backing an honorable business activity and as sophisticated as managing a public ethical investment trust. Established fund managers, in assessing stock market listed companies, provide an insight into some methods commonly used by professional analysts (De George 1995).

Funds and firms may screen the social justice culture of organisations in three ways:

1. Using negative filtering, such as no tobacco, no alcohol, no armaments, or no asbestos allowed;
2. Using positive filtering, such as preferring companies with policies for sustainability, industrial democracy or community consultation; or
3. Incorporating each approach according to the funds or investors own imperatives.

This very basic model can be expanded for real world investment analysis.

When translating the ethics of investing into business ventures in the post-conflict developing world, a risk assessment should be two-way, with value to the investors and value to all the participant stakeholders. The investment will be neither exploitation nor an aid project. The very sustainability depends on the commitment of the participants.

The first rule for doctors is 'do no harm'; an apt caveat when investing in the livelihood of others.

A private market model

To meet the demands of developing countries, the engine of growth is enterprise. Enterprise can be defined as the ability of individuals and of groups to see what is needed around them,
to organise and meet that need. Harnessing the insight that this situational awareness provides requires commitment; the commitment of those who champion the solution they developed. If it is their ideas, their talent and their time, then an intervention both financial and human has merit.

The following private fund models are possible ways to help people escape the poverty trap via personal enterprise.

• **Focused public funds**: A sector based public fund for one country managing risk by investing in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Investors could be institutional, corporate or individuals. As a public fund, the management credentials are institutional; as a social enterprise, the project management is NGO based.

• **Direct private investment**: An involvement by a person or company to establish or participate in a local firm. This is done in free market economies. If done with social purpose, the business would then be considered a for-profit social enterprise.

• **Private project fund**: A project based private fund for entrepreneurial individuals who invest time and resources as well as funds. Project identification research directs investment to meet a market need and those initiatives which incubate fledging local enterprises, by partnering. Business projects which can grow to two, three or four dozen team members should aim at complementing and supporting other projects of the trust, creating a sustainable business community.

The possibility of creating a grassroots business model which is enduring, flexible, can be duplicated and which prevails, is a life’s work. The complexity of issues facing Timor-Leste and other post-conflict nations require sincere engagement at the grassroots. Governments look after the macroeconomic environment; individuals, groups and business look after the microeconomic environment. This is where the individual investor can choose how to use their funds to engage in small business activities in a socially justifiable manner.

New investment models must address the operational environment of business in a developing country. Risk assessment and risk management is no less important than the intervention project research and management. The success and failure criteria of projects must incorporate the non-financial milestones and goals of the participants. The dialogue that ensues must articulate the needs of new businesses to start, to grow and to be sustainable. Any grassroots initiative must be grown in the field.

**References**


Workshop group reports and recommendations

Health group

**Human resources development and strengthening the health system**

There was considerable focus on strengthening the health system at the peripheral level where the health services are not yet strongly staffed, resourced or supported. Multi-skilling of staff is essential but support is needed for those staff working at the periphery. Collaboration between sectors such as those responsible for communications, water and transport will help greatly. Management capacity at the district level, responsible for these services, also needs strengthening.

Part of the solutions may lie in NGOs filling the gaps as long as they collaborate with the district health officer, rather than adding to the officers' burdens. They must sign agreements with the Ministry of Health. Currently, NGOs are largely working in the district capitals and in Dili, rather than in remote areas. The Ministry of Health, through the district services, is endeavouring to increase support for isolated people. The recruitment and development of the role of community motivators is being explored. The use of links with local community leaders and clergy should also enhance support for isolated people. The ratio of female to male health workers may need balancing.

Capacity building involves providing learning opportunities in line with defined objectives. The candidate may need to be assisted to know what is being learnt and how it can be useful for the individual's setting. Opportunities should be provided for the candidate to discuss how the lessons learnt might be applied on return.

Relationships with the Pacific Island countries could be useful because these countries have similar size, logistic and human resources constraints. Teaching institutions in the Pacific may also be relevant to Timor-Leste. International bodies such as the WHO should be encouraged to include East Timorese when organising regional Pacific Island seminars.

**Assistance and coordination issues**

There is a great amount of goodwill and Australians are keen to assist the people of Timor-Leste in every way possible. However, the best assistance to the health sector is that which is provided in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, as explained in the Ministry's guiding frame. This document states that submissions must be written in Portuguese or Tetum. The Ministry should be contacted before preparing any submission to discuss the form and language.

Friendship cities have valuable relationships, mainly with the local government, in the districts. However, their inputs sometimes extend to the health services. It is important that they become aware of the policies and guidelines for appropriate assistance to health services.

It has become apparent that some individual expatriate doctors recruited by the Ministry of Health have been soliciting individual assistance, outside the framework of the established guidelines. There can be a problem with equity if some get help and others do not. It is important that the Ministry of Health agrees to the form of assistance because of the equity issue, but also because of the need to consider sustainability as well as coordination. Without integration into the Ministry of Health programme there is no way to support, supervise, or follow up when the NGO pulls out or finishes the programme. It is important that reports of the NGO projects are shared with the Ministry of Health. Some NGOs have continued support and expansion in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and have assisted with ongoing training. Sequential volunteers have proved helpful when they have had sufficient orientation to follow the Timor-Leste curricula, including the TB manual, Integrated Management of Childhood Illness manual, and can continue seamlessly after the previous person.

It is recognised that there is sometimes a problem with availability of supplies from the Ministry of Health, and NGOs try to work with the Ministry knowing it is the appropriate procedure. However, when the system is extremely slow and people want to help, the NGOs are looking for appropriate direction. It was felt that accessing supplies outside the system in the interim does not help build the capacity of the Ministry of Health. The Ministry is overstretched, but capacity is needed to respond to these problems and if people cover for them, capacity will not be built.

