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Australia-Japan Stocktake Report 2020

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Executive Summary

Australia and Japan have a deep, broad and close relationship that is anchored in strong complementarity in economic relations, rich people-to-people connections, and diplomatic and security cooperation characterised by a shared commitment to stability, peace and inclusive regional order building.

This report takes stock of the bilateral relationship as it was in 2020 and acts as a snapshot of the economic, people-to-people and political-security relationship as the world headed into the COVID-19 pandemic. It does not aim to comprehend all the dimensions of the relationship but aims to highlight the main trends, features and provide data and links for researchers, officials and those who have responsibility for and an interest in the relationship.

The Australia-Japan economic relationship was built on the base of some key agreements. The 1957 Commerce Agreement normalised Australia's trade relations with Japan after World War II, its revision in 1963 and the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between (known as the NARA Treaty) which extended non-discriminatory treatment to investment and people movement were the foundations of the relationship. More recently the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in 2014, and the various regional trade agreements and initiatives that Australia and Japan have been instrumental in concluding, have brought the two economies closer together.

Complementarity drives the Australia-Japan economic partnership.

Japan relies on imports for over 90 per cent of its energy needs and Australia is its most important and stable supplier. Australia supplies more than half of Japan's coal imports and more than a third of Japan's LNG imports. Australia is also Japan's major supplier of strategic raw materials including iron ore, bauxite, alumina, aluminium, and nickel. In 2020 Japan was Australia's second largest two-way trade partner accounting for almost 10 per cent of Australia's goods and services trade, while Australia was Japan's fifth largest two-way trade partner accounting for over 4 per cent of Japan's goods exports and imports.

Japan is the fourth largest source of foreign investment in Australia with a stock of AU\$241.1 billion dollars as of 2019, comprising 6.3 per cent of foreign investment in Australia, and over half this is concentrated in mining.

The Australia-Japan relationship is anchored in its deep people-to-people links.

Australia has more sister-city and sister-state relationships with Japan than any other country with 107 such arrangements, while Australia ranks fourth in Japan (after the United States, China and South Korea) despite its relatively smaller population. The two countries also have 553 sister-school relationships at the high school level making Australia the most popular partner country in Japan for these arrangements. Japanese is the most widely taught foreign language in Australia with over 405,000 students across the primary to tertiary levels. This ranks Australia fourth globally (behind

China, Indonesia and South Korea) and first on a per capita basis. Australia and Japan concluded a reciprocal working holiday agreement that commenced in 1980 which was Japan's first such agreement and Australia's first with a non-Western and non-English speaking country. Since that time Australia has firmly established itself as the most popular destination for Japanese working holiday makers. Tourism between the two countries has also boomed in recent years with over 620,000 Australians visiting Japan and 450,000 Japanese visiting Australia in 2019.

Shared commitment to regional order building.

Australia-Japan diplomatic and security cooperation has been characterised by a shared commitment to inclusive regional order building. This includes joint cooperation and leadership in the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. More recently, Australia and Japan were close partners in the negotiation of the CPTPP and RCEP. Australia and Japan have also spearheaded cooperation in areas of diplomacy such as the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, maritime capacity building cooperation in Southeast Asia, and a range of non-traditional security issues.

Security partnership.

Australia and Japan have come to be each other's second most important security partner after their respective alliances with the United States. Deepening Australia-Japan security cooperation has been institutionalized through the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, the establishment of a Special Strategic Partnership in 2014, and it is expected that a Reciprocal Access Agreement will soon be concluded. Dialogue has also been held regularly at the highest levels of government. Since 1957, Australian prime ministers have made 26 visits to Japan while Japanese prime ministers have made 11 visits to Australia. In 2007, Australia and Japan inaugurated the 2+2 foreign and defence ministers meeting which has been held eight times.

There are a number of blind spots and gaps in the relationship and areas that are under potential, including the failed submarine bid and the whaling issue, that are highlighted in the report that follows.

The report was possible with the generous support of the Australia-Japan Foundation and the hope is that some of the data that has been brought together in it will help inform further work on the development of this important bilateral relationship.

Shiro Armstrong

Director

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The Australian National University

Australia-Japan Stocktake Report 2020

Benjamin J. Ascione

The Australia-Japan Research Centre (AJRC) is the centre of research, teaching and outreach on the Japanese economy in Australia. Established in 1980 with support from the governments and business communities in both Australia and Japan, our research encompasses trade, finance, macroeconomics, as well as international economic relations.

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1. Introduction

The Australia–Japan relationship is one of growing importance in regional and global affairs. Australia and Japan have developed a closeness of cooperation that not only benefits both countries but also promotes regional stability. As well as being advanced economies and key allies of the United States, Australia and Japan have forged extensive people-to-people, economic, and security and diplomatic cooperation based on a shared commitment to free trade and inclusive regional institution and order building. However, with future uncertainty afflicting the Asia Pacific region across issues from the US–China rivalry, climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, bolstering cooperation is more important than ever.

This report provides a snapshot of the health of the Australia–Japan relationship by providing key data on three of its key pillars: economic relations, people-to-people relations, and security and diplomatic cooperation. Bringing this data together in one place, the report seeks to provide a foundation for the future of research and the planning of future cooperation. It makes available a set of benchmarks against which the health of the Australia–Japan relationship can be measured. At the same time, it is hoped the report can provide a starting point for the analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the relationship.

The report is divided into seven self-contained chapters. The present chapter introduces the content, scope and aims of the report. The second chapter provides a brief sketch of the historical background of the Australia–Japan relationship up until the end of the Second World War. This includes the role of the White Australia policy and wartime internment on diminishing relations.

Chapter three analyses Australia–Japan trade and investment and the significance of foundational bilateral economic agreements. Complementarity is highlighted as a key feature of the economic partnership, with Australian natural resource exports playing a critical role in helping to power the Japanese economy and with Japanese investment playing a significant role in driving Australia’s mining sector. At the same time, capitalising on economic complementarity required political commitment, which was built through the 1957 Commerce Agreement and the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The fourth chapter analyses the deep people-to-people relations Australia and Japan have cultivated over the decades, which help to provide a foundation for meaningful cooperation and engagement. This includes the state of sister city relationships, educational cooperation, tourism and working holidays between the two countries. The two countries have established an excellent record of achievement in building engagement and cross-cultural understanding across these dimensions. However, there is no room for complacency. Continued support is needed to rebuild in areas where there have been setbacks in order to maintain people-to-people relations as a pillar of strength into the future. This is especially important given the setback to international people flows the COVID-19 pandemic caused.

The fifth chapter gives a brief sketch of the whaling issue. Significant cultural differences and domestic political forces shape both countries' approach to and understanding of the issue, meaning there is little prospect for a resolution based on shared understandings. However, as the biggest blind spot in the relationship, it is important that Australia and Japan continue to manage the issue carefully so as to prevent the disagreement from spilling over into other areas of cooperation. Understanding the cultural assumptions and domestic political barriers on both sides is critical to avoid inflaming nationalist responses that further entrench confrontational posturing.

Chapter six looks at Australia–Japan diplomatic and security cooperation. This includes the deepening institutionalisation of bilateral security cooperation, with Australia and Japan having become each other's most important security partner in the Asia Pacific after their respective alliances with the United States. This is despite Australia's decision to award France rather than Japan the contract to provide it with 12 new submarines, which left Tokyo disappointed. This choice highlighted the importance of proper processes which can help to avoid unnecessary disappointments or misunderstandings. At the same time, Australia and Japan's security cooperation has been further deepened through mutual participation in trilateral and quadrilateral arrangements with the United States and India. Diplomatically, the shared commitment of the two countries to inclusive regional order building has seen them lead regional institutional building efforts, such as APEC, as well as cooperating with ASEAN nations in the building of ASEAN-led institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+6, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus.

Lastly, the seventh chapter provides a bibliography of resources on Australia–Japan relations for further reading. This spans resources covering the history of the relationship across the three pillars of people-to-people, economic, and security and diplomatic cooperation. This report provides a snapshot of the health of the Australia–Japan relationship. It is hoped this bibliography will be a useful resource for future research.

2. Historical background

The first record of contact between Australia and Japan is from 1830 after the brig *Cyprus* was hijacked by convict mutineers off Tasmania and sailed to China via Japan. After anchoring in waters off the coast of Shikoku in modern-day Tokushima prefecture near the town of Mugi, the *Cyprus* was chased away by cannon, in line with Japan's isolationist policy at the time.¹

As the Tokugawa Shogunate started to lose power and Japan began its Meiji Restoration in 1868, contact between Australia and Japan gradually started to open up. The first Japanese to enter Australia were an acrobatic troupe, The Great Dragon Troupe, who performed at Melbourne's Princess Theatre in 1867.² A later troupe then gave Australia its first Japanese settler, Rikinosuke Sakuragawa, who married a local woman in Melbourne in 1875.³

A small number of Japanese migrants—mostly contract labourers and small merchants—started moving to Australia working in the sugar cane, sea-cucumber and pearl diving industries, especially in Broome, Darwin and Thursday Island.⁴ When the Immigration Restriction Act (White Australia Policy) was passed in 1901 there were about 3500 Japanese in Australia. The new law had the effect of freezing the number of Japanese arrivals.⁵ However, due to a lack of skilled divers the pearl industry was able to gain an exemption.

Pre-Second World War trade between Australia and Japan grew rapidly in the 1920s and early 1930s with Japan exporting a range of goods, such as textiles, wood and wicker, chinaware, and glassware, while Australian exports were dominated by wool, flour and wheat. By 1931, Japan had become Australia's third biggest trading partner.⁶ And by the mid-1930s, Japan ranked as Australia's second biggest export market after Great Britain.⁷ Yet Australia–Japan trade subsequently suffered under Australia's protectionist trade policy, its discriminatory preferences for trade with Britain, and a bitter

¹ Joshua Robertson, 'Australian Convict Pirates in Japan: Evidence of 1830 Voyage Unearthed', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2017, <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/may/28/australian-convict-pirates-in-japan-evidence-of-1830-voyage-unearthed>.

² David Sissons, *Bridging Australia And Japan: Volume 1*, ed. Arthur Stockwin and Keiko Tamura (Canberra: ANU Press, 2016), 50, <https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/asian-studies/bridging-australia-and-japan-volume-1>.

³ Steve Dawson, 'The First Recorded Japanese in Australia: Steve Dawson's Family Story', *Nikkei Australia* (blog), 29 August 2020, <https://www.nikkeiaustralia.com/the-first-recorded-japanese-in-australia-steve-dawsons-family-story/>.

⁴ Sissons, *Bridging Australia And Japan: Volume 1*, 97–117; Yuriko Nagata, 'The Japanese in Torres Strait', in *Navigating Boundaries: The Asian Diaspora in Torres Strait*, ed. Anna Shnukal, Guy Malcolm Ramsay, and Yuriko Nagata (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017), 139–60; Japan Club of Australia, *Japanese in Australia – Japanese Footprints over a Century* (Nikkei Australia, 1998), 30, <https://tinyurl.com/y58txsek>.

⁵ Yuriko Nagata, 'Japanese Internment in Australia during World War II' (PhD Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1993), 23, <https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/handle/2440/21427>.


⁶ DFAT Economic Analytical Unit, 'Shaping Forces: Complementarity and Distance', in *Australia and Japan: A Remarkable Commercial Relationship* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008), <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/australia-japan-commercial-relationship/Pages/chapter-2-shaping-forces-complementarity-and-distance>.

⁷ Chow Misuzu Hanihara, *The Study of Japan in Australia: A Unique Development over Eighty Years* (International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2003), 48, <http://doi.org/10.15055/00003839>.

dispute in 1936 whereby Australia effectively banned the export of iron ore to Japan. Trade then ceased entirely for a time after the outbreak of the Second World War.⁸

During the Second World War, the lives of Australia's Japanese community came to an abrupt halt. The Australian government interned over 4000 Japanese as prisoners of war (POW). This included over 1100 local civilians—almost all registered as Japanese 'aliens' in the country—as well as over 3100 Japanese soldiers who had been captured overseas.⁹ Among the POWs were a group of more than 1000 Japanese soldiers who attempted to escape in August 1944 during the Cowra breakout, which resulted in the deaths of four Australian soldiers and over 200 Japanese prisoners.¹⁰ After the end of the war, almost all of the Japanese POWs, both civilians and soldiers, were repatriated to Japan.

First contacts between Australia and Japan



⁸ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia and Japan—A Trading Tradition', in *Japan's Economy: Implications for Australia* (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), <https://tinyurl.com/y3rkrpzvc>.

⁹ Nagata, 'Japanese Internment in Australia during World War II', 2.

¹⁰ Keiko Tamura, 'カウラ脱走と日豪間の記憶 [The Cowra Breakout and Its Memories in Japan and Australia]', *オーストラリア研究* 19, no. 17 (2006): 33–37.

