




Food security in Asia's populous economies: What role for trade?



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
Key questions

- ⊕ What are the implications for food and other primary product markets of growth in (esp. Asia's) emerging economies?
- ⊕ How would a projection for 2030 alter with slower growth (by 1/4th) in **China and India**?
- ⊕ What about agricultural protectionism?




Methodology

- ✚ We use a modified version of GTAP's global comparative static model to project world economy to 2030
 - ▣ Core sim. calibrated to project small rise in prices of primary relative to other products
 - Using a combination of changes in mineral resources, land and other factor endowments, along with differences in sectoral TFP growth rates, to target exogenous expansions in GDP





Summary of GDP & endowment growth rates assumed (% p.a.)

	High-income	Developing	of which Asia	Total
GDP growth	1.6	5.1	6.3	2.6
Population	0.3	1.0	0.8	0.9
Unskilled labor	-0.6	0.4	0.2	-0.4
Skilled labor	1.4	3.1	2.9	1.7
Capital	1.3	4.6	5.7	2.4
Agric. land	-0.3	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2
Oil	2.1	1.5	0.3	1.7
Gas	0.3	2.5	1.3	1.4
Coal	-0.3	4.3	4.6	2.1
Other minerals	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1




Bottom line: Dev. Asia to become far larger part of global economy in many respects (%)






Regional shares of global GDP, %






It's mostly a China story






Core & other 2030 baseline scenarios

- ✚ Calibrated to keep int'l price of primary goods relative to manufactures rising only a little
 - Consistent with World Bank price projections
- ✚ Alternatives considered are:
 - ▣ Slower growth in China and India:
 - would cause real primary product prices to ***fall*** somewhat,
 - **But**, if that slows primary sector TFP growth globally, real **primary product prices would instead *rise* rel. to 2007**
 - consistent with FAO, IEA and IFPRI price projections




Cumulative changes in international prices, relative to 2007 (% change)

	Core 2020	Core 2030
Rice	1	8
All agric+food	2	9
Other primary	-3	-1
Manufactures	-2	-4
Services	1	1
ALL	0	0





Cumulative changes in international prices of grain, 2007 to 2030 (%): 3 different baselines

	Core	Slow Ch&In growth	Also slow prim. TFP growth
Rice	8	2	27
All agric+food	9	3	21
Other primary	-1	-10	17
Manufactures	-4	-4	-4





Our projections are modest compared with real int'l price changes during 2007-12 (World Bank, 2005 = 100)





Real int'l price changes since 1960 (WB), & as projected in our core scenario to 2030 (2005 = 100)






Shares of global exports, by sector (%)

	Primary goods (%)		Manuf. goods (%)		Services (%)	
	2007	2030	2007	2030	2007	2030
World,	16	19	66	63	18	18
of which:						
<i>Developing Asia</i>	2	2	<i>17</i>	<i>32</i>	3	5
<i>NRR countries</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>11</i>	3	4



Regional shares (%) of global manuf GDP






Implications for agricultural trade, assuming no policy changes

- ✚ Dev. Asia's share of **global ag and food imports** rises from 15% in 2007 to 39% in 2030
 - ▣ mainly due to China (goes from 4% to 27%)
 - ▣ and to the benefit of land-abundant countries




'Revealed' comparative advantage index






What does this imply about food security?

- ✚ Many food-deficit countries worry about **food self-sufficiency**
- ✚ A better indicator of access to food is **real household food consumption per capita** (i.e., at constant prices)
 - ▣ At least national average (Ideally need to also see its distribution across individuals.)





Agric+food self sufficiency (%)

	2007 base (1)	2030 core (2)	2030 slower growth in Ch/In and in primary TFP
China	98	89	89
South Asia	100	97	95
Other E Asia	98	103	98
SS Africa	101	102	100



Cumulative growth in real household agric and food cons'm per capita, 2007 to 2030 (%)






Share of national prim. product exports to China, %

	2007	2030, core projection	2030 slower Ch&Ind + slower prim.TFP growth
Indonesia	10	43	31
India	35	81	73
Rest ASEAN	10	35	25
Rest Dev. Asia	17	49	43
Rest Developing	9	33	24
Australia	22	54	39
Rest HICs	3	26	18
Total	7	32	23





An important caveat

- ✚ Projections assume current trade policies continue, but ...
 - ✚ ... food security concerns may increase as Asian industrialization proceeds
- ✚ China (also India and Indonesia) may not allow food self-sufficiency to fall greatly
 - ✚ and so may follow the agric protection growth path of Japan, Korea and Taiwan
 - means higher domestic food prices, hence **less** food security for these rapidly urbanizing countries





East Asia's agric protection growth, 1955-2004






Agric protection already growing, in Indonesia as in China and India (NRA, %, from www.worldbank.org/agdistortions)






Three take-away messages

- ✚ By 2030, Developing Asia will consume more than **half the world's grain and fossil fuel**, and 3/4^{ths} of its other minerals – paid for by expanding exports of manufactures



Three take-away messages

- ✚ By 2030, Developing Asia will consume more than **half the world's grain and fossil fuel**, and 3/4^{ths} of its other minerals – paid for by expanding manuf exports
- ✚ Bright prospects for resource-exporting countries – BUT dampened if econ growth in China and India slows more than projected



Three take-away messages


- ✚ By 2030, Developing Asia will consume more than **half the world's grain and fossil fuel**, and 3/4^{ths} of its other minerals – paid for by expanding manuf exports
- ✚ Bright prospects for resource-exporting countries – BUT dampened if econ growth in China and India slows more than projected
- ✚ If emerging Asia follows an agric protection growth path, that will reduce its food security even if it raises its food self-sufficiency
 - ✚ Much better to instead raise rural human capital and agr R&D investments to boost food productivity growth and farm h'hold incomes



Thanks!

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Resource-rich vs other regions of world

(based on net trade specializ'n in primary products, 2005-09)

Natural Resource Rich

- ✚ Russia
- ✚ Cent. Asia
- ✚ Canada
- ✚ Australia
- ✚ NZ
- ✚ Indonesia
- ✚ Malaysia
- ✚ Vietnam
- ✚ Pacific Is.
- ✚ Argentina
- ✚ Brazil
- ✚ Chile
- ✚ Mexico
- ✚ Peru
- ✚ Rest LAC
- ✚ ME/NAfrica
- ✚ SSAfrica

Other regions

- ✚ USA
- ✚ Western Europe
- ✚ Eastern Eur (ex. Russia)
- ✚ Japan
- ✚ China
- ✚ E. Asian NIE4
- ✚ Philippines
- ✚ Thailand
- ✚ South Asia