It was acknowledged that financial contributions are most helpful because a lot of supplies can be bought locally. This approach avoids the problems associated with provision of material assistance from outside Timor-Leste. Clearance from the port still poses problems. Following the emergency there was an enormous response to assist the people of Timor-Leste; goodwill was manifest in container-loads of goods shipped to Dili. At that time, there was no capacity for dealing with the quantity of material. The port is very small and there is little sophisticated equipment. Trucks capable of carrying whole containers to the hinterland do not exist. The roads are too narrow and winding to accommodate container trucks. The result is that the port remains clogged with containers, still not unpacked. New materials arrive and the capacity to deal with
these arrivals is hampered by the backlog. These problems emphasise the advantages of financial contributions.

All donations of medical supplies must comply with the Guidelines for Donations of Drugs, Consumables, Equipment and Assets to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. In addition, it is important to comply with all the steps associated with shipping and to have all the necessary paper work at hand to facilitate clearance. Port fees are normally charged for goods. This is an acceptable means of raising revenue for a new country with very limited avenues for revenue raising. However, tax exemption can be arranged through the Ministry of Health. The Ministry document, Exemption of Customs Duty and/or Tax upon Importation of Goods into Timor-Leste, explains the process.

Safe birthing options
A number of factors discourage women from attending formal health services for delivery of their babies. The relationship between midwives and traditional birth attendants will need to be strengthened to help overcome some barriers to safe delivery. When asked in the Department of Health survey who they consulted on delivery, 12 per cent responded 'no one'. Some reasons why women choose to deliver at home include: traditional beliefs that women may be violated; lack of confidentiality; and lack of privacy. The health facility may be far from home and women are responsible for their families, homes and animals even when the delivery of their child is imminent. There is a perception that some health workers have unpleasant attitudes, making home delivery a nicer, less stressful part of a day's work.

Because there is still no official reporting system, it is not possible to calculate an accurate maternal mortality rate, and the number of reported Caesarean sections is very low, due to inadequate referral. However, it is known that both maternal and perinatal mortality are exceptionally high so the presence of trained birth attendance at delivery is extremely important.

An important innovation being developed to overcome the barriers to safer delivery is the establishment of maternal waiting houses which will be friendly houses, set up and equipped like homes in communities, close to a health centre where there will be appropriate staff and medical equipment. Women will be able to live in these houses with family members while they wait for their infant to be born. All women beyond 36 weeks gestation will be eligible and women from high risk groups, especially from rural areas, should be prioritised. The waiting house will be linked into the referral system so obstetric emergencies can be predicted and managed appropriately.

Family planning
High fertility remains a problem but because of the strong negotiation with community and church leaders, family planning, as opposed to child spacing, is now openly discussed and included in Ministry of Health policy documents. High fertility is characteristic of post-conflict settings (Baden 1997). It is considered by Ministry staff and those involved in the DHS that high fertility may be largely due to the lack of knowledge of how to avoid conceiving. The survey results indicated that there is little discussion between men and women on family size.

Budget concerns
It is recognised that factors affecting health run across many sectors. There is some concern that the budgets of other sectors are not sufficient to cover health initiatives. The question has been raised as to whether the Ministry of Health should supply funds to other sectors to undertake initiatives that have an impact on health. However, it is more likely that the various sectors have not been orientated sufficiently to understand how their activities can be undertaken to have a positive impact on health without requiring extra funds. There is insufficient awareness of the need to ask the Ministry how they can help. The challenge is to raise awareness in various sectors.

Advocacy
In some instances legislation is the key to health improvements. For example, breastfeeding plays such an important part in the health of children that legislation against feeding bottles except on prescriptions, as in Papua New Guinea, would make a significant contribution. Tobacco control legislation is being formulated. Health literacy in community leadership can be fostered. Healthy village competitions as in the Solomon Islands may provide a useful model. Community health committees may be more capable of solving intersectoral issues and involving sectors at the local level than are national committees at the central level.

Another example from the Pacific, local women's clubs, may be of interest in Timor-Leste. In Samoa the activities of village women's committees helped reduce maternal mortality significantly. Local environmental issues such as breeding grounds for vectors might be addressed by community health committees. It was suggested that paid jobs could be created for maintaining the environment. In the meantime the use of bed nets is being encouraged throughout Timor-Leste.

Church group
The Church members interest group was concerned to keep alive the call for justice in the Timor Sea negotiations between Timor-Leste and Australia. A specialist workshop was convened with some of the members of the Timor Sea Justice Campaign who updated the group on recent developments, and explained how progress had been made from Timor-Leste standing to gain 18 per cent of Greater Sunrise at the beginning of the year to a likely 50 per cent.
**Governance group**

The governance sectoral group, along with the youth and women's interest groups, all emphasised the importance of consulting young people and women on issues concerning the future of their country. Despite Timor-Leste having a reasonably large percentage of women, and also young people, in the Parliament there is still marginalisation, and by far the largest number of people in poverty are women. Many Australian students and young people have become involved with students in Timor-Leste. In December 2005, the Students' Union of Dili Institute of Technology will host a number of Australian students in their homes.

**Business group**

The business group recommended socially responsible investment in Timor-Leste and warned of dangers of 'fast-tracking', however they also called for improved and faster communications, a one-stop shop and an integrated website for government regulations from all departments covering investment. There was considerable interest in the tourism sector with a number of business people attending the conference so they could find out how to invest in this sector. Dili Institute of Technology has a hospitality and tourism certificate course and they could find out how to invest in this sector. Dili Institute of Technology will host a number of Australian students in their homes.

**Alternative technology group**

The Alternative Technology Association displayed some of their solar generators, tanks, solar wind-up radios, solar phone chargers and solar street lighting they are installing in some districts in Timor-Leste. There was debate on many of the classic rural technology issues: composting toilets versus those using water; iron roofs versus traditional roofing; and rainwater tanks versus underground water. Interestingly Australians and East Timorese have exactly opposite views on whether rainwater or underground water is purer. It was useful to discuss these differences and to realise that the selection of technology for each purpose needs to be made with regard to its social context, economic sustainability and environmental impact and not just its status.