3. Australia–Japan economic relations

3.1 Foundational Economic Agreements

When Australia and Japan concluded the 1957 Commerce Agreement just 12 years after the end of the Second World War, memories of the conflict were still fresh and anti-Japan prejudices still ran deep in Australia. However, the deal had a significant economic and psychological impact. The Commerce Agreement was a watershed moment as Australia became the first country to normalise its trade relations with Japan after the Second World War through the provision of equal tariff treatment on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis. In the words of T.W. Eckersley, the former Acting Japanese Secretary for the Australian Legation in Tokyo, the agreement carried ‘political and psychological significance not measurable ... in terms of money. The removal of discrimination is the removal of a thorn which has troubled the Japanese almost since the time when they first came into contact with the West’.¹¹

The timing was fortuitous as the Commerce Agreement served to undergird Australia’s role as a stable supplier of goods to Japan, particularly in energy and strategic raw materials. As Japan sought to recover from the devastation of the war, trade with Australia contributed to its rapid economic growth. The agreement also opened up for Australia a key market in Asia at a time when the United Kingdom was shifting its focus away from trade through Commonwealth auspices and towards Europe, as momentum built for the establishment of the European Economic Community. By 1967, Japan overtook West Germany to become the second largest economy in the free world.

In 1976, Australia and Japan concluded the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan (known as the NARA Treaty). This was another important foundational document that carried both economic and psychological impacts. The NARA Treaty extended MFN ‘non-discriminatory treatment beyond trade to all commercial dealings between Australia and Japan’ and helped bring about increased investment and people flows between the two countries.¹² Further, as the first such friendship and cooperation treaty signed by Australia with another country, it came to symbolise that ‘memories of Japanese conduct during the Second World War had finally and officially been put to rest’.¹³

Building on these foundational agreements, the two countries concluded the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAPEA) in 2014. JAPEA was lauded the first Japanese trade agreement ‘with any significant commitment to liberalization of agriculture, even though

¹¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Memorandum From Eckersley To Department Of External Affairs’, 10 July 1957, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-19/225-memorandum-from-eckersley-to-department-of-external-affairs>.

¹² Peter Drysdale, ‘Did the NARA Treaty Make a Difference?’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 4 (2006): 490, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710601006994>.

¹³ Takashi Terada, ‘Thirty Years of the Australia–Japan Partnership in Asian Regionalism: Evolution and Future Directions’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 4 (2006): 537, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710601007026>.

liberalization was limited'.¹⁴ The deal saw Japan agree 'to small, quantitative increases in imports by means of staged reductions in tariffs over one to two decades' on beef, processed cheese, high polarity sugars and pork but avoid any liberalisation on other sensitive products such as rice, sugars, wheat, butter and fresh cheese.¹⁵ Australia lowered its tariffs on Japanese electronics, whitegoods and cars.

While this was the first time Japan made concessions on agriculture with 'a major economy with a strong agricultural sector', they were relatively small compared to Australia's trade agreements with South Korea and China, also signed the same year.¹⁶ For instance, tariffs on Australian beef imports to Japan are being incrementally lowered from 38.5 per cent in 2014 to 19.5 per cent by April 2031.¹⁷ By contrast, China and South Korea will incrementally lower tariffs on Australian beef imports to zero by 2024 and 2028 respectively.¹⁸ Given the complications surrounding Japan's agricultural politics, further liberalisation of its so-called sacred products can be expected to be slow despite the structural pressures for reform from globalisation.¹⁹

3.2 Trade

From the abovementioned foundations, trade grew and continues to be a key pillar of the Australia–Japan relationship. In 1967, Japan overtook the United Kingdom as Australia's largest export market, a position it held until 2009 when it was overtaken by China.²⁰ In 2019, Japan was Australia's second biggest trading partner behind China (see Table 2). For Japan, Australia was its fifth largest trading partner behind China, the United States, South Korea and Taiwan (see Table 1). The trade relationship has continued to witness significant growth over the last three decades. Total two-way trade in goods and services between Australia and Japan expanded from AU\$19.4 billion in 1987 to AU\$87 billion in 2019. Despite this growth, as Australia diversified its trade relationships, Japan's share of goods and services trade with Australia decreased from 19.76 per cent in 1987 to 9.48 per cent in 2019 (see Table 2). At the same time, Australia's share of trade in goods with Japan increased from 3.06 per cent in 2004 to 4.2 per cent in 2019 (see Table 1).

As might be expected, the Australia–Japan trade relationship tilts towards Australian exports with a deficit of over AU\$34 billion in 2019 (see Figure 1). Australian goods and services exports to Japan rose from AU\$10.8 billion in 1987 to AU\$60.6 billion in 2019. During this period, Japan's share of Australian goods and services exports fell from 22.69 per cent to 12.31 per cent. Yet Japan still ranks as Australia's

¹⁴ Shiro Armstrong, 'Economic Diplomacy and Economic Security under Abe', *Asian Economic Policy Review*, 2021, 3, <https://doi.org/10.1111/aep.12335>.

¹⁵ Aurelia George Mulgan, 'Japan and Australia "Beef up" Relations', East Asia Forum, 15 April 2014, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/15/japan-and-australia-beef-up-relations/>.

¹⁶ ABC News, 'Abbott Hails Free Trade Deal with Japan', 7 April 2014, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-07/australia-japan-free-trade-deal/5372242>.

¹⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'JA EPA Fact Sheet: Agriculture and Processed Food', August 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/8733smkz>.


¹⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'KAFTA and Trade in Goods', August 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/f25tmcwx>; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'ChAFTA Fact Sheet: Agriculture and Processed Food', August 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/55n2yy5h>.

¹⁹ Aurelia George Mulgan and Masayoshi Honma, eds., *The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy*, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 94, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137414564>.

²⁰ DFAT Economic Analytical Unit, 'Shaping Forces: Complementarity and Distance'.


second largest export destination behind only China (see Table 2). Australia ranked as Japan’s third largest source of goods imports behind China and the United States (see Table 1).

Figure 1: Australia–Japan Trade in Good and Services (country totals) 1987–2019 (AU\$ billions)



Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Time Series Data, Australia’s direction of goods and services trade – calendar years from 1987 to present; see also Australian Bureau of Statistics, catalogue number 5368.0.

Figure 2: Australia–Japan Trade in Goods and Services (Differentiated) 1987–2019 (AU\$ billions)



Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Time Series Data, Australia’s direction of goods and services trade – calendar years from 1987 to present; see also Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, catalogue number 5368.0.

While observing the trade deficit, it should be noted that Japan has offshored the production of many of its goods to other Asian countries, such as China and Southeast Asian nations. In other words, “Made in Japan” has increasingly become “made by Japan elsewhere”.²¹ Between 1990 and 2007, the share of

²¹ DFAT Economic Analytical Unit, ‘A Remarkable Relationship’, in *Australia and Japan: A Remarkable Commercial Relationship* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008), <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/australia-japan-commercial-relationship/Pages/chapter-1-a-remarkable-relationship>.

Japanese electronics manufacturing output produced offshore rose from 11.4 per cent to 45.5 per cent.²² Japanese electronic brands that continue to be popular in Australia—such as Toyota, Honda, Sanyo, Sharp, Sony, Hitachi and Panasonic—are often manufactured in China.²³ Similarly, Japanese fast fashion retailer Uniqlo has set up factories across Asia, especially in China and Vietnam.²⁴

When comparing goods and services, it is evident that the bulk of trade tilts towards goods. In 2019, out of the AU\$60.6 billion total Australian exports to Japan, AU\$57.9 billion was in goods while AU\$2.7 billion was in services. Similarly, of the AU\$26.4 billion in Japanese imports into Australia, AU\$21.6 were in goods while AU\$4.8 were in services (see Figure 2).

Table 1: Japan’s top two-way goods trading partners, 2019 (US\$ millions)

Rank	Country/Area	Exports	Imports	Total	Share
1	China	134,697	169,262	303,960	21.31%
2	United States	139,884	79,215	219,099	15.36%
3	South Korea	46,249	29,586	75,836	5.32%
4	Taiwan	43,016	26,857	69,873	4.90%
5	Australia	14,491	45,463	59,955	4.20%
6	Thailand	30,186	25,360	55,546	3.89%
7	Germany	20,229	24,966	45,194	3.17%
8	Vietnam	16,496	22,489	38,985	2.73%
9	Hong Kong	33,631	2,062	35,693	2.50%
10	United Arab Emirates	7,186	26,201	33,387	2.34%

Source: Japan External Trade Organization, Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics.

Table 2: Australia's top two-way goods & services trading partners, 2019 (AU\$ millions)

Rank	Country/Area	Goods		Services		Total	Share
		Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports		
1	China	149,783	79,491	19,346	3396	252,016	27.46%
2	Japan	57,928	21,645	2,705	4766	87,044	9.48%
3	United States	15,192	37,199	10,248	18462	81,101	8.84%
4	Republic of Korea	26,012	12,211	2,234	886	41,343	4.50%
5	United Kingdom	15,357	7,224	5,851	10068	38,500	4.19%
6	Singapore	11,915	10,529	4,951	5933	33,328	3.63%
7	New Zealand	10,291	7,791	6,275	6805	31,161	3.39%
8	India	14,280	4,671	7,593	2786	29,330	3.20%
9	Malaysia	9,042	10,985	2,660	1276	23,962	2.61%
10	Thailand	4,496	14,878	1,197	2522	23,093	2.52%

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Time Series Data, Australia's direction of goods and services trade – calendar years from 1987 to present; see also Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, catalogue number 5368.0.

²² Peter Drysdale, ‘Time to Re-Think the Economic Partnership with Japan in Asia’, East Asia Forum, 13 September 2009, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/13/time-to-re-think-the-economic-partnership-with-japan-in-asia/>.


²³ DFAT Economic Analytical Unit, ‘A Remarkable Relationship’.

²⁴ Yoshihiro Hara, ‘Uniqlo Discloses All Garment Factories for First Time’, Nikkei Asian Review, 11 May 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Uniqlo-discloses-all-garment-factories-for-first-time>.

Australian exports to Japan are dominated by energy, resources and foodstuffs (see Figure 3). The top categories in 2019 were natural gas, coal, iron ore, confidential items, beef, copper, aluminium, wood chips, cheese and curds, sugars, molasses and honey, meats other than beef and wheat. This correlates broadly with the key sectors of Japanese investment in Australia.

Japan relies on imports for over 90 per cent of its energy needs and Australian exports play a critical role in helping to power the Japanese economy.²⁵ Australia is the major supplier of energy and strategic raw materials to Japan. Australia accounts for over a quarter of Japan's energy imports in coal, LNG and oil when measured in gigajoule (GJ) equivalent (see Figure 4). Australia supplies more than half of Japan's coal imports and more than a third of Japan's LNG imports. Australia also supplies over half of Japan's iron ore and is the major supplier of bauxite, alumina, aluminium and nickel to Japan.²⁶

Figure 3: Australia's Merchandise Exports to Japan (AU\$ billions): Top Categories



Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Statistical Pivot Tables, Country and commodity pivot table 2006 to 2019; See also Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, catalogue number 5368.0.

Given this high level of Australia's energy exports, the global shift away from fossil fuels to mitigate climate change has the potential to significantly affect the composition of Australia–Japan trade. The Reserve Bank of Australia has forewarned of the uncertain long-term global outlook for Australia's coal exports.²⁷ The Australian public has become increasingly conscious of the impacts of climate change in


²⁵ Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, *Japan's Energy 2019*, 1.

²⁶ Ministry of Finance, 'Trade Statistics of Japan, Commodity by Country, Imports', Japan Customs, accessed 25 September 2020, <https://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/tsdl.htm>.

²⁷ Michelle Cunningham, Luke Van Uffelen, and Mark Chambers, 'The Changing Global Market for Australian Coal', *RBA Bulletin* September (2019), <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2019/sep/the-changing-global-market-for-australian-coal.html>.

the wake of the 2019–2020 summer bushfires that devastated the country.²⁸ In July 2020, the Japanese government announced its plan to retire its old generation of coal-fired power plants by 2030. Further, in October 2020, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga pledged that Japan would become carbon neutral by 2050.²⁹ This could have a major impact on Australia given it exported over AU\$9 billion worth of thermal coal to Japan in 2019, making up about 12 per cent of Australia’s total thermal coal exports.³⁰

Figure 4: Japan's Energy Imports (Coal, Petroleum, and LNG) GJ equivalent



Source: Ministry of Finance, Customs and Tariff Bureau, Trade Statistics of Japan, Commodity by Country, Imports.

