

Global corporate tax: anti-abuse, transparency and cooperative compliance- UK perspective

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Where are we now?

- Austerity in developed world plus developing world problems
- media/public/NGO interest



- political emphasis on tax
- Emphasis in debate on corporate tax rather than other taxes (importance of corporation tax in Australia and in developing countries great than in other countries)
- Pot of gold arguments are attractive
- UK role in Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPS)
- BUT tension between competitiveness and 'fair share' concerns

Where are we going?

- Pressure for more transparency
- BEPS action plans overlay of substance over older source/residence system leads to greater confusion (Devereux and Vella, Fiscal Studies 2015)
- Strong arguments for more radical changeunitary taxation/ formulary apportionment; destination based corporation tax etc
- Meanwhile BEPS proceeds plus unilateral actions eg Diverted Profits Tax, Indian equalisation levy

Where is the UK going?

- Brexit
- Corporate Tax rate reduction? (20% going to 17% by 2020- further?)
- Tax haven UK?
- Likely structural impact of CT reduction
- Likely international effect- EU, Australia (DPT)
- Is this best way to provide incentive for investment? Contrast depreciation allowances
- Who would benefit from CT reductions?

But-UK anti-avoidance

- Reduction in interest deductibility
- Hybrid mismatch rules
- Diverted profits tax
- Reduction of carried forward loss relief.
- C b c reporting (not public)
- Publication of large business tax strategies, framework for cooperative compliance and special measures (FB 2016)

Themes for discussion

- Need for different solutions to different problems
- Changing features of tax system without changing basis structure
- Tension between competitiveness and concern about inter state allocation and developing countries
- Focus on transparency without tackling resources and trust
- Belief in a pot of gold that could be diverted to good causes without cost

Defining the problem to be addressed

- Not helpful to aggregate all behaviours into 'tax dodging'(eg Oxfam Hidden Billions 2016)
- Different problems require different solutions Devereux, Freedman and Vella 2012, Christians 2014), Forstater 2015
 - Need to change corporate behaviour to comply with law? OR
 - Anti-avoidance provisions OR
 - Need to change the law to make it reflect 'economic reality' better?

The 'reality' concept

- Current international tax architectureresidence, source etc. is based on one view of reality
- BEPS does not seek to change this fundamentally
- But BEPS adds concepts based on another reality- where economic activity takes place.
- Clashing overlay of reality moves away from coherent principles and opens door to unilateral initiatives

DPT as eg of combining two realities

- DPT looks to 'economic substance'
 - 1. Where PE avoided (designed to ensure no UK PE)
 - 2. Involvement of entities or transactions lacking economic substance
- Intended to apply to very few companies
- But -anecdotal evidence suggests being applied more widely eg every APA needs a DPT opinion
- Escalation of wide legislation inevitable
 - Advisers must advise, and taxpayers decide, whether notification necessary. (Penalties if no notification and should be).
 - HMRC criticised for 'sweetheart deals' must apply strictly (cf Google case in 2016)

Conceptual problem with DPT

- Underlying rationale confused
- Unlike GAAR works against, not with underlying law
- Why not change underlying law on taxable presence, role of residence, transfer pricing arms length rules?
- Because BEPS reached no consensus
- So unilateral action undermines global consensual nature of BEPS
- Do we have a PE concept or not? Do we recognise separate legal personality and residence basis or not? If transaction is arms length, why does rate of tax matter?

Transparency and Trust

- Increasing amounts of date to be required and exchanges
- Cost, especially to developing countries
- Disclosure to public?
- Are we replacing trust in tax authorities with trust in media and NGOs to process tax data?
- Who are the tax collectors?
- Need for well resourced revenue authorities and oversight arrangements that develop trust.

Co-operative compliance

- Tension between co-operative compliance, settlements programme etc and co-ercive approaches such as DPT, special measures etc
- There may be pressure on revenue officials not to settle even where that would make commercial sense.
- In UK most recently case of Google
- Exercise of discretion can be valuable for all but scrutinise revenue authorities for sake of authorities themselves as well as public

The pot of gold

- Use of large numbers often speculative
- May elide different categories of behaviour
- May combine different countries
- Assumes that reduction of certain behaviours eg diversion through low tax areas would increase direct investment into developing countries. Would it?
- Assumes higher tax collected would be used for social good.
- Could damage development debate to rely heavily on availability of source that will never emerge.

More positively

- Growing will to work together- business, NGOs and governments
- More debate should lead to better understanding if not polarised into 'goodies' and baddies'
- Global business awareness of need to make contribution
- Some BEPS changes may help even if some confused and serious discussion of radical change
- Working together likely to be more effective now than naming and shaming

References

- Maya Forstater, Can Stopping 'Tax Dodging' by MNEs Close the Gap in Development Finance?, CGD Policy Paper 069 October 2015
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- A. Christians Avoidance, Evasion and Morality(2014 Journal of Law and Policy vol 44)
- Freedman, Ng and Vella, HMRC's Relationship with Business (2014) sbs.ox.ac.uk website