**Culture and sustainable enterprise group**

Disappointment with the effectiveness of aid may have something to do with our material approach which overlooks the important pre-conditions of success. Tied to this, is our expectations that people can jump through stages and processes of education in less than a generation. However, certain activities can only be sustained if the already existing educational levels and socio-organisational arrangements permit them to do so. When considering handicrafts, particularly weaving, as marketable products to help free women from the burdens of poverty, we need to begin where artisans are at, not where we expect them to be. Handworks, such as tais, are crafted within a particular cultural frame for a specific use. The thinking of the weaver is vastly different to that of a producer whose textiles will be consumed in a Western market. The latter must respond to the fickle nature of Western consumers who demand diversity, originality, value for money and flawless presentation. However the inspiration of tais weavers is not bounded by the expectations of a market economy. The traditional textile, though it may be slightly longer or wider than required, is valued for its ceremonial function and the weaver for her role in cultural continuity. Accordingly, notions of design, aesthetics and quality are associated with local customs. If we are to help women increase their capacity to respond to Western demands, we must acknowledge traditional frameworks and concede that time is needed. After all, Australian design students are offered three years to ready themselves for market entry. Embracing the 'slowness' and cultural pace of communities in Timor-Leste is one of the factors that will help sustain handicrafts projects in the long-term.

**Women in business group**

Beba Sequiera identified land tenure as one of the barriers women face when wanting to start small enterprises. As land passes from father to son, women cannot use land title to secure credit from the bank. Beba spoke about the advantages of micro-credit schemes, especially those that include training and marketing initiatives. She indicated that the local market lacks...
the capacity to support small handcrafts enterprises and too
often women are disappointed when they can't sell their produce.
She also noted the difficulty this creates for many local NGOs
delivering projects for larger donors, and was certain that projects
without sustainable marketing strategies will fail. She also
emphasised the need for Australian women to respond to
assessments made by women's organisations such as Rede Feto.

**Handcrafts group**
The session focused on the fusion of cultural preservation and
economic development through handcrafts to create sustainable
livelihoods for women in Timor-Leste. We identified
communications, quality control, design, marketing and
distribution as being the major barriers, and discussed ways in
which they could be overcome. It was recognised that
collaboration, networking and cooperation between groups in
Australia and Timor-Leste are principles to underpin sustainable
approaches. The nature of solidarity purchases of handcrafts
provides a space for women to cultivate their skills while more
enduring strategies are developed. A system that decentralises
manufacture and centralises distribution and marketing emerged
as a feasible and sustainable strategy to support rural women,
improve quality and resolve the distribution problem. Beba's
participation provided a snapshot of women's situations and
informed the direction of the discussion.

**Women's interest group**
The link between poverty and social problems was one of the
major themes that emerged during the women's interest group
workshops. The East Timorese participants advised us that
increasing women's access to income will help reduce the impact
domestic violence on women in Timor-Leste. However,
economic development approaches must recognise that women
hold solutions to their own problems. Projects must not be
imposed but rather undertaken in partnership with women.
Filomena Reis discussed the need to transform mentalities
especially in relation to gender issues. Rosa de Sousa spoke about
the cross-gender approach of Fokupers that included men in their
work to stop domestic violence. She also noted that by working
with men's organisations, men take on the role of raising awareness
of women's issues in the community. Other issues discussed
included the structural difficulties that prevent women from being
closer to politics, the legal system and the importance of learning
from East Timorese women. A commitment was made to develop
a data base of organisations and to create communication strategies
aimed at sharing information amongst groups both within and
outside Timor-Leste. The conference provided a great opportunity
for collective dialogue and focused on the need to work alongside
East Timorese women and their existing organisations, in a spirit
of solidarity, cooperation and collaboration.

**Friendship group recommendations for more effective cooperation**
For more effective collaboration and cooperation it was agreed
that friendship groups should:

- link activities with the National Development plan
  and the Sector Investment Programmes and be
  aware of Timor-Leste policy development;
- be aware of, learn what other friendship groups are
doing, and collaborate with them;
- be aware that the Victoria Local Governance
  Association is an information storehouse and plays
  an active role in information dissemination and is
  accessible countrywide;
- clarify the role and function of liaison officers;
- set up a list server and a database for friendship
groups;
- provide support for volunteers who are the
  lifeblood of groups;
- share with each other our vision of the future;
- document our experience and practice — both
good and bad;
- link with other sectors;
- link collectively around specific issues;
- establish interest groups to learn from each other
  and work collectively;
- well established groups provide mentoring for new
groups;
- hold an annual conference; and
- develop protocols on accountability and
  transparency.
New Books

East Timor, Australia and regional order: intervention and its aftermath in Southeast Asia

The most comprehensive book covering the politics of East Timor from an Australian perspective, covering the early 1970s to 2002. It examines not only the role of political leaders in Australia and Indonesia but also the impact of the Timor issue on the Australian community through Jose Ramos-Horta's diplomacy (the so-called diplomatic front) and the presence of a Timorese diaspora in Australia.

The Heaviest Blow: The Catholic Church and the East Timor Issue
Patrick A. Smythe, 2004. ISBN 3-8258-7177-0 pb 234 pp Euro 29.50 Publisher: LIT-Verlag, Grevenstrasse/Fremontstrasse 2, D 48159 Munster, Germany. Phone: + 49 251 235 091, Fax: + 49 251 231 972 vertrieb@lit-verlag.de; http://www.lit-verlag.de/neu/thrologie20 In Australia a few copies are available from the Australia-East Timor Association, PO Box 93, Fitzroy 3065, Phone: (03) 9416 2960, Fax: (03) 9416 2746, aetamel@aetamelcom

A most interesting book which explores the reaction of the Catholic Church to the 24 year-long Indonesian occupation of East Timor in Indonesia, Portugal, Australia, the United States, Japan and Britain. The response of the Vatican is also observed - and the effect that it had on the Timorese Churches. The title derives from a statement by religious in 1981, when the Timorese Church was expanding, that the heaviest blow to them had been not the actions of the Indonesian military, but the reluctance of the Catholic Church in Indonesia, and even the Vatican, to give them full support. This book also gives some good insight into the role played by the church as both part of the diplomatic front and the clandestine front during the occupation.