There is significant potential for Australia–Japan cooperation on sustainable and green energy. Preparations are already being made for bilateral cooperation in developing and exporting hydrogen from Australia to Japan. In January 2020, the two countries signed the Joint Statement on Cooperation on Hydrogen and Fuel Cells between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science of Australia.³¹ Australia is due to make its first shipment of hydrogen from Victoria to Japan in March 2021 under the Hydrogen Energy Supply Chain Pilot Project.³² Yet experts have voiced concerns about the Australian government’s ‘plans to promote fossil-fuelled “brown” hydrogen’ rather than green hydrogen.³³

²⁸ Nicholas Biddle et al., ‘Exposure and the Impact on Attitudes of the 2019-20 Australian Bushfires’ (ANU Centre for Social Research and Methods, 2020), <https://csrcm.cass.anu.edu.au/research/publications/exposure-and-impact-attitudes-2019-20-australian-bushfires-0>.

²⁹ Yoshihide Suga, ‘Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 203rd Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 26 October 2020, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2020/1026shoshinhyomei.html.

³⁰ Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Japan Is Closing Its Old, Dirty Power Plants – and That’s Bad News for Australia’s Coal Exports’, The Mandarin, 24 August 2020, <https://www.themandarin.com.au/138094-japan-is-closing-its-old-dirty-power-plants-and-thats-bad-news-for-australias-coal-exports/>.


³¹ Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, ‘Joint Statement on Cooperation on Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science of Australia’, 10 January 2020, <https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2019/01/20200110007/20200110007-3.pdf>.

³² Hydrogen Engineering Australia, ‘About HESC’, *Hydrogen Energy Supply Chain* (blog), accessed 26 November 2020, <https://hydrogenenergysupplychain.com/about-hesc/>.

³³ Elizabeth Thurbon et al., ‘Australia’s Dangerous Dirty Hydrogen Plans’, East Asia Forum, 14 May 2020, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/14/australias-dangerous-dirty-hydrogen-plans/>.

Japan's goods and services exports to Australia rose from AU\$8.6 billion in 1987 to AU\$26.4 billion in 2019 (see Figure 1). This saw Australia's share of Japan's goods exports maintain at over 2 per cent between 2004 and 2019. At the same time, this represented a decrease of Japan's share of Australia's imports from 17 per cent in 1987 to 6.21 per cent in 2019. Japan ranks as Australia's third largest source of imports behind China and the United States while Australia ranks as Japan's tenth largest export destination. The top categories of Japanese exports to Australia in 2019 included passenger motor vehicles, refined petroleum, goods vehicles, civil engineering equipment, gold, rubber tyres, treads and tubes, vehicle parts, office machines, electrical machinery, and heating and cooling equipment (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Australia's Merchandise Imports from Japan (AU\$ billions): Top Categories



Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Statistical Pivot Tables, Country and commodity pivot table 2006 to 2019; See also Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, catalogue number 5368.0.

Fun fact


Australia is the only foreign country trusted to produce wheat for Japan's lucrative premium udon noodle market. Noodle technicians from the Australian wheat industry and the Japanese Flour Millers Association have worked together for over three decades to cultivate specialised varieties of Australian wheat for Japanese udon noodles to ensure the best dough elasticity and soft-firm balance (*mochi mochi*).³⁴

³⁴ Bridget FitzGerald, 'Australian Wheat the Key Ingredient in Japan's Udon Noodles', ABC Radio (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 15 October 2019), <https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/am/australian-wheat-key-ingredient-in-japans-famous-udon-noodles/11602512>.

3.3 Investment

Japan has come to earn a reputation as a trusted investment partner in the Australian economy. A wave of Japanese investment in the 1980s established Japan as one of the country's major investors. In 1981, Japanese investment in Australia stood at AU\$4 billion, and this figure more than quadrupled to over AU\$20 billion by 1986.³⁵ Over the last 15 years there has been another wave of growth with the total level of Japanese investment in Australia growing from AU\$51 billion in 2006 to AU\$241 billion in 2019 (see Figure 6). At the end of 2019, this ranked Japan as the fourth largest foreign investor in Australia (behind the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium) accounting for 6.3 per cent of Australia's total foreign investment (see Table 3)³⁶.

Figure 6: Total level of Japanese Investment in Australia 2001 to 2019 (AU\$ billions)



Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Investment Position, Table 2. Foreign investment in Australia: level of investment by country and country groups by type of investment and year (\$million), catalogue number 5352.0.

Over half of Japanese investment in Australia is concentrated in mining and plays a key role in driving the sector. This has made Australia a trusted and critical supplier of energy and strategic resources for Japan. At the same time, Australia's food, wholesale and retail and finance, insurance and chemicals and pharmaceuticals sectors have also attracted significant investment from Japan (see Figure 7). Japanese investment in Australian agriculture allows for the supply of goods in Japan when they are out of season in the northern hemisphere. For instance, the Executive Director of Ito En Australia noted that 'With our southern hemisphere location, we are able to provide Japan, and the northern hemisphere, with seasonal fresh tea when Japanese plantations lay dormant'.³⁷

Australia has become an increasingly attractive market for Japanese firms and the number of new Japanese entrants into the Australian market is increasing. In 2018, 29 Japanese companies entered the Australian market for the first time and Australia ranked 6th for the total number of Japanese outbound

³⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia and Japan—A Trading Tradition'.

³⁶ Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Foreign Investment in Australia: Level of Investment by Country and Country Groups by Type of Investment and Year (\$million), Catalogue Number 5352.0', accessed 25 September 2020, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-investment-position-australia-supplementary-statistics/latest-release>.

³⁷ 'Australian Green Tea Commended', What's New in Food Technology Manufacturing, 14 October 2010, <http://foodprocessing.com.au/content/training-education/news/australian-green-tea-commended-1120368720>.


M&A deals, up from 12th in 2000.³⁸ This is the result of a number of long-term trends including Australia’s stable legal and political system, Australia’s growing population, Japan’s ageing and shrinking population, the weakening of the Australian dollar, the strengthening of the Japanese yen and Japan’s negative interest rates under Abenomics. At the same time, the Australian Treasury’s Foreign Investment Review Board has not rejected an investment deal from Japan in over 25 years.³⁹

Table 3: Top foreign investors in Australia by level of investment on 31 December 2019 (AU\$ billions)

Rank	Country/Area	Investment (\$AU bn)
1	United States	983.7
2	United Kingdom	686.1
3	Belgium	348.1
4	Japan	241.1
5	Hong Kong (SAR of China)	140.7
6	Singapore	99.9

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Investment Position, Table 2. Foreign investment in Australia: level of investment by country and country groups by type of investment and year (\$million), catalogue number 5352.0.

Figure 7: Japan's FDI Position in Australia by Sector (2005–2019)



Source: Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments, Direct Investment Position.

Japanese M&A deals in Australia have grown in size in recent years. In 2019, five Japanese M&A mega-deals exceeded AU\$1 billion.⁴⁰ Namely, Asahi’s acquisition of Carlton United Breweries from Anheuser-Busch for AU\$16 billion, Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation’s acquisition of Colonial First State Global Asset Management from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia for AU\$4.2 billion, Nippon Paint’s AU\$3.8 billion takeover of paint manufacturer Dulux, Nippon Paper’s AU\$1.7 billion acquisition of fibre packing business Orora, and Sumitomo Chemical’s AU\$1.2 billion acquisition of agricultural chemical company Nufarm.

³⁸ Herbert Smith Freehills, ‘Japan-Australia M&A Review and Trends (2017–2019)’, 18 March 2019, 3, <https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/japan-australia-ma-review-and-trends-2017%E2%80%932019>.

³⁹ Herbert Smith Freehills, ‘Japan-Australia M&A Review and Trends (2017-2020)’, 10 March 2020, 2, <https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/Japan-Australia-M-A-Review-and-Trends-2017-2020>.


⁴⁰ Herbert Smith Freehills, 1.

Research by the Australian Business Cooperation Committee shows that the profile of Japanese companies entering Australia in 2019 comprised four key characteristics. First, they were established firms with a median age of 72 years. Second, they were international firms with international operations in a median of 20 countries. Third, they were large companies with a median annual turnover of AU\$17.4 billion. Finally, Japanese firms that invested in Australia in 2019 identified acquiring Australian know-how and extending their sales network as key objectives for their investments.⁴¹

One future area where the know-how of Australian companies could prove useful for prospective Japanese investors is digitisation. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the importance of telework as an option for workers. It has also exposed the challenges Japanese companies face in shifting to higher rates of telework as a result of a low level of digitisation in Japan.⁴² Moreover, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has further identified digitisation as a key objective for his government.

With regard to Australian foreign investment, Japan was the third ranked destination after the United States and the United Kingdom as of 31 December 2019 (see Table 4). There has been significant growth in the last 10 years with Australian investment in Japan rising from AU\$30.8 billion in 2010 to AU\$139.6 billion in 2019 (see Figure 8). This represents 4.7 per cent of Australian investment abroad.⁴³ The most notable growth in Australian investment has been in the transportation sector while there have also been more significant flows in iron and non-ferrous metals, finance and insurance, and services (see Figure 9).

Figure 8: Australian investment in Japan, levels, 31 December 2019 (AU\$ billions)



Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Table 5. Australian Investment Abroad: Level of Investment by Country and Country Groups by Type of Investment and Year (\$million), catalogue number 5352.0.

⁴¹ Australia Japan Business Cooperation Committee, 'Why Are Japanese Companies Investing in Australia?', June 2020, 3–6, <https://www.ajbcc.asn.au/reports/why-are-japanese-companies-investing-in-australia-ajbcc/>.

⁴² Hiroaki Richard Watanabe, 'Low Levels of Digitalisation Are a Barrier to Telework in Japan', East Asia Forum, 20 June 2020, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/06/20/low-levels-of-digitalisation-are-a-barrier-to-telework-in-japan/>.


⁴³ Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Australian Investment Abroad: Level of Investment by Country and Country Groups by Type of Investment and Year (\$million), Catalogue Number 5352.0', accessed 25 September 2020, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-investment-position-australia-supplementary-statistics/latest-release>.

Table 4: Australian investment abroad, levels, 31 December 2019 (AU\$ billions)

Rank	Country/Area	Investment level
1	United States	837.4
2	United Kingdom	507.4
3	Japan	139.6
4	New Zealand	130.5
5	Germany	97.1
6	China	85.3

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Table 5. Australian Investment Abroad: Level of Investment by Country and Country Groups by Type of Investment and Year (\$million), catalogue number 5352.0.

Figure 9: Australia's FDI Position in Japan by sector (2008–2019)



Source: Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments, Direct Investment Position.


4. Australia–Japan people-to-people links

Australia–Japan relations are anchored in deep people-to-people links. These links span sister city arrangements, education exchanges, mutual working holiday arrangements and tourist flows. Symbolic of these links is that at the age of 14, Japanese Emperor Naruhito (then Crown Prince Naruhito) chose Australia as the destination for his first overseas trip and high school homestay where he stayed with a family in Melbourne for a week in August 1974.⁴⁴

4.1 Sister City Arrangements

Australia has more sister city and sister state arrangements with Japan than any other country. The 101 Australia–Japan sister city arrangements and six sister state arrangements comprise almost 20 per cent of Australia’s such international arrangements outstripping China (99), the United States (86) and the United Kingdom (44).⁴⁵ At the same time, Australia ranks fourth—behind the United States (456), China (374) and South Korea (164) despite its relatively smaller population—with a share of over 6 per cent of Japan’s 1773 sister city and sister prefecture arrangements.⁴⁶ Australia and Japan also maintain five sister port arrangements, more than half of Australia’s sister ports.⁴⁷

Figure 10: Growth of Australia–Japan Sister City Arrangements (1963–2020)



Source: Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, *Sister Affiliations between Australia and Japan*.

The first Australia–Japan sister city arrangement was established in 1963 between the cities of Lismore in New South Wales and Yamato Takada in Nara prefecture. This pioneering relationship came about through the efforts of missionary Father Paul Glynn who organised for businesses from his hometown

⁴⁴ Ben Hills, *Princess Masako: Prisoner of the Chrysanthemum Throne* (Random House, 2006), 55–62.

⁴⁵ Sister Cities Australia, ‘2020 Directory of Australian Sister City and Friendship City Affiliations’, 2020, 11, http://sistercitiesaustralia.com/images/images_media/Documents/Aust_SCA_Affiliations.pdf.

⁴⁶ CLAIR, ‘相手国・地域別姉妹提携数’, 1 October 2020, <http://www.clair.or.jp/j/exchange/shimai/countries/>.

⁴⁷ Sister Cities Australia, ‘2020 Directory of Australian Sister City and Friendship City Affiliations’, 39.


of Lismore to fund the establishment of the Takada Catholic Kindergarten.⁴⁸ Subsequently, the establishment of new sister city relationships greatly accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s after the conclusion of the NARA Treaty (see Figure 10).

