Dealing with Bank System Failure: Indonesia, 1997–2002

The crisis recovery program in Indonesia has failed badly in relation to the
two key objectives of development economics policy-making: efficiency and equity.
The economy went into a very severe recession within a few months of the IMF
appearing on the scene, and five years later output was still only at approximately
the pre-crisis level. The collapse of the banking system and the associated bailout of
depositors by the government has had the effect of imposing a loss on the general
public, and the poor in particular, of the order of 40% of GDP. This paper describes
the collapse of the banking system and the policies the government has followed in
response to it, under advice from the IMF. It then goes on to propose an alternative
scheme that might have been followed—and that could be followed in future
banking crises—the twin objectives of which are to maintain the integrity of the
payments system while avoiding inequitable wealth transfers that result from
government bailouts of banks and their depositors.