Learning independence: education in emergency and transition in Timor-Leste since 1999

This book, which really only covers the emergency and transitional periods in Timor-Leste gives some insights into why policy-making has been so difficult in the field of education. There was a great rush to re-open schools to create a sense of 'normality', there was a dual structure with UNTAET and the CNRT maintaining separate educational structures for a much longer time than in any other Ministry and extreme difficulties with language transitions. This is a valuable book for anyone wanting to understand the extremely complex situation of education in Timor-Leste although it is already considerably out of date.


After being out of print for the last 28 years, due the inability of the author to get back to Timor until 1999, this ethnography of the Suku of Carabalau in Viqueque has now been revised and updated by David Hicks. It includes a new retrospective chapter on the fortunes of Viqueve during the years of the occupation and reconstruction and gives a good insight into the role of ritual during the Portuguese period.
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No 58 July 2002  Environmental Sustainability and Poverty Reduction: Pacific Issues
No 57 February 2002  Microfinance for Poverty Reduction
No 56 October 2001  Involving Young People in Development
No 55 July 2001  Globalisation and Poverty
No 54 March 2001  Tobacco and Development: Critical Issues for the 21st Century
No 53 October 2000  Conflict and Peacemaking in the Pacific: Social and Gender Perspectives
No 52 June 2000  HIV/AIDS: Implications for Development (out of print, electronic version on website)
No 51 March 2000  Gender and Governance
No 50 October 1999  Development: Papua New Guinean Perspectives
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Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor


A polemical book by a Deakin University researcher which argues that, far from urging the rest of the world to support a Peace Keeping Mission in East Timor, the Australian Government was propelled by public opinion into upgrading its proposed mission, which was merely for evacuating Australians following the 1999 militia violence. This short book is well argued and well documented, and situates the argument within a historical examination of Australian – Indonesian relations.

East Timor


East Timor holds a special place for Tony Wheeler, founder of Lonely Planet, one of Australia’s few internationally recognisable companies. He and his wife, Maureen, first visited it as Portuguese Timor, in 1974 and it features in their first book, Southeast Asia on a Shoestring. Apart from a brief visit to Dili in 1991, he didn’t have a chance to tour the whole country again until 2004, 30 years after his first visit, but was clearly inspired by the changes he saw. This sort of book, unfortunately, gets out of date very quickly and the linguistic discussion in it has come under criticism on the website of the Instituto Nacional de Linguística, (INL) on these grounds. Nevertheless it gives the reader much more than the average guidebook and would be a very useful reference for anyone going to Timor-Leste for any purpose.

The Timor Sea’s oil and gas: what’s fair


Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, Phone: (02) 9956 5811 http://www.socialjustice.catholic.org.au/content/publications/socialjustice_papers.html

Father Frank Brennan SJ was asked by the Bishops both in Timor-Leste and Australia to advise them on the issue of ‘What is a fair process and a fair outcome for the negotiation of maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea where Timor-Leste has competing interests and conflicting claims with Australia and Indonesia?’ This booklet is his attempt to explain some of the complexity of the history, the economics and the law so that the churches in both countries could decide their position. It is a very useful background document and guide to a complex issue.

Peace Corps East Timor Tetum language course

Catherina Williams-van Klinken, 2003, The Peace Corps, Dili, available in Timor from the Xanana Gusmao Reading Room, Rua Belarmino Lobo, Dili, Phone 3313052 and other locations, in Australia from the Australia-East Timor Association, P.O., Box 93, Fitzroy, Victoria, Phone: (03) 9416 2960, Fax: (03) 9416 2746. aetamel@aetamel.org

This is probably the most user-friendly of the currently available courses in the Tetum language, and contains a good deal of useful vocabulary. This book can be used by absolute beginners with the guidance of any Tetum speaker and also as a valuable reference-book for those who wish to expand their vocabulary. Dr Catherina Williams-Van Klinken is a respected linguist teaching at the Dili Institute of Technology.

Standard Tetum-English Dictionary: Third revised and expanded edition


The most comprehensive Tetum-English dictionary, with over 28,000 entries. It is useful for learners of the language, but also necessary for all writers of Tetum to check the new orthography of the language.

Portuguese Studies Review (Timor-Leste special)

11 (1) Fall-Winter 2003.