In terms of distribution across Australian states, New South Wales (38) hosts over a third of Australia–Japan sister city arrangements followed by Queensland (21) and Victoria (17) (see Figure 11). In Japan, the prefectures playing host to the most sister city arrangements with Australia are Tokyo (9), Osaka (8), Aichi (7) and Hyogo (7) (see Figure 12).

There has been considerable debate about what objectives sister city arrangements should incorporate. Some of those discussed include objectives such as promoting post-war reconciliation, advancing exchanges of friendship, culture and language, fostering commercial relations, and developing inter-subnational government cooperation.

In terms of post-war reconciliation and promoting exchanges at the local level, Australia–Japan sister city arrangements have been exceedingly successful.⁴⁹ For instance, the town of Cowra in New South Wales and Joetsu City in Niigata prefecture—which were both sites of prisoner of war camps during the Second World War holding detainees from each country—maintain a unique friendship agreement. Cowra is now home, in the name of peace and remembrance, to the Cowra Japanese War Cemetery and the Cowra Japanese Garden and Cultural Centre, the largest Japanese garden in the southern hemisphere.⁵⁰ Moreover, since 2011 four Australia–Japan sister city partnerships have won an International Exchange Commendation from the Japanese Ministry for Internal Affairs and Communications.⁵¹

Figure 11: Number of Australia–Japan Sister City Arrangements by State



Source: Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, *Sister Affiliations between Australia and Japan*.


⁴⁸ CLAIR, ‘Yamato Takada-Lismore Sister City Association International Exchange Commendation’, 28 April 2017, http://www.jlga.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2016Yamato_e_full.pdf.

⁴⁹ CLAIR Sydney, ‘Sister City Achievements’, accessed 11 October 2020, <http://www.jlga.org.au/international-exchange-2/sister-city-exchange/results-of-this-initiative/>.

⁵⁰ Embassy of Japan, ‘The Cowra Japanese War Cemetery Online Database’, accessed 11 October 2020, <https://www.cowrajapanesecemetery.org/>.

⁵¹ CLAIR, ‘International Exchange Commendation’, accessed 11 October 2020, <http://www.clair.or.jp/>.


Figure 12: Number of Australia–Japan Sister City Arrangements per Prefecture



Source: Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, *Sister Affiliations between Australia and Japan*.

A comprehensive survey by Hiroaki Mori in 2020 of Japanese local governments with a sister city arrangement with Australia investigated the portfolio of activities and the degree of satisfaction with current arrangements. Mori’s survey shows that educational exchanges are the dominant form of cooperation with almost 90 per cent of Australia–Japan sister city arrangements engaged in such activities. This is followed by mayor/councillor visits (46.4 per cent), cultural and sporting exchanges (39.1 per cent), and staff exchanges (15.1 per cent) (see Figure 12).⁵² The local entities participating in sister city programs were most commonly schools (76.5 per cent), sister city committees (60.9 per cent) international exchange associations (58.6 per cent), individual volunteers (27.6 per cent), and local Australia–Japan societies (23.8 per cent).⁵³ The reported benefits included student education (92.6 per cent), greater cultural awareness (83.8 per cent), promoting citizens’ interest in the sister city and Australia (79.4 per cent), and opportunities to learn English (67.2 per cent).⁵⁴

Figure 13 Portfolio of Australia–Japan Sister City Activities



Source: Hiroaki Mori, ‘Making old friendships match more: strategic development of Japan-Australia sister-city arrangement’, Research Report of the Competitive Research Promotion Grant at the University of Kitakyushu, p. 7.

⁵² Hiroaki Mori, ‘Making Old Friendships Match More: Strategic Development of Japan-Australia Sister City Arrangement’ (The University of Kitakyushu, 2020), 7, <https://tinyurl.com/4zehxxn6>.

⁵³ Mori, 8.

⁵⁴ Mori, 12.

Previous research shows that most local government are interested in developing commercial relations and tourism as new dimensions of their sister city relationships.⁵⁵ This research recommends establishing policy guidelines and a framework to guide the potential commercial aspects of sister city relationships.⁵⁶ However, the number of Japanese local governments reporting activities in these areas stood at only 2.9 per cent (trade and investment) and 4.3 per cent (tourism) respectively.⁵⁷

Overall, despite reporting a number of challenges, the sister city relationships appear to be relatively successful in achieving their objectives. The two biggest problems reported were a lack of resources (55.9 per cent) and personnel rotation in local governments affecting communication channels (44.1 per cent).⁵⁸ Yet a vast majority of cities (82.6 per cent) reported that they intended to continue with their current programs.⁵⁹

Sister state relationships could be used as a vehicle for inter-subnational government cooperation on a range of global challenges, such as global sustainable development. A case study of the Western Australia–Hyogo partnership suggests that Australia–Japan sister state relationships seem to be underutilised in pursuit of such objectives.⁶⁰ While further research is needed on cooperation between sister states, a lack of awareness of the opportunities and a lack of resources appear to be the primary impediments to further development in this area.

4.2 Education

Education is a further anchor underpinning Australia and Japan’s strong people-to-people relations. Japanese is the most widely taught foreign language in Australia with over 405,000 students across primary and tertiary levels. This ranks Australia fourth globally behind China, Indonesia and South Korea, and the highest in the world on a per capita basis (see Figure 14).⁶¹ However, the vast majority of Australia’s Japanese language learners are concentrated in the primary and lower secondary levels. Greater research is needed to investigate the factors leading to low retention rates in the upper secondary and tertiary cohorts.⁶²

⁵⁵ Kevin O’Toole, ‘Kokusaika and Internationalisation: Australian and Japanese Sister City Type Relationships’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55, no. 3 (1 November 2001): 403–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710120095243>.

⁵⁶ Mona Chung and Bruno Mascitelli, ‘A New Dimension of Sister City Relationships in the 21st Century : A Pilot Study in Australia’, *Business Strategies and Technological Innovations for Sustainable Development : Creating Global Prosperity for Humanity : Global Business and Technology Association : Eleventh International Conference Readings Book*, 1 January 2009, 228; Kevin O’Toole, ‘From Mates to Markets: Australian Sister City Type Relationships’, *Policy, Organisation and Society* 19, no. 1 (1 June 2000): 43–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10349952.2000.11876718>.

⁵⁷ Mori, ‘Making Old Friendships Match More: Strategic Development of Japan-Australia Sister City Arrangement’, 7.

⁵⁸ Mori, 13.

⁵⁹ Mori, 16.

⁶⁰ Yasuo Takao, ‘Reinvigorating the Transnational Links of Sub-National Governments between Australia and Japan with Special Reference to Western Australia–Hyogo Sister-State Relations’, *The Pacific Review* 23, no. 4 (13 August 2010): 453–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2010.496000>.


⁶¹ The Japan Foundation, ‘Survey Report on Japanese-Language Education Abroad 2018’, 2020, 13, https://www.jpfa.go.jp/j/project/japanese/survey/result/dl/survey2018/Report_all_e.pdf.

⁶² Anne de Kretser and Robyn Spence-Brown, ‘The Current State of Japanese Language Education in Australian Schools’, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010, 73, <https://docs.education.gov.au/documents/current-state-japanese-language-education-australian-schools>; Robyn Spence-

More than half of Australia’s universities (24 out of 43) offer Japanese language or Japanese society courses. Yet only six universities have dedicated Japanese studies programs (The Australian National University, the University of Sydney, the University of New South Wales, the University of Melbourne, Monash University and the University of Western Australia). At the same time, ‘a large proportion of the students of Japanese language [at Australian universities] are international students from Asia. While this had been a positive factor for the financial sustainability of Japanese studies programs until 2020, it has made them particularly vulnerable to loss of enrolments during the COVID-19 crisis’.⁶³

In Japan, studies of Australia have been spearheaded by the Australian Studies Association of Japan (ASAJ) since its establishment in 1989. This includes the publication of the *Journal of Australian Studies* and the organisation of an annual conference.⁶⁴ The University of Tokyo’s Centre for Pacific and American Studies established a Visiting Professorship in Australian Studies in 1999, supported by the Australia-Japan Foundation, ‘to promote a deeper understanding of Australia and its regional engagement’.⁶⁵ Australians have also contributed to the study of English and international exchange in Japanese high schools. One example of this is the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme. Since its establishment in 1987, Australia has sent almost 10,000 participants to Japan in Assistant Language Teacher, Coordinator for International Relations, and Sports Exchange Advisor positions. In 2019, Australia sent 343 participants accounting for 6 per cent of all participants that year (see Figure 15). This ranked Australia fourth (behind the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada) out of 57 participating countries.⁶⁶

Figure 14: Number of Japanese Language Learners by Country, Primary to Tertiary Levels (1998–2018)



Source: The Japan Foundation, Survey on Japanese-Language Education Abroad (1998–2018).

Brown, ‘On Rocky Ground: Monolingual Educational Structures and Japanese Language Education in Australia’, in *Dynamic Ecologies: A Relational Perspective on Languages Education in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Neil Murray and Angela Scarino, Multilingual Education (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 183–98, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7972-3_12.


⁶³ Rebecca Suter, ‘The Current State of Japanese Studies in Australia in 2020’, Asian Studies Association of Australia, 19 May 2020, <http://asaa.asn.au/the-current-state-of-japanese-studies-in-australia-in-2020/>.

⁶⁴ Australian Studies Association of Japan, ‘Objectives of the Association’, accessed 22 October 2020, http://australianstudies.jp/about/objectives_of_the_association_e.html.

⁶⁵ Kate Darian-Smith, ‘Visiting Professor in Australian Studies: University of Tokyo’, *International Australian Studies Association* (blog), 30 August 2019, <https://inasa.org/blog/visiting-professor-in-australian-studies-university-of-tokyo/>.

⁶⁶ CLAIR, ‘Participating Countries’, JET Programme, 2 August 2019, <http://jetprogramme.org/en/countries/>.

Figure 15: Number of Australian JET Programme Participants (1987–2019)




Source: Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, JET Programme Participating Countries; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number of JET participants since 1987.

4.3 Sister School Arrangements

With 553 Australia–Japan sister school arrangements at the senior high school level as of 2018, Japan has more such arrangements with Australia than with any other country. This positions Australia ahead of the United States (424), Canada (315), South Korea (309) and New Zealand (299). The most significant period of growth for Australia–Japan sister high schools came in the 1990s when the number of arrangements expanded from 131 in 1993 to 387 in 1999. Australia’s share of Japan’s total number of arrangements peaked at over 25 per cent in 2009 before falling back to its 1993 level of just over 18 per cent in 2018. This is a significant achievement given that a number of new countries have established sister school relations with Japan since 2016 (see Figure 16 and Figure 17).⁶⁷


Figure 16: Sister School Arrangements between Japanese & Australian High Schools



Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 10.

⁶⁷ MEXT, ‘高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges]’, 27 August 2019, 10, https://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/koutou/ryugaku/koukousei/1323946.htm.

Figure 17: Sister School Arrangements with Japanese High Schools by Country



Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 10.

Sister school arrangements can take diverse forms. For instance, the Victorian state government identified sister school arrangements based on a range of different objectives such as language-based partnerships, community link programs, topic-specific partnerships, information and communication technology-based links, social justice-based partnerships, professional development programs, cultural-based partnerships, and network and region-specific programs.⁶⁸ In some cases sister school arrangements have grown out of sister city relationships, such as the 13 sister school partnerships between Canberra and Nara.⁶⁹

4.4 Senior High Schools Exchanges

Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) divides student exchanges and study trips by senior high school students into three categories: overseas study trips (研修旅行), student exchanges (留学) and overseas school excursions (修学旅行).⁷⁰ Overseas study trips are defined as trips for less than three months where students participate in language training, study or international exchange. Student exchange programs are defined as study abroad where the student is hosted by an overseas school in-country for three months or more. Overseas school excursions by Japanese senior high school students to Australia are not as strictly defined and may be aimed at cultural learning and sightseeing more generally. Overseas school excursions by Australian high school students to Japan are defined as those that include an accompanying visit hosted by a Japanese senior high school.

⁶⁸ Department of Education and Training, State of Victoria, ‘Sister School Resource Kit’, 2018, 10,


<https://www.study.vic.gov.au/Shared%20Documents/en/Sister-Schools/Sister-schools-resource-kit.pdf>.

⁶⁹ ACT Treasury and Economic Development Directorate, ‘Exchange Activities’, accessed 22 October 2020,

https://www.cmtedd.act.gov.au/communication/cir/nara_japan/activities.

⁷⁰ While there is a lack of publicly available data about overseas high school exchanges on the Australian side, the data presented here is a summary of Japanese-language statistics from MEXT translated into English.

Figure 18: Japanese Senior High School Student Trips to Australia by Category



Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Current Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019].


