Storm
brews over Japan’s new security laws
By
Ben Ascione, ANU
Photo
by US Navy
On
16 July Japan’s Lower House passed a package of security
related-bills in a vote that was boycotted by opposition
parties as tens of thousands protested outside the Diet.
Under
the Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of its post-war constitution,
Japan foreswears the use of military force as a means of
settling international disputes. The Japan Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) are restricted from using force unless directly attacked
and are limited to the minimum level necessary to defend Japan.
In
July 2014 the
Abe cabinet reinterpreted the constitution to recognise
limited forms of collective self-defence. The security bills,
once passed, will allow this reinterpretation to be
implemented. This gives the SDF the right to use force to come
to the aid of a ‘foreign country in a close relationship with
Japan’ if ‘three new conditions’ are satisfied: the
attack threatens the Japanese people’s constitutional right
to ‘life, liberty and pursuit of happiness’; there are no
other means to repel the attack; and the use of force is
limited ‘to the minimum extent necessary’.
In
July 2014 the Abe cabinet reinterpreted the constitution to
recognise limited forms of collective self-defence. The
security bills, once passed, will allow this reinterpretation
to be implemented.
The
security bills will also expand the scope for the SDF to
provide rear-area logistical support to friendly countries, and
respond to so-called ‘grey zone’ infringements of Japanese
territorial waters and airspace that fall short of an armed
attack. They also loosen restrictions on SDF participation in
UN peacekeeping operations.
But
there is a great deal of opposition among the Japanese public.
The antimilitarist culture that developed following Japan’s
disastrous defeat in 1945 still holds sway. A significant group
who oppose any exercise of collective self-defence contend that
the bills are the start of a ‘slippery
slope’ toward offensive military action.
Other
public opposition groups argue that the conditions limiting the
use of force are vague, giving
future governments too much leeway to interpret them as
they see fit. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s go-to example of a
situation that would warrant the SDF’s right to exercise
collective self-defence — a
blockade of the Strait of Hormuz
— has further fuelled
distrust among the Japanese public.
Critics point out that Abe is pushing different messages according to the audience;
in the US he emphasised the importance of the US–Japan alliance
globally,
while back home he has emphasised the bills are only for defending Japan.
The
legality of the bills has come under scrutiny after three
prominent constitutional scholars testified before the Diet
that the bills were unconstitutional. The government initially
maintained that these scholars were not representative of the
broader consensus among academics but was forced to backtrack
after it became obvious this was untrue. An independent
survey of 151 leading constitutional law scholars revealed
that only three held the security bills to be constitutional.
An
independent survey of 151 leading constitutional law scholars
revealed that only three held the security bills to be
constitutional.
There
is also some public distrust of Abe’s ultimate intentions.
Abe is on the public record as wanting to formally revise
Article 9. Doing so requires not only a two-thirds majority in
both houses, but also a majority in a national referendum.
Without the necessary public support for a formal revision,
reinterpreting the constitution was a practical, if unpopular,
way for Abe to move forward with his security agenda. Critics
have labelled his approach a ‘revision by stealth’ and a
‘destruction
of the rule of law
Despite
public opposition, the security bills will likely pass. The
Upper House has until 17 September to deliberate. But even if
the Upper House fails to vote or rejects the bills, the Lower
House can still pass it with a two-thirds majority, meaning
Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) only needs the support
of its junior coalition partner Komeito.
Abe
has shown he is determined to get the bills passed. He extended
the Diet session by more than three months to 27 September, and
has proved willing to expend much political capital in pushing
his security agenda, with his approval rate dipping below his
disapproval rate.
The
big questions are what impact the security bills will have on
Abe’s prime ministership and on Japan’s regional security
environment. The ultimate fallout on Abe’s public support
rate over the security bills will largely depend on how the
government uses the Upper House deliberations to clarify what
situations it considers to satisfy the ‘three new conditions’
for the use of collective self-defence.
Given
the state of disarray among opposition parties, Abe’s biggest
concern will be challengers within his own party.
Given
the state of disarray among opposition parties, Abe’s biggest
concern will be challengers within his own party. LDP internal
party regulations dictate that an election for the party
president (effectively the prime ministership assuming the LDP
is in power) must be held every three years, irrespective of
the election cycle. As such, Abe must face challengers this
September. While nobody has dared challenge him yet, this may
change if his administration faces further blows in the coming
months.
On
the regional security front, the positive security gains of
implementing collective self-defence — notably the increased
deterrence and interoperability of the US–Japan alliance —
will be mitigated if Japan fails to conduct sufficient
diplomatic reassurance. China and South Korea are concerned
that the legislative changes will negatively impinge on their
security, especially amid tensions over history and territorial
issues.
Against
this background, Abe’s anticipated speech to commemorate the
70th anniversary of World War II in August will be critical in
setting a platform for regional trust. Failure to unequivocally
uphold Japan’s gold-standard war apology, the Murayama
Statement, and its
key words will fuel perceptions that Japan has not learnt
from its history and increase distrust in Asia toward the
changes to Japan’s security policy.
About the author
 |
|
Ben
Ascione is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public
Policy. He is Japan and Korea editor at East Asia Forum and a
research associate of the Japan Center for International
Exchange in Tokyo |
About AJRC
 |
|
The Australia-Japan Research Centre (AJRC) at Crawford School of Public Policy conducts research to explore and improve understanding of the economies and economic policy processes in Australia and Japan and both countries' strategic interests in the Asia Pacific economy. Its policy-oriented areas of interest cover developments in regional economic cooperation and integration and encompass research on trade, finance, macroeconomics and structural and regulatory reform, as well as international economic relations. |
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12 October 2015
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