East Timor: a rough passage to independence

James Dunn, 2003, Longueville, Double Bay, NSW

Timor lives!: speeches of freedom and independence

Xanana Gusmao, 2005, Longueville, Double Bay, NSW

October 2005

151
### Books on Timor-Leste available from the Australia-East Timor Association

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<th>Author(s)</th>
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<td>A DIRTY LITTLE WAR</td>
<td>John Martinkus</td>
<td>Random House Australia, Sydney 2001</td>
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<td>A TRAVELLER'S DICTIONARY IN TETUN-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-TETUN</td>
<td>Cliff Morris</td>
<td>Baba Dook Books, Melbourne 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contains an introduction to Timorese culture, grammar, pronunciation, phrases for travellers and maps.</td>
<td>Pocket size paperback with durable plastic cover.</td>
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<td>A WOMAN OF INDEPENDENCE: A story of love and the birth of a new nation</td>
<td>Kinsky Sword Gusmão</td>
<td>Pan MacMillan Australia, Sydney 2003</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Colour photographs. 320 pages.</td>
<td>Paperback.</td>
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<td>BITTER DAWN: East Timor, a People's Story</td>
<td>Irena Cristalis</td>
<td>Zed Books, London 2002.</td>
<td>34.95</td>
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<td>A vivid, first-hand account of the lives of individual Timorese in their struggle for freedom.</td>
<td>306 pages. HB.</td>
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<td>BITTER FLOWERS, SWEET FLOWERS: East Timor, Indoneisa and the World Community</td>
<td>edited by Richard Tanter et al.</td>
<td>Pluto Press Australia, Sydney 2001</td>
<td>4.95</td>
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<td>COVER-UP: the inside story of the Balibo Five</td>
<td>Jill Joliffe</td>
<td>Scribe Publications, Melbourne 2001</td>
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<td>Reveals the previously hidden details of the deaths of five journalists in Balibo in 1975. 360 p. PB.</td>
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<td>DANCING WITH THE DEVIL: A personal account of policing the East Timor vote for independence</td>
<td>by David Savage. Monash Asia Institute, Melbourne 2002.</td>
<td>Foreword by Xanana Gusmão. 366p. PB</td>
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<td>DEATH IN DILI</td>
<td>Andrew McMillan, Hodder &amp; Stoughton.</td>
<td>Sydney 1992.</td>
<td>4.95</td>
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<td>A documentary account, told in a racy style. 235 pages. Paperback.</td>
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<td>DIPLOMATIC DECEITS: Government, Media and East Timor</td>
<td>Rodney Tiffen</td>
<td>University of NSW Press, Sydney 2001</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Various contributors. Bibliography, chronology. 259 pages. PB.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Revised and updated version of Timor: A People Betrayed. 399 pages. Paperback.</td>
<td>East Timor published by Lonely Planet and was written by the founder of the company. 152p. PB.</td>
<td>39.95</td>
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<td>EAST TIMOR IN TRANSITION 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra 2001. Includes documents, chronology, colour photographs. 312 p. PB.</td>
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<td>EAST TIMOR PHRASEBOOK</td>
<td>John Hajek and Alexandre Viral Tilman.</td>
<td>Lonely Planet, Melbourne 2001.</td>
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<td>Rowena Lemos</td>
<td>Pluto Press, Sydney 2000.</td>
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<td>Biography of East Timor's first Timorese Catholic 'Bishop'. 260 pages. PB.</td>
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<td>Bernardo Duarte. Aberi Design, Melbourne 2000.</td>
<td>Paperback.</td>
<td>5.00</td>
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<td>INSIDE OUT: EAST TIMOR</td>
<td>Rose Bird. Hermann Press, Melbourne 1999.</td>
<td>Colour photographs of East Timor and 45 black and white portraits of exiled Timorese. 168 pages. Paperback.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
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<td>LAND CLAIMS IN EAST TIMOR</td>
<td>Daniel Fitzpatrick. Asia Pacific Press, Australian National University, Canberra 2002. Examines the complex issue of land ownership in East Timor. 246 p. PB.</td>
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Limited quantities of some previously listed items are still available. Ask us!

October 2005
Films on Timor-Leste

There are many films and videos depicting Timor-Leste, its history and current issues. Many of the older films are available at State Film Centres, the National Library and some university collections, particularly Victoria University, Melbourne. The earliest are on 16mm film and later productions on video while the most recent are available on DVD. Several are on sale from the Australia-East Timor Association in Melbourne. The following is a chronological listing.

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1942
Damien Parer and Bill Marien
*Men of Timor*

The first known film on East Timor, filmed during Parer and Marien’s dangerous visit to Timor after the Japanese advance and the fall of Timor. See www.ww2australia.gov.au/japadvance/guerillas.html

---

1975
Boubacar Adjali, Denis Freney
*Isle of Hope: Isle of Fear*

East Timor Defense Committee, New York.

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1986
Mandy King, James Kesteven, Denis Freney
*The Shadow Over East Timor*

Updated with SBS 1991.

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1989
Gil Scrine
*Buried Alive: the Story of East Timor*

Sydney.

---

1992
Max Stahl
*In Cold Blood: the Massacre of East Timor*

Yorkshire Television, UK.

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1994
John Pilger
*Death of a Nation: the Timor Conspiracy*

76 minutes.

Elaine Briere
*Bitter Paradise: the Sell-Out of East Timor*

Canada, 56 minutes.

Max Stahl
*Sometimes I must Speak out* Strongly profile of Nobel Prize Winner Bishop Belo, UK. 52 minutes.

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1998
Anne Daly and Ronan Tynan,
*Grounding a Hawk with a Hammer*

Esperanza Productions: how four women risked life imprisonment in 1996 to disarm a Hawk Jet Fighter to stop it being used against civilians in East Timor.

---

1999
Annie Goldson, Gaylene Preston, John Gilbert
*Punitive Damage: the True Story of a death in East Timor and the power of a mother’s grief.*

Occasional Productions in association with the New Zealand Film Commission, Australian distributor Ronin Films, Canberra.

Anne Daly and Ronan Tynan,
*Dropping No. 10 for Dili*


Mark Davis and Michael Doyle
*A Licence to Kill*

Mark Davis
*East Timor on the Brink*
Australian Broadcasting Corp., Sydney.

Carmela Baranowska
*Scenes from an Occupation*
Ronin Films, Canberra.

The Road to Freedom Goes through Hell
Darwin, Available from phone: (61) 8 8981 5700.

2000
Andrew Fowler
*The Ties That Bind*
Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Cooperation, broadcast 14 February 2000.

Tom Zubrizki, Sally Browning
*The Diplomat*
Film Australia, Lindfield, NSW, Final year of the struggle with Jose Ramos-Horta.

Louise Crowe et al
*East Timor: From Colonization to Independence*
Video Education Australia, (incorporating footage from ABC), Bendigo Victoria.

Lyndall and Sophie Barry
*Viva Timor Loro Sae*
About FALINTIL’s restriction to their barracks during the attacks by the militia in 2000.

Amanda King, Fabio Cavadini
*Starting from Zero.*
Ines Almida, Lala dos Reis and Jacinto Tenoco return to East Timor after 23 years.

2001
Mark Davis
*East Timor Intelligence*

Joan Robinson
*One Day in Fatulai*
Intrepid Media, Melbourne. Dr Colette Livermore, an Australian doctor working as a volunteer in East Timor, travels to the remote village of Fatulai to conduct a medical clinic.

Tim Costello et al.
*Rising from the Ashes*
Opportunity Internazional, Sydney.

2002
Bernadette Connole and David Bradbury
*Oecussi boy*
SBS Dateline, broadcast 15 May 2002.

Mark Davis
*East Timor: New Future, Hidden Past*
Broadcast SBS Television, May 2002.