School excursions have been the most popular type of trip on both sides. For Japanese high school excursions to Australia, numbers grew rapidly from just over 2300 in 1992 to almost 39,000 in 2006. They plateaued at about 20,000 in the last four MEXT surveys between 2011–2017 (see Figure 18). This made Australia the fourth most popular destination in 2017 (after Taiwan, the United States and Singapore) accounting for 12.2 per cent of Japanese students participating in overseas high school excursions globally (see Appendices 9 & 10).

On the Australian side, high school excursion students to Japan (accompanied by a visit to a Japanese high school) have fluctuated between a low of 1265 in 2011 and a high of 3647 in 2017 for the seven survey years with data between 2004 and 2017 (see Figure 19). This saw Australia’s share of incoming international high school excursion students to Japan range from a high of 12.2 per cent in 2004 to a low of 7.3 per cent in 2013. In the most recent survey in 2017, Australia ranked fifth (behind Taiwan, South Korea, China, and the United States) and accounted for 9.2 per cent of high school excursion students visiting Japan (see Appendices 11 & 12).

Study trips have also accounted for a significant flow of high school students between Australia and Japan. Australia is the most popular destination for Japanese students going on overseas study trips with numbers growing from just over 2300 in 1992 to a peak of over 11,200 in 2004, maintaining at least 8200 in the six MEXT surveys since (see Figure 18). This means that since 1998, Australia has outstripped the other native English speaking countries that round out the top five destinations (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand) while accounting for between a third and a quarter of all Japanese high school students going on overseas study trips (see Appendices 1 & 2).⁷¹

⁷¹ MEXT, ‘高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges]’, 3–4.

Figure 19: Australian High School Student Trips to Japan by Category



Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019].

Australia sent more high school students to Japan on study trips than any other country for all 11 MEXT survey years (1996–2017) except 2015. On average, Australia sent over 1100 students per survey year (see Figure 19). In the most recent survey in 2017, Australia sent 764 students, accounting for over 22 per cent of all high school students who visited Japan on study trips (see Appendices 3 & 4).⁷²

Japanese students participating in overseas exchange programs to Australia have been relatively stable across the 13 MEXT survey years between 1992–2017, fluctuating between a low of 386 students (12 per cent) in 2011 and a high of 741 students (17 per cent) in 2004. In the most recent survey in 2017, Australia hosted 522 Japanese senior high school exchange students (see Figure 18). This ranked Australia fourth behind the United States, Canada and New Zealand (see Appendices 5 & 6).⁷³

By contrast, Australian students going on exchange programs hosted by a Japanese high school have seen a startling decline. In 1994, Australia sent 380 students accounting for almost a third of the total high school exchange students hosted in Japan. However, in the most recent survey in 2017, Australia sent 81 students representing just over 3 per cent (see Figure 19). As a result, Australia’s rank has fallen from 2nd in 1992 (behind China) to 7th in 2017 (behind China, Thailand, the United States, South Korea, Germany, and Taiwan) (see Appendices 7 & 8).⁷⁴

⁷² MEXT, 7.


⁷³ MEXT, 4–5.

⁷⁴ MEXT, 18.

4.5 Japanese Students in Australian Tertiary Education

Japanese student participation in Australian tertiary education can be divided into four categories as defined by the Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment. Namely, higher education (HE) institutions such as universities, vocational education and training (VET) institutions (including Technical and Further Education or TAFE), English Language Intensive Courses for Overseas Students (ELICOS) programs, and non-award studies (such as enabling and foundation courses). The bulk of Japanese student enrolments in the Australian tertiary sector are in ELICOS followed by VET. Enrolment data is provided by the Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment from the Commonwealth Provider Registration and International Student Management System. This does not necessarily represent the number of international students in Australia as a student enrolled in two different sectors during the same reference period (such as a Bachelor degree and ELICOS) would both be counted.⁷⁵

Figure 20: Japanese Student Enrolments in Australian Tertiary Education by Sector



Source: Department of Education, Skills and Employment, International Education Group, International Student Data 2020, Basic Pivot Table.

The number of Japanese student enrolments in Australian HE has seen a sustained decline in both absolute numbers and share over the last two decades. From a peak of 3828 students accounting for 2.15 per cent in 2003, Japanese student HE enrolments declined to a pre-COVID-19 pandemic low of 1496 in 2016, accounting for 0.49 per cent of all international HE enrolments (see Appendix 13). As a result of these declining numbers, Japan's ranking as a sending country has dropped from 11th in 2002 to 24th in 2019.⁷⁶ A lack of English ability among Japanese students appears to be an obstacle to greater participation in Australian HE institutions as well as international study more broadly. In the most

⁷⁵ Department of Education, Skills and Employment, 'Explanatory Notes for International Student Enrolment Data', 1 April 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/rfdjkjft>.

⁷⁶ Department of Education, Skills and Employment, 'International Student Data 2019, Basic Pivot Table 2002 Onwards', accessed 26 October 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/24wkc5zb>.

recent EF English Proficiency Index, Japan ranked 55 out of 100 countries putting it in the ‘low proficiency’ band.⁷⁷

The number of Japanese student enrolments at Australian VET institutions has by comparison remained relatively more stable over the last two decades. In terms of absolute numbers, a first peak occurred in 2004 with 4543 student enrolments. Numbers then declined to a low of 3006 in 2011 before recovering again to a second peak of 4648 in 2018. Japan’s share of total international student enrolments in Australian VET institutions, however, has declined from nearly 10 per cent in 2004 to around 2 per cent between 2008 to 2019 (see Appendix 14). As a result, Japan’s ranking dropped from 3rd in 2002 to 16th in 2019.⁷⁸ These larger numbers compared with HE seem to reflect the lower English level threshold for entry. The drop in Japan’s share reflects the large overall growth in numbers from other countries, such as India, Nepal, China and Brazil.

ELICOS programs are the most popular tertiary qualification for Japanese students to pursue. Between 2002 and 2020 there were over 127,000 Japanese ELICOS enrolments, averaging almost 6700 enrolments per year. Absolute numbers peaked in 2003 with 9271 enrolments, dropped to a low of 4759 enrolments in 2011, and recovered to a second peak of 7969 enrolments in 2017. Japan’s share of ELICOS enrolments reached over 14 per cent in the early 2000s, after which it dropped to a low of 3.73 per cent in 2009. It plateaued at around 4–5 per cent between 2010–2020 (see Appendix 15). Japan’s rank dropped from 2nd in 2002 to 5th in 2019.⁷⁹ This reflects a significant growth in the overall number of ELICOS students, especially from China, Colombia, Brazil, Thailand and India.

4.6 Australian Students in Japanese Tertiary Education

By comparison there are relatively few Australian students enrolled in Japanese tertiary education institutions. International student numbers in Japan are calculated by MEXT prior to 2003 and by the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO) after 2003 based on student visas across all tertiary sectors.⁸⁰ There have not been more than 150 Australian enrolled in a tertiary degree or award program in Japan since 2001. University exchange programs, which are defined as study for one year or less, have been a relatively more popular option for Australian students. Over the past two decades there have been at least 200 Australian university exchange students in Japan most years, with a low of 125 students in 2011 and a high of 285 students in 2017 and 2018. Australia’s share of international students enrolled in tertiary programs in Japan (including both degree students and exchange students) has never been large, ranging from a high of 0.43 per cent in 2001 to a low of 0.17 in 2011 (see Figure 21).

Nevertheless, opportunities for Australian university students to study in Japan are increasing. More Japanese universities are offering programs in English, such as forerunners Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University and Waseda University. Further, Australia and Japan are starting to establish dual degree programs. Among these are the Australian National University and Ritsumeikan University dual degree

⁷⁷ Education First, ‘EF English Proficiency Index 2020’, 2020, 6, <https://www.ef.com/wwen/epi/>.


⁷⁸ Department of Education, Skills and Employment, ‘International Student Data 2019, Basic Pivot Table 2002 Onwards’.

⁷⁹ Department of Education, Skills and Employment.

⁸⁰ JASSO, ‘2019 (令和元) 年度外国人留学生在籍状況調査結果 [2019 Foreign Student Enrolments Survey Results]’, 2020, <https://www.studyinJapan.go.jp/ja/statistics/zaiseiki/data/2019.html>.

program at the undergraduate level and the dual Master of Public Policy degree program between the Australian National University and Tokyo University's Graduate School of Public Policy.⁸¹

Figure 21: Number of Australian Students Enrolled in Japanese Tertiary Institutions



Source: Japan Student Services Organization, 外国人留学生在籍状況調査 [Survey on the Situation of Foreign Student Enrolments] (2001-2019).

4.7 Working holiday arrangements

After the signing of the NARA Treaty in 1976, Australia and Japan concluded a reciprocal working holiday agreement that commenced in 1980. This was Japan's first of its 26 working holiday agreements.⁸² For Australia it was the fourth of its 45 working holiday arrangements and the first with a non-Western and non-English speaking country.⁸³

Japan has been a relatively popular working holiday destination for Australian youths behind English-speaking destinations such as the United Kingdom and Canada. Based on data from Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), over the last 13 years more than 12,000 Australians were issued working holiday visas to Japan.⁸⁴ During this time, Australia's share of total working holiday maker visas issued

⁸¹ The Australian National University, 'ANU and Ritsumeikan Forge Ahead with Innovative New Program', 11 December 2018, <https://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/news-events/all-stories/anu-and-ritsumeikan-forge-ahead-innovative-new-program>. The Australian National University, 'ANU Signs Double Degree Agreement in Public Policy with University of Tokyo', 29 March 2017, <https://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/news-events/all-stories/anu-signs-double-degree-agreement-public-policy-university-tokyo>.


⁸² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'ワーキング・ホリデー制度 [Japan's Working Holiday System]', 18 June 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/visa/working_h.html.

⁸³ Department of Home Affairs, 'Working Holiday Maker Visa Program Report', 30 June 2019, 6, <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-stats/files/working-holiday-report-jun-19.pdf>.

⁸⁴ MOFA, 'ビザ (査証) 発給統計 [Visa Issuance Statistics]', E-Stat Japan, accessed 15 September 2020, https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-search/files?page=1&toukei=00300500&result_page=1.

by Japan fell from a high of 14 per cent in 2007 to a low of 5 per cent in 2011 in the wake of the 3/11 Fukushima nuclear disaster. The largest year in terms of absolute numbers was 2019 with over 1600 Australians receiving Japanese working holiday visas, which comprised 9 per cent of total working holiday maker visas issued by Japan that year (see Figure 22). This ranks Australia third behind South Korea and Taiwan (see Appendix 16).

Figure 22: Working Holiday Visas Issued to Australian Citizens by Japan (2007–2019)



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e-Stat Japan, ビザ（査証）発給統計 [Visa Issuance Statistics] (2007–2019).

There is a dearth of research about the motivations of Australian working holiday makers. However, casual observations suggest that Australians are attracted to Japan for its cultural opportunities, its stable political environment and its high standard of living and technology. At the same time, the popularity of skiing and snowboarding in Japan among Australian youths seems to be a big drawcard and a cheaper alternative than Europe or North America. The large Australian presence in Japanese snow towns such as Niseko further offers seasonal working holiday job opportunities for non-Japanese speakers.⁸⁵

Australia is the most well established and popular destination for Japanese working holiday makers. Analysis by the Japanese national broadcaster NHK shows that out of 24,000 Japanese working holiday makers in 2017, almost half (over 11,000) visited Australia.⁸⁶ Statistics from the Department of Home Affairs show that between 2006 and 2019 an average of over 10,000 working holiday visas were issued to Japanese citizens per year by the Australian government (visa subclass 417) (see Figure 23). In 2019, Japan ranked sixth among all working holiday maker visas issued by Australia (behind the United Kingdom, France, South Korea, Germany and Taiwan) (see Appendix 17).⁸⁷

Australia’s popularity among Japanese working holiday makers is shaped by a number of push and pull factors. Push factors include improving English language abilities, gaining travel experience, earning


⁸⁵ Junko Hirabayashi, ‘G’day Niseko! Australian Skiers Flock to Japan’, *Reuters*, 13 June 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-australia-niseko-idUSSP27388620080613>.

⁸⁶ NHK, ‘遊びながら働くはずが... [You Should Work While You Play, But...]', NHK News, 31 January 2020, <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20200131/k10012266791000.html>.

⁸⁷ Department of Home Affairs, ‘Working Holiday Maker Visas Granted Pivot Table’, 30 July 2020, <https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/visa-working-holiday-maker>.

money and escaping from routine. Pull factors that make Australia an attractive destination include a stable working holiday visa arrangement, its status as an English speaking country, a positive perception of Australia and job opportunities.⁸⁸


Figure 23: Working Holiday Visas Issued to Japanese Citizens by Australia (2006–2020)



Source: Department of Home Affairs, Australian Government Data, Working Holiday Maker Visas Granted Pivot Table.

A key trend among Japanese working holiday makers to Australia is the imbalanced gender ratio (see Figure 24). The proportion of female working holiday makers is almost double the number of males. One may speculate that contributing factors underlying this trend might include Japan’s dual-track labour market that disproportionately steers women into non-regular work and a workplace culture that favours males for job promotions.⁸⁹ However, further research is needed to determine possible linkages with women’s working conditions in Japan.

Figure 24: Working Holiday Visas Issued by Australia to Japanese Citizens by Gender 2006–2019



Source: Department of Home Affairs, Australian Government Data, Working Holiday Maker Visas Granted Pivot Table.

⁸⁸ Hayato Nagai, Pierre Benckendorff, and Aaron Tkaczynski, ‘Exploring the Motivations of Asian Working Holiday Makers Travelling to Australia’, *Wakayama University Association for Tourism Studies* 18 (2018): 43–53.


⁸⁹ Emma Dalton, ‘Is Womenomics Improving Japanese Working Women’s Lives?’, *East Asia Forum Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (28 September 2018): 30–31.

4.8 Tourism Between Australia and Japan

Historically, the number of Japanese tourists visiting Australia has outstripped the number of Australian tourists visiting Japan, as might be expected given the population difference between the two countries. The number of Japanese overseas travellers grew rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s.⁹⁰ The number of Japanese tourists visiting Australia peaked at over 814,000 in 1997.⁹¹ However, since 2015, the trend has reversed, with Australian visitors to Japan now growing rapidly.

In the 2000s, Japanese short-term visitors to Australia declined from a peak of over 700,000 in 2003 to just over 350,000 in 2009. Between 2010–2015, Japanese visitors to Australia plateaued between 330,000 and 400,000. Subsequently, from 2015 numbers started to grow again, reaching over 498,000 in 2019 (see Figure 25).⁹² Japan’s share of total short-term visitors to Australia over the last decade peaked at 6.75 per cent in 2010 and dropped to a low of 4.57 per cent in 2015. Since 2016 Japan has maintained its share of around 5 per cent, keeping pace as the total visitors from all countries to Australia grew from nearly 6.9 million in 2015 to 8.7 million in 2019 (see Figure 26).

Figure 25: Tourist Flows Between Australia and Japan (2003–2020)



Source: Japan National Tourism Organization, ‘国籍/月別 訪日外客数(2003年～2021年)’; Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Overseas Arrivals and Departures, Australia, Table 5: Short-Term Movement, Visitors Arriving - Selected Countries of Residence: Original’.

The number of Australian tourists to Japan gradually rose during the 2000s from 172,000 in 2003 to over 242,000 in 2008. Numbers dropped in 2011, the year of the 3/11 Fukushima nuclear disaster, to 162,000. Since then, there has been a rapid growth in Australian tourists visiting Japan, reaching a high


⁹⁰ Japan National Tourism Organization, ‘年別 訪日外客数、出国日本人数の推移 (1964年-2019年) [Change in the Number of Foreign Visitors to Japan and the Number of Japanese Overseas Travellers by Year (1964-2019)]’, accessed 2 March 2021, https://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/statistics/visitor_trends/index.html.

⁹¹ Angus Grigg, ‘Japanese Tourists Are Back and Growing More Quickly than Chinese Arrivals’, *Australian Financial Review*, 18 April 2017, sec. tourism, <https://www.afr.com/companies/tourism/japanese-tourists-are-back-and-growing-more-quickly-than-chinese-arrivals-20170418-gvmuya>.

⁹² Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Overseas Arrivals and Departures, Australia, Table 5: Short-Term Movement, Visitors Arriving - Selected Countries of Residence: Original’, 17 February 2021, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/industry/tourism-and-transport/overseas-arrivals-and-departures-australia/latest-release>.


of over 620,000 in 2019 (see Figure 25).⁹³ This rapid growth corresponds with a successful campaign by the Japanese government to proactively increase tourism. The tourism boom that followed saw a high of over 31 million tourists from all countries visit Japan in 2019.⁹⁴ Australia's share of the total number of overseas tourists visiting Japan peaked in 2003 at 3.3 per cent. Despite the rapid growth of Australian tourists visiting Japan since 2013, Australia's total share has remained below 2 per cent since 2015 in light of the overall rapid growth of Japan's tourist industry (see Figure 27).

Figure 26: Overseas Visitor Arrivals in Australia and Japan's Share



Source: Tourism Research Australia, International Visitor Survey Results 1: Trends Country Purpose Year Ending December 2019.

Figure 27: Total Overseas Visitor Arrivals in Japan and Australia's Share



Source: JTB Tourism Research & Consulting Co., Japan-bound Statistics.

⁹³ Japan National Tourism Organization, '国籍/月別 訪日外客数(2003年~2021年) [Monthly Foreign Visitor Numbers to Japan by Country (2003-2021)]', accessed 2 March 2021, https://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/statistics/since2003_visitor_arrivals.pdf.

⁹⁴ Yoko Konishi, 'Making the Most of Japan's Tourism Boom', *East Asia Forum* (blog), 25 June 2016, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/25/making-the-most-of-japans-tourism-boom/>.

5. The Whaling Dispute

While Australia and Japan have forged strong people-to-people links, developed a strong and complementary economic relationship and increasingly deepened and institutionalised strategic and diplomatic cooperation, this does not mean that there have not been misunderstandings or disagreements between the two countries. The biggest post-war disagreement, perhaps, has been Japan's whaling program. Friction over this issue dates back to the start of Japanese whaling operations in the Antarctic in 1934, but Australia's objections have evolved over the decades.

After Japan began whaling in the Antarctic, Australia's sought to safeguard its territorial claim in Antarctica, which had been transferred to it by the United Kingdom in 1933. Establishing Antarctic whaling operations was seen as one of the few things Australia could practically do to protect its claim. However, Australia never established an Antarctic whaling program out of concern that it would not be commercially viable when other nations were exhausting whale stocks, and Japan was especially singled out for blame.⁹⁵

Australia also sought to protect its position as an active coastal whaling nation, until it abandoned commercial whaling in 1978. This meant protecting Antarctic whale stocks that made their migratory journey north past the Australian coastline. As such, Australia was an active participant in the 1931 Geneva Convention for Regulation of Whaling and the 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, precursors to the current International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) adopted in 1946.⁹⁶

Japanese Antarctic whaling was also seen as a national security concern until after the end of the Second World War. There were concerns that Japan would establish its own whaling base in the Antarctic.⁹⁷ Australia and the United Kingdom successfully petitioned the United States to have Japan renounce 'all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area' under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.⁹⁸

The nature of the whaling dispute shifted in the post-war era due to two key developments. First, after Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur permitted Japan to restart Antarctic whaling during the occupation period (1945–1952), whale meat consumption was transformed from a localised practice into a dish that was eaten nationwide. Consumption peaked in the 1960s, especially in school lunches.⁹⁹ Second, environmental NGOs successfully proselytised their message globally that whaling is unethical—both due to the threat of extinction and the fact whales

⁹⁵ Shirley V. Scott and Lucia Meilin Oriana, 'The History of Australian Legal Opposition to Japanese Antarctic Whaling', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 73, no. 5 (2019): 469–70.

⁹⁶ Scott and Oriana, 471–72.

⁹⁷ 'Japanese Whalers', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 March 1937.

⁹⁸ Shirley V. Scott, 'Japan's Renunciation of Territorial Rights in Antarctica and Australian Diplomacy', *Polar Record* 35, no. 193 (1999): 99–106, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247400026449>.

⁹⁹ Jakobina Arch, 'Whale Meat in Early Postwar Japan: Natural Resources and Food Culture', *Environmental History* 21, no. 3 (2016): 468.

are intelligent mammals—and the International Whaling Commission (IWC) adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982.¹⁰⁰

Subsequently, Japan used the scientific research provision (Article 8) in the ICRW as a loophole to continue to catch hundreds of whales per year, while disputing the scientific basis of the moratorium.¹⁰¹ Bureaucrats from the Fisheries Agency who control Japan's whaling policy are reticent to give it up as it would likely lead to a decline in their political power.¹⁰² Meanwhile, pro-whaling nationalist politicians from Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Whaling Association have framed the issue in terms of 'sovereignty and national pride'.¹⁰³

Pro-whaling Japanese nationalists portray themselves as 'the victim of neo-colonial acts of foreign states, who prevent it from following its cultural traditions'.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, they willfully ignore the fact that whale was not widely consumed in Japan prior to the Second World War and that European countries such as Norway and Iceland engage in whaling.¹⁰⁵ The 'hard shaming' tactics employed by the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, including 'tracking down and attacking Japanese whaling vessels by water-jetting, butyric acid attacks and shooting signal rockets at the fishermen', seem to have played into the hands of Japan's pro-whaling nationalists and reinforced their narrative among the Japanese public.¹⁰⁶

Over the decades, Australian diplomats have sought to persuade Japan to cease whaling in the Southern Ocean. In May 2010, after having failed to affect any change, Australia decided to initiate proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague with a legal strategy supported by research from the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW).¹⁰⁷ In 2014, the ICJ found in Australia's favour, judging that Japan's research output was not commensurate with the number of whales killed and ordered Japan to end its Southern Ocean whaling program.¹⁰⁸ Yet Australia's victory was somewhat short lived as Japan revised its research program to sidestep the ruling and resumed whaling in 2015.

In 2018, Japan announced its intention to withdraw from the IWC arguing that the institution no longer upheld its original purpose to enable sustainable whaling. This enabled Japan to recommence commercial whaling in its exclusive economic zone, to reduce subsidies to the whaling industry and to avoid repairing its long-range Antarctic whaling vessel, which was estimated to cost about 10 billion

¹⁰⁰ Michal Kolmaš, 'International Pressure and Japanese Withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission: When Shaming Fails', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 75, no. 2 (4 August 2020): 6, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1799936>.

¹⁰¹ 'Conservation & Management - Total Catches', International Whaling Commission, accessed 26 January 2021, <https://iwc.int/total-catches>.

¹⁰² Keiko Hirata, 'Why Japan Supports Whaling', *Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy* 8, no. 2–3 (2005): 145–46.

¹⁰³ Kolmaš, 'International Pressure and Japanese Withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission', 8.

¹⁰⁴ Kolmaš, 9.

¹⁰⁵ Arne Kalland, 'The Anti-Whaling Campaigns and Japanese Responses', The Institute of Cetacean Research, 1998, http://luna.pos.to/whale/icr_camp_kalland.html.

¹⁰⁶ Kolmaš, 'International Pressure and Japanese Withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission', 10.

¹⁰⁷ Donald R. Rothwell, 'The Whaling Case: An Australian Perspective', ed. Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dai Tamada, *Whaling in the Antarctic: The Significance and the Implications of the ICJ Judgment*, 1 January 2016, 276.

¹⁰⁸ 'Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand Intervening)', § International Court of Justice (2014), <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/148/148-20140331-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>.

yen (US\$91.3 million).¹⁰⁹ Despite appearances, the Japanese withdrawal from the IWC may actually end up being a face-saving win-win for Japan, Australia and the international community. Less whales are likely to be killed under this program and for the first time ever there will be no whaling conducted in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Akane Otsuku, 'Why Japan Risked Condemnation to Restart Commercial Whaling', Nikkei Asian Review, 19 February 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Why-Japan-risked-condemnation-to-restart-commercial-whaling>.

¹¹⁰ Elizabeth Matsangou, 'The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea – Japanese Whaling Brings Surprising Conservation Benefits', World Finance, 14 October 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/y62ygdz>.

6. Australia–Japan Diplomatic and Security Cooperation

Australia and Japan have significantly deepened their security cooperation throughout the post-Cold War era. The two countries are considered the northern and southern anchors of the US-led network of bilateral alliances in the Asia Pacific region, known as the San Francisco System or the hub-and-spokes system.¹¹¹ Since the end of the Cold War, Australia and Japan have deepened and institutionalised their security cooperation. This cooperation is rooted in the shared objectives to persuade the United States to stay engaged in the region, to increase burden sharing both with the United States through the deepening of spoke-to-spoke security cooperation and to maintain shared regional stability and prosperity under an inclusive and liberal regional order. Australia–Japan security cooperation is arguably the most successful example of spoke-to-spoke cooperation in the region and the two countries are considered each other’s most important security partner after their respective alliances with the United States. Australia and Japan have also increasingly deepened trilateral and quadrilateral security cooperation with the United States and India.

6.1 Political Engagement

The high level of Australia–Japan political engagement is underscored by the number of prime ministerial summits held between the two countries. Beginning with prime minister Robert Menzies’s visit to Japan in April 1957, there have been 42 prime ministerial summits held between the two countries. This includes 28 visits by Australian prime ministers to Japan, 13 visits by Japanese prime ministers to Australia, and one virtual summit held between Scott Morrison and Shinzo Abe in July 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic (see Appendix 18). Notably, prime minister Julia Gillard was the first world leader to visit Japan in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake that triggered the 3/11 triple disaster in 2011. In 2020, Prime Minister Scott Morrison was the first world leader to hold a summit with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga after he succeeded Shinzo Abe, despite the obstacles to travel due to COVID-19 which required Morrison to quarantine at the Lodge for two weeks upon his return to Australia.