2003
Simon Garner
*With a Little Help from My Friends: East Timor - Case Studies in International Aid*
Video Education Australia, Bendigo, Victoria.

2004
Morag Ramsay, Jonathan Holmes
*Rich Man Poor Man*
Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, broadcast 10 May 2004.

Sahe Media
Film on demonstrations against Australian Timor Sea policy.

2005
Luke Gosling
*Call of Duty*
Reminiscences of the soldiers of the 2/2 Commandos in East Timor superimposed with scenes of the daily life of Australian Peacekeepers in 2000.
Organisations and contacts in Timor-Leste

GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

Prime Minister and Cabinet of Timor-Leste
http://www.pm.gov.tl

Ministers and government agencies
http://www.gov.east-timor.org/

Parliament of Timor-Leste
http://www.parliament.east-timor.org/
Available in three languages. A great deal of information about the members, parties, commissions and legislation can be gained from this website.

Autoridade Bancaria e de Pagamentos (Banking & Payments Authority)
http://www.bancocentral.tl/
Available in three languages. Several useful publications on the economy can be downloaded from this website.

Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)
http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/
PO Box 144, Correio Central, Dili, East Timor. Housed in the old prison, Comarca Balide, Dalan Balide, Dili. Phone: 390-311263 Email: info@cavr-timorleste.org

An independent statutory authority which inquired into human rights violations between April 1974 and October 1999 and carried out a large number of hearings and local reconciliation discussions. Its final report will be published late 2005. The website contains all earlier reports and much other resource material.

National Directorate of Statistics
http://ane.mapf.gov.tl/
This website includes provisional results of 2004 National Census.

The Office of the Inspector General
http://www.inspecaogeral.gov.tl
Deals with complaints about corruption.

ILO in Timor-Leste (with Ministry of Labor and Solidarity)

Tourism website in English and Portuguese
http://www.turismotimorleste.com/

Timor Sea Office
http://www.timorseaoffice.gov.tl/
A great deal of background information on the conflict with Australia over the rights to oil and gas fields can be found here.

Ministry of Transport, Communications and Public Works
http://www.mtcp.gov.tl/
Provides basic information about the department.
http://www.nic.tp/
A specialised website on Timor-Leste’s ICT domain names.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation
http://www.mfac.gov.tl/
Includes contact information for Timor Leste’s Embassies.

MEDIA

RTTL – Radio-Televisão Timor Leste
http://www.rt.tl
Phone 332-1827.

Internews Timor-Leste
http://www.internews.tpl
Includes a section on advice for visitors to Timor-Leste.

Community Radio Stations around Timor-Leste
Radio Tokodehe (Liquica), Radio Comunidade Maliana (Maliana), Radio Comunidade Los Palos (Los Palos), Radio Lian Matebian (Baucau), Radio Lii-ual (Manatuto), Radio Café (Ermera), Radio Cova Taroman (Suai), Radio Rai Husar (Aileu), Radio Lian Tatamailau (Ainaro), Radio Boaventura 1912 (Same), Radio Atoni Lifau (Oecusse), Radio Viqueque (Viqueque), Radio Rakambia (Dili), Radio Timor Kmanek (Dili), Radio Falintil (Dili), Radio Lorico Lian (Dili-not broadcasting), Radio La Luna (Dili – not broadcasting).

Suara Timor LoroSa’e
http://www.suaratimorlorosae.com/
One of Timor’s two daily newspapers which provides useful topical information about events in Timor-Leste.

Timor-Leste Sun
http://www.timorlestesun.com/index.htm
Dili Trade Centre - Travesa De Lecidere #1 Bideu Lecidere,
Phone: (+670) 332 4032 - Fax: (+670) 332 4032 Email: info@easttimorsun.com
Weekly newspaper in English, Indonesian and Portuguese.
NON GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

HASATIL (Sustainable Development Network)
Email: hasatil_tl@yahoo.com
Founder and Director: Eugenio Lemos (Ego). An umbrella organisation for a number of small NGOs involved in sustainable agriculture. Organises a sustainable development expo every year on World Food Day (October) and run seminars on organic and sustainable agriculture.

Judicial System Monitoring Project
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/about.htm
Email: info@jsmp.minihub.org
Since its establishment in early 2001 in Dili, JSMP has researched, analysed and reported on court monitoring, the development of the judicial system, aimed to contribute to the ongoing evaluation and building of the justice system in East Timor.

Forum Organização Não-Governamental de Timor-Leste
http://www.geocities.com/etngoforum/
The Forum of NGOs of Timor-Leste is the umbrella organisation for NGOs and civil society in Timor-Leste. Their website includes databases of national and international NGOs in Timor-Leste.

HAK Association (Human Rights NGO)
Email: direito@yayasanhak.minihub.org
The first secular human rights organisation established in East Timor. It has a long history of involvement in human rights.

La'o Hamutuk
http://www.laohamutuk.org/
PO. Box 88, Dili, East Timor.
Office landline +670-3325013,
Fax +670-3317294.Email: laohamutuk@easttimor.minihub.org
La’o Hamutuk (Walking Together) monitors, analyses, and reports on the principal international institutions present in Timor Lorosae as they relate to the physical, economic, and social reconstruction and development of the country. Back copies of all its Bulletins, in several languages, can be found on the website.

East Timor Development Agency
Email: etda@etda.minihub.org
Rua Merkadu, Taibesi, Dili, Timor Leste.
Runs training courses in languages and computing skills and office administration.

Oxfam Australia

Oxfam Great Britain
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/where_we_work/east_timor/

EDUCATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Xanana Gusmão Reading Room
Rua Belarmino Lobo, Dili, Phone: 3313052.
A small library, bookshop and cybercafe, which also has a good collection of videos on Timor-Leste which can be watched on the premises. Contains a good many of the gifts, photos and other memorabilia presented to Xanana Gusmão during the struggle for independence and some archives.

Alola Foundation
http://www.alolafoundation.org/
Established by Timor’s First Lady Kirsty Sword-Gusmao to assist women and children, contains a very good library-resource centre of materials on women and development, also houses the National Breastfeeding Association of East Timor.

Centro Audio-Visual Max Stahl Timor Leste
http://www.shoalhaven.net.au/~mwsmith/aatms.html
Memorial Hall, Dili.
An archive of films significant in Timor’s history, curated by Max Stahl, who took the video of the Dili massacre in 1991, which proved to be a turning point in Timor’s history.

Dai Popular (Popular Educators Network)
Email: naralikare@hotmail.com
Director: Nuno Rodrigues.
An NGO network of Timorese NGOs interested in rural adult education, popular education and literacy.

Instituto Catolico de Formacao de Professores – Catholic Teachers’ College
Email: markpaul@maristmelb.org.au
PO. Box 249, Correios Central, Dili (actually in Baucau). Contact: Brother Mark Paul.

Instituto Nacional de Linguistica
http://www.shlrc.mq.edu.au/~eccles/
An Institute at the National University working on standardizing the spelling of Tetum; developing a written form for the other 15 Timorese languages; and publishing dictionaries, grammars and phrase books. Located on the Liceu Campus of the National University, Avenida Cidade de Lisboa. Visiting researchers in the field of linguistics.
are required to apply for research permits. This information is on the website.

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**Asosiasaun Biblioteka no Informasaun (ABITL)**

Email: infoabitl2004@yahoo.com

ABITL is the Timor-Leste Library and Information Association. The main contact is: Jose Caetano Guterres, Board Member ABITL.

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**Centro National de Investigacao Cientifica (SNIC) National Research Centre**

Email: faustino_cardoso@yahoo.com.au

Director: Dr Faustino Cardoso Gomes.

The Centre provides a venue for academics from the National University and other universities to conduct research of benefit to the development of the country. Visiting academics are also welcome to visit this Centre to share their own research findings and help create research and training opportunities for the Timorese academics.

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**Arte Moris (Living Art)**

E-mail: admin@artemoris.minihub.org

http://www.artemoris.minihub.org/

P.O. Box 166, Correios Central, Dili.

Fine Arts school, cultural centre and artists association, founded by Swiss artists Luca and Gabriela Ganser. The patron is Jose Ramos Horta.

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**Dili Institute of Technology**

Email: director@dit.east-timor.net

P.O. Box 293, Correios Central, Dili.

DIT provides certificate, diploma and degree courses in natural resource management, public administration, hospitality and tourism.

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**RDTL ICT**


Provides information on the use of information technology in education.
Australian organisations working with Timor-Leste partners

**Australia-East Timor Association (Victoria)**
aetamel@aetameL.org
PO Box 93, Fitzroy 3065, Phone: (03) 9416 2960, Fax: (03) 9416 2746, John Sinnott, Secretary.

Founded on the day of the Indonesian invasion by David Scott and others who had recently returned from East Timor. Now has branches in Ballarat, Geelong. Its bookshop is a valuable resource for printed materials, videos, CD-ROMs, DVDs, music CDs on and from Timor-Leste.

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**Australia-East Timor Association (NSW)**
jefferson.lee@bigpond.com, brendanfish@bigpond.com
PO Box 703, Leichhardt, NSW 2040, Phone: (02) 9331 5986 or 9519 4788.

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**Melbourne East Timor Activities Centre (METAC)**
Metac75@hotmail.com
19-21 Belgium Ave, Richmond.

A neighbourhood house run by Timorese residents in Melbourne. Their regular dinners on the first Friday of each month are a major networking event for the many people in Melbourne who have just returned from or are just about to go to Timor-Leste for whatever purpose. Contact Bernardo Duarte.

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**YWCA East Timor Working Group**
Joan Meredith, cl- Hotel Y, 489 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne 3000, Phone: (03) 9326 9622, Fax: (03) 9328 2931.

Mobilizing community support within Australia for the Timorese women's organization Fokupers, which works on issues of violence against women.

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**Australian organisations working with Timor-Leste partners**

**Australia-East Timor Friendship Association (SA)**
c/- Global Education Centre, 1st Floor Torrens Building, 220 Victoria Square, Adelaide SA 5000, Phone: (08) 8295 6481 or (08) 8344 3511.

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**International Federation for East Timor**
http://lean.org/lifet/
Federation of all the major groups which internationally were working for a free East Timor during the occupation – they continue to do advocacy work on behalf of Timor when required. Work closely with La'o Hamutuk, and several other Timorese NGOs based in Dili.

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**East Timor Sunrise**
6 Quandong Crescent, Nightcliff, NT 0810, Fax: 8948 2648. Email: biggmob@bigpond.com

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**Backdoor, Newsletter on Timor Loro Sae**
PO Box 5005, Lyneham ACT 2602,
A useful newsletter and website, in Tetum, Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesia.

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**East Timor Women Australia**
tinorswomen@optusnet.com.au
http://www.timorswomen.org/

A group in Melbourne working closely with a co-operative of weavers in the Taibesse veterans compound in Dili and networking with other women's groups in Timor-Leste.

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**The Kangaroo Valley – Remexio Partnership**
http://www.shoal.net.au/-easttimor/
One of the original locality to locality partnerships between Australians and Timorese.

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**Tekee Media Inc.**
http://www.shoalhaven.net.au/~mws/ timcmrproj.html
c/o Ros Dunlop, 17 Callan St., Rozelle, NSW 2039. Phone: (02) 9810 2253, Mob: 0418 802 757. Email: rdunlop@greenway.uwyd.edu.au

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**International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)**
http://www.idea.int/news/timor-leste.cf
International IDEA, Strömsborg, SE-103 34 Stockholm, Sweden, Phone: +46 8 698 37 00, Fax: +46 8 20 24 22. E-mail: info@idea.int

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**Friends of the UNTL Library**

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**Friendship Schools Project of the Alola Foundation**

Aims to bring together schools in Timor-Leste and Australia in a mutual communication for friendship and understanding, also works on curriculum for Australian schools about East Timor. Lee Norris, co-ordinator
lnorris@aeuvic.asn.au
Friends of Samé – Boroondara Victoria
http://friendsofame.org/index.php
One of the most active of the Friendship Cities operating from the Melbourne area, this useful website contains a list of Victorian Friendship Councils and Community Groups and their contact details.