Table 4: List of Diplomatic Missions Between Australia and Japan

City	Diplomatic Service	Est.	Until	City	Diplomatic Service	Est.	Until
Tokyo	Embassy	1952	present	Canberra	Embassy	1953	present
Osaka	Consulate General	1965	present	Sydney	Consulate General	1954	present
Sendai	Consulate	1992	2007	Melbourne	Consulate General	----	present
Nagoya	Consulate	1992	2009	Perth	Consulate General	1966	present
Sapporo	Consulate	1992	2019	Brisbane	Consulate	1966	1972
Fukuoka	Consulate	1992	2000	Brisbane	Consulate General	1972	present
Fukuoka	Consulate General	2000	2019	Cairns	Consulate	1997	present

¹¹¹ Thomas S. Wilkins, ‘From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Alliance?: Australia-Japan Security Ties and the Asia-Pacific’, *Asia Policy*, no. 20 (2015): 100.

6.2 Bilateral Security Cooperation

Australia–Japan security cooperation has gradually deepened throughout the post–Cold War era. In 1992, Japan passed the International Peace Cooperation Act.¹¹² It enabled the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to be dispatched overseas for the first time and to participate in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in certain forms within the framework of the Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of Japan’s post-war constitution.¹¹³ This development saw the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the SDF work together for the first time under the banner of UN PKOs. Notably this included SDF troops serving under Australian command during the 1992–1993 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The ADF and SDF also worked closely together during the 2002–2005 United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISSET) where Australia and Japan were the largest providers of troops.¹¹⁴ During the Iraq War, Australian troops provided protection for the SDF during its 2004–2006 humanitarian assistance mission in Samawah.¹¹⁵

The two countries have institutionalised their cooperation through a number of declarations and agreements as well as the regularisation of high-level meetings. A major step forward was the conclusion in 2007 of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC). The JDSC deepened cooperation across a range of areas including law enforcement, border security, counter-terrorism, disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, maritime and aviation security, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and exchange of strategic assessments. It also helped to strengthen practical cooperation between the ADF and the SDF including through the exchange of personnel and joint exercises and training.¹¹⁶

A further outcome of the JDSC was the establishment of regular 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministers Meetings. Australia–Japan 2+2 meetings have been held eight times since 2007. The 2+2 meetings have covered a wide range of issues including deepening Australia–Japan bilateral security cooperation, mutual cooperation trilaterally with the United States, quadrilateral cooperation with the United States and India, strategy on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), engagement with ASEAN countries, and the situations in the South China Sea and in North Korea.¹¹⁷

In 2010, Australia–Japan concluded the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The ACSA provides a framework for the ADF and the SDF to engage in ‘the reciprocal provision of supplies and services for such activities as: exercises and training, UN Peace Keeping Operations, humanitarian

¹¹² The full official English name is the ‘Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations’.

¹¹³ Akiho Shibata, ‘Japanese Peacekeeping Legislation and Recent Developments in U.N. Operations’, *Yale Journal of International Law* 19, no. 2 (1994): 325, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol19/iss2/2>.

¹¹⁴ Yoichiro Sato, ‘Japan–Australia Security Cooperation: Jointly Cultivating the Trust of the Community’, *Asian Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2008): 161–62.

¹¹⁵ Gerard Henderson, ‘Labor Tested by Japan’s Iraq Resolve’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 March 2005, <https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/labor-tested-by-japans-iraq-resolve-20050301-gdktwk.html>.

¹¹⁶ MOFA, ‘Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’, 7 March 2007, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html>.

¹¹⁷ ‘Eighth Japan–Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 18 October 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page3e_000949.html.

relief operations, operations to cope with large scale disasters, transportation of nationals and others in overseas exigencies, or other routine activities'.¹¹⁸ This was Japan's second such agreement after its ACSA with the United States signed in 1996.

In the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake triple disaster on 11 March 2011, the ADF and the SDF deepened their cooperation through Operation Pacific Assist. The Royal Australian Air Force dispatched three C-17 Globemaster aircraft to assist the SDF with transportation from Okinawa to Fukushima for the disaster response. This included the transport of over 450 tonnes of vehicles, people and supplies as well as a remotely operated water cannon system that was used as part of the containment operations after the meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.¹¹⁹

In May 2012, the two countries concluded an Information Security Agreement (ISA). The ISA provides a strengthened legal framework for the exchange of classified information between Australia and Japan.¹²⁰ The ISA grew out of the JDSC, stipulating the 'exchange of strategic assessments and related information' and the 2+2 meeting, which in 2008 called for the establishment of an ISA.¹²¹

In September 2012, Australia and Japan concluded the Common Vision and Objectives (Vision Statement) at the fourth 2+2 meeting. The Vision Statement declares Australia and Japan to be 'natural strategic partners' and envisions a 'new phase of Japan-Australia defence cooperation' with a focus on 'how the two countries can cooperate in shaping the future of the Asia-Pacific region'.¹²² This vision identified cooperation objectives across a wide range of areas, including building positive relations with China to support its 'constructive participation in the international rules-based order', multilateral cooperation for 'long-term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula', strengthening the East Asia Summit 'to promote cooperation on political, security, economic and other challenges facing the region', and 'strengthening joint efforts in support of sustainable development in the Pacific'.¹²³

In July 2014, Australia and Japan concluded the Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology. This agreement provides a legal framework for 'Japan and Australia to participate in the joint research, development, and production of defence equipment and technology, and for the handling of defence equipment and technology to be transferred between Japan and Australia'.¹²⁴ Notably, this agreement came just months after the Japanese government replaced its 1967

¹¹⁸ 'The Signing of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 19 May 2010, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/5/0519_02.html.

¹¹⁹ Department of Defence, 'Operation Pacific Assist', 25 March 2011, <https://web.archive.org/web/20140211223933/http://www.defence.gov.au/op/pacificassist/index.htm>.

¹²⁰ 'Signing of the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 17 May 2012, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/0517_01.html.

¹²¹ Yusuke Ishihara, 'Japan-Australia Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region', in *Beyond the Hub and Spokes: Australia-Japan Security Cooperation*, ed. William T. Tow and Tomonori Yoshizaki (Tokyo: NIDS, 2014), 102.

¹²² Ishihara, 104.

¹²³ 'Australia and Japan - Cooperating for peace and stability: Common Vision and Objectives', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 14 September 2012, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034392.pdf>.

¹²⁴ 'Signing of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 8 July 2014, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000349.html.

Three Principles on Arms Exports (that effectively banned arms exports) with the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, as the Abe government sought to promote the export of Japanese arms and military equipment.¹²⁵

On the back of the defence technology transfer agreement, Australia and Japan upgraded their security cooperation to the level of ‘Special Strategic Partnership’. The joint statement accompanying the announcement emphasised the comprehensive nature of the relationship. According to the statement, the relationship encompasses economic relations, security and defence cooperation, cooperation on regional and international issues, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. Further, the statement emphasised a new level of political commitment with Australian prime minister Tony Abbott and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe confirming that the two countries’ leaders ‘would meet annually, alternately in Australia and Japan, to take forward the special relationship’.¹²⁶

In November 2020, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison went to Tokyo where he announced with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga an ‘in-principle’ agreement on a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The RAA is intended to streamline the process for stationing ADF troops in Japan and SDF troops in Australia, and to ‘facilitate joint military exercises and disaster relief and to bolster interoperability’.¹²⁷ While it is expected that a deal will be signed in 2021, a key sticking point regarding the potential application of the death penalty for ADF personnel is yet to be resolved.¹²⁸

It worth noting that in many cases the conclusion of security-related agreements with Australia were often ground-breaking firsts for Japan outside of its alliance with the United States and opened the way for agreements with other security partners. For instance, after the Australia–Japan JDSC in 2007, Japan established similar security declarations with India (2008), Canada (2010) and the United Kingdom (2017). After the Australia–Japan 2+2 in 2007, Japan established 2+2 frameworks with France (2014), the United Kingdom (2015), Indonesia (2015) and India (2019). The Australia–Japan ACSA in 2010 was followed by similar deals with the United Kingdom (2017) and Canada (2018).

6.3 The Australia-Japan submarine saga

A hiccup in Australia–Japan security cooperation came in 2016 because of decisions made about Australia’s Future Submarine Program (SEA1000). Australia awarded French firm DCNS the contract to build its next generation of submarines ahead of Japanese and German bids. Japan was left disappointed after believing it was the frontrunner for the contract.

¹²⁵ Purnendra Jain, ‘Japanese Arms for Sale’, East Asia Forum, 15 February 2017, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/02/16/japanese-arms-for-sale/>.

¹²⁶ ‘Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe Joint Statement: Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century Japan’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 8 July 2014, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044543.pdf>.

¹²⁷ Ben Ascione, ‘Australia-Japan Pact Is about US’, Australian Financial Review, 22 November 2020, <https://www.afr.com/world/asia/australia-japan-pact-is-about-us-20201122-p56gta>.

¹²⁸ Donald Rothwell, ‘Legal Hurdles Remain in the Australia–Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement’, East Asia Forum, 30 November 2020, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/12/01/legal-hurdles-remain-in-the-australia-japan-reciprocal-access-agreement/>.

Expectations of an Australia–Japan submarine deal were built on a personal relationship between prime minister Tony Abbott and prime minister Shinzo Abe. Abe’s desire to deepen cooperation with Australia was part of his broader project to loosen the post-war restraints on Japanese security policy.¹²⁹ Abbott was keen to strengthen US–Japan–Australia trilateral security cooperation on the recommendations of his former national security advisor Andrew Shearer.¹³⁰ As such, both men overpromised what they could deliver.

There was never a broad consensus in Australia about the relational aspect of the deal—entrenched by its ‘40-year lifespan and ongoing service requirements’—to deepen US–Japan–Australia security cooperation.¹³¹ A number of Australian commentators argued that the expectation that Australia align itself strategically with Japan and the United States against a rising China was too big a constraint on Australian independence and flexibility. Ultimately, it posed the risk of Australia having to either automatically commit to support Japan in a possible future conflict against China or jeopardise Japanese support in the upkeep of its submarines.¹³²

The question of where to build the submarines became a political issue. Abe wanted to have the submarines built in Japan to headline his efforts to position Japan as a new major player on the global arms export stage. However, Japan’s defence companies, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corp (KSC), only have capacity to supply Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces and appeared less interested in the project than the Abe government.¹³³ Before Abbott consulted his cabinet about the necessity of a competitive tender process, he supported Abe’s plan. This is despite the fact that in 2013 as leader of the Liberal party, Abbott supported a bipartisan consensus with the opposition Labour government under Julia Gillard that Australian submarines would be built domestically to create jobs in Adelaide.¹³⁴ A number of politicians from his party in South Australia were relying on the submarines being built there to shore up votes.¹³⁵

After Abbott was ousted by Malcolm Turnbull in 2015, concerns came to the fore about Japan’s inexperience in the arms export business and the lack of enthusiasm about the deal in Japan. Japan had only recently revised its arms export law in 2014 and this was to be its first international deal on arms and defence technology. Moreover, the Australian Department of Defence was reportedly concerned that Abe’s enthusiasm about the deal was not shared by bureaucrats in Japan’s Ministry of Defense who

¹²⁹ EAF Editorial Board, ‘Australia’s Fraught Decision on Submarines’, *East Asia Forum* (blog), 18 April 2016, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/18/australias-fraught-decision-on-submarines/>.

¹³⁰ Andrew Shearer, ‘Australia–Japan–U.S. Maritime Cooperation: Creating Federated Capabilities for the Asia Pacific’ (CSIS, 2016), 37, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160401_Shearer_AustJapanUSMaritime_Web.pdf.

¹³¹ EAF Editorial Board, ‘Australia’s Fraught Decision on Submarines’.

¹³² Hugh White, ‘If We Strike a Deal with Japan, We’re Buying More than Submarines’, *The Age*, 14 March 2016, www.theage.com.au/opinion/if-we-strike-a-deal-with-japan-were-buying-more-than-submarines-20160314-gni3hl.html.

¹³³ Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Why Japan Lost Aussie Sub Bid’, *The Japan Times*, 29 April 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/04/29/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-lost-aussie-sub-bid/>.

¹³⁴ Graeme Dobell, ‘The Tacit Consensus for the White Paper’, *The Strategist*, 6 May 2013, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-tacit-consensus-for-the-white-paper/>.

¹³⁵ Graeme Dobell, ‘Tony Abbott and a Japanese Sub’, *The Strategist*, 24 May 2015, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/tony-abbott-and-a-japanese-sub/>.

were hesitant ‘about the transfer of sensitive submarine technology—the crown jewels of Japan’s naval force’.¹³⁶

6.4 Trilateral and Quadrilateral Cooperation with the United States and India

One of the key underpinnings of Australia–Japan security cooperation is their mutual alliances with the United States. As a result, trilateral US–Australia–Japan security cooperation has emerged as a key objective for the three countries. At the same time, quadrilateral security cooperation with the United States and India has also been developed gradually. However, the form and objectives of this cooperation are contested and ill-defined.¹³⁷

The origins of US–Australia–Japan trilateral security cooperation can be traced to the US–Japan Joint Security Declaration and the Sydney Statement, which concluded in 1996. As argued by Satake, these statements served to redefine the US–Japan and US–Australia alliances away ‘from a traditional bilateral defense arrangement to one that focussed on addressing regional and global security problems’. As such, ‘Tokyo and Canberra came to play a more explicit role in responding to both regional and global contingencies such as terrorism, regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’.¹³⁸

Subsequently, the three countries established a trilateral dialogue in 2002. At first the trilateral dialogue met at the vice-ministerial level. It was then upgraded with the establishment of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) in 2006 at the foreign minister level. Part of the motivation for Australia and Japan was to keep the United States engaged in the Asia Pacific region through increased burden sharing at a time when the United States was showing an increased focus on the Middle East after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.¹³⁹ The TSD also enabled the United States to promote greater interoperability between Japan and Australia.¹⁴⁰

Quadrilaterally, security cooperation between Australia, Japan, India and the United States emerged in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This included the establishment of the ‘Tsunami Core Group’ to ‘facilitate coordination of relief activities’.¹⁴¹ While this was only intended to serve the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, it took on a broader scope after it was promoted further by

¹³⁶ Jesse Johnson and Reiji Yoshida, ‘Australian Politics, Japan’s Lack of Experience behind Failed Bid to Build Subs’, *The Japan Times*, 26 April 2016, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/26/national/japan-loses-bid-build-australian-subs-french-firm/.

¹³⁷ H. D. P. Envall, ‘The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Towards An Indo-Pacific Order?’, RSIS Policy Report, 2019, 2, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/the-quadrilateral-security-dialogue-towards-an-indo-pacific-order/>.

¹³⁸ Tomohiko Satake, ‘The Origin of Trilateralism? The US–Japan–Australia Security Relations in the 1990s’, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, no. 1 (2011): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcq020>.

¹³⁹ Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings, ‘Japan–Australia Security Cooperation in the Bilateral and Multilateral Contexts’, *International Affairs* 94, no. 4 (1 July 2018): 824, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iyy028>.

¹⁴⁰ Satake and Hemmings, 825.

¹⁴¹ Envall, ‘The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Towards An Indo-Pacific Order?’, 3.

Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and foreign minister Taro Aso.¹⁴² It also found support in the United States from vice president Dick Cheney.¹⁴³

In 2007, the four countries established the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The leaders of the four countries met for the first Quad meeting in May 2007 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila. The four countries also held a number of joint military exercises. However, disagreement over whether the Quad would unnecessarily aggravate China to the detriment of regional stability saw former prime minister Kevin Rudd withdraw Australia from the grouping in 2008. The Quad thus lay dormant until it was resurrected in 2017.

The Quad appears to be hobbled by its unclear purpose. As argued by H. D. P. Envall, it must overcome two key challenges if it is to be viable into the future. First, 'it is unclear whether the four powers will be able to maximise opportunities for cooperation while ensuring that wider geopolitical rivalries do not again overwhelm the grouping'. Second, 'given that it has been revived to support th[e] 'Indo-Pacific' order, the [Quad] is constrained by the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific concept and the absence of Indonesia'.¹⁴⁴

6.5 Regional Institution Building

Australia and Japan have played an instrumental role in establishing regional institutions to promote shared regional stability and prosperity and deepen multilateral regional security cooperation. The inclusivity of regionalism in the Asia Pacific is a shared concern of both Australia and Japan. For Japan, multilateral forums provide a neutral venue to forge cooperation with regional neighbours with whom questions of Japan's legacy in the Second World War are still unresolved. For Australia, multilateral forums have helped it forge a cooperative relationship with a region where it had long been perceived as an outsider and the European colonial outpost.

In 1989, Australia and Japan cooperated to establish the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). This was the first forum where the heads of state from Asia Pacific countries could regularly meet. Moreover, APEC has played a critical role in promoting free trade in the Asia Pacific. This is a critical shared interest for Australia and Japan given their reliance on free trade for economic security.¹⁴⁵

Australia and Japan also cooperated in promoting ASEAN centrality through ASEAN-led forums. Australia–Japan cooperation contributed to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Japan played a critical role in championing the expansion of the ASEAN+3 forum into ASEAN+6, which included Australia, New Zealand and India. This was the precursor to the East Asia Summit, which now includes the United States and Russia as the seventh and eighth ASEAN partners. At the same

¹⁴² Taro Aso, 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 30 November 2006, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html>.

¹⁴³ Brendan Nicholson, 'China Warns Canberra on Security Pact', *The Age*, 15 June 2007, <https://www.theage.com.au/national/china-warns-canberra-on-security-pact-20070615-ge54v5.html>.

¹⁴⁴ Envall, 'The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Towards An Indo-Pacific Order?', 1.

¹⁴⁵ Takashi Terada, *The Genesis of APEC: Australian-Japan Political Initiatives* (Australia-Japan Research Centre, 1999), <https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-298.pdf>.

time, Australia and Japan have worked closely to coordinate their cooperation in the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+).¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Brendan Taylor, 'A Pragmatic Partner: Australia and the ADMM-Plus', *Asia Policy*, no. 22 (July 2016): 83–88.

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
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
Appendices

Appendix 1: Number of Japanese High School Students Participating in Overseas Study Trips




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, pp. 3-4.

Appendix 2: Number of Japanese High School Students Participating in Overseas Study Trips to Australia




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, pp. 3-4.

Appendix 3: Number of High School Students Participating in Overseas Study Trips to Japan




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 7.

Appendix 4: Number of Australian High School Students Participating in Overseas Study Trips to Japan




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 7.

Appendix 5: Number of Japanese High School Students Participating in Overseas Student Exchanges




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, pp. 4-5.

Appendix 6: Number of Japanese High School Students on Overseas Exchanges to Australia




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, pp. 4-5.

Appendix 7: Number of Australian Students on Overseas Exchanges at Japanese High Schools




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 8.

Appendix 8: Number of International Students Hosted by Japanese High Schools on Student Exchanges




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 8.

Appendix 9: Number of Japanese Students Participating in Overseas School Excursions




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 6.

Appendix 10: Number of Japanese Students Participating in School Excursions to Australia




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 6.

Appendix 11: Number of International Students Participating in School Excursions to Japan Hosted by a Japanese High School




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 9.

Appendix 12: Number of Australian Students Participating in School Excursions to Japan Hosted by a Japanese High School




Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ‘平成 29 年度高等学校等における国際交流等の状況について [The Condition of High School International Student Exchanges 2019]’, p. 9.

Appendix 13: Japanese Student Enrolments at Australian Higher Education Institutions




Source: Department of Education, Skills and Employment, International Education Group, International student data (2002-2020).

Appendix 14: Japanese Student Enrolments at Australian Vocational Education and Training Institutions




Source: Department of Education, Skills and Employment, International Education Group, International student data (2002-2020).

Appendix 15: Japanese Student Enrolments in ELICOS Programs




Source: Department of Education, Skills and Employment, International Education Group, International student data (2002-2020).

Appendix 16: Working Holiday Makers to Japan by Nationality



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e-Stat Japan, ビザ（査証）発給統計 [Visa Issuance Statistics] (2007-2019).

Appendix 17: Working Holiday Visas (subclass 417 & 462) Issued by Australia



Source: Department of Home Affairs, Australian Government Data, Working Holiday Maker Visas Granted Pivot Table.

Appendix 18: List of Australia-Japan Prime Ministerial Summits

No	Date	Australian PM	Japanese PM	Location	Source
1	Apr-1957	Robert Menzies	Nobusuke Kishi	Tokyo	NAA: A463, 1956/1760 PART 1
2	Nov-1957	Robert Menzies	Nobusuke Kishi	Canberra	NAA: A1533, 1957/3000
3	Sep-1963	Robert Menzies	Hayato Ikeda	Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne	NAA: A1209, 1963/6541 PART A
4	Oct-1967	Harold Holt	Eisaku Sato	Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne	NAA: A4311, 677/2
5	May-1970	John Gorton	Eisaku Sato	Tokyo, Osaka	NAA: AA1980/735, 197
6	Oct-1973	Gough Whitlam	Kakuei Tanaka	Tokyo	NAA: M4472, Album 14
7	Oct-1974	Gough Whitlam	Kakuei Tanaka	Canberra, Sydney, Perth	NAA: AA1980/735, 64
8	Jun-1976	Malcolm Fraser	Takeo Miki	Tokyo	NAA: AA1980/735, 215
9	Apr-1978	Malcolm Fraser	Takeo Fukuda	Tokyo	NAA: M4805, 6
10	Jan-1980	Malcolm Fraser	Masayoshi Ohira	Canberra, Melbourne	NAA: A1209, 1979/1730
11	Jul-1980	Malcolm Fraser	Zenko Suzuki	Tokyo (PM Ohira funeral)	NAA: M1343, 35
12	May-1982	Malcolm Fraser	Zenko Suzuki	Tokyo	NAA: M1269, 34
13	Feb-1984	Bob Hawke	Yasuhiro Nakasone	Tokyo	NAA: M3856, 11
14	Jan-1985	Bob Hawke	Yasuhiro Nakasone	Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne	NAA: A1209, 1983/1090
15	May-1986	Bob Hawke	Yasuhiro Nakasone	Tokyo	NAA: A1209, 1986/286 PART1
16	Dec-1987	Bob Hawke	Noboru Takeshita	Tokyo	NAA: M3856, 78
17	Jul-1988	Bob Hawke	Noboru Takeshita	Brisbane, Sydney, Canberra	NAA: A463, 1988/3183
18	Sep-1990	Bob Hawke	Toshiki Kaifu	Tokyo	NAA: M3856, 141
19	Sep-1992	Paul Keating	Kiichi Miyazawa	Tokyo	NAA: A8281, 232
20	Apr-1993	Paul Keating	Kiichi Miyazawa	Canberra	NAA: A463, 1993/1704
21	Sep-1994	Paul Keating	Tomiichi Murayama	Tokyo	NAA: A8746, KN12/9/94
22	Nov-1995	Paul Keating	Tomiichi Murayama	Osaka (APEC)	NAA: A8746, KN7/6/95
23	Sep-1996	John Howard	Ryutaro Hashimoto	Tokyo	NAA: A13966, 961146-961190
24	Apr-1997	John Howard	Ryutaro Hashimoto	Canberra	NAA: A463, 1997/1060-1070
25	Jul-1999	John Howard	Keizo Obuchi	Tokyo, Osaka	NAA: A13966, 990500-990536
26	Jun-2000	John Howard	Yoshiro Mori	Tokyo (PM Obuchi funeral)	MOFA
27	Aug-2001	John Howard	Junichiro Koizumi	Tokyo	MOFA
28	May-2002	John Howard	Junichiro Koizumi	Canberra, Sydney	MOFA
29	Jul-2003	John Howard	Junichiro Koizumi	Tokyo	MOFA
30	Mar-2007	John Howard	Shinzo Abe	Tokyo	MOFA
31	Jun-2008	Kevin Rudd	Yasuo Fukuda	Tokyo	MOFA
32	Dec-2009	Kevin Rudd	Yukio Hatoyama	Tokyo	MOFA
33	Apr-2011	Julia Gillard	Naoto Kan	Tokyo	MOFA
34	Apr-2014	Tony Abbott	Shinzo Abe	Tokyo	NLA
35	Jul-2014	Tony Abbott	Shinzo Abe	Canberra	NLA
36	Dec-2015	Malcolm Turnbull	Shinzo Abe	Tokyo	NLA
37	Jan-2017	Malcolm Turnbull	Shinzo Abe	Sydney	NLA
38	Jan-2018	Malcolm Turnbull	Shinzo Abe	Tokyo	PM of Australia
39	Nov-2018	Scott Morrison	Shinzo Abe	Darwin	PM of Australia
40	Jun-2019	Scott Morrison	Shinzo Abe	G20, Osaka	PM of Australia
41	Jul-2020	Scott Morrison	Shinzo Abe	Virtual Summit	PM of Australia
42	Nov-2020	Scott Morrison	Yoshihide Suga	Tokyo	East Asia Forum