Bega Valley Advocates for Timor-Leste
Work closely with the Ministry of Agriculture on rehabilitating the Narabora Agricultural College.

Centre for International Health
http://www.burneiinternationalhealth.edu.au/Macfarlane Burnet Institute for Medical Research & Public Health, GPO Box 2284, Melbourne 3001, Phone: (03) 9282 2115.
Working with Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Health on HIV-AIDS, prevention of malaria and other community-based health issues. Go to their website, search for many valuable documents from the Timor-Leste Ministry of Health in English.

Alternative Technology Association – International Projects Group
http://www.suburbia.com.au/~atal/ Email: ata@atal.org.au
PO Box 2919, Fitzroy, VIC 3065. Phone: (03) 9419 2440.
Works closely with friendship city groups bringing solar cookers, pumps and electricity and other useful technology to remote areas of Timor-Leste.

Mary MacKillop Institute of East Timorese Studies
20 Mamre Road, PO Box 299, St Marys, NSW 1790. Phone: (02) 9623-2847, Fax: (02) 9623-1573 Email: mmiet@nareg.com.au
Works at the request of the Bishop of Dili to produce reading materials for the Catholic schools in Tetum and other languages of Timor-Leste.

Victorian Local Governance Association – East Timor Working Group
60 Leicester St, Carlton, Melbourne, VIC 3053. Email: bmillane@vicnet.net.au
This group coordinates all the friendship city groups in Victoria and develop policies on material aid and coffee trade.

Sebastião Aparicio da Silva Project
http://www.shire.mq.edu.au/~leccles/ pub.html, PO Box 68, Winston Hills, NSW 2153. Fax: (+ 61) 2 9614 7942. Email: sa.dasilho@optusnet.com.au
Works closely with the Timor-Leste’s Instituto Nacional de Lingufstica (INL), (National Institute of Linguistics), in Dili assisting with production of linguistic resources in Tetum and Timor’s indigenous languages and promoting them within Australia. Books and journals can be ordered from the website.

Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)
http://www.acfid.asn.au/campaigns/ easttimor.htm . 14 Napier Clow, Private Bag 3, Deakin, ACT 2600. Phone: (02) 6285 1816, Fax: (02) 6285 1720, East Timor working group: (02) 6281 9217.
Peak Council of the voluntary overseas aid organisations in Australia, as ACFOA for many years it advocated on behalf of the human rights of the people of East Timor. It now has a working group on Timor-Leste made up of all its member organisations with projects in Timor-Leste.

APHEDA (Timor web pages)

Australian Conservation Foundation
http://www.acfonline.org.au
Floor 1, 60 Leicester Street, Carlton, VIC 3053. Lee Tan, Coordinator, Asia-Pacific Unit. Phone: 61 (3) 9345 1135 Fax: 61 (3) 9345 1166
The most detailed reporting on Timor from media all over the world on any date is available from this site.

Kiwanis Club, Timor-Leste Dairy Project
http://www.timordairy.com/home.htm
Kiwanis runs the Timor-Leste Dairy Project.

Connect East Timor
http://www.connecteasttimor.com/
Chairman: Peter de Haas, Brisbane, Qld Phone: (07) 4097 6605, Email: connectET@bigpond.com.au
A group of communications professionals in Queensland working, together with the Ministry of Communications to connect rural and remote areas of Timor-Leste to basic (radio-telephone) communications services.

Timor Sea Justice Campaign
http://www.timorseajustice.org
Tom Clarke, Co-ordinator. Phone: (04) 22 545 763.
The website contains some detailed maps, legal documents and background material on the overlapping claims of Australia and Timor-Leste in the Timor Sea.
An informal group of Victoria University staff, students, graduates, council members and associates, who have collaborated with Timorese students and academics in a number of ways, in particular at the Dili Institute of Technology and the National University of Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste is also part of the work of the University's Institute for Community Engagement and Policy Alternatives, ICEPA, which continues to host the webspace for useful documents from Timor-Leste.

A full list of Friendship City organisations is available at http://www.devnet.anu.edu.au/bulletin
Author Guidelines

Manuscripts and Copyright

Manuscripts are normally accepted on the understanding that they are unpublished and not on offer to another publication. Once published by the Development Studies Network (the Network), however, manuscripts, articles and reports may subsequently be published elsewhere. Acknowledgement of the Network as the source would be appreciated. No acknowledgement is needed for conference reports, other notices or lists of publications.

The Network cannot assume responsibility for any loss of or damage to manuscripts. Contributors are therefore encouraged to retain a complete copy of their work.

Word length

Submitted papers are to be short and concise, with a minimum of 1000–1500 words and a maximum of 2,500–3,000 words. The word limit includes subheadings and footnotes and excludes references. Conference reports: 800–1000 words.

Presentation and Style

Manuscripts should be double spaced with at least 2.5cm (1") margins. Subheadings, footnotes and references need to be clearly indicated in the text. Quotation marks should be single, double within single. Spelling is English (OED with ‘-ise’ endings).

Documents can be sent as email attachments, on disk or in hard copy. Documents sent electronically should be saved as Microsoft Word files, or in .rtf format. Email attachments are preferred in Word or .rtf format. A virus check is requested prior to any material being electronically sent. No .pdf files please as these cannot be edited or corrected prior to printing.

Referencing

A minimum of references and/or footnotes is requested due to space constraints. All references referred to or cited in the text are to be included in the reference list. Book titles and journal names should be italicised or underlined; titles of journal articles and book chapters are in single inverted commas.

The Harvard style of referencing is preferred: author’s surname, forename and/or initials, date of publication, title of publication, publisher and place of publication. Journal references should include volume and issue number, date and page numbers.

Detailed guidelines on the Harvard style of referencing are available online at: http://www.uwe.ac.uk/library/resources/general/info_study_skills/harvard2.htm#book

Examples:


